JUDGMENT : JANAK RAJ KOTWAL, J. 1. This is a writ petition. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. Admitted ground of both the sides is that the petitioner was selected for the post of Sub-Inspector in the Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police in the year 1999. Order of appointment in his favour, however, was not issued due to adverse character verification as he Was found involved in a criminal case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) registered as FIR No. 148/1990 in which he was arrested and detained under the Public Safety Act (PSA). The detention of the petitioner was quashed by this Court on 02.04.1992 in Habeas Corpus Petition filed by him and later he came to be discharged/acquitted in the criminal case on 30.12.1994. After his discharge/acquittal, the petitioner filed SWP No. 123/1995 in this Court seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus inter alia commanding respondents to issue appointment order of the petitioner pursuant to his selection as Sub-Inspector. Respondents filed objections to that writ petition, which, however, was allowed by this Court vide Judgment dated 05.11.1998. Operative paragraphs of the judgment read: "Respondents having selected the petitioner to the post of Sub-Inspector and having failed to prove the involvement of the petitioner in a criminal case, respondents have no reason to deny employment to the petitioner. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition succeeds and a writ of mandamus is issued, commanding the respondents to treat the petitioner as selected candidate for appointment pursuant to selection made by the selection committee to the post of Sub-Inspector Police (Executive). No order as to costs." 3. Respondents assailed the judgment of the Writ Court in LPA(SW) No. 70/1999. Learned Division Bench took up the question 'as to whether a positive mandate could be issued commanding the respondents in the writ petition to treat the writ-petitioner as selected candidate and he be treated as having been appointed pursuant to selection made by the Selection Committee' and after referring to and quoting the operative paragraphs of the Writ Court judgment held that the petitioner was entitled to relief claimed for and deserved appointment from the State Government. Learned Division Bench, therefore, disposed of the LPA vide Judgment dated 09.09.1999. Learned Division Bench, therefore, disposed of the LPA vide Judgment dated 09.09.1999. Operative paragraphs of the judgment read: "If above is the position of law a person who has been convicted then a person who stands acquitted is definitely on a better footing. He is definitely entitled to the relief claimed for as order of acquittal has been passed. Therefore, he deserves appointment from the State Government. In view of the position of law noticed above, the only variation which is being made is that the appellant-State would consider the case of the respondent/writ-petitioner for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive). Merely because he was involved in a criminal case in which case he stands discharged would not stand in his way. The appellate authorities to pass an order in this regard. Let this be done within a period of two months from the date copy of the order passed by this court is made available by the respondent/writ-petitioner to the appellant-State and its functionaries, who figure as respondents in the writ petition. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." 4. After the Judgment in the LPA, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed, Jammu Range, issued Order No. 51 of 2000 dated 09.03.2000 whereby petitioner was appointed as probationary Sub-Inspector in J & K Armed Police against the existing vacancy with a condition that he shall remain on probation for a period of three years with effect from his joining his duties. At a later stage the petitioner submitted a representation to the respondents for giving retrospective effect to his appointment and fixing his seniority from the year 1990 when he was selected for appointment. This representation was rejected by the Director General of Police-respondent No. 2 vide PHQ Order No. 2302 of 2008 dated 09.07.2008 as he took the view that the petitioner was not appointed in the year 1990, meaning thereby that he was not physically present on the rolls of the department. Petitioner claims to have preferred appeal against this order on 17.08.2008 to the Home Department-respondent No. 1, which he alleges was not decided. 5. Petitioner claims to have preferred appeal against this order on 17.08.2008 to the Home Department-respondent No. 1, which he alleges was not decided. 5. By the medium of this writ petition, petitioner seeks writ of mandamus commanding respondent No. 1 to decide his appeal dated 17.08.2008 and further commanding the respondents to give him seniority with effect from the year 1990 along with his batch mates and to promote him to the rank of Dy. S.P. by fixing his seniority with effect from the year 1990. In addition, petitioner seeks writ of certiorari quashing order dated 09.07.2008 issued by respondent No. 2 whereby his representation was rejected. 6. Case set up by the petitioner, primarily, is that learned Writ Court in its judgment had commanded the respondents to consider the petitioner for appointment pursuant to his selection made by the selection committee so in view of the Judgment the respondents are bound to provide him seniority from the year 1990 when the selection was made. It is contended also that even though respondents can deny monetary benefits to the petitioner, they are under obligation to provide him seniority and promotion from due date. 7. Stand of the respondents in their objections is that as the petitioner did not exist on the rolls of the department nor he physically performed his duties, he is not entitled to the antedating of his seniority. It is contended also that the petitioner having been detained under PSA is not entitled to claim benefit of antedating. Further it is contended that benefit of retrospective appointment has not been granted to the petitioner by the Writ Court or the LPA Court so there is no cause of action for filing fresh writ petition and raising the question afresh. 