JUDGMENT The Oriental Insurance Company Limited through its Deputy Manager has preferred this First Appeal From Order (FAFO) against the judgment and award dated 28.5.2016 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Meerut in M.A.C. No.581 of 2015 (Smt. Shuchi and others v. Mukesh Kashyap and others). 2. As per record this much is reflected that the claimants had filed claim petition being M.A.C. No.581 of 2005 (Smt. Shuchi and others v. Mukesh Kashyap and others) under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 claiming compensation of Rs.1,25,00,000/- on account of death of her husband namely Arun Gupta in a motor accident, which had taken place on 30.3.2015. In the said claim case the appellant-insurance company had filed its written statement and contested the claim petition on merits on the ground that in the present matter the insured Wagon-R was not involved in the accident and it was falsely roped by the claimants with the collusion of owner of insured car for the purpose of compensation. In the said proceedings, the claimants had filed the photocopies of the income tax return of the deceased and the insurance company had also refuted the alleged claim regarding the income of the deceased. 3. Shri V.C. Dixit, learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company has vehemently opposed the judgment of Claims Tribunal firstly on the ground that the claimants had filed photo copy of the income tax return of 2012-13 disclosing the income of Rs.2,04,926/-, income tax return of 2013-14 disclosing the income of Rs.2,32,815/- and income tax return of 2014-15 disclosing the income of Rs.2,58,822/- and as such it is sought to be contended that average income of last three years ought to have been accepted but the Claims Tribunal had committed gross illegality in accepting the income disclosing in income tax return of 2014-15 instead of taking average income. 4. Secondly it has been contended that the Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 15 accepting the age of deceased between 40-45 years, whereas Hon'ble the Apex Court has provided the multiplier of 14 from the age group of 41-45 years in the case of Smt. Sarla Verma v. Delhi Road Transport Corporation, 2009 (2) TAC 677 (SC). 4. Secondly it has been contended that the Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 15 accepting the age of deceased between 40-45 years, whereas Hon'ble the Apex Court has provided the multiplier of 14 from the age group of 41-45 years in the case of Smt. Sarla Verma v. Delhi Road Transport Corporation, 2009 (2) TAC 677 (SC). Thirdly it is contended that the medical expenses incurred towards treatment of the deceased is also on higher side and in any case the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal is highly excessive and without any basis and the liability had wrongly been fastened upon the appellant-insurance company/insurer of the Wagon-R car and as such this Court should come for rescue and reprieve of the appellant. 5. We have proceeded to examine the record in question and find that so far first objection/ground is concerned, the Tribunal in its judgment and award dated 28.5.2016 has calculated the compensation by taking yearly income of the deceased as Rs.2,18,510/- and as per Rule 220 Ka (3) (2) of U.P. Motor Vehicle (11th Amendment) Rules, 2011 if the age of the deceased is between 40 to 45 years, for his future prospects 30% would be increased in his income and as such total yearly income was calculated by the Tribunal as Rs.2,18,510.00 +Rs.65,553.00 =Rs.2,84,063.00. 6. This much is also reflected that at the time of death five persons were depending upon the deceased namely Smt. Suchi (wife), Km. Vani (minor daughter), Km. 6. This much is also reflected that at the time of death five persons were depending upon the deceased namely Smt. Suchi (wife), Km. Vani (minor daughter), Km. Kavya (minor daughter), Shri N.C. Gupta (father and Smt. Sushma (mother) and the Tribunal had proceeded to deduct 1/3rd of the income incurred for his own expenses and made the following observations: - ^^vr% e`rd v:.k xqIrk dh e`R;q ds mijkUr ;kphx.k dks tks izfrdj dh /kujkf'k ns; gksxh] og fuEuor fu/kkZfjr dh tkrh gSA :i;s 2]18]510-00 ¼okf"kZd vk;½] +30 izfr'kr ¼laHkkfor izR;k'kh½ :i;s 2]18]510-00+ :i;s 65]553-00 :i;s 2]84]063-00 ¼nks yk[k pkSjklh gtkj frjlB :i;s½ & 1@4 ¼dVkSrh½ :i;s 2]84063-00 :i;s 71]016-00 :i;s 2]13]047 ¼'kq) vk;½ 15 ¼xq.kkad½ :i;s 31]95]705-00 ¼bDdrhl yk[k iapkucs gtkj lkr lkS ikap :i;s½ blds vfrfjDr ;kphx.k m0iz0 eksVj;ku ¼X;kjgoka la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh 2011 ds fu;e 220d ¼,d½ ds vuqlkj lEink dh {kfr ds fy;s izfrdj :i;s 5000-00 ¼ikap grkj :i;s½ m0iz0 eksVj;ku ¼X;kjgoka la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh 2011 ds fu;e 220d ¼4½ ¼nks½ ds vuqlkj laxBu dh {kfr ds fy;s izfrdj :i;s 5000-00 ¼ikap grkj :i;s½ m0iz0 eksVj;ku ¼X;kjgoka la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh 2011 ds fu;e 220d ¼4½ ¼rhu½ ds vuqlkj izse o Lusg dk {kfr ds fy;s izfrdj 5000-00 ¼ikap grkj :i;s½] m0iz0 eksVj;ku ¼X;kjgoka la'kks/ku½ fu;ekoyh 2011 ds fu;e 220d ¼4½ ¼pkj½ ds vuqlkj vaR;ksf"V rF; ds fy;s izfrdj 5000-00 ¼ikap grkj :i;s½ Hkh izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA** 7. On this score, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the award regarding calculation of income, as such first objection/ ground does not sustain and is accordingly rejected. 8. For the second objection/ ground, as per record this much is also reflected that the deceased was born on 13.10.1974 as per his High School marksheet and as such on the date of accident he was 40 years and five month old and as such he was placed in between the age group of 40 to 45 years and as such the Tribunal as per the provisions contained under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act had applied the multiplied of 15 for the age group of 40 to 45 years. 9. In this background, we have proceeded to examine the judgment so cited by counsel for the appellant in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. (Supra). The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted as below: - "17. 9. In this background, we have proceeded to examine the judgment so cited by counsel for the appellant in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. (Supra). The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted as below: - "17. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia inserting Section 163A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163A of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of Rs.3,000/- to Rs.40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs.40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the application is under section 163A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs.40,000/-, by applying the formula : (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of 20the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability are excluded when the claim is under section 163A of MV Act. There are however discrepancies/errors in the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule Table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for cases where a higher multiplier of 18 is applicable and a larger compensation with reference to cases where a lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is applicable. There are however discrepancies/errors in the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule Table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for cases where a higher multiplier of 18 is applicable and a larger compensation with reference to cases where a lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is applicable. From the quantum of compensation specified in the table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept in the Schedule and the `multiplier' figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 & 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12, 10, 8, 6 and 5. Another noticeable incongruity is, having prescribed the notional minimum income of non-earning persons as Rs.15,000/- per annum, the table prescribes the compensation payable even in cases where the annual income ranges between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12000/-. This leads to an anomalous position in regard to applications under Section 163A of MV Act, as the compensation will be higher in cases where the deceased was idle and not having any income, than in cases where the deceased was honestly earning an income ranging between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12,000/- per annum. Be that as it may. 18. The principles relating to determination of liability and quantum of compensation are different for claims made under section 163A of MV Act and claims under section 166 of MV Act. (See : Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Meena Variyal - 2007 (5) SCC 428 ). Section 163A and Second Schedule in terms do not apply to determination of compensation in applications under Section 166. In Trilok Chandra, this Court, after reiterating the principles stated in Susamma Thomas, however, held that the operative (maximum) multiplier, should be increased as 18 (instead of 16 indicated in Susamma Thomas), even in cases under section 166 of MV Act, by borrowing the principle underlying section 163A and the Second Schedule. This Court observed: "Section 163-A begins with a non obstante clause and provides for payment of compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal representatives of the deceased or injured, as the case may be. Now if we turn to the Second Schedule, we find a table fixing the mode of calculation of compensation for third party accident injury claims arising out of fatal accidents. Now if we turn to the Second Schedule, we find a table fixing the mode of calculation of compensation for third party accident injury claims arising out of fatal accidents. The first column gives the age group of the victims of accident, the second column indicates the multiplier and the subsequent horizontal figures indicate the quantum of compensation in thousand payable to the heirs of the deceased victim. According to this table the multiplier varies from 5 to 18 depending on the age group to which the victim belonged. Thus, under this Schedule the maximum multiplier can be up to 18 and not 16 as was held in Susamma Thomas case..... Besides, the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45 and his dependents are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in the choice of the multiplier......What we propose to emphasise is that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 years' purchase factor. This is the improvement over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16..." 19. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Charlie [ 2005 (10) SCC 720 ], this Court noticed that in respect of claims under section 166 of the MV Act, the highest multiplier applicable was 18 and that the said multiplier should be applied to the age group of 21 to 25 years (commencement of normal productive years) and the lowest multiplier would be in respect of persons in the age group of 60 to 70 years (normal retiring age). This was reiterated in TN State Road Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Rajapriya [ 2005 (6) SCC 236 ] and UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Krishna Bala [ 2006 (6) SCC 249 ]. This was reiterated in TN State Road Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Rajapriya [ 2005 (6) SCC 236 ] and UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Krishna Bala [ 2006 (6) SCC 249 ]. The multipliers indicated in Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie (for claims under section 166 of MV Act) is given below in juxtaposition with the multiplier mentioned in the Second Schedule for claims under section 163A of MV Act (with appropriate deceleration after 50 years) : Age of the deceasedMultiplier scale as envisaged in Susamma thomasMultiplier scale as adopted by Trilok ChandraMultiplier scale in Trilok chandra as clarified in CharlieMultiplier specified in second column in the Table in II Schedule to M.V. ActMultiplier actually used in Second Schedule to M.V. Act (as seen from the quantum of Compensation) 123456 Upto 15 yrs.