JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Dinkar Mani Tripathi, Advocate, for appellant, Sri Arun Kumar Shukla and Sri Vijay Kumar Dwivedi, Advocates, for respondents and perused the record. 2. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “UPSRTC”) has filed this appeal being aggrieved by judgment and award dated 25.3.2003 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 197 of 2001. 3. Tribunal was moved by heirs of deceased who died in accident involving appellant-Corporation’s Bus. Claim Petition was partly allowed by awarding Rs. 7,17,000/-. However, while passing award, Tribunal exonerated Insurance Company and directed Corporation to pay the awarded amount. 4. The only ground for which we are being addressed is that despite the fact that ownership of the vehicle remained with owner and the Driver was holding effective driving license, the vehicle was insured with New India Insurance Company and the finding of fact on issues No. 2 and 3 were in their favour, despite that Tribunal has exonerated Insurance Company and the only reason given is that since private company with whom contract of insurance was there was attached with UPSRTC and hence the Insurance Company would not be liable. 5. The facts which are important for our purpose are that accident is not disputed. The only question is exoneration of Insurance Company by Tribunal and holding the appellant solely responsible. It is an admitted position of the fact that Bus which met with accident was being run by Driver but under control and possession of Corporation. The fact as pleaded is that the Corporation entered into an agreement with owner of Bus No. UP 65H/2999 to ply the bus under a contract according to which Driver of Bus would be an employee of owner. The Bus was plying under the contract with Corporation and as per contract, for any tortious act of Driver, owner would be responsible. Tribunal has held against appellant. 6. While admitting this appeal, following order came to be passed: “Admit.” Issue notice by RPAD returnable at an early date. Until further orders, the operation of the impugned judgment and award dated 25-3-2003 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 197 of 2001-Smt. Sukha Devi and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation-shall remain stayed, provided the appellant deposits Rs. Until further orders, the operation of the impugned judgment and award dated 25-3-2003 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Varanasi in Motor Accident Claims Case No. 197 of 2001-Smt. Sukha Devi and others v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation-shall remain stayed, provided the appellant deposits Rs. 5,00,000/- with the concerned Tribunal within two months from today. If such amount is deposited, the claimants shall be entitled to withdraw 50% amount with security (other than cash and Bank guarantee) and balance amount without security. The amount of Rs. 25,000/- deposited in this Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act shall be remitted to the concerned Tribunal within three weeks from today and the aforesaid amount shall be duly accounted for while making deposit before the Tribunal under this order. Balance amount shall be subject to final orders being passed after hearing the parties.” 7. It is an admitted position of fact and undisputed that owner has placed vehicle with Corporation but the insurance continued even on date of accident. 8. The only ground raised is whether it would be the liability of New India Insurance Company or of appellant to pay compensation to claimants. It is submitted that it was not in issue as to who would be liable to pay compensation. It is not mentioned how there was any breach of condition. Tribunal while considering issues-2 and 3 and observing that vehicle was insured, has held that vr% ;g ugha dgk tk ldrk fd nq?kZVuk ds le; cl pkyd ds ikl oS/k MªkbZfoax ykblsUl ugha Fkk and Issue-3 was decided in negative. Despite this, the has Tribunal has exonerated the Insurance Company without assigning reason as why Insurance Company would not be liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle and this finding that contract between UPSRTC and owner of vehicle was that in case of any accident, it would be payable by owner, it has been that it is not liable. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company has relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari and others, 1998 (1) TAC 42 (SC) and stated that it is this judgment on which Tribunal has relied. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company has relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari and others, 1998 (1) TAC 42 (SC) and stated that it is this judgment on which Tribunal has relied. However, later on in the year 2011 the Apex Court has reconsidered this issue in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum and others, 2011 (8) SCC 142 and learned counsel appearing for Insurance Company could not dispute this fact that later decision in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum and others (supra) holds to the contrary. The Insurance Company, therefore, cannot evade its liability in the light of decision in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum and others (supra). The factual scenario as it emerges would show that contract of insurance was in force at the time of accident. Just because the vehicle was taken on contract by the appellant-Corporation, policy will not be absolved. We fortified in our view by decisions of the Apex Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum and others, JT 2011 (8) SCC 142 and Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. v. India Insurance Company, 2016 (2) SCC 382 . Thus, the Insurance Company would be liable. The Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability by invoking the provision of Section 147. The Tribunal in our view has fallen in error on this ground. The cover note and the insurance policy clearly show that the Insurance Company would be liable. The finding of fact to the contrary cannot be sustained. The fact that Insurance Company was not a party to the contract cannot absolve it from indemnifying the owner of the vehicle. Just because the appellant had the control over the vehicle will not make it the owner of the vehicle. Hence, this appeal has to be allowed. 10. The next submission that Driver of offending vehicle in which deceased was traveling was negligent. Both the counsels for the appellant as well as Insurance Company have contended that Driver of the offending vehicle had contributed to the accident having taken place. 