JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This bunch of five criminal revision petitions is directed against the common judgment dated 24-7-2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dharmanagar, North Tripura in Criminal Appeal No.20 of 2012 upholding the judgment dated 3-4-2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kanchanpur, North Tripura in G.R. No.137 of 2005 convicting (i) Shri Khagendra Reang (hereinafter referred to as “P-3” for simplification) under Section 409 IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and, in default thereof, to suffer another rigorous imprisonment for one month, and also convicting the co-accused, namely, (ii) Shri Pradip Dey (“P-2” for short), (iii) Shri Bijan Rakshit, (“P-4” for short), (iv) Shri Parimal Ch. Das (“P-5” for short) and (v) Sri Dhananjoy Reang (“P-1” for short) U/s 409/109 IPC and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and, in default thereof, to suffer another rigorous imprisonment for one month by each of them. It may be noted at this stage that one of the co-accused, namely, Chandaham Reang died during the trial, while another co-accused, namely, Samiran Chakraborty was acquitted by the trial court. There is nothing on record to show that the other co-accused/convict, namely, Punyadhan Reang (‘the non-petitioner” for short) has challenged his conviction and sentence. The five criminal revision petitions, being inter-connected and involving a common question of facts, were heard together, and are now being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The case of the prosecution is that one Sistamohan Das, the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Kanchanpur, North Tripura lodged a written complaint with the Officer-in-Charge, Kanchanpur Police Station against the P-3 and P-2, Ex-Cashier of the same Block alleging that on 18-3-2005, a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- @ Rs.10,00,000/- was advanced to the non-petitioner, P-1 and Sri Chandram Reang (“the deceased”), who died during the pendency of the trial (“the deceased” for short), all Panchayat Secretaries by P-3 through cheques No. 402610, 402611 and 402612 respectively of Tripura Graming Bank, Kanchanpur Branch. But the amount was withdrawn from the Bank by Sri Pradip Dey, ex-Cashier of Dasda Block (“P-2”) on 19-3-05 who, on being asked by the complainant (PW-14), told that he had handed over the entire amount to Crl. Rev. Petn. No.49/2012 & 4 ors Page 4 of 28 P-3 on the same day. But the amount was withdrawn from the Bank by Sri Pradip Dey, ex-Cashier of Dasda Block (“P-2”) on 19-3-05 who, on being asked by the complainant (PW-14), told that he had handed over the entire amount to Crl. Rev. Petn. No.49/2012 & 4 ors Page 4 of 28 P-3 on the same day. Moreover, another sums of Rs.5,59,251/- and Rs.4,57,569/- were shown to have been paid to P-4, a Junior Engineer, and P-5, Work Assistant, in the Cash Section, where were at the relevant time working in the Office of the Dasda RD Block but the same were not actually paid to them. P-3 and P-2 have thus misappropriated Government fund amounting to Rs.40,69,320/- sanctioned for the construction of 150 houses for refugees. 3. On the basis of the complaint so lodged, the police swung into action and duly investigated the case. According to the prosecution, in the course of investigation, Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) is a centrally sponsored Scheme on cost sharing basis between the Government of India and the State Government. The District Panchayat on the basis of the allocation made and target so fixed is to decide the number of houses to be constructed under the IAY Scheme during a financial year. Thereafter the Gram Sabha would select the beneficiaries. Selection by a Gram Sabha is final. No approval by higher authorities is required. BDOs should, however, be sent the list of selected beneficiaries for their information. As per the Guidelines of IAY Scheme issued by the Government of India, Ministry of RD, New Delhi effective from 1-4-2004, New Delhi, payment was to be made to the beneficiaries on a staggered basis depending on the progress of the work; the entire amount should not be paid to the beneficiaries in lump-sum. As per the guidelines, the duty of the BDO was to monitor all aspects of the IAY through visit of worksite. 4. According to the prosecution, it appeared from the records of the Office of P-3 that there was no proper system of verifying the work and its related financial transaction either by the P-3 himself or the appropriate authority since long. As a result, huge financial irregularities and corrupt practices took place in the implementation of works under the IAY Scheme as well as in the cash section of Office of the BDO Dasda RD Block after receipt of huge amounts under IAY Scheme. As a result, huge financial irregularities and corrupt practices took place in the implementation of works under the IAY Scheme as well as in the cash section of Office of the BDO Dasda RD Block after receipt of huge amounts under IAY Scheme. Subsequently, Sri SM Das, SDM, Kanchanpur (PW-15) getting wind of such messy affairs made by the officials of the BDO, Dasda RD Block, conducted a thorough scrutiny into the cash and other financial activities of Dasda RD Block and detected no trace of the sum of Rs.40,69,320/- allocated for the financial year 2004-05 under the IAY Scheme when P-3 was posted and working as BDO, Dasda RD Block (i.e. from 24-10-2002 to 17-4- 2005) and when the non-petitioner was the Cashier of the said Block. P-2, who was an LDC. P-2 had been working as Cashier from 1994 till 29-1-2005 when he handed over the charge to the non-petitioner. 5. It is the further case of the prosecution that out of the fund of Rs.92.63 lakhs released by the RD Panchayat Department, Government of Tripura, under the IAY Scheme for the year 2003-04, a sum of Rs.41’25 lacs was credited to the C.D. account No. 24 of P-3. On 10-2-2005, P-3 issued pay order in the names of P-5 and P-4 for Rs.4,57,569/- and Rs.5,59,251/- respectively directing the non petitioner to make the payment to them under the IAY Scheme. But no work order was found to be issued in respect of those amounts issued to them. Again, on 18-3-2005, P-3 issued another pay order for Rs.10,17,500/- each to the non-petitioner, P-1 and the deceased directing the Cashier i.e. the said Samiran Chakraborty (another non-petitioner) to make the payment to them under the IAY Scheme. Simultaneously, P-3 issued three CD cheques bearing No.402610, 402611 and 402612 all dated 18-3-2005 in the names of the said three Implementing Officer for Rs.10,00,000/- each for encashment from his account maintained in the Tripura Grammin Bank, Kanchanpur Branch against the said pay order. Another cheque for the remaining amount of Rs.52,500/- was also issued by P-3 against the pay order dated 18-3-2005. Another cheque for the remaining amount of Rs.52,500/- was also issued by P-3 against the pay order dated 18-3-2005. As per the seized passbook No. II, Cash Book Vol-14 and Acquittance Roll Book of the RD Block, Dasda, the said amounts of Rs.30,00,000/- and Rs.52,500/- were encashed from the said account of P-3 on 19-3-2005 and 6-4-2005 respectively; these amounts were