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2016 DIGILAW 35 (JHR)

Md. Anamul Haque @ Anamul Ansari v. State of Jharkhand

2016-01-05

RAVI NATH VERMA

body2016
ORDER : 1. Invoking the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short “the Code”) the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding of Complaint Case No. 102 of 2004, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi, on the ground that for the same set of facts and offence, the petitioners have already been acquitted after trial by the learned Sessions Judge, Lohardaga vide judgment of acquittal dated 29.08.2005 passed in Sessions Trial No. 120 of 2003. 2. The facts of the case, which is based on a complaint filed at the instance of Samida Khatoon, in short, is that her marriage was solemnized with Md. Anamul Haque-the petitioner no. 1 on 26.11.1999 and it was also registered in the village Panchayat. In the marriage, her father had given sufficient cash to her husband and after marriage, she went to her Sasural with gift of Rs. 20,000/- and ornaments of Rs. 10,000/- and lived there up to 25th November, 2003 but thereafter her husband and in-laws started torturing her for further dowry of Rs. 50,000/- and due to non-fulfillment of their demand, she was subjected to physical and mental torture. Even, she was ravished completely by her father-in-law and after committing rape, her father-in-law threatened her not to disclose this fact to anyone but when she informed her husband about the rape, all the accused persons tortured her and kicked her out of matrimonial home. She came back to her father’s house and the information regarding the torture and rape was given to Kuru Police Station on 26.03.2003 but as no step was taken against the accused persons, she filed the present complaint case. 3. It appears from the record that after examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation and other witnesses, the court below took cognizance of the offence under Section 498-A and 323 I.P.C. but held that no case of rape under Section 376 I.P.C. is made out. It further appears that the petitioners by filing supplementary affidavit have brought on record the judgment of acquittal passed in Sessions Trial No. 120 of 2003 arising out of Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003. It further appears that the petitioners by filing supplementary affidavit have brought on record the judgment of acquittal passed in Sessions Trial No. 120 of 2003 arising out of Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003. The prosecution case as disclosed in the said judgment reveals that on the written report of the informant Samida Khatoon Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003 was instituted on 24.03.2003 with the allegation that her marriage with Anamul Haque Ansari son of Abdul Gaffar Ansari was solemnized on 26.11.1999 according to Muslim customs and rites and after marriage, she started residing in village Baridih, within the police station Kuru, district-Lohardaga along with her husband, but almost after lapse of one year, the accused persons namely her husband-Anamul Haque Ansari, father-in-law Abdul Gaffar Ansari and mother-in-law started torturing her and used to hurl threat to oust her from matrimonial home. It was also alleged that whenever her relatives came at her matrimonial home, they were also abused and assaulted and that her father-in-law Abdul Gaffar Ansari on several occasion tried to commit rape on her but whenever she complained regarding such act of her father-in-law to her husband, he did not pay heed and flatly refused to interfere by saying that he has no concern in any matter relating to her. It is also alleged that the accused persons had demanded Rs. 50,000/- and a motorcycle. Whereafter, Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003 was instituted against the petitioners. After investigation, the police submitted the charge-sheet against the three accused persons of that case, who are the petitioners before this court namely Anamul Haque, Abdul Gaffar Ansari and Hakiman Khatoon. Accordingly, the court took cognizance of the offence under Sections 498-A and 376/511 of I.P.C. but after trial, the petitioners were acquitted of the charges vide judgment dated 29.08.2005 passed by Sessions Judge, Lohardaga as indicated above. 4. Mr. Jitendra Singh learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners after full trial have already been acquitted of the charges in Session Trial No. 120 of 2003 arising out of Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003 by a competent court and as such, the continuation of the proceeding in the instant case for the same set of facts is completely barred under Section 300 of the Code and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that Article 20(2) provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once while Section 300 of the Code clearly imposes restriction that the person, who once has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence. It was also submitted that in the instant case also, the court after taking cognizance of the offence, issued summons for the appearance of the petitioners and put the petitioners on trial, which is not permissible under the law. Learned counsel further submitted that in the first case, which was lodged on the basis of the first information report and in the instant case, the only difference is that in the earlier case, cognizance was taken under Section 376/511 I.P.C. besides 498-A of I.P.C. but in the instant case, the court has taken cognizance of the offence only under Section 498- A and 323 of I.P.C. and refused to take cognizance under Section 376 of I.P.C. 5. Contrary to the aforesaid submissions, Md. Mokhtar Khan learned counsel appearing for opposite party no. 2 fairly informed the Court that for the same set of facts and offences, petitioners have already been acquitted of charges by competent court after full trial, the present case is obviously barred under the provisions of Section 300 of the Code and under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. 6. Before I enter into the factual aspect of the case, I would like to refer Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Article 20(2) provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same set of offence more than once. To attract applicability of Article 20(2), there must be a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence for which the accused has been prosecuted and punished previously. A subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment are not barred if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct. It is a significant basic rule of criminal law that no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. The rule provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict which is commonly known as double jeopardy. It is a significant basic rule of criminal law that no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. The rule provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict which is commonly known as double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy is stated in the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. For better appreciation of the issue, Article 20 of the Constitution of India and Section 300 of the Code are quoted herein-below:- “Article 20(1) - No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” “Section 300 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence - (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any acts causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any acts causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, an tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. (5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is subordinate. (6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this Code. Explanation - The dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.” 7. I have gone through the complaint petition filed at the instance of the present opposite party no. 2 Samida Khatoon and have also examined the judgment of acquittal by competent court in S.T. No. 120 of 2003 arising out of Kuru P.S. Case No. 20 of 2003 and find that the facts of both the cases are exactly the same and both the cases were instituted by the same person but only difference is that in earlier F.I.R. instituted on the fardbeyan of the informant Samida Khatoon after investigation, the court had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 498-A and 376/511 but in the instant case after examination of the complainant on S.A. and other witnesses, the court took cognizance of the offence under Sections 498-A and 323 of I.P.C. and refused to take cognizance under Section 376 I.P.C. as there was no basis or material on record to proceed under Section 376 I.P.C. 8. From bare reading of Section 300 of the Code, I find that sub-section (1) of the said Section lays down the rule that a person, who has once been tried by competent court for an offence and either convicted or acquitted of such offence, is not liable to be tried for the same offence so long conviction or acquittal remains in force. 9. In the instant case, for the same set of facts, the petitioners after trial have been acquitted of the charges. Under the above circumstance, the petitioners cannot be allowed to be put on trial again to face the charges under the same provisions of Indian Penal Code for the same set of facts in which they have already been acquitted. 10. In view of the discussions made above, the entire criminal proceedings of Complaint Case No. 102 of 2004 corresponding to T.R. No. 1055 of 2005, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi is, hereby, quashed. 11. In the result, this criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed.