JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. P. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents. 2. This is an appeal by the National Insurance Company Limited, the insurer of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. No. TR01S0246 [Ambassador] owned by the respondent No.3, questioning the judgment and award dated 16.05.2013 delivered in T.S.(MAC) 338 of 2012 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No. 4, West Tripura Agartala. 3. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. S. Lodh, learned counsel has urged fundamentally 3(three) grounds of objection viz: (i) The owner of the other vehicle bearing registration No. TR03C9880 [Motor Bike] involved in the said accident has not been impleaded as the party in the claim proceeding and thus the claim petition was hit by the principle of non-joinder of necessary party. In this regard Mr. Lodh, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Gauhati High Court in Dipak Kumar Jain Vs. Rita Das and Others reported in (2006) 3 GLR 720 as under : 10. In the face of the evidence on record, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the said accident took place, because of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle No. AS25A0676 (hereinafter referred to as "the offending vehicle"). In a situation, such as the present one, merely because of the fact that two vehicles were involved in the accident, no liability to make payment of compensation could have been imposed on the present appellant as owner of the vehicle No. ASU4947 and/or its insurer, i.e., the respondent No. 4 herein. When two vehicles are involved in an accident, appropriate it is that the owners of both the vehicles be made parties to the claim proceeding so as to enable the Tribunal to determine as to whose fault, if any, has led to the accident. Making the owners of both the vehicles involved in the accident as parties to a claim proceeding does not necessarily mean that the owners/insurers of both the vehicles must be fastened with the liability to pay compensation even if there was no fault on the part of the driver of one of such vehicles. Making the owners of both the vehicles involved in the accident as parties to a claim proceeding does not necessarily mean that the owners/insurers of both the vehicles must be fastened with the liability to pay compensation even if there was no fault on the part of the driver of one of such vehicles. This fundamental principle of determination of compensation, in an application under Section 166 of the MV Act (which embodies the principle of payment of compensation on fault) appears to have escaped the pattention of the learned Tribunal. (ii) Imposition of the penal interest @ 9% as bad as the traveler has no jurisdiction to impose any penal interest with retrospective effect under Section 171 of the M.V. Act. (iii) Addition of loss of future prospect at 30% cannot be sustained as the decision of Santosh Devi Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and others, reported in (2012) 6 SCC 421 and Rajesh Vs. Rajbir Singh & Others, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 54 , Sarla Verma & Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corp. & Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , Reshma Kumari Vs. Madan Mohan, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 65 in respect of loss of future prospects has been seriously questioned by the apex court in Shashikala & Others Vs. Gangalakshmamma & Another reported in (2015) ACJ 1239. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel has referred to the following passages from Shashikala (supra) to draw the attention of this court on that aspect: “28. Hence, I am of the opinion that the Rajesh & Ors. (supra) itself applied the Santosh Devi (supra) case, even while clarifying that for self employed individuals, age is also a determining factor, as is seen in the observation in the case of Rajesh & Ors. (supra) in the case of self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. In fact, this gives shape to the view that future prospects are to be taken into account even in case of self employment and also that there cannot be a set formula for determining such compensation. The best application of this view may be seen in Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210 where the facts were noticed as follows : “12. The best application of this view may be seen in Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210 where the facts were noticed as follows : “12. The appellant was a selfemployed person. Though he had claimed a monthly income of Rs.5000/-, the income tax returns filed by him demonstrate that he had paid income tax on an annual income of Rs.41,300/-. No fault, therefore, can be found in the order of the High Court which proceeds on the basis that the annual income of the claimant at the time of the accident was Rs. 41,300/-…” Then, this Court after noticing the decisions of this Court in the cases of Sarla Verma & Ors., Santosh Devi, and the three Judge Bench of this Court in Reshma Kumari & Ors. and Rajesh & Ors. (supra) applied the law in the following manner in Sanjay Verma’s case (supra): “16. Undoubtedly, the same principle will apply for determination of loss of income on account of an accident resulting in the total disability of the victim as in the present case. Therefore, taking into account the age of the claimant (25 years) and the fact that he had a steady income, as evidenced by the income tax returns, we are of the view that an addition of 50% to the income that the claimant was earning at the time of the accident would be justified. 17. Insofar as the multiplier is concerned, as held in Sarla Verma or as prescribed under the Second Schedule to the Act, the correct multiplier in the present case cannot be 15 as held by the High Court. We are of the view that the adoption of the multiplier of 17 would be appropriate. Accordingly, taking into account the addition to the income and the higher multiplier the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant under the head “loss of income” is Rs. 10,53,150/(Rs.41,300/+ Rs. 20,650/= Rs. 61,950//17).” The clarification of the position, by a three judge Bench, in Rajesh & Ors., ipso facto could not have led to the conclusion that there was a conflict between the views of various Benches, since Santosh Devi itself had noticed Sarla Verma, the logic of which in respect limiting compensation for nonpermanent employment was clarified. 