surprisingly shown disbursed to the said the three implementing officers on 18-3-2005 in the cash book as well as A/Roll Book of the RD Block. On the basis of the seizure list dated 4-5-2005, P-3 issued 3 work orders No. 18016-27, 18028-39 and 18006-15 all dated 24-3-2005 in the names of P-1, the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang) and Chandaham Reang (now deceased) for construction of 71 houses under the IAY Scheme during the Crl. Rev. Petn. No.49/2012 & 4 ors Page 6 of 28 year 2004-05 @ Rs.27,500/-, but no work order was issued for the remaining 79 houses as sanctioned even though a sum of Rs.40,69,320/- was shown to have been disbursed to the five implementing officers out of the amount of Rs.41,25,000/- sanctioned for 15 houses under the IAY Scheme for the year 2004-05. The manner of issuing the said work orders on 24-3-2005 after issuing pay order on 10-2-05 and 18-3-05 was illegal and in violation of the norms. Moreover, P-3 was found to be reluctant to inform the beneficiaries about the aforesaid work though as per the guidelines para 2.1., he was bound to do so. 6. According to the prosecution, as per the money receipt dated 10-2-05 and 19-3-2005 bearing the seal and signature of P-3, he received Rs.10,16,820/- and Rs.30,52,500/- against the money requisitions dated 10-2-2005 and 18-3- 2005 from the non-petitioner. Thus, on scrutiny of the relevant documents, it was found that P-3 collected the entire amount of Rs.40,69,320/- through Samiran Chakraborty (non-petitioner) against which the said two pay orders in the name of the above-named five I.O. were issued under the IAY Scheme, not a single house was constructed there under. P-3 has, therefore, misappropriated the aforesaid public money in respect of IAY Scheme, 2004-05 in connivance with the Cashier/non-petitioner and P-2 and five implementing officers without utilizing the money for the works sanctioned for. P-3 has, therefore, misappropriated the aforesaid public money in respect of IAY Scheme, 2004-05 in connivance with the Cashier/non-petitioner and P-2 and five implementing officers without utilizing the money for the works sanctioned for. The misappropriation of the said Government money took place when the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty) was the Cashier of the Dasda RD Block who directly facilitated P- 3 to misappropriate government money to the order of Rs.40,69,320/- of IAY Scheme for the year 2004-05; the said Cashier paid the aforesaid amount to P-3 in 2 instalments on 10-2-2005 and 18-3-2005 on the basis of his money requisition without paying any amount to the implementing officers against whom the pay orders were issued under IAY. According to the prosecution, the implementing officers, P-4, P-5, Puniyadhan Reang (non-petitioner), P-1, the deceased (Chandraham Reang) facilitated P-3 and the non-petitioner in misappropriating the said amounts by putting their signatures on 3 cheques and A-Roll Book on 10-2-2005 and 18-3-2005, which showed that they had received the amounts physically from the Bank Cash section of Dasda RD Block against their pay order under IAY 2004-05. As a result, no houses for the beneficiaries were constructed under the IAY Scheme. On the other hand, P-3 collected the entire amount of Rs.40,69,320/- through the said Samiran Chakraborty (Cashier) against the said two pay orders issued in the names of the said 5 Implementing Officers under IAY Scheme. Therefore, P-3 misappropriated the aforesaid amount in connivance with the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty). As a prima facie case was found against P-3 U/s 409/420 IPC and against Samiran Chakraborty (non-petitioner), Cashier of Dasda RD Block, P-4, P-5, Puniyadhan Reang (non-petitioner), P-1, Chandaham Reang (now deceased), P-2 U/s 409/420/09 IPC for helping P-3 to misappropriate government money to the tune of Rs.40,69,320/-, they were so charge-sheeted to stand their trial. On the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the police, the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kanchanpur, South Tripura thereafter framed the charges against the petitioners on the basis of the charge sheet submitted by the police, but all of them pleaded not guilty to the charges whereupon the learned Magistrate proceeded with the trial. Except for the petitioner No. 1 who wanted to adduce evidence, none of the petitioners chose to do so. Except for the petitioner No. 1 who wanted to adduce evidence, none of the petitioners chose to do so. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 45 witnesses to bring home the charges against the petitioners, while three witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence. After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court passed the impugned judgment of convictions and sentences. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, P- 1-, P-2, P-3, P-4 and P-5 separately filed the criminal revision petitions there against. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy, it will at the outset be beneficial to refer to the cognate provisions of Sections 405, 406 and 409 IPC, which read as follows: “405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’. * * * 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. * * * 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” In order to prove the offence of criminal breach of trust which attracts the provision of Section 409 IPC, the prosecution must prove that one who is, in any manner, entrusted with the property dishonestly misappropriates the property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. In other words, in order to sustain conviction under Section 409 IPC, two ingredients are to be proved, namely, (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty-bound to account for; and (ii) the accused has committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under Section 405 IPC. 8. Thus, to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it. It has to be established further that in respect of the property so entrusted, there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal in violation of a direction of law or legal contract, by the accused himself or by someone else which he willingly suffered to do. A direction of law need not be a law made by Parliament or a legislature; it may be made by an authority having the power there for; the law could be a subordinate legislation, a notification or even a custom. Thus, in my opinion, the Guidelines of IAY Scheme issued by the Government of India, Ministry of RD, New Delhi can be construed to be a direction of law, which are binding upon the petitioners herein. The Apex Court in Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 observed: “100. Even if the words “directions of law” are to be given literal meaning, it would include a direction issued by the authorities in exercise of their statutory power as also the power of supervision. We have opined here to before that it has been accepted at the Bar that both the RBI circulars as also the Manual of UCO Bank were binding on the authorities.” 