JUDGMENT : Debasish Kar Gupta, J. This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing an order passed by respondent no. 3 under memo no. 229/DR/SSLC dated November 14, 2014 (Annexure P-8 to this writ application) rejecting the prayer of the petitioner no. 1 for transfer of dealership in respect of the Fair Price Shop of the petitioner no. 1 bearing no. FPS-2832 (hereinafter referred to as the said fair price shop), running in the Sub-Area of Jorasanko of Kolkata North Sub-Control of the Food and Supply Department, Government of West Bengal in favour of the petitioner no. 2 (his nephew). 2. According to the petitioners, the petitioner no. 1 had been running his said fair price shop for a considerable period of time. The petitioner submitted an application dated August 19, 2011, to the respondent no. 3 for issuing the licence of his said fair price shop in the joint name incorporating the name of the petitioner no. 2 therein as a partner. The petitioner no. 2 was his nephew (the son of his elder brother). The petitioner no. 2 also submitted a representation on the same date, i.e. on August 19, 2011, with relevant papers and documents. 3. By an order communicated under memo no. 496/E dated November 3, 2011, the respondent no. 5 informed the petitioner that there was no provision for joint ownership of a fair price shop under the West Bengal Urban Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control), 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the said Control Order, 2003). 4. Thereafter the petitioner submitted an application dated June 5, 2013, (received by the respondent authority on June 6, 2013) (Annexure P-5 to this writ application) to the respondent no. 3 for transfer of his licence in respect of the said fair price shop in favour of the petitioner no. 2 on the ground that he could not run the said fair price shop properly without the participation of the petitioner no. 2 due to his physical disablement due to old age. The above application was accompanied by the necessary papers and documents including the medical certificate in support of his physical disability. 5. By the impugned order as communicated under memo no. 229/DR/SSLC dated November 14, 2014, the respondent no. 3 rejected the above application of the petitioner no. 1 on the ground that the petitioner no. The above application was accompanied by the necessary papers and documents including the medical certificate in support of his physical disability. 5. By the impugned order as communicated under memo no. 229/DR/SSLC dated November 14, 2014, the respondent no. 3 rejected the above application of the petitioner no. 1 on the ground that the petitioner no. 2 did not come within the zone of consideration under the provisions of Clause (f) of paragraph-16 of the West Bengal Urban Public Distribution System (Maintenance and Control) Order, 2013, (hereinafter referred to as the said Control Order, 2013). 6. It is submitted by Mr. Debabrata Saha Roy, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the said Control Order, 2013, came into force with effect from August 12, 2013, i.e. after submission of his application dated June 6, 2013. According to him, the provision of the said Control Order, 2013, was not applicable in case of consideration of his application under reference. 7. Mr. Saha Roy relies upon the decisions of Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 567 , P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 411 , Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 644 , and an unreported decision dated December 5, 2014 passed in the matter of Reba Mukherjeev. The State of West Bengal (in re: WP 12361 (W) of 2014) in support of his above submission. 8. It is submitted by Mr. S. Sengupta, learned Junior Government Advocate, High Court, Calcutta, that the said Control Order, 2013, came into force on the date of consideration of the application and as a result the application of the petitioner was considered under provisions of the said Control Order, 2013. 9. Mr. Sengupta relies upon the decisions of Umesh Kumar Nagpal v.State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 138 and MGB Gramin Bank v.Chakrawarti Singh, reported in 2014 (3) CHN (SC) 31 in support of his above submissions. 10. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and I have considered the facts and circumstances of this case carefully. 11. According to the settled principles of law, the legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect provided there is no recognised constitutional limitation. 10. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and I have considered the facts and circumstances of this case carefully. 11. According to the settled principles of law, the legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect provided there is no recognised constitutional limitation. But no retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision which amounts to impairing or taking away and existing right, unless there is a direction of that statute for giving retrospective effect to the same either expressly or by necessary implication. Reference may be made to the decision of A.A. Calton v. Director of Education, reported in (1983) 3 SCC 33 and the relevant portions of the above decision is quoted below:- “5. It is no doubt true that the Act was amended by U.P. Act 26 of 1975 which came into force on August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make an appointment under Section 16-F(4) of the Act in the case of minority institutions. The amending Act did not. However, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending proceedings under Section 16-F of the Act. Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary intendment would affect such pending proceedings. The process of selection under Section 16-F of the Act commencing from the stage of calling for applications for a post up to the date on which the Director becomes entitled to make a selection under Section 16-F(4) (as it stood then) is an integrated one. At every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of one or the other or the candidates. Section 16-F of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as merely a procedural provision. It is true that the legislature may pass laws with retrospective effect subject to the recognised constitutional limitations. But it is equally well settled that no retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away an existing right, unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication directs that it should have such retrospective effect.…” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In order to examine the propriety and the validity of the impugned order in the light of the settled principles of law as discussed hereinabove, the fact which is required to be considered is that the petitioner no. In order to examine the propriety and the validity of the impugned order in the light of the settled principles of law as discussed hereinabove, the fact which is required to be considered is that the petitioner no. 1 found it difficult to run his said fair price shop due to his ailments arising mainly due to his old age. He was in need of active participation of the petitioner no. 2 (his nephew) to run the said fair price shop. The aforesaid nephew (son of his elder brother) of the petitioner no. 1 was residing in a joint mess with the petitioner no. 1 along with five (5) family members depending on the income from the said fair price shop. 13. The petitioner no. 1 could run his business of the said fair price shop only with active participation of petitioner no. 2. Initially he submitted a prayer before the respondent no. 3 to incorporate the name of the petitioner no. 2 in the licence issued by the respondent authority treating the petitioner no. 2 as his partner to run the said fair price shop. Admittedly, the petitioner no. 1 was informed by the respondent no. 5 that there was no provision for joint ownership under the said Control Order, 2003. 