The petitioner No.1 Sree Kamakhya Tea Company Private Limited being involved in the business of tea cultivation applied for working capital credit facilities from the respondent No. 2 Bank, i.e. Punjab National Bank comprising of Term Loan Cash Credit for their tea gardens, namely, Manohari Tea Estate at Dibrugarh District and Craigpark Bagicha, Gobindakupa & Kalainchera at Cachar District of Assam. 2. To avail such loan of working capital & cash credit facilities, the petitioner tea company created security interest by mortgaging their following properties : (i) All that piece and parcel of land measuring an area 2704 Bighas 0 Cottahs 16 Chittaks lying and situated at Titadimore, Sarugatheri and Marabari Manwar Gaon in the State of Assam, along with building/super structure/factory shed i.e. Manohari Tea Estate, Titadimore, Dibrugarh, Assam; (ii) All that piece and parcel of land measuring an area 5509 Bighas 10 Cottahs 9 Chittaks lying and situated at Craigpark Bagicha, Gobindachupa and Kalaincherra, District - Cachar in the State of Assam along with building/super structure/factory shed; (iii) (a) All that hypothecated plants & machineries lying at Monabari Tea Estate, Titadimore, Dibrugarh, Assam, (b) All that hypothecated plants & machineries lying at Craigpark Tea Estate, Silchar, Cachar, Assam and (iv) (a) All current assets including stocks lying at Monabari Tea Estate, Titadimore, Dibrugarh, Assam, (b) All current assets including stocks lying at Craigpark Tea Estate, Silchar, Cachar, Assam. 3. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 Bank, through its Brabourne Road Branch, Kolkata, sanctioned an amount of Rs. 7,45,50,000/- to the petitioner tea company. However, due to failure on the part of the petitioner tea company in making payment of necessary instalments and thereby to repay the loan availed by it, the respondent No. 2 Bank on 30.09.2007 declared the account of the petitioner tea company as non-performing assets. As required, the respondent No. 3, the Authorised Officer of the respondent No. 2 Bank on 05.09.2012 issued notice under the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, in short) to the petitioners, including petitioner No. 2 & 3, being the Guarantor of the petitioner No. 1 tea company, for the concerned loan and demanded Rs. 8,29,83,916.55 only, with further interest as due to the Bank as on 31.12.2012. 8,29,83,916.55 only, with further interest as due to the Bank as on 31.12.2012. By the said notice dated 05.09.2012 the petitioners were further directed to pay them the entire debt of Rs. Rs. 8,29,83,916.55 with interest on the contracted rate w.e.f. 01.01.2010 until payment is made in full within 60 days from the date of said notice, intimating them that in default in making payment the respondent Bank shall impose any or all of the powers under section 13(1) of the SARFAESI Act. 4. The petitioner company on receipt of the said notice from the respondent Bank, by its letter dated 25.09.2012 submitted an offer for a onetime settlement with the respondent Bank. As the petitioner did not deposit the due amount, in spite of their notice, the respondent Bank on 17.12.2012 issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the petitioners informing them that it decided to take possession of their secured assets and directed them to deliver possession of the same before 01.01.2013, failing which it would take possession of the said secured assets on or after 01.01.2013. Against the same, the petitioners on 26.12.2012 submitted its representation under section 13 (3A) of the SARFAESI Act, to which, the respondent Bank by its letter dated 10.01.2013 replied that the offer of a onetime settlement made by the petitioners is very much on the law said as compared to the total outstanding dues clarifying its stand to take possession of the secured assets of the petitioners. 5. Later, the Authorised Officer of the respondent Bank on 23.02.2013 took over possession of the secured assets of the petitioner tea company, its immovable property measuring about 5509 Bighas, 9 Chittaks lying and situated at Craigpark Bagicha, Gobindakupa & Kalainchera at Cachar District, Assam and along with building/superstructure/factory shed at Craigpark Tea Estate, Silchar, Assam under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and published the possession notice of said secured assets in two leading newspapers, namely, the English Daily 'Hindustan Times' on 27.02.2013 and Hindi Daily ' Sanmarg' on 28.02.2013 under Rule 8(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 6. The petitioner company aggrieved with the said action of the secured creditor, the respondent Bank, preferred an appeal under section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, being S.A. No. 13 of 2013 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT, in short), Guwahati in April 2013. 6. The petitioner company aggrieved with the said action of the secured creditor, the respondent Bank, preferred an appeal under section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, being S.A. No. 13 of 2013 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT, in short), Guwahati in April 2013. Prior to that on 12.03.2013 the authorised officer of the respondent Bank issued notice to the petitioners under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 8(6) of said 2002 Rules with regard to the sale of their aforesaid secured assets and the said sale notice was published in leading newspapers on 25.04.2013. The petitioners preferred a Misc. Case being MA No. 38/2013 in said S.A. 13/2013 before the DRT, Guwahati challenging the sale notice of sale of said secured assets of the petitioners involved in said S.A. No. 13/2013 and the DRT, Guwahati by its order dated 14.05.2013 passed an interim order restraining the said sale by the respondents. After hearing the parties, the DRT, Guwahati by its order dated 22.07.2014 