9. It is against the backdrop of the aforesaid principles that I proceed to examine the materials relied on by the prosecution to bring home the charges against the petitioners. In so far as the question as to whether there was entrustment of Rs.41,25,000/- under Indira Awas Yojna Scheme (IAY Scheme)for 2004-05 is concerned, PW-19, who was the then Project Director, DRDA, North Trupura, in his evidence categorically stated that a sum of Rs.41,25,000/- was transferred to P-3 for the purpose of implementation of IAY Scheme, 2004-05. In so far as the question as to whether there was entrustment of Rs.41,25,000/- under Indira Awas Yojna Scheme (IAY Scheme)for 2004-05 is concerned, PW-19, who was the then Project Director, DRDA, North Trupura, in his evidence categorically stated that a sum of Rs.41,25,000/- was transferred to P-3 for the purpose of implementation of IAY Scheme, 2004-05. This fact is also admitted by the P-3 himself in his examination under Section 313, CrPC. Moreover, no dispute is raised by anyone in this behalf. The fact that P-3 received back a sum of Rs.10,16,820/- from the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty) is proved by the letter dated 10-2-2005 written by P-3 addressed to him and the acknowledgement for the said amount found in his chit of the same date vide Exbt. 31 series. According to PW-34, who was the Account Officer in the Office of BDO, Dasda RD Block, three pay orders were issued from the Office of P-3 under the IAY Scheme each amounting to Rs.10,17,500/- in that financial year to the non-petitioner, P-1 and the deceased and that during enquiry, it was revealed that Rs.10,00,000/- each was issued by P-3 to the said three Panchayat Secretaries by separate cheques while another cheque amounting to Rs.52,500/- was issued separately in the name of P-2, who withdrew the same. PW-43, Assistant Government Examiner of questioned documents proved that the signature found therein marked Q-6 belonged to P- 3. Similarly, the receipt of Rs.30,52,500/- from the same Cashier is proved by the chit dated 19-3-05, which was authored by P-3, and his signature marked Q-7 is proved by the same Examiner to be that of his. At this stage, I may refer to the evidence of P-1, who was examined as DW-3 and who was the Panchayat Secretary during that period. It may be noted that he was duly cross-examined by P-3 and P-2, the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty) as well as the prosecution. DW-3 was one of the Implementing Officer appointed by P-3. At this stage, I may refer to the evidence of P-1, who was examined as DW-3 and who was the Panchayat Secretary during that period. It may be noted that he was duly cross-examined by P-3 and P-2, the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty) as well as the prosecution. DW-3 was one of the Implementing Officer appointed by P-3. In his evidence, DW-3 stated that on 18-3-2005, he was called by P-3 to his chamber and was asked to put his signatures going to the Cash Section and on his asking, he was told by P-3 that since it was the end of the financial year, he needed to give his signatures and the adjustments would be made within a few days and that when he was called by P-3 three times, he was compelled to put his signatures going to the Cash Section when P-2 and the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty) were present. He further testified that the said non-petitioner procured his signatures on the Acquittance Roll on the reverse side of a blank cheque and that no money or work order were given to him and that no houses were constructed for any beneficiary under the IAY scheme and further that no adjustment report was submitted against any work there under by any of the Implementing Officers. He admitted that Exbt.-8 is the letter/complaint lodged by him to PW-15 wherein he stated that P-3 called them to his office and then in the presence of P-2, the Ex-Cashier, their signatures, i.e. his signature and the signatures of the deceased and the non-petitioner were taken in the Acquittance Roll and in three cheques and that initially they hesitated to do so, but at the special order given by P-3, they could not deny it and put their signatures on compulsion. He further stated therein that they were assured by P-2 that within a short period, the matter would be cleared, but no work orders for construction of IAY houses were given to them. He identified Exbt. 8/4 as his signature and Exbt. 8/5 and 8/6 as the signatures of the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang) and the deceased respectively. DW-3 was cross-examined by the counsel for prosecution, P-2, P-3 and the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty), but they could not falsify the truthfulness of his statement. In my opinion, the statement of DW-3 (P-1) is admissible U/s 133, Evidence Act. 8/4 as his signature and Exbt. 8/5 and 8/6 as the signatures of the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang) and the deceased respectively. DW-3 was cross-examined by the counsel for prosecution, P-2, P-3 and the non-petitioner (Samiran Chakraborty), but they could not falsify the truthfulness of his statement. In my opinion, the statement of DW-3 (P-1) is admissible U/s 133, Evidence Act. The law is now well-settled that when a person, accused along with others, voluntarily steps in the witness-box as a witness in defence, he is in the same position as an ordinary witness and is, therefore, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution counsel and evidence brought in such cross-examination can be used against his co-accused and that if such a witness incriminates his co-accused, the other accused, jointly tried with him, has the right to cross-examine him if he wants so to do.- See Tribhuvan Nath v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 SCC 511 . Therefore, the evidence of DW-3 can be used as corroborative evidence for proving the prosecution case against P-3. Therefore, it is not difficult to hold that there was an entrustment of a sum of Rs.41,25,000/- by PW-19 upon P-3 for the purpose of implementation of IAY Scheme. The more important question is whether a sum of Rs.40,69,320/- was dishonestly used or disposed of by P-3 in violation of a direction of law or legal contract? 10. It is the contention of Mr. P.K. Biswas, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner No. 3, that though the cheques for the aforesaid amount were issued by the petitioner No. 3 in his capacity as BDO, Dasda RD Block, there is not an iota of evidence to prove that the amounts in question were handed over to him by P-1, the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang) and the late Chandaham Reang after the cheques were encashed by them. According to the learned counsel, the evidence of the then Project Director, DRDA, North Tripura District, who was examined as PW-19, would indicate that utilization certificates submitted by P- 3 were not accepted by him on the instruction of the District Magistrate, North Tripura and that there was no complaint from the BAC relating to the utilization of the fund of Rs.41.25 lakhs. He reminds this Court that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, howsoever, grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court to overturn the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and return a verdict of not guilty in favour of the petitioner. Per contra, Mr. R C Debnath, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor supports the impugned judgment and submits that the conviction of the petitioner was based on sufficient evidence and need not be interfered with by this Court. 