JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This appeal under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is directed against the judgment dated 21-11-2011 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No. 4, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S. (MAC) No. 634 of 2004 dismissing the claim petition filed by the appellant. 2. The material facts giving rise to the appeal are that the appellant is the mother of the late Pradip Kumar Chakma, who died on 2-4-2004 due to vehicular accident. According to the appellant, the deceased was a handyman of the Truck bearing registration No. AS-01-R-3251, which was detailed at 4th Kilo Sutnga Road under Khliehriet, Jayantia Hlls, Meghalaya for loading of coal. On the instruction of the driver of the said Truck, the deceased had gone to take food and on his return, he saw the Truck bearing registration No. AS-25-C-6631, which was also sent there to load coal, taking side, but could not do so due to the parking of the Truck No. AS-01-R-3251. The deceased then went behind Truck No. TR-01-R- 3251 to give signal to its driver for moving backward to give way to the other Truck. However, the driver of the Truck No. AS-01-R-3251 (“V-1” for short) ignoring his signal suddenly started the engine and drove the vehicle backward in a rash and negligent manner knocking down the deceased, who in the process sustained serious bleeding injuries; he subsequently succumbed to his injuries. According to the appellant, the driver of the offending vehicle (respondent No. 3), with a view to escape any liability, lodged a false ejahar against the owner and driver of the vehicle No. AS-25- C-6631 (“V-2” for short) and the police in connivance with the owner and driver of V-1 investigated the case on the wrong direction, falsely implicated V-2 in the accident to shift the liability upon them and registered Khliehriat Police Station Case No. 38(4)2004 U/s 279/304-A IPC. The appellant thereafter filed the claim petition claiming compensation to the order of Rs.25,18,000/-. 3. The claim petition was resisted by the owner of V-1 (respondent No. 1) by filing his written statement. The appellant thereafter filed the claim petition claiming compensation to the order of Rs.25,18,000/-. 3. The claim petition was resisted by the owner of V-1 (respondent No. 1) by filing his written statement. The stance taken by the respondent No. 1 is that the accident took place without any fault on the part of his vehicle (V-1) and, in any case, his driver was having a valid driving license at the time of the accident and, as such, the liability to satisfy the award should be fastened upon the respondent No. 2 (Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.). The respondent No. 2 also contested the claim petition and filed its written statement by denying the allegations and the claim of the appellant claimants, who should be put to strict proof thereof. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues: 1. Whether the death of the son of the claimant-petitioner was caused in a motor vehicular accident occurred on 2-4-2004 at about 1 PM on 4th Kilo Sutnga road under Khliehriat Police Station due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle bearing No. AS-01-R-3251 or AS-25-C-6631 or both by its drivers? 2. Whether the claimant-petition is entitled to get any compensation due to the death of the deceased, if so, what would be the quantum of compensation and who shall be held liable for payment of the same? 3. To what other relief or reliefs the parties are entitled to? 4. The appellant-claimants examined two witnesses and exhibited some documentary evidence such as copies of the FIR, post mortem examination report, etc. to substantiate their claim petition. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the owner of V-1 and the respondent No. 2 to rebut the case of the claimants. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Member of the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition on the basis of the following findings arrived at by it: “In a claim case of this nature, the Tribunal is required to draw its attention over the fact whether the fact of accident finds parity with the findings of the Police inquiry. In the present case, the claim-petitioner filed her claim mainly against the owner of the vehicle bearing No. AS-01-R-3251 (Truck) and the Oriental Insurance Company Limited. In her plaint, the claimant-petitioner stated that her son Pradip Kr. In the present case, the claim-petitioner filed her claim mainly against the owner of the vehicle bearing No. AS-01-R-3251 (Truck) and the Oriental Insurance Company Limited. In her plaint, the claimant-petitioner stated that her son Pradip Kr. Chakma succumbed to his injuries being hit by vehicle bearing No. AS-01-3251 (Truck) due to rash and negligent driving by its driver. She also stated that the driver of the vehicle No. AS-01-R-3251 with a view to escape himself from the liability of the accident lodged the ejahar shifting the liability upon the vehicle bearing No. AS-25-C-6631. On perusal of the ejahar under Exbt.1, it appears