Amit Tiwari, Trustee of K. P. Foundation v. Marco Polo Restaurant Pvt. Ltd.
2016-04-12
I.P.MUKERJI
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : I.P. MUKERJI, J Marco Polo is a restaurant on Park Street. It is spread over an area of 2731 sq. ft. on the north western side of the ground floor of a building called “Anuj chambers”. It is numbered as 24, Park Street. The building is also known as the “annexe building”. A company by the name of Magma Leasing Limited is the owner of this area. The cause title of the plaint reveals that there are 20 trusts managed by 6 trustees. One trustee died during pendency of the suit. The plaintiff trustees got a lease of this property on 22nd September, 2003 and 1st December, 2003 from Magma Leasing Limited by execution of 20 registered deeds of lease. The deeds of lease mentioned that the interest of the lessors was ‘undivided and demarcated’. These lessees had the power to sub-lease. On 22nd April, 2004, these lessees (the plaintiffs and the deceased trustee), sought to underlease the said premises to the defendant on a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-. The purported demise was for nine years from 22nd April, 2004 till 21st April, 2013. The sub lessee would pay the stipulated rent by a single cheque to Mayank Poddar Family Trust which would issue a single receipt. It was stated in the lease deed that the lessors/plaintiffs were making a demise of that area to the lessee defendant. It was submitted that the last rent paid by the defendant was Rs. 1,98,000/- per month. The instrument was unregistered By a notice dated 16th May, 2013 issued by M/s Singhvi and Company Advocates, ostensibly u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the defendant was called upon to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to one of the plaintiff trustees within fifteen days of the date of receipt of the notice. The notice also informed the defendant that on 31st March, 2013 one of the trustees would visit the premises to take vacant and peaceful possession thereof. The defendant did not deliver possession of the premises unto the plaintiff. Hence this suit. At the very threshold Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, learned senior advocate for the defendant took the point that the demise stated to be for nine years had to be by a registered and properly stamped instrument. The deed of lease was not registered and was insufficiently stamped.
Hence this suit. At the very threshold Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, learned senior advocate for the defendant took the point that the demise stated to be for nine years had to be by a registered and properly stamped instrument. The deed of lease was not registered and was insufficiently stamped. Hence the deed of lease could not be looked into. Hereinafter, these parties will be known as lessors/plaintiffs and lessee/defendant. The lessors by a notice dated 16th May, 2013 sought to determine the lease/tenancy with fifteen days’ notice. Now, I come to the main dispute between the parties. According to the lessee they are entitled to obtain leave of this court to defend the suit on a legal issue. The issue is this. The superior lessor of the lessors had granted separate leases to them. The rent was paid separately by lessors to the superior landlord. Therefore the holdings were all different. The lessors had granted separate leases to the lessee. The rent that they were paying had to be appropriated amongst the lessors according to their shares in the property. If it were so appropriated each of the lessors got less than Rs. 10,000/- a month. Hence, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 applied to the tenancy. The notice dated 16th May, 2013 could not have determined the tenancy. The lessee is a monthly tenant under the said rent act. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra very ably assisted by Mr. Ghosh showed me a division bench judgment of our court Coal India Ltd. v. Apeejay Private Ltd. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 192 . It held that if the defendant raised a substantial question of law, it was entitled to defend the suit. Learned Counsel for the defendant suggested that a substantial question of law had been raised by them and that this court should not pass a judgment and decree on the Chapter XIIIA application but should relegate the suit to trial. What I have stated above is a narration of a basic question of law raised by the lessee. Whether, this issue raises a substantial question of law or not has to be analysed on a little closer analysis of the facts and arguments made on behalf of the parties. Before deciding the issue, one question has to be decided. Whether this court can look into the lease deed dated 22nd April, 2004?
