JUDGMENT Hon’ble Bharat Bhushan, J.—Two appellants have assailed the judgment and order dated 26.2.1983 passed by the then Sessions Judge, Banda in S.T. No. 414 of 1982 (State v. Santosh Singh and others) arising out of Crime No. 57 of 1982 under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C., Police Station (P.S.) Bisinda, District Banda whereby Trial Judge convicted the appellants Brijesh Singh and Phullu Raliha and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. Co-accused Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh have been given benefit of doubt and acquitted for the same offence by the aforesaid impugned judgment. 3. Prosecution story in brief is that appellants were residing in a village Punahur alongwith deceased Ramdhani. It is alleged that one Brij Bhushan was murdered some six years prior to the present incident alongwith Lallu. Brij Bhushan was father of appellant Brijesh Singh and two other accused Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh. Their associate Phullu Raliha was the brother of Lallu. A prosecution was launched wherein complainant of this case Gajraj, deceased Ramdhani and certain others were made accused. However, after trial they were all acquitted some three years prior to the present incident. 4. It is stated that prior to the present incident election for village Pradhan took place wherein Munna brother of appellant Phullu Raliha and deceased Ramdhani contested with several other persons. Both of them lost election. However, it is alleged that Munna perceived that he had lost election because of deceased Ramdhani. 5. Coming back to the present incident it is alleged that on 28.6.1982 at about 5:30 a.m. deceased Ramdhani left his residence for easing himself. It is stated that complainant Gajraj Singh was following him. As soon as deceased Ramdhani reached in front of the house of Bablu Domar near well in a lane (gali), he was accosted by appellants Brijesh Singh, Phullu Raliha, Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh. Appellant Brijesh Singh and co-accused Mangal Singh exhorted the accused persons saying that an enemy has been found and should be eliminated whereupon appellant Brijesh Singh opened fire on his cousin deceased Ramdhani who fell down. Appellant Phullu also opened fire from his country made pistol but gun failed to discharge. Complainant Gajraj Singh (P.W.1) raised alarm alongwith his relative Phula wife of Mithai Lal and Raju son of deceased Ramdhani upon which all four accused fled towards southern side. Appellant Phullu also opened fire from his country made pistol but gun failed to discharge. Complainant Gajraj Singh (P.W.1) raised alarm alongwith his relative Phula wife of Mithai Lal and Raju son of deceased Ramdhani upon which all four accused fled towards southern side. The commotion attracted the neighbours and other village folks. Deceased Ramdhani succumbed to fire-arm injury after gasping for some time. Fearing disappearance and concealment the cadaver of Ramdhani was brought back and placed in front of door of Ramdhani’s residence. This incident is said to have occurred at 5:30 a.m. in the morning and F.I.R. was lodged within two hours at P.S. Bisinda, district Banda which was 5 km. away from the place of occurrence. 6. P.W. 4 constable Vinod Kumar Dubey recorded the F.I.R. (Ext. Ka-1) in general Diary (G.D.) of P.S. Bisinda, the extract of which is available on record as Ext. Ka-6. Investigation was entrusted to P.W. 6 Devendra Singh Bhadauriya who immediately rushed to the place of occurrence around 9:10 a.m. after recording the statement of complainant Gajraj Singh (P.W. 1) at police station itself. Inquest proceedings were conducted. The cadaver was sent to post-mortem. The autopsy (Ext. Ka-2) was also conducted on 29.6.1982. The samples of blood stained earth and plain earth were taken. The statements of witnesses were recorded. Site plan (Ext Ka-18) was prepared. Finding sufficient evidence against appellants and two other accused, a charge-sheet under Section 302 I.P.C. was filed against four persons, namely, appellants Brijesh Singh, Phullu, Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh. 7. Trial Judge charged appellants Brijesh Singh under Section 302 I.P.C. on 17.11.1982 and on same day charged other accused persons, namely, Phullu, Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. All accused persons denied allegations; pleaded not guilty and desired to be tried. During course of trial, prosecution produced five witnesses, namely, P.W.1 Gajraj, P.W. 2 Bahori (eye-witness), P.W.3 Dr. P.C. Chandel (conducted autopsy), P.W. 4 constable Vinod Kumar Dubey (recorded F.I.R.) and P.W. 5 Devendra Singh Bhadauriya (investigator). 8. The statements of accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the accused denied the allegations and claimed false implication on account of previous enmity. The trial Judge found sufficient evidence against the appellants Brijesh Singh and Phullu but was not fully convinced by the evidence against remaining accused, namely Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh. 8. The statements of accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. All the accused denied the allegations and claimed false implication on account of previous enmity. The trial Judge found sufficient evidence against the appellants Brijesh Singh and Phullu but was not fully convinced by the evidence against remaining accused, namely Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh. Therefore, accused Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh were given benefit of doubt and acquitted of offences for which they were charged. However, appellant Brijesh Singh was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. and Phullu Raliha under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. Both were sentenced to undergo an imprisonment for life. This judgment is under challenge before this Court. 