11. To prove their case that the petitioners dishonestly disposed of the said amounts in violation of the direction of law, the prosecution examined the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Kanchanpur, who is the informant/complainant, as PW- 15. According to him, a sum of Rs.41,25,000/- was disbursed by the District Magistrate/Collector, North Tripura (“DM” for short) through the Project Director, DRDA, North Tripura (“PD” for short), who was examined as PW-19 to the account of P-3 and that from the account of P-3, the cheques were encashed and withdrawn from Tripura Gramin Bank, Kanchanpur (“the Bank” for short). He also testified that as per the guidelines of IAY Scheme, selection of beneficiaries were done by the BAC and after allocation of fund by the authority, the BDO used to issue work orders through the implementing officers, but as against the three cheques so issued, no work order was issued by P-3 for construction of houses under the scheme for the beneficiaries and that he did not physically visited the houses of the beneficiaries who were selected under the IAY Scheme and had no knowledge about the construction. PW-15 stated in his evidence that no work order was issued by P-3 for construction of houses under the IAY Scheme for the beneficiaries. In his cross examination, he admitted that according to the norms of IAY Scheme, on completion of the work, utilization certificates (UC) were to be issued by P-3 after getting adjustment of the works by him from the Implementing Officers and submit them to the DM. He also stated in his cross-examination that he was unable to say whether after completion of the work, Utilization Certificate was submitted or not. He also stated in his cross-examination that he was unable to say whether after completion of the work, Utilization Certificate was submitted or not. He also stated that he was unable to say whether P-4 and P-5 submitted their completion reports for their works under IAY Scheme entrusted to them. PW-19, who was the Project Director, DRDA, in his evidence, deposed that he transferred a sum of Rs.41.25 lacs to the BDO, Dasda R.D. Block for the purpose of implementation of IAY Scheme; that as the Project Director, it was his duty to monitor the fund under the said Scheme and as per the norms under the said Scheme, BAC was to prepare a list of beneficiaries and the BDO used to send the proposal to the DM & Collector and that after two months of the transfer of the Rs.41’25 lacs to the BDO, Dasda, the latter transmitted the U.C. of the said amount to him on 31-3-2005 by supplying a copy thereof to the DM/Collector. He, however, testified that after two months of submission of the U.C. by the P-3, he was informed by the DM & Collector, North Tripura that an amount of Rs.41.25 lacs was defalcated by P-3. In cross, he testified that in (on?) papers, he found no discrepancies with respect to the amounts transferred to P- 3 nor did he personally enquire whether the UC submitted by P-3 was right or not. He also deposed that there was no complaint from the BAC relating to the utilization of fund amounting to Rs.41.25 lacs nor did he enquire the same through BAC. He admitted that his statement was not recorded by the police in connection with this case nor did he depose before the police. This witness, unfortunately, does not appear know anything at all as to what was going on in the Office of the BDO, Dasda RD Block. He admitted that he did not enquire personally whether the UC submitted by P-3 was correct or not. Since the prosecution case is basically based on documentary evidence, the statement of this witness is valuable only to extent that he transferred a sum of Rs.41.25 lakhs to the account of BDO/Das RD Block for implementation of IAY Scheme. 12. He admitted that he did not enquire personally whether the UC submitted by P-3 was correct or not. Since the prosecution case is basically based on documentary evidence, the statement of this witness is valuable only to extent that he transferred a sum of Rs.41.25 lakhs to the account of BDO/Das RD Block for implementation of IAY Scheme. 12. To demonstrate that the fund under the IAY Scheme was not utilised for the purpose for which it was sanctioned, the prosecution examined one Ranadhir Das as PW-25, who deposed that due to the presence of extremists in their respective villages, 350 families including him of different villages took shelters in a Refugee Camp under Dasda RD Block in the year 2001. He testified that during the tenure of P-3, who used to visit their camp, no house was constructed nor were cash monies sanctioned in their names. The prosecution also examined another refugee by the name of Smt Basanti Das as PW 27, who testified that in the year 2000, she took shelter in a refugee camp within Dasda RD Block along with 400/500 families; it was due to extremist problems in their village that they had to come to the refugee camp. She further testified that they stayed in the refugee camp for 4/4 and half years, but no house was sanctioned or cash amounts given by the Government in her name during that period. Thus, from the evidence of PW-15, PW-19, PW-25 and PW- 27, it is established that no house was constructed by any beneficiary, for whom the IAY Scheme was extended in Dasda RD Block. Clause 2.3 of Chapter- II of the Guidelines for Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) stipulates that the beneficiaries should be involved in the construction of the house, and to this end, the beneficiaries may make their own arrangements for procurement of construction material, engage skilled workmen and also contribute family labour. Simiarly, Clause 4.10 of Chapter IV of the said Guidelines further provides that payment should be made to the beneficiary on a staggered basis depending on the progress of the work; that the entire amount should not be paid to the beneficiary in lump-sum and that instalments of payment to be linked to the progress of work can be decided by the State Government or at the District level. Clause 6.1 of Chapter-VI of the said guidelines stipulates that officers at the district, sub-division and block levels must closely monitor all aspects of the IAY through visits to work sites; that a schedule of inspection which prescribes a minimum number of field visits for each supervisory level functionary from the State level to the block level should be drawn up and strictly adhered. Clause 6.3 of Chapter-VI of the same guidelines requires greater transparency in the implementation of the IAY at the various levels and hinges on the assumption that people should have access to information about implementation of these programmes in all their aspects; disclosure of information should be the rule and withholding of information should be the exception and withholding of information an exception. List of items (illustrative not exhaustive) on which information should invariably be made available to people to bring about greater transparency at the block level: (i) Details of houses taken up at the Block level with cost, sources of funds and implementing agency. (ii) Distribution of funds village-wise for the scheme. (iii) Allocation/availability of funds and progress in implementation of the Indira Awas Yojana. 