that Pradip Kr. Chakma (now deceased) met with the road traffic accident and succumbed to his injuries being dashed by the vehicle bearing No. ADS-25-C-6631. The contents of the ejahar contradict the statement of the claimant-petitioner. The Tribunal requires clear findings, i.e. for whose fault the accident occurred. Here the averments of the claimant do not corroborate the contents of the ejahar. To get rid off this situation, it seems that report of the Police investigation will be the proper document which can disclose as to which vehicle was involved in the accident or under whose fault the accident occurred for which a mother had to lose her young son. But curiously enough no such Police investigation report is available with the case record. Besides, the oral evidence of the petitioner side could not give any clear indication to decide the matter in controversy as PW 1 was an eyewitness to the occurrence and the evidence of PW 2 also has not been supported by any cogent evidence. It is an admitted fact that the son of the claimant-petitioner succumbed to his injuries in a vehicular accident but until and unless the same finds corroboration from the Police investigation report as well as from other cogent evidence, the Tribunal feels it unnecessary to go with the other facts of the case which will cause wastage of Tribunal’s time nothing else.” 5. Assailing the findings of the Tribunal, Mr. Assailing the findings of the Tribunal, Mr. P.K. Biswas, the learned senior counsel for the appellant-claimants, submits that the approach of the learned Member of the Tribunal in appreciating the evidence adduced by the claimants is absolutely erroneous and betrays ignorance of the settled law that a claim petition is to be decided on its own facts and evidence without being influenced by the findings recorded in a criminal case. According to the learned senior counsel, the evidence of PW 2, who is the eye witness to the incident, has remained unshaken, nay, not even contradicted. When PW 2 has categorically described in graphic details the manner in which the deceased was knocked down by V-1, which was moving backward recklessly, contends the learned senior counsel, there was absolutely no reason for the Tribunal to disbelieve the case of the claimants that it was the vehicle of the respondent No. 1 which caused the death of the deceased in the vehicular accident. He relies on the decisions of the Apex Court in Kusum Lata v. Satbir, (2011) 3 SCC 646 and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in R.P. Gautam v. R.N.M. Singh, AIR 2008 MP 68 to fortify his submissions. He further submits that since the occupation and income of the deceased have not even been questioned by the respondents, the appellants are entitled to compensation determined in accordance therewith. It is, therefore, contended by the learned senior counsel that the impugned judgment awarding nil award, being based on perverse findings, is not sustainable in law, and is liable to be set aside. 6. Mr. K. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the insurer, however, supports the impugned judgment and submits that no interference is called for. It is his contention that in order to succeed in the claim petition, the first and foremost duty of the claimant is to prove that the owner and driver of the vehicle against whom a claim petition is filed are guilty of negligence, but, in the instant case, the facts constituting the claim petition have been totally contradicted by the FIR and other police reports. According to the learned counsel, since the claim petition of the appellants is based on no evidence or, at any rate, on contradictory evidence, there is no duty to pay compensation by the owner of the vehicle and vicariously by the insurer. According to the learned counsel, since the claim petition of the appellants is based on no evidence or, at any rate, on contradictory evidence, there is no duty to pay compensation by the owner of the vehicle and vicariously by the insurer. He also contends that the deceased died in a vehicular accident when he was in the course of employment of the respondent No. 1, he was deemed to be a workman and his legal representatives cannot file the claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“MV Act”); he should rather be directed to file a claim petition under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (now called “Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923”). He relies on the judgment dated 3-8-2015 passed by this Court in MAC App. No. 99 of 2011 (Kajal Das v. Nirodelal Das and another) to fortify his contention. He, therefore, submits that there is no merit in this appeal, which is liable to be dismissed. 