JUDGMENT : This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC questioning the judgment dated 07.07.2012 delivered in T.A. No. 14 of 2011 by the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur [as he then was]. By the said judgment, the judgment dated 30.03.2011 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, South Tripura, Udaipur in T.S. 32 of 2009 has been affirmed. 2. For purpose of hearing the appeal, the following substantial question of law was formulated : “Whether in view of paragraph (3) of the Tripura Foodgrains (Distribution) Control Order, 1972 as amended on 24.06.1987, providing right to appeal to the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, incharge of the Food Department, against any order passed by the Director of Food & Civil Supplies within 30(thirty) days from the date of the order, a suit as filed by the respondent can be maintained ?” 3. The essential fact as would be material to understand the challenge may be introduced at the outset. The respondents instituted the suit being T.S. 32 of 2009 having been aggrieved by the suspension order dated 05.02.2009, issued by the SDM, Udaipur [the defendant No. 3 in the suit] by which the dealership of the respondent was suspended and the other consequential orders including the order of cancellation of dealership by the memorandum dated 16.01.2009. The respondent was engaged in distribution of the essential commodities to the consumers from his fair price shop following the guidelines prescribed by the licensing authority till 05.02.2009 on which day the SDM (Sri M.L. Das) suspended his license by the order No. 1708/F.3.(47)SDM/UDP/FP/08 dated 05.02.2009. It has been pleaded that before the said order dated 05.02.2009 was passed, the respondent was asked to show cause by the notice dated 07.01.2009. The show cause notice was issued on the basis of the report furnished by the Inspector of Food after visiting the F.P. shop of the respondent on 03.01.2009. 4. The respondent submitted his reply denying all the allegations of committing irregularities. On 20.01.2009 the respondent was asked to appear in person before the S.D.C.(Food).The plaintiff-respondent herein was personally heard by the S.D.C. and thereafter the said suspension order dated 05.02.2009 was issued. 5. In the suit, for demonstrating the illegality and impropriety of the impugned order and memorandum, the plaintiff urged inter alia that the allegations are baseless and the memorandum dated 20.01.2009 was beyond jurisdiction. 5. In the suit, for demonstrating the illegality and impropriety of the impugned order and memorandum, the plaintiff urged inter alia that the allegations are baseless and the memorandum dated 20.01.2009 was beyond jurisdiction. Consequentially, the suspension order dated 05.02.2009 was also without jurisdiction inasmuch as Mr. M.L. Das, the respondent No.3, who issued the suspension order was not a regular SDM. However, the license was cancelled by a regular SDM on 16.06.2009. The allegations against the respondent was that he did not display the stock and price chart of the ration commodities and the list of names of BPL/AAY/ANP beneficiaries and during the inspection of the said inspector, the ration card holders bearing ration card Nos. BPL R/C No. 176, BPL R/C. No. 2 and APL R/C. No. 142 complained to him that they had not been delivered sugar, KOil, by the plaintiff for last few months and what he delivered had been lesser than the prescribed scale. According to the plaintiff-respondent, when the ration cards were verified it was found that the allegations were not sustainable at all. The plaintiff-respondent has averred that even though he filed an elaborate reply against the notice dated 07.01.2009 but no hearing was afforded by the proper authority. Not affording the opportunity of hearing his license was suspended arbitrarily by the said order dated 05.02.2009. Categorically, what has been pleaded is that Sri. M.L. Saha, Addl. S.D.M., the respondent No. 3 had no authority to pass such order of suspension. On culmination of the said vitiated procedure, his license/dealership was cancelled. 6. By filing a common written statement the appellants have stood by their allegations and contended that no proper reply was made by the plaintiff-respondent. From their statements what further has surfaced is as under : “Prior to the above noted show cause notice several allegations for non-delivery of BPL Rice to BPL card holders received in the Office and explanation letter in this regard was issued from this office in earlier occasion vide No. F.4(41)/SDO/UDPFP/92/285-88 dated 04.04.2002 (Annexure No. 01 enclosed herewith). On the other hand Sri Swapan Das, exdealer of Dhajanagar F.P. Shop No. 3 was penalized by the weights & measure department with pecuniary fine in tune of Rs. 1,000/on 06.01.09 for keeping inaccurate weight stone and the same was collected vide M.R. No. 25543/1022 dt. On the other hand Sri Swapan Das, exdealer of Dhajanagar F.P. Shop No. 3 was penalized by the weights & measure department with pecuniary fine in tune of Rs. 1,000/on 06.01.09 for keeping inaccurate weight stone and the same was collected vide M.R. No. 25543/1022 dt. 06.01.09 (Annexure No. 2 enclosed herewith) which is proved that willfully he committed this offence as such he has violated the terms and condition as laid down in the aforesaid Control Order as well as different terms and conditions of weights and measures rules.” 7. Having due regard to the pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as under : “1. Whether the present suit is maintainable in its present form and nature? 2. Whether the defendant No. 3 was the Licensing Authority of the plaintiff, or he was holding the post of SDM, Udaipur on 05.02.09?” 3. Whether suspension order No. 1708/F.3(47)SDM/UDP/FP/08, dated 05.02.09 issued and signed by Sri M.L. Das as Licensing Authority (defendant No.3) by which he suspended the dealership of the plaintiff is void, illegal and inoperative ? 4. Whether the Memo No. 247/F.4 (41) SDM/UDP/FP/92 dated 16.06.09 issued and signed by SDM, Udaipur, by which he cancelled the dealership of the plaintiff is void, illegal ?” 8. Finally, on recording the evidence, the trial court came to the finding that the order dated 05.02.2009 and the memorandum dated 16.09.2009 were illegal and those cannot be allowed to continue any further. As such, the respondents were directed to allow the plaintiff-respondent to continue such retail dealership of Dhajanagar FP shop (No.3), unless the dealership is terminated in terms of the provisions of paragraph 3(2) of the Tripura Foodgrains (Distribution) Control Order, 1972. The defendants have also been mandated compensation to the extent of Rs.90,000/- again the period from 05.02.2009 to 05.03.2011 when the dealership was under suspension and to pay further compensation with effect from 06.03.2011 at Rs.5,000/- per month till the date up to which the order dated 05.02.2009 and the memorandum dated 16.06.2009 continued or continue to remain in force along with interest @ 6% per month, till the date of realization. 