13. From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the responsibility of P-3 does not end with issuing cheques for the purpose of implementation of the Scheme. Even after issuing cheques, it was his responsibly to account for the manner in which the sanctioned amounts were utilised by the beneficiary. It is the case of the prosecution that P-3 never issued any work orders before issuing the cheques and that the money released by him through the said three cheques were never utilized for the purpose for which they were released, which were rather shown as unutilized. What did he do is evident from his reply to his examination under Section 313, CrPC, namely, “No utilization certificate was submitted by him without completion of work. However, I may say that it is not always possible on the part of the BDO to visit each and every work sites personally and I had to depend on field reports from Implementing Officers. After preparation and clearance from accounts section, I put my signature on utilization certificates.” Not a single utilization certificate was produced or exhibited by him in the course of trial. After preparation and clearance from accounts section, I put my signature on utilization certificates.” Not a single utilization certificate was produced or exhibited by him in the course of trial. The Apex Court in Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 while construing the provision of Sections 5(2) read with 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption, which is couched in the language of Section 409 read with 405 IPC observed: “Although the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused, yet where the entrustment is proved or admitted it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove the actual mode or manner of misappropriation and in such a case the prosecution would have to rely largely on the truth or the falsity of the explanation given by the accused. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay, (1960) 3 SCR 319 : AIR 1960 SC 889 : 1960 Cri LJ 1250 this Court observed as follows: “The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made.” The courts below appeared to have convicted the appellant on the basis of the decision referred to above and have held that since the explanation given by the appellant was false, an inference of misappropriation could reasonably be drawn against him. This proposition cannot be doubted. But the question is whether the explanation given by the appellant in this case can be said to be absolutely false? Another question that arises is what are the standards to be employed in order to judge the truth or falsity of the version given by the defence? This proposition cannot be doubted. But the question is whether the explanation given by the appellant in this case can be said to be absolutely false? Another question that arises is what are the standards to be employed in order to judge the truth or falsity of the version given by the defence? Should the accused prove his case with the same amount of rigour and certainty, as the prosecution is required, to prove a criminal charge, or it is sufficient if the accused puts forward a probable or reasonable explanation which is sufficient to throw doubt on the prosecution case? In our opinion three cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence are well-settled, namely : “(1) that the onus lies affirmatively on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and it cannot derive any benefit from weakness or falsity of the defence version while proving its case; (2) that in a criminal trial the accused must be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty; and (3) that the onus of the prosecution never shifts.” 14. Section 102, Evidence Act says that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. In the instant case, the prosecution has discharged the initial burden of proof by establishing that a sum of Rs.41,25,000/- was entrusted to P- 3 for implementation of IAY Scheme i.e. for construction 150 houses for refugees and that he issued the required number of cheques and pay orders in favour of P-1, the non-petitioner and the deceased amounting to Rs.40,69,320/-. How those amounts were utilized and, if so, when or where, are facts, which are obviously especially within his knowledge. Section 106, Evidence Act provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is true that this provision cannot be used, so as to shift the onus of proving the offence, from the prosecution to the accused. Section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or, at any rate, disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. Section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or, at any rate, disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. If knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution on exercise of due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be “especially” within the knowledge of the accused. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may be upon the accused. In the instant case, the crucial facts regarding the misappropriation of Rs.40,69,320/- are facts, which are especially within the knowledge of P-3 and are not facts which could, with exercise of due diligence, be easily established by the prosecution; the prosecution cannot be expected to prove the negative. No shred of documentary evidence could be produced by P-3 to show that the funds were properly utilized. 15. On the contrary, it has been clinchingly established by the prosecution that the P-3 issued the three cheques of Rs.10,00,000/- each to P-1, the nonpetitioner and the deceased (Chandraham Reang) for purpose of implementation of IAY Scheme at Dasda RD Block i.e. for construction of 150 houses for the refugees and that those amounts were received back by him from the Implementing Officers i.e. co-accused as evident from the statement of PW- 34. PW-34 was the Panchayat Extension Officer in the Office of Dasda RD Block from 1997 to November 2005. He testified that in the month of April, 2005, PW- 15 visited their Block and asked him along with the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang), P-1, Samiran Chakraborty, P-5 and P-4 to visit his quarter. He then enquired about the drawal of some money. He further deposed that P-2, the ex- Cashier, also visited his quarter. He also testified that on that day, DM, North Tripura District, namely, Debatosh Datta also visited Kanchanpur and on his arrival, they all paid a visit to him at the Kanchanpur Dak Bungalow and that the DM also enquired about the withdrawal of Rs.30 lakhs. He further deposed that P-2, the ex- Cashier, also visited his quarter. He also testified that on that day, DM, North Tripura District, namely, Debatosh Datta also visited Kanchanpur and on his arrival, they all paid a visit to him at the Kanchanpur Dak Bungalow and that the DM also enquired about the withdrawal of Rs.30 lakhs. PW-34 further deposed that during that meeting P-2 disclosed