7. Having gone through the impugned judgment and other materials on record and having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the first point for consideration is whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the claim petition filed before the Tribunal under Section 166, MV Act is maintainable or whether the appellant should be directed to pursue her remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (WC Act) as was done in Kajal Das case (supra)? In my opinion, this contention is an afterthought and cannot be entertained at this appellate stage when such a plea was never put to test or gone into by the Tribunal inasmuch as the insurer neither took this plea or adduced any evidence to that effect. This then takes me to the point raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, namely, a claim petition cannot be decided on the basis of the findings given by a criminal court. In the case at hand, the FIR as well as the Police investigation report admittedly do not corroborate, nay, contradicted the case of the appellant that the deceased was knocked down and killed by V-1 belonging to the respondent No. 1. In the case at hand, the FIR as well as the Police investigation report admittedly do not corroborate, nay, contradicted the case of the appellant that the deceased was knocked down and killed by V-1 belonging to the respondent No. 1. PW-2, who is an eye witness to the incident, came forward to depose that on 2-4-2004 at about 1 PM, when he was supervising the loading of coal on his truck at 4th Kilo-Sutnga Road under Khliehriet Police Station, he saw the deceased knocked down by a truck bearing registration No. AS-01-R-3251 driven by its driver from backside which resulted in causing serious bleeding injuries; he died instantaneously on the spot. He then described in graphic details as to how the accident exactly took place. PW-2 was cross-examined by the owner of the vehicle and the insurer in the following manner: “Cross :- for the OP No. 1 I have not submitted any document/paper to prove that on 2-4-04 at about 1 P.M., I was supervising the loading of coal on my vehicle at the place of occurrence. It is not a fact that the accident had occurred not due to the fault of the vehicle AS-01-R-2251. Cross :- for the OP No. 2 : None appears.” 8. The evidence of PW-2 is unshaken, credible and cannot be disbelieved at all. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the veracity of statement of this witness, who was present at the scene of the incident when the deceased was knocked down and killed by V-1 driven by its driver. The cross-examination made by the respondent No. 1 did not disprove the otherwise reliable evidence given by him. Interestingly, no cross-examination was done by the insurer. The only reason the Tribunal discarded and disbelieved the evidence of PW-2 is that both the ejahar and the Police investigation report did not corroborate the evidence of PW-2. The manner in which the evidence in a motor accident claim cases is to be appreciated is explained by the Apex Court in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 53, which is as under: “15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. The manner in which the evidence in a motor accident claim cases is to be appreciated is explained by the Apex Court in Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 53, which is as under: “15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.” 9. The question as to how far the decision of a criminal case or the police report can influence the decision of a civil case was discussed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mahila Dhanwanti and others v. Kulwan and others, AIR 1994 MP 44 , and it was held therein: “10. Coming to the other contention that the deceased was travelling as a passenger and, therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay any compensation, it has also no merit. True, the F.I.R. (Ex. D/2-C) and the statement of the Investigating Officer gives a version which support the case of the Insurance Company, but even assuming that the F.I.R. is a public document, but it is the rule of law that it is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used only for the purposes of corroboration or contradiction of the maker only. The maker having not been examined by either side, the statement of A. S. Yadav carries no weight as he only investigated the occurrence. He is not an eyewitness to the occurrence. His testimony is of hearsay evidence, therefore, the conclusions which he drew after investigation cannot be taken into consideration unless supported by proper material, It is well settled proposition of law that evidence recorded in criminal Court and the findings arrived at thereon should not be used in claim cases. Such evidence, for the purposes of claim cases is inadmissible. (See Shabbir Ahmad v. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal, AIR 1984 MP 173 ).” 10. In R.P. Gautam v. R.N.M. Singh and another, AIR 2008 MP 68 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court lucidly summed up the proposition of law in the following manner: 13. Such evidence, for the purposes of claim cases is inadmissible. (See Shabbir Ahmad v. M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal, AIR 1984 MP 173 ).” 