JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned Counsel for appellant and Sri Vineet Kumar Singh holding brief of Sri H.N. Singh appearing for respondents. 2. United India Insurance Company Limited - opposite party has filed this appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act challenging judgment and award dated 18.9.2000 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gorakhpur, in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 436 of 1997. Insurance - Company has challenged judgment and award only on one issue i.e. issue of contributory negligence. As far as other aspects are concerned, they have accepted the judgment and no defence, which can be raised under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has been raised before us. Even the challenge of quantum has not been pressed before us. 3. In view of decision of Apex Court in the case of UPSRTC v. Km. Mamta and others, AIR 2016 SCC 948, the issue of contributory negligence alone has to be decided by this Court. 4. It is submitted by learned Counsel for Insurance Company that accident occurred due to sole negligence of scooterist. It is submitted that Tribunal did not rely on the site plan. It is submitted that the Tribunal ought to have considered the fact that scooter collided on the right side of the motor. The evidence of an eye-witness examined by Insurance Company has not been believed by Tribunal. 5. We have perused the entire record. We have perused judgment of Tribunal in particular paragraph Nos. 14 and 16 of judgment. 6. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from prove facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 7. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 8. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 9. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents due to rash and negligent driving, are well known. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 10. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 11. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not, by interpretation, displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 12. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was not being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 13. The driver of offending vehicle has not stepped into the witness-box nor has he filed any written statement. 13. The driver of offending vehicle has not stepped into the witness-box nor has he filed any written statement. In the F.I.R., he was shown as an accused and charge-sheet is laid against him. No police official has been examined to prove the site plan. Tribunal has disbelieved eye-witness as he was at a very long distance and his say could not have been believed and his evidence does not prove that deceased was in any way negligent, leave apart sole negligent. The finding of fact is such that it does not persuade us to take a different view then that taken by Tribunal as it is an admitted position that when two vehicles of unequal magnitude dash with each other, the vehicle with greater magnitude will throw behind the vehicle with less magnitude weight. In this case also scooterist was thrown away as is evident from record of finding of fact and, therefore, we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a different view then that taken by Tribunal. 14. No other issue was raised before us. This appeal fails and is dismissed. The stay granted earlier shall stand vacated.