that he paid an amount of Rs.30 lakhs to P-3 and that P-2 also showed three slips relating to the receipt of the said amounts by P-3. Now, apart from simple denial, this statement of PW-34 has remained unshaken. On the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that this witness has any axe to grind against P-3 to make false allegations against him (P-3). It must be noted that the duty of P-3 in the implementation of the scheme did not end with the issuance of the work orders or with the issuance of the cheques; he was equally responsible for proper execution of the work orders. For execution of the construction works, the first requirement is issuance of work order. But there is no evidence that the work orders were issued or received by the beneficiaries. Preparation of work orders is one thing, but actual issuance of such work orders to the beneficiaries is an entirely another transaction. Not a single witness is produced by P-3 to prove that he actually issued such work order. Since the entrustment of Rs.30,00,000/- to P-3 has now been proved to the hilt by the prosecution, it is for P-3 to prove as to how the money entrusted to him was dealt with; after all, the actual mode of entrustment or misappropriation is not to be proved by the prosecution. As already noticed, it is, however, sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he succeeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant, as already noticed, P-3 has miserably failed to account for the manner in which he dealt with a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- entrusted to him. In the instant, as already noticed, P-3 has miserably failed to account for the manner in which he dealt with a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- entrusted to him. At this stage, it may also be observed that the said amount of Rs.30,00,000/- were encashed in quick succession on 10-2-2005 and 18-3-2005 on the basis of the cheques, etc. admittedly issued by P-3. It is interesting to note that P-3 claimed to have submitted the Utilization Certificates by 31-3-2005. However, Clause 4.10 of Chapter IV of the said Guidelines provides that payment should be made to the beneficiary on a staggered basis depending on the progress of the work; that the entire amount should not be paid to the beneficiary in lump-sum and that instalments of payment to be linked to the progress of work can be decided by the State Government or at the District level. The trial court has rightly observed that “[T]hus if we look at the point of guideline discussed above, we would find that it was humanly impossible to utilize the said amount as per guidelines within the said period (of two months).” In this view of the matter, P- 3 has a lot to explain, but he has miserably failed to do so. Moreover, the manner in which these amounts were released by him is contrary to the said Guidelines. This is nothing but dishonest use or disposal of IAY Fund in violation of the direction prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged. A reasonable doubt cannot be an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason or common sense. A sum of Rs.30,00,000/- has demonstrably vanished into thin air and without a trace at the time when the same was entrusted with P-3 and when it was his duty to monitor the manner in which those amounts were to be utilized. Yet, he has the audacity to ask the prosecution to prove how he misappropriated those amounts! The concept of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” cannot be stretched to such a ridiculous level even in a criminal case. It is his duty to prove that he utilized those amounts as per the direction of law. 16. It is, however, contended by Mr. Yet, he has the audacity to ask the prosecution to prove how he misappropriated those amounts! The concept of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” cannot be stretched to such a ridiculous level even in a criminal case. It is his duty to prove that he utilized those amounts as per the direction of law. 16. It is, however, contended by Mr. PK Biswas, the learned senior counsel for P-3 that there was no dishonest intention on the part of P-3 as there is no proof of wrongful gain to him. I completely disagree. Irrespective of whether P-3 actually pocketed these amounts by himself or not, he caused wrongful loss to the State-respondents by not utilizing the same for the purposes for which they were sanctioned. Whoever does anything with intent to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss to another is said to act dishonestly under Section 24 of the Indian Penal Code, and it must be presumed that a person intends the natural consequences of his acts under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The legal position as to the meaning of the expression “dishonestly uses or disposes of that property” is concerned, this can best be understood by referring to decision of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Silas Moses reported in 1915 (17) Bom LR 670, which in my opinion and with due respect succinctly explained the legal position. That was the case in which the appellant was convicted of criminal breach of trust in respect of a motor car entrusted to him under a hire purchase agreement. The appellant could not dispute that agreement, nor the clause therein binding him not to assign, underlet or part with the possession of that motor car during the hire-purchase agreement. He was also compelled to admit the execution by him of two mortgages and one transaction purporting to be a sale of that motor car during the period of hire-purchase agreement. It was, however, contended by the appellant that he had no intent to cause wrongful loss to the owners and, therefore, did not act honestly in entering into those mortgages and sale transactions; and it was also contended by him by that those transactions did not amount to assignments within the meaning of the hire-purchase agreement. M.H.W., J. in his concurring judgment held: “9. M.H.W., J. in his concurring judgment held: “9. With regard to the first contention, whoever does anything with intent to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another is said to act dishonestly under Section 24 of the Indian Penal Code, and it must be presumed that a person intends the natural consequences of his acts under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Now there can, in my opinion, be no reasonable doubt that the appellant did, by entering into these transactions, both cause wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss to the owners of the motor car. He caused wrongful gain to himself by containing moneys on the security of the motor car contrary to a legal agreement prohibiting him from assigning any interest in that car, and he caused wrongful loss to the owners by putting in their way difficulties in recovering the moneys due from him to them and by subjecting their motor car to the risks of attachment and litigation.” 