passed in said S.A. 13/2013 & MA No. 38/2013 partly allowed the said appeal and set aside the sale notice dated 25.04.2013 as the secured creditors, the respondent Bank failed to take bona fide measure of taking valuation report of the aforesaid secured asset, put up for sale, before the issuance of its sale notice, as required under the Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 7. After disposal of the aforesaid appeal by the DRT, the Authorised Officer of the respondent Bank, in terms of its earlier notice dated 05.09.2012 and under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act took symbolic possession of the other secured assets of the petitioner company i.e. immovable properties of Manohari Tea Estate, including 2704 Bighas, 0 Katha, 16 Lechas lying and situate at Tiladimore, Sarugatheri & Manabari Gaon along with building/superstructure/factory shed of Manohari Tea Estate in the district of Dibrugarh, Assam and other movable assets and in that respect issued possession notice on 06.01.2015. Further, the Authorised Officer by its letter dated 07.01.2015 informed the petitioners about the possession notice dated 06.01.2015, which they received on 09.01.2015. 8. Further, the Authorised Officer by its letter dated 07.01.2015 informed the petitioners about the possession notice dated 06.01.2015, which they received on 09.01.2015. 8. Thereafter, the concerned Authorised Officer of the respondent Bank issued sale notice dated 10.02.2015 with regard to the sale of secured assets of the petitioner tea company, i.e. the immovable properties at Manohari Tea Estate in Dibrugarh District and Cragpark Tea Estate in Cachar District of Assam and said sale notice was published in the leading newspapers on 12.02.2015 namely, 'Times of India', 'Dainik Asom' and 'Dainik Jugasankha' as required under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. By the said sale notice dated 10.02.2015, the Authorised Officer of the respondent Bank notified 16.03.2015 as the date of sale/E-Auction of aforesaid secured assets of the petitioner tea company. 9. The petitioners being aggrieved with such sale notice of their secured assets approached the DRT, Guwahati by filing an appeal under section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, and it was registered and numbered as S.A. No. 15 of 2015. The petitioners also filed petition No. 183/2015 for necessary interim order in the said S.A. No. 15/2015. The DRT, Guwahati after hearing the parties by its order dated 12.03.2015 came to the finding that the petitioners herein failed to make out any prima facie case for the intervention of the Tribunal, denied the prayer of the petitioner for granting interim order restraining the secured creditor, i.e. the respondent Bank herein for taking any further steps on the basis of their Notice dated 05.09.2012, Possession Notice dated 06.01.2015 and the Public Notice caused to be published and declined the prayer for interim order as prayed for in Petition No. 183/2015 and disposed of the same, accordingly. 10. The petitioner tea company, after the aforesaid order of the DRT dated 12.03.2015 by its communication dated 13.03.2015 submitted a representation before the authorities of the respondent Bank for one-time settlement of the Bank's due at Rs. 9,25,00,000/-enclosing two cheques of Rs. 50,00,000/- each amounting to Rs. 10,00,000/- as a down payment, offering to pay the balance amount of Rs. 8,00,00,000/- within a period of 12 months in 4 equal quarterly instalments and requested the Bank authorities to stop the sale process fixed on 16.03.2015. On 16.03.2015 the petitioner company issued a reminder to the Bank authorities with regard to its earlier communication dated 13.03.2015. 10,00,000/- as a down payment, offering to pay the balance amount of Rs. 8,00,00,000/- within a period of 12 months in 4 equal quarterly instalments and requested the Bank authorities to stop the sale process fixed on 16.03.2015. On 16.03.2015 the petitioner company issued a reminder to the Bank authorities with regard to its earlier communication dated 13.03.2015. As it did not receive any response from the respondent Bank, the petitioners preferred this writ petition. 11. Heard Mr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Shyamal Kr. Goswami, learned Counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Joy Saha, with Mr. P.K. Kalita for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3, Mr. S S. Dey, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. S.K. Kejriwal for the respondent No. 5 and Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned CGC for the respondent No. 1. 12. The contention of the petitioners herein is that as provided in Section-31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002; the provisions of the said 2002 Act is not applicable in any security interest created in agricultural land and that the secured assets, involved in the case, with regard to Manohari Tea Estate and Craigpark Tea Estate being of special tea cultivation land, is an agricultural land and as such, the action of the respondent Bank and its authorised officer (respondent Nos. 2 & 3) under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 over the security assets/secured properties of the petitioner tea company are outside the purview of the said 2002 Act and therefore, such action, being illegal and unauthorised are liable to be quashed by issuing appropriate writ. 13. The petitioners also contended that the action of the respondent Bank and its Authorised Officer under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is a quasi-Judicial Action and the DRT failed to exercise its jurisdiction by considering the important statutory provisions of Section-31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and therefore, the DRT should be directed to exercise its jurisdiction regarding application of the SARFAESI Act and prohibition under Section 31(i) of the said Act. 14. The petitioners further contended that in spite of receipt of the offer of one-time settlement at Rs. 9.25 Crores from the petitioner tea company on 14.03.2015 with down payment of Rs. 14. The petitioners further contended that in spite of receipt of the offer of one-time settlement at Rs. 9.25 Crores from the petitioner tea company on 14.03.2015 with down payment of Rs. One Crores, the respondent Bank and its authorised officer without communicating the rejection of the said offer, went ahead with the sale process of the secured assets of the petitioner tea company on 16.03.2015 though the Bank authorities had the legal duty either to accept or to reject the offer made by the petitioners, which is clear violation of natural justice. 