Whether, this issue raises a substantial question of law or not has to be analysed on a little closer analysis of the facts and arguments made on behalf of the parties. Before deciding the issue, one question has to be decided. Whether this court can look into the lease deed dated 22nd April, 2004? It purports to be a demise for nine years. Any demise of a period of over one year is required to be registered under Section 107 of the Transfer Property Act, 1882 read with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. A demise for nine years is also required to be stamped in accordance with the calculation method provided in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. This deed of lease is not registered. It is on a Rs. 10/- stamp paper. Thus it is insufficiently stamped. It is well-known that if a document is required to be registered and not registered then it does not affect the property sought to be dealt with by the instrument. But the terms of the document can be looked into for collateral purposes (see Section 49 including the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908). However, if a document is required to be stamped and it is unstamped or deficiently stamped it cannot be looked into for any purposes. (see Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899). My judgment in Merlin Orihects v. Eouco Ventures (P) Ltd. reported in AIR 2015 (NOC) 65 Cal does not have any application in this case because here the court is called upon to deliver a final judgment and decree in the suit. Upto now any party desirous of using the document, has not asked this Court to provide it an opportunity to get it stamped in the Collectorate by payment of stamp duty, penalty etc.. Therefore, when at this stage the suit may be decided finally, the document cannot be looked into. The ratio of that judgment would not apply. It might apply in interlocutory proceedings where there is no scope of deciding the suit finally and any party has the opportunity to cure the defect by getting it properly stamped on the conditions mentioned in the said Act. Thus the deed of lease cannot be looked into for any purpose. Hence the Deed of lease is invalid. However, it did not wipe out the relationship between the parties.
Thus the deed of lease cannot be looked into for any purpose. Hence the Deed of lease is invalid. However, it did not wipe out the relationship between the parties. Even if a demise for 9 years was not created, nobody can deny that the defendant occupied the premises as a monthly tenant / lessee for a period of 9 years. The defendant occupied the premises and paid rent every month for a period of 9 years beginning from 22nd April, 2004 and ending on 21st April, 2013. It did pay rent by a single cheque to Mayank Poddar Family Trust each and every month and the trust issued a single receipt. Now, these are the only admissible documents in this Chapter XIIIA application, to decide the question raised. Now, I come to the question whether there was one demise or several demises of the said property. Demise is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary as follows:- “1. The conveyance of an estate for a term of years, a lease.” Lease as defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition as follows: “Lease— 1. A contract by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for consideration, usu. Rent. The lease term can be for life, for a fixed period, or for a period terminable at will. 2. Such a conveyance plus all covenants attached to it. 3. The written instrument memorializing such a conveyance and its covenants. 4. The piece of real property so conveyed. 5. A contract by which the rightful possessor of personal property conveys the right to use that property in exchange for consideration.” A lease as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property in consideration of something to be rendered periodically or a specified occasion by the transferee to the transferor. Under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as amended from time to time one of the conditions for treating a lease as not covered by the Rent Act is that the rent should be above Rs. 10,000/- per month. This is simply to say that the rent per demise should be more than Rs. 10,000/- per month.
Under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as amended from time to time one of the conditions for treating a lease as not covered by the Rent Act is that the rent should be above Rs. 10,000/- per month. This is simply to say that the rent per demise should be more than Rs. 10,000/- per month. (see Section 3(e) read with the definition of premises in Section 2(e) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997) To constitute a lease there must be a transfer of an estate for a term. In other words, one lease is evidenced by one transfer. Hence, we have to examine whether there was a single demise or multiple demises in respect of the said property in favour of the defendant. Whether the lessors obtained separate leases from the joint and undivided owners of the property cannot be gone into by this Court because the Deed of lease cannot be gone into. There is no other evidence. In Charanjit Lal Mehra and Others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (smt.) and Another reported in (2005) 11 SCC 279 cited by Mr. Saha the Supreme Court on a consideration of the lease which was executed by four brothers came to the conclusion that it was composite and not individual. Similar was the conclusion of the court in FAB India Overseas Private Limited v. S.N. Sheopori reported in 199 (2013) DLT 351. Since we are not looking at the contract between the parties S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand reported in AIR 1968 SC 438 cited by Mr. Saha has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the case. In Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury reported in (1988) 2 SCC 172 cited by Mr. Mitra Mr. Justice S. Ranganathan remarked that whether there was a single tenancy or not, is a question of fact and that the Delhi High Court under Section 25 (B) (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act should not have entered into the factual dispute as to whether there was a single tenancy or not. Both learned Counsel Mr. Mitra and Mr. Ghosh for the defendant tried to argue that whether there was a single tenancy or not was a question of fact. More importantly, a substantial question of law was associated with it. They relied on Coal India Ltd. v. Apeejay Private Ltd. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 192 .