---1520 15 to 20 yrs.1618181619 21 to 25 yrs.1517181718 26 to 30 yrs.1416171817 31 to 35 yrs.1315161716 36 to 40 yrs.1214151615 41 to 45 yrs.1113141514 46 to 50 yrs.1012131312 51 to 55 yrs.911111110 56 to 60 yrs.810988 61 to 65 yrs.68756 Above 65 yrs.55555 20. Tribunals/courts adopt and apply different operative multipliers. Some follow the multiplier with reference to Susamma Thomas (set out in column 2 of the table above); some follow the multiplier with reference to Trilok Chandra, (set out in column 3 of the table above); some follow the multiplier with reference to Charlie (Set out in column (4) of the Table above); many follow the multiplier given in second column of the Table in the Second Schedule of MV Act (extracted in column 5 of the table above); and some follow the multiplier actually adopted in the Second Schedule while calculating the quantum of compensation (set out in column 6 of the table above). For example if the deceased is aged 38 years, the multiplier would be 12 as per Susamma Thomas, 14 as per Trilok Chandra, 15 as per Charlie, or 16 as per the multiplier given in column (2) of the Second schedule to the MV Act or 15 as per the multiplier actually adopted in the second Schedule to MV Act. Some Tribunals, as in this case, apply the multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service with reference to the retiring age. It is necessary to avoid this kind of inconsistency. Some Tribunals, as in this case, apply the multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service with reference to the retiring age. It is necessary to avoid this kind of inconsistency. We are concerned with cases falling under section 166 and not under section 163A of MV Act. In cases falling under section 166 of the MV Act, Davies method is applicable. 21. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years." 10. So far as the third objection regarding the medical expenses on higher side is concerned, we find that the same has meticulously been dealt by the Tribunal and the same also does not require any interference. 11. After respectfully considering the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. (Supra) we find that Hon'ble the Apex Court while considering the aforesaid case had proceeded to observe that the lack of uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation has been a matter of grave concern. Every district has one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/s. If different Tribunals calculate compensation differently on the same facts, the claimant, the litigant, the common man will be confused, perplexed and bewildered. If there is significant 9divergence among Tribunals in determining the quantum of compensation on similar facts, it will lead to dissatisfaction and distrust in the system. 12. In the case in hand the main thrust upon the counsel for the appellant is to the extent that while awarding the compensation the Tribunal has erred on applying the multiplier of 15. 13. Bare perusal of para 21 of the judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. 12. In the case in hand the main thrust upon the counsel for the appellant is to the extent that while awarding the compensation the Tribunal has erred on applying the multiplier of 15. 13. Bare perusal of para 21 of the judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. (Supra) this much is reflected that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie). The relevant portion of the said table is again reproduced hereunder: - Age of the deceasedMultiplier scale as envisaged in Susamma thomasMultiplier scale as adopted by Trilok ChandraMultiplier scale in Trilok chandra as clarified in CharlieMultiplier specified in second column in the Table in II Schedule to M.V. ActMultiplier actually used in Second Schedule to M.V. Act (as seen from the quantum of Compensation) 123456 36 to 40 yrs.1214151615 41 to 45 yrs.1113141514 14. We find from the record in question that the deceased was born on 13.10.1974 and at the time of his death he was 40 years 5 months. From the chart aforesaid this much is clear that multiplier of 15 would be applicable for the age group of 36 to 40 years, whereas multiplier of 14 would be applicable for 41 to 45 years and as such the Tribunal has not erred in holding that on the date of death admittedly the deceased was 40 years 5 months old and had not completed 41 years and as such the multiplier of 15 would be applicable in the case and as such the Tribunal had rightly proceeded to apply multiplier of 15. 15. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act) enjoins a Claims Tribunal to determine the amount of compensation which is just and reasonable. It can neither be a source of profit nor should be a pittance. In other words, it should not be meager nor should be a windfall. In this connection, a reference may be made to the report of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 , which dealt with the grant of compensation in case of injury which principles equally apply in case of award of compensation in fatal accident cases. In Para 7, the Supreme Court held as under: "7. In Para 7, the Supreme Court held as under: "7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense damages which in turn appears to it to be just and reasonable. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be just and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be just compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of just compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression which appears to it to be just a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression just denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just." 16. Section 168 of the Act enjoins the Claims Tribunal to hold an inquiry into the claim to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and reasonable. It has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall or a bonanza nor it should be niggardly. In Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, 1999 (1) SCC 90 , the Supreme Court held that "the Court and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. In Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, 1999 (1) SCC 90 , the Supreme Court held that "the Court and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any." 17. In the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 176 , it was held as under: - "5......The determination of the quantum must answer what contemporary society "would deem to be a fair sum such as would allow the wrongdoer to hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing". The amount awarded must not be niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free society in generous scales'. All this means that the sum awarded must be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards." 18. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find no infirmity or illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal and no interference is required in the matter. The first appeal from order sans merit and is accordingly dismissed.