15. Mr. Saha learned Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 & 3, i.e. the concerned Bank raised the question of maintainability of the present petition. It is submitted that the petitioner tea company availed credit facilities from the respondent Bank and for that purpose created equitable mortgage of its tea estates involved in the case. But as the petitioners defaulted & failed to regularise their accounts, as such on 30.09.2007 the account of the petitioner tea company was declared as non-performing assets. The respondent Bank contended that the petitioners failed to reply its notice under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act dated 05.09.2010 and preferred an appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act being S.A. No. 13/2013, with similar issues involved in this writ petition, which was partly allowed by the DRT, Guwahati on 22.09.2014, rejecting all the claims of the petitioners and interfered with the sale notice dated 25.04.2013 since before put up for sale of the relevant secured asset, i.e. Craigpark Tea Estate of the petitioner tea company, the necessary measures with regard to taking of valuation report of the said secured asset was not obtained as required under the Rule 8(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The respondent Bank also submitted that though the petitioners in the said S.A. No. 13/2013 raised the issue that the tea garden/tea estate in question were agricultural lands, but the DRT did not make any pronouncement with regard to said issue, which amounts to rejection and that the petitioners did not prefer any appeal before the Appellate Tribunal as required under section 18 of the SARFAESI Act by depositing 50% of the amount of the debt due from it before the said Tribunal and by efflux of time, the said order of the DRT dated 22.09.2014 has become final & absolute. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Saha submitted that the petitioners have also not approached the Appellate Tribal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the detail order dated 12.03.2015 passed by the DRT, Guwahati in their appeal under Section 17 of the 2002 Act being S.A. No. 15 of 2015, by which the Tribunal declined to pass any interim prayer of the applicants/petitioners herein as they failed to make out prime-facie case for the intervention of the Tribunal at the said stage granting any relief by way of interim order to the applicant restraining the secured creditors, the respondent Bank hearing and its authorities from taking any further steps on the basis of the Notice dated 05.09.2012 under Section 13(2) of the 2002 Act, Possession Notice dated 06.01.2015 and the Public Notice caused to be published,. Learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 submitted that the perusal of the present petition clearly shows that in the guise of a writ petition it is a petition against the said order of the DRT, Guwahati dated 12.03.2015. 17. Mr. Saha submitted that the SARFAESI Act, 2002 provides for a statutory appeal against any order passed by the DRT under section 17 of the said 2002 Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal subject to borrowers depositing 50% of the amount debt due from the appellant, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT, whichever is less and in existence of an alternative remedy, the petitioners cannot be allowed to bypass or avoid or go by on the ground that the condition of pre deposit contained therein is onerous. 18. Mr. Saha also brought to the notice of the Court that against the order dated 07.10.2015 passed by this Court in the present petition, the petitioners preferred a Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court being SLP (C) No. (S) 29514/2015 and on 14.10.2015, after arguing the matter for some time, petitioners withdrew the same with a liberty to avail of alternative remedy, if any and accordingly, on 14.10.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the same preferred by the petitioners herein as withdrawn with liberty as aforementioned. 19. Mr. 19. Mr. Dey, learned Senior counsel for the respondent No. 5, submitted that the said respondent has impeded itself as a party respondent in the present proceeding, as in terms of the Sale Notice dated 10.02.2015 for sale of their secured assets at Manohari Tea Estate in Dibrugarh District and Craigpark Tea Estate in Cachar District of Assam by the secured creditors under the SARFAESI Act, where the sale of secured assets involved in the case was fixed on 16.03.2015, participated in E-Auction by depositing Rs. 66 Lakhs as earnest money on 11.03.2015 which was transferred through RTGS on the said date itself. As there was no order from any Court of law restraining the respondent Bank to proceed with the said E-Auction, the property in question was auctioned on 16.03.2015 and the bid quoted by the respondent No. 5 at Rs. 10,09,80,000/- being found to be the highest, the respondent Bank unequivocally confirmed the sale of Manohari Tea Garden in favour of the respondent No. 5 on depositing 25% of the bid amount, amounting to Rs. 1,86,45,000/- adjusting the earnest money of Rs. 66 Lakhs. 