10. In R.P. Gautam v. R.N.M. Singh and another, AIR 2008 MP 68 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court lucidly summed up the proposition of law in the following manner: 13. It is settled proposition of law that every civil case is decided on it's own facts and evidence without influencing the papers and decision of the criminal case. In such premises registration of the offence and police investigation is not a condition precedent for awarding the claim. Besides this due to one reason or another if the first information report of vehicular accident is not lodged with the police or the same was given at later stage and police neither registered the offence nor investigated the same, it does not mean that right of the victim for compensation who suffered the vehicular accident is washed away. The victim remains entitled for compensation on proving the facts and circumstances regarding such accident and factum of injuries sustained by him, he could not be deprived from such right, provided by the Motor Vehicles Act, although such compensation may be awarded only on proving all relevant facts with all probabilities.” 11. Motor accident claim case is in the nature of a civil suit and certainly not a criminal case. Therefore, the Tribunal has grossly erred in law in relying on the contents of the ejahar and the Police investigation report to disbelieve and discard the case of the claimant. The claimant, on the contrary, is entitled to prove her case on the basis of the evidence adduced by her, which was corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of PW-2, who personally saw the accident resulting in the death of the deceased, in the course of trial. On my above findings, I have no hesitation in holding that the deceased was killed in the vehicular accident on 2-4-2004 due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the respondent No. 1. Resultantly, the insurer, who admittedly insured the vehicle in question at the time of the accident, is vicariously liable to satisfy the award. 12. On my above findings, I have no hesitation in holding that the deceased was killed in the vehicular accident on 2-4-2004 due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the respondent No. 1. Resultantly, the insurer, who admittedly insured the vehicle in question at the time of the accident, is vicariously liable to satisfy the award. 12. Ordinarily, I would have held that the case deserves to be remanded to the Tribunal for determination of the quantum of compensation payable, but this is neither advisable nor expedient at this belated stage, i.e. some twelve years have gone by since the accident and, as such, I should rather make an attempt to determine the quantum of compensation payable on the basis of the materials available on record. PW-1 testified that the deceased was a handyman of V-2 and was earning Rs.4,000/- per month. The testimony of PW-1 is fully corroborated by PW-2. Nothing in the cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-2, as already reproduced above, elicited anything which could falsify their testimonies. As per the post mortem report, the deceased was found to be 22 years old at the time of the accident. He obviously died a bachelor. The appellant is his mother. The fact that the deceased was working as a handyman at the time of the accident is not in dispute. However, I do not think that he would be earning Rs.4,000/- per month in those days. Keeping in mind the ground realities of those days with some element of guesswork, it will not be unreasonable to hold that a handyman of heavy truck in those days would be earning a sum of Rs.3,000/- per month inclusive of bonus. As a bachelor, 30% of his income must have been spent by him for his living and personal expenses. The deceased, as a self-employed person, shall, however, be entitled to 30% increase in his total income over a period of time “as it will be naïve to think that wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc. would remain the same throughout his life”. Since the deceased was found to be 22 years old at the time of the accident, a multiplier of 18 shall have to be adopted. would remain the same throughout his life”. Since the deceased was found to be 22 years old at the time of the accident, a multiplier of 18 shall have to be adopted. Thus, the appellant will be entitled to compensation of [Rs.3000+30% of Rs.3000 = Rs.3900/- less 30% towards personal and living expense = Rs.2,700x12 = Rs.32,400, which when multiplied by 18 will come to Rs.5,83,200/-]. The appellant shall also be entitled to funeral expenses of Rs.10,000/- and another sum of Rs.50,000/- for loss of love and affection. Thus, the total amount of compensation payable to the appellant is determined at Rs.6,43,200/- (Rupees six lakhs forty-three thousand and two hundred) only. In addition, the appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from the date of the claim petition. 13. The respondent No. 2 is, therefore, directed to deposit the awarded amount together with the interest accrued thereon with this Registry within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment for payment to the appellant. As and when the amount is deposited, the same shall be released to the appellant after satisfying the usual formalities without further reference to this Court. Transmit the L.C. record.