8. Mr. M.I. Sherkhan, learned counsel for petitioner, submitted that petitioner was illegally deprived of the benefit of appointment along with his batch mates due to his false implication in a criminal case and detention under PSA. Mr. Khan argued vehemently that the learned Writ Court and the learned LPA Court have found the petitioner entitled to appointment pursuant to his selection in the year 1990 so respondents cannot deny giving retrospective effect to his appointment and benefit of seniority from the date of his selection. Mr. Mr. Khan argued vehemently that the learned Writ Court and the learned LPA Court have found the petitioner entitled to appointment pursuant to his selection in the year 1990 so respondents cannot deny giving retrospective effect to his appointment and benefit of seniority from the date of his selection. Mr. Elian would say that refusing such a benefit has caused discrimination to the petitioner as compared to the persons who were selected along with him and have now risen to the rank of Dy. S.P. and above and thereby his fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have been infringed. 9. Per contra, Mr. W.S. Nargal, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondents submitted that there was no illegality in not appointing the petitioner along with his co-selectees in the year 1990 in face of adverse character verification report due to his involvement in a criminal case under TADA and detention under PSA. Mr. Nargal argued that no direction for giving retrospective effect to appointment of the petitioner was issued either by the Writ Court or by the LPA Court so there is no cause of action for filing fresh writ petition in this regard. Mr. Nargal, in particular, referred to the observation made and direction issued by the learned Division Bench in the operative part of the LPA Judgment and submitted that the judgment of the Writ Court has merged into the judgment of the learned Division Bench in the LPA in which there even is no indication of giving retrospective effect to the appointment of the petitioner. 10. The question raised for determination of this Court is: Whether in backdrop of the aforementioned fact situation the petitioner is entitled to claim retrospective effect to his appointment and fixing his seniority from the year 1990 for the purpose of giving promotional benefit? 11. On reading the judgment dated 05.11.1999 rendered by the learned Single Bench in the writ petition and the judgment dated 09.09.1999 rendered by the learned Division Bench in the LPA filed by the respondents, it is evident that question in regard to legality or otherwise of refusing appointment to the petitioner due to adverse character verification was neither raised nor taken up for determination in the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner. Learned Single Bench, while allowing the writ petition, held that respondents, having selected the petitioner and having failed to prove his involvement in a criminal case, have no reason to deny employment to him. Likewise, learned Division Bench held that petitioner was entitled to relief claimed for as order of acquittal has been passed. What is thus clear is that learned Single Bench as also the learned Division Bench had found the petitioner entitled to appointment pursuant to and because of his discharge/acquittal in the criminal Case. Refusal of appointment till the time of discharge/acquittal was not held illegal. Question in regard to the legality or otherwise of refusing the appointment order till the petitioner earned discharged/acquitted in the criminal case in the year 1994 vide Judgment of the trial Court dated 30.12.1994, therefore, does not arise in this petition nor can be raised. 12. As said hereinabove also, petitioner seeks retrospective effect to his appointment and seniority, primarily, on the ground that learned Single Bench vide Judgment dated 05.11.1999 had directed the respondent to accord consideration to his appointment pursuant to his selection in the year 1990. In this context it was argued by the learned AAG that the judgment of the learned Single Bench in the writ petition has merged into the judgment of the learned Division Bench in the LPA. 13. There cannot be any dispute in regard to the legal position that when there are two judgments, one from Single Bench and another from Division Bench, the two cannot operate simultaneously and it is the judgment of the Division Bench which will hold the field and govern the subject matter of dispute between the parties and will bind them. Reference in this regard can be made to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in LPA No. 39/2010, Mehraj-ud-Din Mir v. State of J & K & Ors. 2010 (2) JKJ 343 [HC] : JKJ Soft JKJ/25183 : 2010 SLJ 828. 14. The question of merger, however, does not deserve much attention in this case for the reason that in neither of the two judgments there is any direction clearly or by implication that the appointment order shall be issued with retrospective effect from the date of selection or from the date when the co-selectees of the petitioner were appointed or his seniority shall be reckoned from that date. This is not even the case of the petitioner as had it been so there was no necessity of filing this writ petition. Learned Single Bench, while directing that for his appointment the petitioner be treated as selected candidate pursuant to selection made by the selection committee, cannot be said to have directed the respondents to give retrospective effect to his appointment from the date of selection for the simple reason that such a direction, if intended, could have been issued in clear terms. Learned Single Bench had emphasized that appointment of the petitioner shall be made on the basis of his selection having taken place in the year 1990 and in no case can be construed to have issued any direction to appoint him retrospectively from that time. Doubt, if any, stands cleared by the judgment of the learned Division Bench whereby it was directed that respondents shall consider the case of the writ-petitioner for his appointment and merely because he was involved in criminal case in which he stands discharged would not come in his way. 15. The clear and indisputable position, thus, arising is that both, the Writ Court and the LPA Court, in earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner had found him entitled to appointment on the basis of his selection in the year 1990 because of his acquittal/discharge in the criminal case and therefore, issued direction to the respondents to appoint/accord consideration to his appointment. No direction for giving retrospective effect to his appointment from the date of selection or date of appointment of co-selectees, however, was issued. 16. As a matter of fact, retrospective effect to his appointment from the date of selection or giving him seniority from that date does not seem to have been claimed by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition filed by him. The judgment dated 05.11.1998 rendered by the learned Single Bench would show that in that writ petition petitioner had sought writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to issue appointment order in his favour pursuant to his selection and to pay him compensation to the tune of Rs. 85 lac for malicious prosecution and falsely impleading him in criminal case, depriving him of liberty, service and comforts of life. Relief of compensation, however, was not granted nor was the denial of this relief assailed by the petitioner. 17. 85 lac for malicious prosecution and falsely impleading him in criminal case, depriving him of liberty, service and comforts of life. Relief of compensation, however, was not granted nor was the denial of this relief assailed by the petitioner. 17. Relief of retrospective effect to the appointment or fixation of seniority with retrospective effect having not been claimed in the earlier writ petition and in any case having not been granted by the learned Single Bench or the learned Division Bench, such a relief cannot be claimed by way of a subsequent writ petition. A similar view has been taken by a learned Division Bench of this Court in LPA(SW) No. 87/2015 disposed of vide judgment dated 23.02.2016. Respondent in that case was given engagement as R-e-T pursuant to and in compliance with the judgment dated 22.2.2007 rendered by the learned Writ Court in an earlier writ petition filed by him. In that writ petition respondents had not prayed for retrospective appointment. Appointment order was issued in his favour on 17.7.2013. The respondent filed another writ petition in which a learned Single Bench vide order dated 19.12.2014 issued direction to the appellants therein to treat the petitioner as having been appointed/engaged as R-e-T though notionally with effect from the date when Ms. Janko Devi was engaged whose appointment subsequently was found to be illegal and an outcome of fraud. In LPA filed by the respondents, learned Division Bench, while relying upon Hon'ble the Supreme Court judgment dated 02.05.2011 in SLP (Civil) 9415-9416/2008, modified the order passed by the learned Single Bench to the effect that the appointment of respondent shall be treated from the date of judgment notionally, that is, from 22.02.2007, for the purposes of getting regularization. It is apt to quote paragraphs-3, 4 of the judgment dated 23.02.2016: "3. It is a fact that the respondent has not prayed for retrospective appointment in the earlier proceedings. A similar issue was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 9415-9416/2008 and by judgment dated 02.05.2011, in respect of RET. Hon'ble the Supreme Court directed to consider the appointment of the petitioner as RET w.e.f. the date of judgment of writ Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court further ordered that the said appointment should be without monetary benefits. However, for regularization, the said period was directed to be taken into consideration. Hon'ble the Supreme Court directed to consider the appointment of the petitioner as RET w.e.f. the date of judgment of writ Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court further ordered that the said appointment should be without monetary benefits. However, for regularization, the said period was directed to be taken into consideration. In this case, judgment of the writ Court in the earlier proceedings was rendered on 22.02.2007, therefore, the order passed by the writ court granting appointment w.e.f. 22.09.2003 stands modified to the effect that the appointment of the petitioner shall be treated from the date of judgment notionally i.e. from 22.02.2007 for the purposes of getting regularization. However, he is entitled to get pecuniary benefits only from the date of joining the post." 18. Matter needs to be looked from another angle also. Petitioner could not have been appointed after his selection in the year 1990 due to adverse character verification because of his involvement and arrest in a criminal case under TADA and detention under PSA. Detention under PSA was quashed by this Court on 02.04.1992 and petitioner was discharged/acquitted of the criminal charge on 30.12.1994. After his discharge/acquittal, the petitioner filed SWP No. 123/1995 seeking aforementioned reliefs. Judgment dated 05.11.1998 (supra) rendered by the Writ Court does not show nor there is any other material to show that before filing that writ petition, petitioner had approached respondents (Competent Authority) for appointing him pursuant to his discharge/acquittal. He instead chose to file the writ petition straightway, matter became subjudice in this Court till the writ petition was deciding in November, 1998. LPA against the judgment was decided in September, 1999 and learned Division Bench vide judgment dated 09.09.1999 gave two months' time to the respondents to issue the order in this regard. Appointment order came to be issued on 09.03.2000. It is, thus, clear that there had been no deliberate delay on the part of the respondents in issuing the appointment order after discharge/acquittal of the petitioner. The petitioner seems to have felt satisfied with the issuance of appointment order on 09.03.2000 though he again agitated the matter by filing a representation apparently somewhere in the year 2008. For all these reasons also the benefit of retrospective effect cannot be granted and even equity is not in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner seems to have felt satisfied with the issuance of appointment order on 09.03.2000 though he again agitated the matter by filing a representation apparently somewhere in the year 2008. For all these reasons also the benefit of retrospective effect cannot be granted and even equity is not in favour of the petitioner. Respondents, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any illegality in refusing retrospective effect to the appointment of the petitioner nor a case for issuing writ in this regard is made out. 19. For all that said and discussed above, this writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. Disposed of.