17. The natural and probable consequence of not utilizing Rs.30,00,000/- for the purpose for which it was sanctioned or was sanctioned contrary to the said Guidelines was thus to cause wrongful gain to P-3 or, at any rate, wrongful loss to the Government. And since every one must be taken to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own act, the inference is irresistible and the conclusion inescapable that such wrong loss to the Government or wrongful gain to P-3 was intended by him and by him only. This satisfies the test of “dishonestly uses or disposes of” public money by P-3 in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such public money was entrusted to him. 18. In my opinion, the trial court rightly convicted P-3 and the appellate rightly upheld the conviction and the sentence. All that he could say in his defence is that there were many doubts in the case of the prosecution, but he could not explain the actual mode or manner of utilization of the sanctioned amounts, which were entrusted to him. This reminds me of the oft-quoted observations of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 , which read thus: “12. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. This reminds me of the oft-quoted observations of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 11 SCC 271 , which read thus: “12. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. (See Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh,) (1990) 1 SCC 445 The prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava.,) (1992) 2 SCC 86 A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.).], (1978) 4 SCC 161 Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. “A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.” (Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution, 1944 AC 315 quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, 1988 Supp SCC 686 SCC p. 692, para 17. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. (See: Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa.),” (2002) 8 SCC 381 19. Coming now to the case of Pradip Dey (P-2), the trial court relied on the evidence of PW-8, PW-9 and DW-3 to convict him. (See: Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa.),” (2002) 8 SCC 381 19. Coming now to the case of Pradip Dey (P-2), the trial court relied on the evidence of PW-8, PW-9 and DW-3 to convict him. PW-8 was at the relevant time working as Group-D in the Office of the Dasda RD Block and deposed that P-2 was the Cashier of this RD Block Office during the tenure of P-1 and was transferred from this RD Block in the year 2005. He testified that he told daroga that on 18-3-2005, P-2 visited their RD Block. PW-9, who was also at the relevant time, serving as Group-D employee, testified that he knew P-2, who was posted at Panisagar following his transfer in the year 2005 and that probably one month after the transfer and release of P-2, he found him in their Dasda RD Block Office. In my opinion, if we rely on the evidence of PW-7 and PW-8 alone, there is obviously nothing therein which can remotely suggest the guilt of P-2 just because he happened to be in the premises of Dasda RD Block on 18-3-2005; something more is required for returning a verdict of conviction. However, the evidence of PW-32 and PW-33 against P-2 are highly incriminating. PW-32 was the Branch Manager of Tripura Gramin Bank, Kanchanpur, from 2004 to 2005 and was quite well-acquainted with P-2, who had been Cashier of Dasda RD Block for many years and often visited the Bank for banking transactions on behalf of the RD Block. PW-32 deposed that when the three cheques of Rs.10,00,000/- each were withdrawn in the Bank on the 18th or 19th March, 2005, P-2 was the Cashier of the TD Block and had visited the Bank accompanied by 6/7 persons. He also deposed that a sum of Rs.52,500/- was also withdrawn on 6-4-2005 by way of transfer from the account of P-3. In his cross-examination, he, however, volunteered to state that Samiran Chakraborty was the Cashier of the RD Block and P-2 was the Cashier prior to him. In my opinion, this voluntary statement sufficiently corrected his previous wrong statement, which must have been caused by slip of tongue. This is quite natural. In his cross-examination, he, however, volunteered to state that Samiran Chakraborty was the Cashier of the RD Block and P-2 was the Cashier prior to him. In my opinion, this voluntary statement sufficiently corrected his previous wrong statement, which must have been caused by slip of tongue. This is quite natural. In my opinion, the credibility of this witness could not be impeached at all in his cross-examination; on the contrary, this particular witness rather appears to be a natural witness and his evidence cannot be discarded. Moreover, his evidence is corroborated by PW-33, who was the Clerk-cum- Cashier of the Tripura Gramin Bank when he deposed that on 19-3-2005, a sum of Rs.30,00,000/- were withdrawn by three cheques from the CD account No. 24 and that on that day, P-2 accompanied by some others visited their Branch to withdraw the said amounts. In my opinion, these two witnesses must have interacted with P-2 for quite some time when the latter was the Cashier of the RD Block; they could not have mistaken his identity as he must have gone to their Bank regularly for banking transactions on behalf of the RD Block prior to his transfer. The evidence of PW-32 and PW-33 clearly established the presence of P-2 at the Bank when the cheques were withdrawn by P-1, the deceased and P-5. It may also be observed that P-2 was on leave in those days and, as such, the possibility of his going to Bank on that day to claim his share in the booty cannot thus be ruled out. It may be noted that in some, if not all, of the Government offices dealing with development funds, it has become, towards the end of every financial year, the established practice of officials to make desperate efforts to en cash all the funds available which are likely to lapse; this is how development funds are siphoned off by officials to fill their pockets. As already noticed, PW-34 testified that in the month of April, 2005, PW-15 visited their Block and asked him, the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang), P-1, Samiran Chakraborty, P-5 and P-4 to visit his quarter. He then enquired about the drawal of some money. He further deposed that P-2, the ex-Cashier, also visited his quarter. As already noticed, PW-34 testified that in the month of April, 2005, PW-15 visited their Block and asked him, the non-petitioner (Punyadhan Reang), P-1, Samiran Chakraborty, P-5 and P-4 to visit his quarter. He then enquired about the drawal of some money. He further deposed that P-2, the ex-Cashier, also visited his quarter. He also testified that on that day, DM, North Tripura District, namely, Debatosh Datta also visited Kanchanpur and on his arrival, they all visited him at the Kanchanpur Dak Bungalow and that the DM also enquired the withdrawal of Rs.30 lakhs. During that meeting, deposed PW-34, P-2 disclosed that he paid an amount of Rs.30 lakhs to P-3 and that P-2 also showed three slips relating to the receipt of the said amounts by P-3. His cross-examination does not elicit anything to falsify the statement of this witness. In my opinion, the statement of P-2 made before P-15 amounts to an extra-judicial confession, which is worthy of acceptance. This extra-judicial confession, in my judgment, established the complicity of P-2 in the crime as an abettor. But for his active participation, P-3 could not have withdrawn the cheques. Moreover, as already noticed, DW-3, the co-accused, in his evidence, despite cross-examination by him, has clearly implicated P-2 in abetting P-3 to misappropriate the amounts encashed from the three cheques signed by him and others. What is abetment is defined by Section 107 IPC, which says, among others, that a person abets the doing of a thing, who intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 2 to Section 107 IPC further explains that whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. Doing something for the offender is not an abetment, but doing something with knowledge so as to facilitate him to commit the crime or otherwise would constitute abetment. Thus, on the facts found by me, the prosecution has clinchingly established that P-2 abetted P-3 in the misappropriation of public money to the order of Rs.30,52,500/- and his conviction by the both the courts below under Section 409/109 IPC does not call for the interference of this Court. 