JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. Application No. 34321/2013 has been filed for taking legal representatives of Petitioner No. 1, Raghuveer Dutt, who expired on 27.05.2013. 2. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the application is allowed. Legal representatives of deceased Petitioner No. 1 as mentioned in the application are taken on record. Amended Cause Title annexed with the application be taken on record. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties on the writ petition. 4. This writ petition has been filed by the defendants-petitioners assailing order dated 23.07.2010 passed by Civil Judge(SD) No. 1, Srimadhopur, District Sikar whereby application filed by the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC has been allowed. Plaintiff No. 3, who on purchasing the disputed property from the original plaintiff, filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC and was impleaded as Plaintiff No. 3 by order dated 10.07.2008 passed by the trial court. The respondents-plaintiffs filed the aforesaid application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC seeking amendments in the plaint. First amendment was based on the objection of the defendants-petitioners in the written statement that date of death of Bhagwan Sahai, who was father of Hari Narain in fact took place in the year 1940 and not in 1960 as pleaded in para no. 1 of the plaint. It may be noted at this stage that Hari Narain mortgaged the disputed property with the defendants-petitioners on 26.08.1957 and the suit was filed by the original plaintiff Sitaram and others for redemption of that mortgage in the year 1987. Second amendment that was sought to be inserted was to the factum of sale of disputed property by original plaintiff to plaintiff No. 3. Third amendment sought to be inserted was in fact insertion of prayer clause in respect of restoring possession of the property now to Plaintiff No. 3. 5. Mr. Anoop Dhand, learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants argued that there was an order of injunction by the learned trial court and therefore by virtue of doctrine of lis pendense, the respondents-plaintiffs could not sell the disputed property save with permission of the Court. His further argument is that the claim of the plaintiff No. 3 to recover possession of disputed property was time barred. His further argument is that the claim of the plaintiff No. 3 to recover possession of disputed property was time barred. It is also argued that in another suit for permanent injunction No. 69/2010, stay order was passed against the plaintiffs-respondents and the plaintiffs have been restrained from handing over the possession of the suit property on the basis of sale deed. If the amendment is allowed it would change the nature of the plaint. Learned counsel submitted that insertion in the prayer clause would amount to fresh suit and such suit would be barred by limitation. In support of his arguments, learned counsel fro the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashutosh Chaturvedi v. Prano Devi Alias Parani Devi & Others, (2008) 15 SCC 610 . 6. Mr. B.L. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the suit was originally filed in the year 1987 by Plaintiff No. 1 and 2 for redemption of suit property. They sold the suit property to Plaintiff No. 3 by sale deed dated 22.09.2004, who in less than two years thereafter filed application for impleadment on 22.07.2006 under Order 22, Rule 10 and was ordered to be impleaded as Plaintiff No. 3 vide order dated 10.09.2008 passed by the trial court. So far as amendment with regard to correction in the year of death of Bhagwan Sahai, father of the mortgagor, Hari Narain is concerned, this was passed on the objection of the defendants themselves in their written statement. Rest of the amendments namely factum of sale of suit property in favour of Plaintiff No. 3 who was later on impleaded as plaintiff and consequential prayer for possession were based on subsequent developments and therefore they could not be objected. Cited judgment by learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. Learned counsel also argued that in the reply to the application filed by the petitioners no such plea which they are now raising to argue before this Court was made namely the alleged order of injunction by the trial court in this suit or by any other suit, therefore, such an argument should not be allowed to be made herein for the first time. 7. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order, I find that the defendants-petitioners in their reply to the application filed by the respondents-plaintiffs merely raised objection that desired amendments if allowed would change the nature of the suit and suit would become time barred. The petitioners have although made a reference to injunction suit No. 69/2010 filed by them against Sitaram and others, but no such injunction order has been placed on record. The amendments brought about in the pleadings at the instance of the plaintiffs and newly impleaded plaintiff are based on subsequent developments. The impleadment having been made within two years of the sale, how the suit which was filed in the year 1987 became time barred has not been explained. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashutosh Chaturvedi (supra) cited by learned counsel for the petitioners arose out of a declaratory suit whereas the present case is with regard to redemption of mortgage. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that plaintiff no. 3 had no right or interest in the suit property earlier than the purchase of the same and therefore, he could not have any right or interest either for filing another suit for redemption of mortgaged property. Once he purchased the suit property only thereafter he could apply for his impleadment. Plaintiff No. 3 having purchased the suit property stepped into the shoes of the original plaintiff. Although, it is another matter that the original plaintiffs also continued to remain the party to the suit. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, no interference is required by this Court in the impugned order passed by the trial court. There is no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Stay application also stands dismissed.