Both learned Counsel Mr. Mitra and Mr. Ghosh for the defendant tried to argue that whether there was a single tenancy or not was a question of fact. More importantly, a substantial question of law was associated with it. They relied on Coal India Ltd. v. Apeejay Private Ltd. reported in 2009 (4) CHN 192 . In that case Coal India Ltd. was in possession of the premises in question before execution of the lease. The lease was executed on 22nd January, 1992 with effect from 1st March, 1991 for a period of 21 years. The lessor was Apeejay Pvt. Ltd. The lease was not registered. Apeejay Pvt. Ltd. treated it has an invalid lease. It said it was a monthly tenancy. They tried to terminate the same by a 15 days’ notice dated 4th January, 2006 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In that case Coal India Limited submitted that possession had been granted to it under the lease that they were acting in terms of the lease deed. They were entitled to defend their possession under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act during the continuance of the lease. In that case I had the privilege for delivering the judgment of the division bench of this court. We held that a substantial question of law had been raised by Coal India Limited and that they were entitled to defend their possession. Were there multiple tenancies in favour of the lessee? Has the defendant been able to raise a substantial question of law? Meggary & Wade in their treatise on the Law of Property have categorically stated that it is possible to create a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common, in respect of a lease or tenancy. One has to see whether the lessee has been granted exclusive possession. One has also to examine whether the demised estate can be taken as a single unit or several units. If they are separate units then the presumption is in favour of separate tenancies or tenancies in common. This is equivalent to separate tenancies. The estate of the superior lessors was one. It was undivided. This undivided estate was further sub-leased to the lessee as one estate with possession. Therefore, there is no question of multiple tenancies.
If they are separate units then the presumption is in favour of separate tenancies or tenancies in common. This is equivalent to separate tenancies. The estate of the superior lessors was one. It was undivided. This undivided estate was further sub-leased to the lessee as one estate with possession. Therefore, there is no question of multiple tenancies. This would appear from an examination of the single rent receipt for the lease/tenancy and the tender of one cheque by the lessee every month as rent. This court has been able to reach a final conclusion that the lease/tenancy was a single demise and not multiple separate demises. For all these reasons, there is no question of law raised by the lessee defendant which in terms of the ratio in the case of Coal India Ltd. v. Apeejay Pvt. Ltd. should be relegated to trial. This application under Chapter XIIIA of the Original Side rules is allowed. I pass a final judgment and decree for eviction of the defendant in terms of prayer (a) of the Master’s Summons. I grant six months’ time to the defendant to quit and vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession thereof to the plaintiffs subject to payment of mesne profits. Mr. Suhrid Kumar Roy Choudhury, Barrister-at-law is appointed as a Special Referee to ascertain the mesne profits from the date of determination of the lease/tenancy till the date of the decree and upto the date of handing over possession of the premises by the defendant to the plaintiffs or a period of three years from the date of the decree whichever is earlier. The Special Referee is to file a report in this court for the period upto the date of the decree by 31st December, 2016 and supplementary reports later, if necessary for the subsequent period. The Special Referee will be entitled to a remuneration of Rs. 15,000/- per sitting to be shared by the parties equally. He will have the power to engage a clerk and a stenographer, whose remuneration will be similarly borne by the parties. If the defendant does not pay, the plaintiffs will bear the costs which would be added to the decree. The suit is part decreed. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.