20. Thus, on the facts found by me, the prosecution has clinchingly established that P-2 abetted P-3 in the misappropriation of public money to the order of Rs.30,52,500/- and his conviction by the both the courts below under Section 409/109 IPC does not call for the interference of this Court. 20. This then takes me to the question of involvement of P-4 (Bijan Rakshit) and P-5 (Parimal Ch. Das) in the abetment of the crime committed by P-3 in misappropriating another sums of Rs.5,59,251 and Rs.4,57,569/-. P-4 was a Junior Engineer in the Office of the Dasda RD Block whereas P-5 was Work Assistant in the same Office. PW-15 in his evidence deposed that P-4 and P-5, who were also the Implementing Officers, also disclosed to him that they were compelled to put their signatures in the Acquittance Roll maintained in the Office of Dasda RD Block for the purpose of making advance payment to the Implementing Officers. In the Acquittance Rolls where they put their respective signatures, they acknowledged the receipt of Rs.5,59,251/- in eleven equal break-ups of Rs.50,841/- and another sum of Rs.4,57,569/- in nine equal break-ups of Rs.50,841/- on 10-2-2006. Their signatures found therein were also proved by the evidence of Sri Vinod Kumar, Govt. Examiner, who was examined as PW-43. In their examinations under Section 313, Cr.PC, both of them admitted that they were compelled to put their signatures on the Acquittance Roll. It is quite possible that they might not have actually received any amount, but then they cannot escape their liability with respect to the charge of abetment of the offence of criminal misappropriation committed by P-3 as they were partners in crime. If they were really being forced to put their signatures for illegal purpose, they should have either refused or reported it to the police. After all, they evidently knew the consequence of putting their signatures on the Acquittance Rolls to support the misappropriation of public money by P-3. The legal position is clear that where the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC contains both exculpatory and inculpatory parts, only inculpatory part of the statement may be taken into consideration by the Court. In other words, it is permissible to the court to take into account even the inculpatory statement ignoring the exculpatory statements if it accords with the evidence on record and to press it to the arena of appreciations. In other words, it is permissible to the court to take into account even the inculpatory statement ignoring the exculpatory statements if it accords with the evidence on record and to press it to the arena of appreciations. The question to be considered is whether on the above admitted facts, P-4 and P-5 can be said to have abetted the commission of the offence of Section 409 IPC by P-3. In my opinion, the prosecution has proved to the hilt that PW-4 and PW-5 abetted the commission of the offence of Section 409 IPC by P-3 another sums of Rs.5,59,251/- and Rs.4,57,569/-, i.e. Rs.10,16,820/-. Under the circumstances, I have no alternative but to uphold the conviction of both P-4 and P-5 U/s Section 109 IPC for abetting P-3 in the commission of the offence punishable under Section 409. 21. Coming now to the involvement of P-1 (Dhananjoy Roy), it may be noted that this witness examined himself as DW-3. In his evidence, it may be recalled, he stated that he was the Panchayat Secretary of Anandasagar ADC Village Panchayat during the financial year 2004-05; that no target or number of beneficiaries from among the refugees was received from the Block at the Anandasagr ADC Village Panchayat during the said financial year and that on 18-3-2005, he was called by P-3 to his chamber and was asked to put his signatures going to the Cash Section and on his asking, P-3 told him that since it was the end of financial year, he had to give his signatures and adjustment would be made within a few days thereafter. He further testified that he was called to the chamber of P-3 thrice and was compelled to put his signatures going to the Cash Section where P-2 and the deceased (Samiran Chakraborty) were present. The deceased then procured his signatures on the Acquittance Roll and the Reverse Side of a blank cheque by assuring him that his signature would be procured on the cheque receipt register and on the counter-foil of the cheque within a few days thereafter after releasing the money against the cheque. He further deposed that he never received any money as assured by the deceased. He further deposed that he never received any money as assured by the deceased. This clearly shows that he was expecting receipt of the money from P- 3 as assured by P-2 and that he knew the consequence of the signatures given in those cheques and the acquittance roll. In this view of the matter, it can be said that P-1 has certainly abetted the commission of the crime by P-3 inasmuch as it was by his act of putting his signatures on the Acquittance Roll and the cheques that public money to the order of Rs.40,69,320/- was misappropriated by P-3. In other words, at the time of putting his signature, he had the knowledge that the transactions in question were illegal and he allowed himself to facilitate the commission of the crime by P-3. He tried to defend his indefensible act by stating that he was compelled to do so without, however, indicating in what manner such compulsion was exerted upon him; this is nothing but a lame excuse. He was a partner in crime. He was simply trying to make out that his acts were innocent and without the knowledge that he was further the culpable objects of P-3 but the evidence is otherwise. In my considered view, the courts below did not commit any illegality in convicting P-1 for abetting the commission of the offence punishable U/s 409 IPC by P-3. 22. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in any of these criminal revision petitions, which are hereby dismissed. The bail-bonds of all the petitioners stand cancelled forthwith. The five petitioners herein shall surrender forthwith before the trial court whereupon they shall serve out their respective sentences imposed by the impugned judgment of convictions and sentences. Transmit the L.C. records forthwith.