14. Finding no other alternative the petitioner no. 1 had to submit his application dated June 6, 2013, for transfer of the said fair price shop in favour of the petitioner no. 2 on compassionate ground. The same was rejected by virtue of the impugned order on the ground that nephew of the petitioner no. 1 (licensee) did not come within the ambit of the definition “family member” under the said Control Order, 2013. 15. It is not in dispute that the petitioner no. 1 had submitted his application dated June 6, 2013, i.e. prior to the date when the said Control Order, 2013, came into operation with effect from August 12, 2013, having no retrospective effect either expressly or by necessary implication of any of its provision. The said Control Order, 2003, was in force at the time of submitting the above application of the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the settled principles of law as decided in the matter of A.A. Calton (supra), the aforesaid application of the petitioner no. 1 should not have been considered under the said Control Order, 2013. The said Control Order, 2003, was in force at the time of submitting the above application of the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the settled principles of law as decided in the matter of A.A. Calton (supra), the aforesaid application of the petitioner no. 1 should not have been considered under the said Control Order, 2013. The impugned order was bad in law due to the above reason. 16. It is also the accepted principles of law as decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of I.J. Divakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1982) 3 SCC 341 , that submission of an application by a candidate in response to an advertisement inviting application for appointment/engagement in a post does not create any right in favour of that candidate to the post concerned but his application makes him eligible for being considered for the post concerned. The relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- “4. Proviso to clause (3) or Article 320 confers power on the government as respects services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State to make regulations specifying the matters in which either generally or in any particular class of case or in any particular circumstances it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commission to be consulted. Armed with this power GO No. 646 was issued withdrawing various posts from the purview of the Commission. The only contention urged was that at the time when the advertisement was issued the post of Junior Engineer was within the purview of the Commission and even if at a later date the post was withdrawn from the purview of the Commission it could not have any retrospective effect. There is no merit in this contention and we are broadly in agreement with the view of the Tribunal that inviting the applications for a post does not by itself create any right to the post in the candidate who in response to the advertisement makes an application. He only offers himself to be considered for the post. His application only makes him eligible for being considered for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post.…” (Emphasis supplied) 17. With regard to the question of consideration of the above application of the petitioner no. He only offers himself to be considered for the post. His application only makes him eligible for being considered for the post. It does not create any right in the candidate to the post.…” (Emphasis supplied) 17. With regard to the question of consideration of the above application of the petitioner no. 1, it was not in dispute that the said Control Order, 2003, was silent with regard to appointment/engagement of any dealer on compassionate ground for running a fair price shop. Admittedly, a departmental guideline issued by the respondent no. 3 under memo no. 880/DR/LL dated July 3, 1985, was in existence at the point of time. It was not cancelled or superseded after introduction of the said Control Order, 2003, either expressly or by necessary implication of any of the provision of the above Control Order. 18. According to the above guideline dated July 3, 1985, in the event of death of a dealer or his designation of the ground of age, infirmity, etc., the resultant vacancy need not be invited initially and it might be filled up by appointing the husband/wife/son/daughter of the deceased/resigned dealer provided he or she was otherwise suitable in all respect. There was further provision for consideration of the case of next of kin of such deceased/resigned dealer in absence of or unwillingness of husband/wife/son/daughter of such dealer to be appointed. Though the application dated June 6, 2013, did not by itself create any right in favour of the petitioner no. 2 to run the said fair price shop, but the above application made him eligible for being considered in view of the proposition of law decided in the matter of I.J. Divakar (supra). 19. The point for consideration involved in the decision of Umesh Kumar Nagpal (Supra) was relating to the consideration which should guide while giving appointment in public service on compassionate ground. The object of extending the benefit of compassionate appointment for the purpose of enabling the family to get over the financial crisis which was faced at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner was recognised in the above judgment. Therefore, the above decision does not help the State respondents in any way. 20. The object of extending the benefit of compassionate appointment for the purpose of enabling the family to get over the financial crisis which was faced at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner was recognised in the above judgment. Therefore, the above decision does not help the State respondents in any way. 20. It has been decided by the Apex Court in the matter of MGB Gramin Bank (Supra) that in a case where the scheme for compassionate appointment does not create any legal right, a candidate cannot claim that his case is to be considered as per the scheme existing on the date the cause of action had arisen that is the death of the incumbent on the post. As discussed hereinabove the departmental guideline dated July 3, 1985 provided for appointment/engagement of the husband/wife/son/daughter of the deceased/resigned dealer and in absence of any such relation or in the event of such relation not willing to be appointed the case of next of the kin of such deceased/resigned dealer of a fair price shop. Therefore, in view of the distinguishable facts and circumstances the above decision does not also help the State respondents in any way. 21. Therefore, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. 22. The competent authority of the State respondents is directed to extend the benefit of the compassionate appointment in favour of the petitioner no. 2 for running the said fair price shop in place of the petitioner no. 1 within a period of eight (8) weeks provided he is found eligible for such appointment. It is however made clear that in the event the petitioner no. 2 is found not eligible for such appointment, the competent authority of the State respondents shall communicate the reason therefor to the petitioners within the period mentioned hereinabove by passing a reasoned and speaking order after giving them an opportunity of hearing. 23. This writ application is thus, disposed of. 24. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 25. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, on priority basis.