29. The above facts recount the position as emerging from a combined reading of various orders and judgments. 29. The above facts recount the position as emerging from a combined reading of various orders and judgments. What is clear is that a two judge Bench as was the formation in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. V. Pushpa (supra) could not, having regard to the settled legal principle outlined in the decision of this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohar Community (supra) have referred the matter to a larger Bench. The correct view would have been to place the matter before a Bench of coordinate strength which decided Reshma Kumari & Ors. and Rajesh & Ors. (supra), i.e. three judges. 30. However, I agree that the matter in relation to future prospects to be added to the annual income to determine the compensation towards loss of dependency cannot be finally decided by us and has to be ultimately referred to a larger Bench – because I was a party to the reference in National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Pushpa (supra) and more importantly, cannot in propriety recall that reference while I am part of another Bench presently. In view of the observations, the matter has to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders towards the constitution of a suitable larger Bench in accordance with law.” [Emphasis added] 4. According to Mr. Lodh, learned counsel, a serious reservation has been expressed by the apex court and hence neither Santosh Devi (supra) nor Rajbir Singh (supra) should be applied for adding loss of future aspect. 5. On the other side, Mr. P. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has urged this court that the loss of future prospect as added by the tribunal is not inconsonance to the decision rendered by the apex court in Rajbir Singh (supra) and hence the loss of future prospect should be added as 50% to the assessed income. Mr. Saha, learned counsel has fairly submitted that the claimant have not preferred any appeal but this court can undo this serious illegality by exercising its jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC. 6. Mr. Saha, learned counsel has fairly submitted that the claimant have not preferred any appeal but this court can undo this serious illegality by exercising its jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC. 6. Having due regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the records this court is of the view that non-impleadment of the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. TR03C9880 (motor bike) cannot be fatal for this procedure as in the claim petition, the claimant respondents have clearly stated that motor bike was hit by the offending vehicle bearing No. TR01S0246 (Ambassador) and as such the claimant respondents was not under any obligation to plead the owner of the motor bike as the party in the proceeding. 7. The decision of the Gauhati High Court as cited before this court is on the premises that when two vehicles are involved in an accident, appropriate it is that the owners of both the vehicles will be the parties in the claim proceeding so as to enable the tribunal to determine as to whose fault, if any, has led to the accident. 8. On scrutiny of the claim petition and the written objection filed by the respondents and the appellant, this court does not find any averment to the effect that the motor bike was in anyway responsible for the said accident. 9. In the premises, this court is of the considered opinion that the owner of the motor bike cannot be treated as the necessary party and the decision of the Gauhati High Court cannot have any application in the circumstances. 10. So far as the imposition of the penal interest @ 9% is concerned, on numerous occasions this court has held that the tribunal does not have any jurisdiction or authority to impose such penal interest retrospectively or in such a manner. The apex court has clearly stated the law and as such that part of the award is clearly irregular for lack of jurisdiction and accordingly the same is interfered with. The awarded compensation shall carry interest at 7% per annum but failure to make such payment will not burden the insurer to pay the enhanced rate of interest, which according to this court is penal in nature. That direction for paying penal is set aside. 11. So far the other submission as launched by Mr. The awarded compensation shall carry interest at 7% per annum but failure to make such payment will not burden the insurer to pay the enhanced rate of interest, which according to this court is penal in nature. That direction for paying penal is set aside. 11. So far the other submission as launched by Mr. Lodh, learned counsel that the principle as laid down by Santosh Devi (supra) and Rajesh (supra) cannot be applied in view of Sashikala (supra) cannot be accepted by this court inasmuch as Sashikala (supra) does not lay down any law at all. It is a mere order making reference to the Chief Justice of India to consider the merit of the reference and to constitute a larger coordinate bench to revisit those principles which according to the two judges bench which passed the Sashikala (supra) is conflicting with Sarla Verma (supra), Reshma Kumari (supra) and other decisions. Since Sashikala (supra) does not lay down any principle or law at all, this court cannot but to follow the principles as laid by the three judges bench in Rajesh (supra) and as such this objection as raised by the appellant is rejected. 12. What Mr. P. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted, this court is constrained to observe that, no case has been made out by the claimant-respondents to exercise the jurisdiction under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC, even though they have not filed the appeal. There is no such circumstance to interfere as there is no failure of substantial justice and the compensation has been reassessed by the court having regard to all the relevant aspects. 13. Thus, the appeal is allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs. The appellant shall pay the remainder of the awarded compensation within a period of 2 (two) months from today in the tribunal, meaning after deducting the amount that they have already paid. The claimant respondent shall be entitled to receive their respective share subject to the observation made by the trial court in the impugned judgment.