9. Being aggrieved by the said judgment dated 30.03.2011 delivered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, South Tripura, Udaipur, the appellants herein filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the court of the District Judge being TA No. 14 of 2011. 9. Being aggrieved by the said judgment dated 30.03.2011 delivered by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, South Tripura, Udaipur, the appellants herein filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the court of the District Judge being TA No. 14 of 2011. By the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2012, the said first appeal has been dismissed against the said concurrent finding, the present appeal has been filed on the substantial ground as noted above. 10. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that both the courts below have come to a perverse finding without determining the jurisdictional objection as raised in the written statements in the following words : “15. As per law any dealer, if aggrieved by the order of the Director may file appeal to the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Incharge of the Food Department within 30 days from the suspension order of dealership. But the plaintiff did not file any appeal and hence he is barred by the principles of estoppels, waiver.” Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has further submitted that even the first appellate court has come wrongly to the following finding while appreciating the challenge as to the necessity of exhausting the remedy available at law. “The Order of 1972 has not provided any remedy to an aggrieved retailer if any order is passed by the licensing authority under Paragraph 3(2) and by which any amendment, suspension or revocation of his appointment is done. Be that as it may, Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to undo the wrong done to a retailer in accordance with Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, otherwise there shall be a wrong without remedy which is not permissible. Viewed in that perspective, learned trial court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 11. Mr. Be that as it may, Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to undo the wrong done to a retailer in accordance with Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, otherwise there shall be a wrong without remedy which is not permissible. Viewed in that perspective, learned trial court has inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 11. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has produced the Tripura Foodgrains (Distribution) Control Amendment Order, 1987 published vided the notification dated 24.06.1987 for inserting a subparagraph after the subpara2 to the para 3 of Tripura Food grains (Distribution) Control Order, 1972 : “(3) A retail dealer aggrieved by an order of the Director under sub paragraph (2) may prefer an appeal to the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, in charge of the Food Department, against any order of amendment, suspension or revocation of his appointment within 30 days from the date of the order appealed against and the Secretary shall dispose of the appeal after giving the appellant the reasonable opportunity of being heard.” 12. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel has submitted that the civil court therefore was not having any jurisdiction under Section 9 of the CPC when a remedy is provided under the statute, the plaintiff was under obligation to follow the remedial jurisdiction. To bolster his submission, Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has relied on a decision of the apex court in Chandraikant Tukaram Nikam & Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad & Another reported in AIR 2002 SC 997 . 13. The said case was in respect of an industrial dispute. The apex court has held that the powers of the authorities deciding industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act are very extensive, much wider than the powers of a Civil Court while adjudicating a dispute, which may be an industrial dispute. 13. The said case was in respect of an industrial dispute. The apex court has held that the powers of the authorities deciding industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act are very extensive, much wider than the powers of a Civil Court while adjudicating a dispute, which may be an industrial dispute. But under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act since the ‘workman’ cannot approach the Labour Court or Tribunal directly and the Government can refuse to make a reference even on grounds of expediency, such handicap would lead to the conclusion that for adjudication of an industrial dispute in connection with a right or obligation under the general or common law and not created under the Act, the remedy is not exclusive, and on the other hand is not alternative, and therefore, the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned with enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act and not otherwise. In other words, it was held that if the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. But if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of the right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. 14. In Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam (supra) the apex court based on this principle has held that, the legality of order of termination passed by the employer will be an Industrial Dispute. In the aforesaid premises the apex court has held that in such case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been impliedly barred and the appropriate forum for resolution of such dispute is the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. Mr. In the aforesaid premises the apex court has held that in such case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been impliedly barred and the appropriate forum for resolution of such dispute is the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel taking nourishment from the decision has submitted that dispute herein relates to the breach of the license conditionalities and the appropriate action therefore can be indulged by the licensing authority under the Para 3(2) of the Tripura Foodgrains (Distribution) Control Order, 1972 and as such the civil court cannot wield the jurisdiction to adjudicate such dispute when a substantive remedial forum is provided by the subpara (3) as has been inserted by way of amendment. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has also relied on a decision of the apex court in Krishnan Lal versus State of Jammu & Kashmir reported in (1994)4 SCC 422 where the apex court has held : “That the civil courts’ jurisdiction was barred, inasmuch as there being violation of mandatory provision ad contained in Section 17(5) of the Act, it can well be said that the respondents had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and by doing so that committed a “jurisdictional error”. 16. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has stoutly stated that the crux of the petitioners challenge in the suit was that the order of suspension which was followed by the memorandum cancelling the dealership of the plaintiff-respondent was issued by a person having no authority to issue such order. In this regard the finding of the courts below are not only concurrent but could not be comprehended by the defendant-appellant in any manner and the ground in this appeal in respect of the subpara3 of the said order. But from a clean reading of Krishan Lal (supra) it would be apparent that the finding the apex court has observed as under: “11. We may not labour much on this appoint because of the aforesaid legal proposition and also because of what was pointed out by a Constitution Bench in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., (1993) 3 SCC 161 that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court should not be readily inferred. We may not labour much on this appoint because of the aforesaid legal proposition and also because of what was pointed out by a Constitution Bench in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., (1993) 3 SCC 161 that exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court should not be readily inferred. So we agree with Shri Mehta that the High Court erred in law in holding that the civil courts’ jurisdiction was barred, inasmuch as there being violation of mandatory provision as contained in Section 17(5) of the Act, it can well be said that the respondents had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and by doing so they committed a “jurisdictional error”.” [Emphasis added] 17. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has also relied on a decision of the apex court in Premier Automobiles Ltd vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke reported in (1976) 1 SCC 496 to hold that when any order is passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute, it can be challenged both under the forum created by any statutory provision or under the Civil court and the right to elect lies with the person aggrieved by any action. 18. It is true that the principles adumbrated in Premier Automobiles (supra) may not be very relevant as a whole for the present case. The question that is pertinent in the present context is that when the impugned order has been passed by the person other than who was designated, such order can be treated as the order against the mandatory provisions created by Tripura Foodgrain (Distribution) Control Order, 1972 and the answer given by the courts below concurrently is violative of all such mandatory provisions. Thus, the principle No.3 of Premier Automobiles (supra) is of immense relevance. There it has been stated that “the words under the Act” in the principle No.3 must, in our considered opinion, be understood as referring not only to Industrial Disputes Act but also to all sister enactments [like Industrial Employment] (Standing Orders) Act] which do not provide a special forum of their own for enforcement of the rights and liabilities created by the certified Standing Orders has necessarily got to be adjudicated only in the forum, created by the Industrial Disputes Act. It has been provided that such a dispute amounts to an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) and 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act or such enactment says that such dispute shall either be treated as an industrial dispute or shall be adjudicated by any of the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act. The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such disputes. In other words, a dispute arising between the employer and the workman/workmen under, or for the enforcement of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders, is an industrial dispute, if it satisfies the requirements of Section 2(k) and/or Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act and that dispute must be adjudicated in the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act alone. This would be so, even if the dispute raised or relied claimed is based partly upon certified Standing Orders and partly on general law of contract.” 19. It has been further held that the certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to “statutory provisions”. Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relied either before the forum a created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where the recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated therein. 20. In Krishnan Lal (supra) the apex court has clearly stated that when the mandatory provisions having been violated, the Civil court jurisdiction cannot be excluded. In Wells vs. Ministry of Housing and Local Government reported in (1967) 1 WLR 1000 : (1967) 2 ALL ER 1041 as quoted in H.W.R. Wade’s Administrative Law, the law has been stated as under : “I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity can be waived, even by a public authority, so as to render valid that which would otherwise be invalid.” 21. Even the apex court in Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 held as under : 10. Even the apex court in Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 held as under : 10. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") says that Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature "except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". According to the Corporation once the jurisdiction of the Court to try a suit in which the validity of any order passed under the provisions of the Corporation Act or the notice issued thereunder has been specifically barred and an internal remedy has been provided for redressal of the grievances of the persons concerned, there is no scope for Court to entertain a suit. 11. In the olden days the source of most of the rights and liabilities could be traced to the common law. Then statutory enactments were few. Even such enactments only created rights or liabilities but seldom provided forums for remedies. The result was that any person having a grievance that he had been wronged or his fight was being affected, could approach the ordinary Civil Court on the principle of law that where there is a right there is a remedyubi jus ibi remedium. As no internal remedy had been provided in the different statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary Civil Courts had to examine the grievances in the light of different statutes. With the concept of the Welfare State, it was realised that enactments creating liabilities in respect of payment of taxes obligations after vesting of estates and conferring rights on a class of citizens, should be complete codes by themselves. With that object in view, forums were created under the Acts themselves where grievances could be entertained on behalf of the persons aggrieved. Provisions were also made for appeals and revision to higher authorities. 12. Then a question arose as to where a particular Act had created a right or liability and had also provided a forum for enforcement of such right or for protection from enforcement of a liability without any authority in law, whether a citizen could approach a Court. It may be pointed out that many statutes have created certain rights or liabilities and have also provided the remedial measures in respect thereof. It may be pointed out that many statutes have created certain rights or liabilities and have also provided the remedial measures in respect thereof. But such statutes have not touched the common law rights of the citizen. But there are some statutes, which in public interest affect even the common law rights or liabilities of toe citizen, which were in the nature of existing rights. The distinction between the two types of rights or liabilities is subtle in nature but at the same time very vital. 23. With the increase in the number of taxing statutes, welfare legislations and enactments to protect a class of citizens, a trend can be noticed that most of such legislations confer decision making powers on various authorities and they seeks to limit or exclude Court's power to review those decisions. The result is that the power of the Court under section 9 of the Code is being denuded and curtailed by such special enactments, in respect of liabilities created or rights conferred. This Court in the judgments referred to above has upheld the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Court on examination of two questions - (1) Whether the right or liability in respect whereof grievance has been made, had been created under an enactment and it did not relate to a preexisting common law right? (2) Whether the machinery provided for redressal of the grievance in respect of infringement of such right or imposition of a liability under such enactment, was adequate and complete? The ouster of the jurisdiction of the Court was upheld on the finding that the rights or liabilities in question had been created by the Act in question and remedy provided therein was adequate. 24. But the situation will be different where a statute purports to curb and curtail a preexisting common law right and purports to oust the jurisdiction of the Court so far remedy against the orders passed under such statute are concerned. In such cases, the courts have to be more vigilant, while examining the question as to whether an adequate redressal machinery has been provided, before which the, person aggrieved may agitate his grievance. In such cases, the courts have to be more vigilant, while examining the question as to whether an adequate redressal machinery has been provided, before which the, person aggrieved may agitate his grievance. In the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 , this Court after referring to the case of Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 807 , observed: "It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to two limitations. First, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors." It was held that a suit for declaration that "the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain properties to be an 'estate' under Section 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act was void, was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an'inam village'. In Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government, [1960] A.C. 260, the appellants sought a declaration of their common law right to quarry their land without the need to obtain planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. In that connection it was said: "The appellant company are given no new right of quarrying by the Act of 1947. Their right is a common law right and the only question is how far it has been taken away. They do not uno flatu claim under the Act and seek a remedy elsewhere. On the contrary, they deny that they come within its purview and seek a declaration to that effect." 25. In spite of the bar placed on the power of the Court orders passed under such statutes can be examined on "jurisdictional question". They do not uno flatu claim under the Act and seek a remedy elsewhere. On the contrary, they deny that they come within its purview and seek a declaration to that effect." 25. In spite of the bar placed on the power of the Court orders passed under such statutes can be examined on "jurisdictional question". To illustrate, a special machinery has been provided for removal of the encroachments from public land' under different enactments in different states and the jurisdiction of the Court has been barred in respect of the orders passed by such special tribunals or authorities constituted under such Acts. Still a suit will be maintainable before a Court on a plea that the land in question shall not be deemed to be public land within the meaning of the definition of public land given in the Act in question, and as such provisions thereof shall not be applicable. [Emphasis added] 22. Having regard to the principles as stated above this court is of the view that in view of the challenge raised to the authority of Mr. M.L. Das, Addl. SDM the respondent No.3, the suit was amenable to the jurisdiction of the civil court as well as to the special forum as created by the sub-para 3 of the para 3 of Tripura Foodgrains (Distribution) Control Order, 1972 as the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be said to be impliedly or expressly barred by the said provision. Thus, there is no irregularity which cannot be waived by this court even if it found that there is the statutory remedy. 23. Having held so, this court does not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs thereafter.