20. Mr. Dey, learned Senior counsel also stated that pursuant to the respondent Bank's letter dated 24.03.2015, the respondent No. 5, deposited the remaining 75% of the bid money amounting to Rs. 7,57, 35,000/- on 27.03.2015 through RTGS and on the receipt of the said amount, the respondent Bank, as per Rule 7(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 issued Certificate of Sale dated 27.03.2015 in favour of the respondent No. 5. 21. The respondent No. 5 urged that in spite of the own knowledge about the sale process of their secured assets on 16.03.2015, the petitioners concealing and suppressing the said development obtained the order of status quo from this Hon'ble Court on 27.03.2015. Mr. Dey submitted that the respondent No. 5 purchased the Manohari Tea Garden by depositing valuable consideration of Rs. 10,09,80,000/- pursuant to E-Auction by the respondent Bank and as such it has acquired the right, title and interest over the said property and such right accrued to the bonafide purchaser cannot be stalled at the instance of defaulting borrower. 22. Mr. Dey submitted that the respondent No. 5 purchased the Manohari Tea Garden by depositing valuable consideration of Rs. 10,09,80,000/- pursuant to E-Auction by the respondent Bank and as such it has acquired the right, title and interest over the said property and such right accrued to the bonafide purchaser cannot be stalled at the instance of defaulting borrower. 22. Mr. Misra, learned senior Counsel in support of his contention on behalf of the petitioner placed reliance on the Judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (i) (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation -Vs- Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others), (ii) (2003) 2 SCC 107 (Harbansal Sania & Another -Vs- Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Others), (iii) (2003) 7 SCC 546 (Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Another -Vs- C.K. Rajan & Others, (iv) (2009) 2 SCC 630 (Committee of Management & Another -Vs- Vice-Chancellor & Others, (v) (2009) 14 SCC 358 (Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. -Vs- Assistant Commissioner (AA) & Another, (vi) (1985) 3 SCC 267 (Ram and Shyam Company -Vs- State of Haryana & others and (vii) AIR 1977 SC 1132 (State of U.P. & Others -Vs- M/S. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. 23. Mr. Saha, learned Counsel for the respondent Bank, in support of his contention, has relied upon the Judgments reported in (i) (2001) 6 SCC 569 (Punjab National Bank -Vs- O.C.Krishnan & Another, (ii) (2010) 8 SCC 110 (United Bank of India -Vs- Satyawati Tondon & Others, (iii) (1997) 3 SCC 261 (L. Chandra Kumar -Vs- Union of India & Others, (iv) (2011) 4 SCC 548 (Narayan Chandra Ghosh -Vs- UCO Bank & Others, (v) (2011) 2 SCC 782 (Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev -Vs- State of Maharastra & Others, (vi) (2010) 4 SCC 772 (Raj Kumar Shivhare -Vs- Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement & Another, (vii) (2003) 5 SCC 399 (Seth Chand Ratan -Vs- Pandit Durga Prasad (D) By Lrs. & Others, (viii) 2011 (1) CHN (CAL) 182 (Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. & Another -Vs- Kalavanti Doshi Trust & Others). 24. It is seen that this petition was filed by the petitioners on 19.03.2015 and on 27.03.2015, the Court directed to maintain status-quo as on said date, which was in force till 07.10.2015, when the Court while modifying the interim order directed the petitioners to deposit Rs. 24. It is seen that this petition was filed by the petitioners on 19.03.2015 and on 27.03.2015, the Court directed to maintain status-quo as on said date, which was in force till 07.10.2015, when the Court while modifying the interim order directed the petitioners to deposit Rs. 10,09,80,000/- with interest @ 18% from the date of the respective deposits made by the respondent No. 5 within one week before the Court which was to be paid to the auction purchaser. By the said order dated 27.03.2015, the Court clarified that the rights of the auction purchaser with regard to the sale shall be subject to the final result of the proceeding and in default of deposit, the injury order, granted earlier shall stand vacated and consequence of auction sale shall follow, subject to the final result of this petition. Against this order the petitioner's preferred SLP (C) No. (S) 29514/2015 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that was dismissed on withdrawal on 14.10.2015. 25. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels appearing for the parties and have also gone through the most important judgments cited by them. 26. In the case of Whirlpool Corporation -Vs- Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , cited by the petitioners, the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 20. Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. 21. That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the “Tribunal” ”. 27. In the cases reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 , (2003) 7 SCC 546 , (2009) 2 SCC 630 and (2009) 14 SCC 35 cited by the petitioners, the law laid down in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) have been followed. 28. In the case of Ram & Shyam reported in (1985) 3 SCC 267 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that – “….. Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. 28. In the case of Ram & Shyam reported in (1985) 3 SCC 267 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that – “….. Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. …..”. 29. In the case of State of U.P. & Others -Vs- M/S. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1132 the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - “4. ….. Ordinarily it is true that the hume pipes were not sanitary fittings and there was nothing to show otherwise, the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition. Moreover, there is no rule of law that the High Court should not entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy is available to a party. It is always a matter of discretion with the Court and if the discretion has been exercised by the High Court not unreasonably or perversely, it is settled practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court. The High Court in the present case entertained the writ petition and decided the question of law arising in it and in our opinion rightly”. 30. In the case of Punjab National Bank -Vs- O.C.Krishnan & Another, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 569 , a case under Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1933, an act prevailing before the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Apex Court have held that - “5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum. 6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the Banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” 31. In the case of United Bank of India -Vs- Satyawati Tondon & Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , a case under SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of Banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” It is to be noted herein that while deciding this case the Hon'ble Apex Court amongst others have also considered the law laid down in the case of Whirlpool's case (Supra). 32. The Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar -Vs- Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 have laid down that - “93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summaries our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. 32. The Constitution Bench in the case of L. Chandra Kumar -Vs- Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 have laid down that - “93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summaries our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.” 33. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narayan Chandra Ghosh -Vs- UCO Bank & Others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 548 , a case under SARFAESI Act, 2002 have held that - “7. Section 18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Section 18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under Section 18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to the entertainment of an appeal under Section 18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. 8. It is well-settled that when a statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre-deposit under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the statute. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement.” 34. In the case of Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev -Vs- State of Maharastra & Others reported in (2011) 2 SCC 782 , a case under SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Hon'ble Apex Court have held that - “22. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT. 23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories.)” 35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Shivhare -Vs- Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 772 in a case of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 have held that - “19. The word “any” in this context would mean “all”. We are of this opinion in view of the fact that this section confers a right of appeal on any person aggrieved. A right of appeal, it is well settled, is a creature of statute. It is never an inherent right, like that of filing a suit. The word “any” in this context would mean “all”. We are of this opinion in view of the fact that this section confers a right of appeal on any person aggrieved. A right of appeal, it is well settled, is a creature of statute. It is never an inherent right, like that of filing a suit. A right of filing a suit, unless it is barred by statute, as it is barred here under Section 34 of FEMA, is an inherent right (see Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code) but a right of appeal is always conferred by a statute. While conferring such right a statute may impose restrictions, like limitation or pre-deposit of penalty or it may limit the area of appeal to questions of law or sometime to substantial questions of law. Whenever such limitations are imposed, they are to be strictly followed. But in a case where there is no limitation on the nature of order or decision to be appealed against, as in this case, the right of appeal cannot be further curtailed by this Court on the basis of an interpretative exercise.” 36. In the case of Seth Chand Ratan -Vs- Pandit Durga Prasad, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 399 , Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - “13. Even otherwise, the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court for repelling the objection of the appellant regarding the maintainability of the writ petition that an alternative remedy does not divest the High Court of its powers to entertain petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, has hardly any application on the facts of the present case. It has been settled by a long catena of decisions that when a right or liability is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is no doubt a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and the court may in exceptional cases issue a discretionary writ of certiorari. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is no doubt a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and the court may in exceptional cases issue a discretionary writ of certiorari. Where there is complete lack of jurisdiction for the officer or authority or tribunal to take action or there has been a contravention of fundamental rights or there has been a violation of rules of natural justice or where the Tribunal acted under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, then notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief. In the present case, the alternative remedy of challenging the judgment of the court was not before some other forum or tribunal. On the contrary, by virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 27 of the Act, the order passed by the court amounted to a decree against which an appeal lay to the High Court. When the party had statutory remedy of assailing the order passed by the District Court by filing an appeal to the High Court itself, he could not bypass the said remedy and take recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Such a course of action may enable a litigant to defeat the provisions of the statute which may provide for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of court fee or deposit of some amount or fulfillment of some other conditions for entertaining the appeal.” 37. It is seen that petitioners claimed that their secured assets at Craigpark Tea Estate in Cachar District of Assam are tea cultivation land viz. agricultural land and is covered by the provisions under Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In this regard, in the Appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, in S.A. 13/2013, the DRT, Guwahati in its order dated 22.07.2014 came to the conclusion that - “in absence of any evidence it cannot be said that the property in question is an agricultural land”. This decision of the DRT is still valid in law as the petitioners have not preferred any appeal against the said order of the DRT before the Appellate Tribunal. 38. This decision of the DRT is still valid in law as the petitioners have not preferred any appeal against the said order of the DRT before the Appellate Tribunal. 38. Since there had been a slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions a new legislation namely, “the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002” (SARFAESI Act) has been enacted to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto enabling the b9anks and financial institutions to realise long term assets, manage problem of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction. Section 18 of said 2002 Act provides for an appeal to Appellate Tribunal against any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act and it reads as follows: “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal. - (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal 1[under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal. Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent, of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent, of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 39. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 39. The borrower or by person other than the borrower as appellant can avail to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by depositing the prescribed fee and by depositing 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors and further the Appellate Tribunal is also empowered to reduce the amount of debt to be deposited by the borrower to a certain amount as provided under it. As such the SARFAESI Act according our opinion is not burdensome and also not an onerous one. 40. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (Supra) have laid down that “the Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned”. As such the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act or the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act can determine whether the security assets are agricultural land or not and whether security assets falls under Section 31(i) of said 2002 Act or not. 41. From the secured assets that have been mortgaged with the respondent Bank by the petitioner tea company as security does not disclose any thing that those parcels of land are agricultural land. The petitioners did not adduce any evidence before the DRT that their secured assets are agricultural land so as to get the benefit under Section 31(i) of the 2002 Act. The petitioners first approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and as they did not get any favourable order from the Tribunal as prayed for, approached this Court under Writ Jurisdiction, though the SARFAESI Act provides for appeal under Section 18 of the Act before Appellate Tribunal. It is to be borne in mind that the case in hand relates to Debt Laws and the petitioners failed to repay their debts to the respondent Bank. It is to be borne in mind that the case in hand relates to Debt Laws and the petitioners failed to repay their debts to the respondent Bank. Moreover, the petitioners failed prove that they come under the bar of three contingencies as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation -Vs- Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others (supra). 42. In the present case, the petitioners have a statutory remedy to assail the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati under Section 17 of the 2002 Act by filing an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 18 of the Act and in our considered opinion the petitioners cannot bypass the said statutory remedy and take recourse to the present proceeding under Articles 226 of the Constitution, since such course of action would enable them to defeat the provisions of the statute viz. the SARFAESI Act which provides for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of court fee, deposit of some amount of debt due from them as claimed by the secured creditors and fulfillment of some other conditions for entertaining the appeal. 43. For the reason stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the present petition is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed. Any interim order passed earlier in favour of the petitioners stands vacated. 44. No order as to costs. ____