9. Heard Sri Mewa Lal Shukla, Amicus Curiae for appellant No. 1, Brijesh Singh, Sri Kapil Rathore, learned counsel for appellant No. 2, Phullu Raliha and Sri Syed Ali Murtaza, learned A.G.A. on behalf of State. 10. Both counsel for appellants have argued that prosecution evidence on record is not trustworthy. According to them there are vast and significant discrepancies in prosecution evidence reducing their credibility. The F.I.R. was ante timed. They have also argued that cadaver of Ramdhani was sent for autopsy with unexplained considerable delay. Submission is that medical evidence is inconsistent with the ocular testimony. Counsel for appellants have also drawn the attention of this Court towards the fact that the copy of chik report was sent to learned Magistrate with considerable delay without any proper explanation. 11. To the contrary Sri Syed Ali Murtaza, learned A.G.A. has argued that the witnesses of fact have given a very convincing narration of the entire episode. Therefore, there is nothing on record to discard their testimony. P.W.1, complainant Gajraj Singh is family member of deceased and there is no reason for him to let go the real culprit and falsely implicate the appellants. Learned A.G.A. has also argued that an evaluation of eye-witness account should be done in the backdrop of social and economic status of witnesses and that the evidence of village folk cannot be rejected merely because of some minor discrepancies. Similarly, he has submitted that medical evidence is never compared with the ocular testimony in mathematical manner. Learned A.G.A. has relied upon the judgments of Apex Court in Dr. Similarly, he has submitted that medical evidence is never compared with the ocular testimony in mathematical manner. Learned A.G.A. has relied upon the judgments of Apex Court in Dr. Krishna Pal and another v. State of U.P., 1996 (7) SCC 194 , Brahm Swaroop and another v. State of U.P., 2011 Cr LJ 306 and Nandu Rastogi @ Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar, 2003 SCC (Cri) 177. 12. For appreciating the argument of learned Amicus Curiae, counsel for appellant Phullu and learned A.G.A., it is necessary to have brief glimpse of prosecution evidence. Only two eye-witnesses have been produced. P.W. 1 Gajraj (complainant) was cousin of deceased Ramdhani. He has given brief history of previous litigations between the rival parties. In one serious incident, the father (Brij Bhushan) of accused Brijesh Singh, Santosh Singh and Mangal Singh and Lallu, brother of accused Phullu were murdered. Apparently, deceased Ramdhani, P.W. 1 complainant Gajraj and eleven other persons faced the criminal prosecution in which they were acquitted three years prior to this incident. 13. In addition to that few days prior to this incident i.e. on 16.6.1982 election of village Pradhan was held in which Munna, brother of Phullu and deceased Ramdhani contested alongwith several persons. Both Munna and Phullu lost the election. However, Munna reportedly claimed that he had lost election because of entry of deceased Ramdhani in electoral fray. According to prosecution the previous litigation, antagonistic relationship and immediate defeat in village election impelled the appellants to commit the present crime. Within 15 days of that election deceased Ramdhani was accosted by appellants in front of house of Bablu Domar near well while deceased was going to attend the nature’s call. Appellant Brijesh Singh and accused Mangal Singh exhorted and appellant Brijesh Singh fired from country made pistol which hit Ramdhani who fell down. Appellant Phullu also opened fire from his gun but gun failed to discharge. P.W. 1 complainant Gajraj, his family member Smt. Phulla and deceased’s son Raju raised alarm upon which all four accused fled the place of occurrence. Deceased Ramdhani struggled for life for some time and then succumbed to injuries. 14. Stunned, shocked and distraught family also feared the concealment of dead body, therefore, they brought the cot and placed deceased Ramdhani on it. This cot was then taken to the residence of Ramdhani and placed in front of his house. 15. Deceased Ramdhani struggled for life for some time and then succumbed to injuries. 14. Stunned, shocked and distraught family also feared the concealment of dead body, therefore, they brought the cot and placed deceased Ramdhani on it. This cot was then taken to the residence of Ramdhani and placed in front of his house. 15. This narration by complainant Gajraj (P.W.1) has been supported by the independent testimony of P.W.2 Bahori who too was coming back after attending nature’s call. He has testified that he was coming back after defecation alongwith Ram Manohar and as soon as they reached the residence of Bablu, they saw Ramdhani coming from north to south within the same lane (gali). The accused person surrounded Ramdhani and appellant Brijesh shot him. Appellant Phullu also tried to open fire-arm upon deceased but gun failed to discharge. 