11. It would be relevant at this stage to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 12. Both the counsels for the appellant as well as Insurance Company have contended that Driver of the offending vehicle had contributed to the accident having taken place. 11. It would be relevant at this stage to discuss the principles for deciding contributory negligence and for that the principles for considering negligence will also have to be looked into. 12. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 13. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well-settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 14. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. 14. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 15. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 16. These provisions (Section 110A and Section 110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was ‘new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 17. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 17. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if Courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well-settled and, therefore, Court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 ACJ(SC) 1840). 18. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part of driver of another vehicle. 19. The fact regarding contributory negligence was not proved by adducing cogent evidence and thus it cannot be said that deceased has contributed in the accident having taken place. In this regard, we are in agreement with the finding of fact recorded by Tribunal. Thus, as far as the issue of negligence is concerned, we concur with Tribunal and we hold that the Driver of the Bus was solely negligent as held by Tribunal. 20. Cross-objection has been filed by Insurance Company. Heard learned Advocate for Insurance Company. Insurance Company has contended that Tribunal has held contributory negligence of deceased so as to avoid its liability. It has relied on following grounds: “(1) Because, the offending Bus was hired by the U.P.S.R.T.C. and it was running on the Route on which permit was granted in favour of corporation. (2) Because, the bus was under possession and control of hirer corporation and therefore hirer corporation has rightly been held liable to pay entire compensation. It has relied on following grounds: “(1) Because, the offending Bus was hired by the U.P.S.R.T.C. and it was running on the Route on which permit was granted in favour of corporation. (2) Because, the bus was under possession and control of hirer corporation and therefore hirer corporation has rightly been held liable to pay entire compensation. (3) Because, services of the driver were Transferred alongwith complete control to U.P.S.R.T.C. under whose directions, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not to ply the illfated bus on the fateful day. (4) Because, although driver of the bus was an employee of the registered owner of the bus yet at the relevant time he was performing his duties under order and command of the conductor of U.P.S.R.T.C. for operation of the bus. (5) Because, according to Section 2(30) of M.V. Act 1988 owner includes the person to whom vehicle has been lent on hire or under agreement. At the time of accident vehicle was under control and custody of corporation through an agreement and it was being operated under directions and command of U.P.S.R.T.C., hence it was liable to pay the compensation as its owner at the particular time and Tribunal has rightly fixed entire liability on it. (6) Because, registered owner had neither any control and possession over the offending bus nor any liability has been fixed on him. Under the circumstances, learned Court below has rightly exonerated the New India Assurance Company from liability of paying compensation. The duty of Insurer is only to satisfy the Judgments and awards passed against insured. (7) Because, the New India Assurance Company was not a party in agreement executed between registered owner and corporation hence it was not liable to pay the compensation while bus was being driven under agreement. (8) Because, accident was caused due to contributory negligence of deceased but learned Court below has ignored this fact. (9) Because, no independent eye-witness was produced by claimants to prove negligence of bus driver and finding of Tribunal regarding sole negligence of bus driver is based on surmises and self conjectures. (10) Because, the compensation computed and awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive in the facts and circumstances of the case. (9) Because, no independent eye-witness was produced by claimants to prove negligence of bus driver and finding of Tribunal regarding sole negligence of bus driver is based on surmises and self conjectures. (10) Because, the compensation computed and awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive in the facts and circumstances of the case. (11) Because, Plea of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation taken in the appeal regarding liability of registered owner and Insurance Company is misconceived, misleading and against the facts, law and the circumstances of the case. (12) Because, the appeal filed by U.P.S.R.T.C. has got no force and merits hence liable to be dismissed with costs. 21. The Insurance Company has filed its cross-objection and contended that rate of interest awarded is on a higher side and second the multiplier applied should have been 11 as per the 2nd schedule and not 13. 22. As far as first submission is concerned, on the question of selection of multiplier, Tribunal has considered the multiplier as 13. It is contended that Deceased Mewa Lal was in age group 45-50 more particularity 50 years and therefore as per Second Schedule multiplier of 11 ought to have been applied. However, we find no force in the said submission. The proper multiplier as per Smt. Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, AIR 2009 SC 3104 , is 13 for the age of 50. Therefore, the submission that Tribunal has not applied proper multiplier is rejected. 23. The next contention is regarding interest. Tribunal has considered the rate of interest at 9% as was admissible in those days. These issues are answered against Insurance Company and are rejected. 24. In the result, the appeal preferred by UPSRTC is partly allowed. Impugned award dated 25.3.2003 is modified to the extent that compensation awarded therein shall be paid by Insurance Company. 25. The cross-objection filed by Insurance company is rejected.