16. P.W. 3 Dr. P.C. Chandel (conducted autopsy upon deceased) found following injuries on the person of deceased : “1. Multiple abrasion in an area of 10 cm x 4 cm on right side of face and forehead including eyebrow. 2. Seven gun shot wounds of entry in an area of 11 cm x 8 cm on back of chest left side upper level upto upper most level of back. Lower level upto lower border of scapula, each measuring 1 cm x 1 cm x chest cavity deep. Margins inverted with abraded collar, maximum distance between two wounds 7 cm minimum 5 cm. Direction inwards forwards. No blackening, no tattooing, no charring. 3. Gun shot wound of entry 1 cm x 1cm x neck muscle deep on left side of neck 7 cm below and behind left ear. No tattooing, no charring. Direction inwards, forwards and slightly upwards. 4. Gunshot wound of exit (six in number) in an area of 12 cm x11 cm on left front of chest lower level upto 7 cm away from nipple, upper level upto upper border of chest, each measuring 1, 1/4cm x 1 ¼ cm x chest cavity deep. Margins averted. Maximum distance between two wounds is 11 cm and minimum x 4 cm corresponds to injury No. 2. 5. Contusion in an area 15 cm x 11 cm on left side of front of chest around injury No. 4.” 17. P.W.4 constable Vinod Kumar Dubey recorded the F.I.R. (Ext. Margins averted. Maximum distance between two wounds is 11 cm and minimum x 4 cm corresponds to injury No. 2. 5. Contusion in an area 15 cm x 11 cm on left side of front of chest around injury No. 4.” 17. P.W.4 constable Vinod Kumar Dubey recorded the F.I.R. (Ext. Ka-1) and carved out chik report (Ext Ka-5) and thereafter made entries in general diary (G.D.) after arrival of Investigating Officer (I.O.) from the place of occurrence. P.W. 5 Devendra Singh Bhadauria has testified regarding contours of investigation. He has stated that he reached the place of occurrence on 9:10 a.m. and after recording the statement of complainant Gajraj (P.W.1) of police station itself, he also recorded the statements of Phula, Raju, Ram Manohar and Chedia, prepared site plan etc. and thereafter submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons. 18. A bare perusal of eye-witnesses account given by P.W. 1 Gajraj and P.W. 2 Bahori would reveal that both accounts are consistent with the original prosecution story. The existence of previous enmity has been admitted by rival parties. F.I.R. (Ext. Ka-1) itself talks of previous enmity which has been reiterated by P.W.1 Gajraj during his testimony. Rival parties have claimed antagonistic relationship. Learned counsel for appellant has argued that the earlier murder took place six years back and therefore, this cannot be a reason for murder of Ramdhani in 1982. Learned counsel for appellants have drawn the attention of this Court towards the F.I.R. (Ext Kha-1) of earlier incident which says that incident took place on 31.3.1977. It is true that earlier incident took place in March 1977 but its trial was conducted later on and acquittal took place three years prior to the present incident. It was not merely the incident but subsequent acquittal which probably was the reason for the anger of appellants. 19. Further it must be understood that fifteen days prior to the incident, election for village Pradhan took place in which deceased Ramdhani and Munna brother of appellant Phullu contested and lost election but Munna said to have said that he lost election because of entry of deceased Ramdhani. 20. That may or may not be true, but fact of the matter is that question of motive is one of the perception. Normally motive lie locked in the heart of the miscreants. It is very difficult to establish a motive. 20. That may or may not be true, but fact of the matter is that question of motive is one of the perception. Normally motive lie locked in the heart of the miscreants. It is very difficult to establish a motive. It has to be gathered from the facts of the case. As stated earlier, two persons father (Brij Bhushan) of appellant Brijesh Singh and the brother (Lallu) of appellant Phullu had been murdered in previous incident. The deceased Ramdhani and his brother complainant Gajraj (P.W.1) faced prosecution in that case. Obviously this criminal prosecution and subsequent acquittal would ordinarily create bad blood. Similarly, the loss of election is a strong motive as well. Loss of election coupled with previous instance of double murder and subsequent acquittal of deceased in our opinion furnish strong and immediate motive for the crime. 21. Testimonies of P.W. 1 Gajraj and P.W. 2 Bahori are of high quality. These are credible and in consonance with the normal human conduct. Learned counsel for appellants have drawn the attention of this Court towards some discrepancies. They have claimed that F.I.R. is silent regarding the presence of Phula and Ramdhani’s son Raju while complainant P.W. 1 Gajraj has claimed during his testimony that he was following deceased Ramdhani and Phula and Ramdhani’s son Raju were following him. Counsel for appellants have claimed that this improvement has been made in order to create more witnesses and that; F.I.R. does not say that Raju (deceased’s son) and Phula (relative of complainant, Gajraj) were also following complainant P.W. 1 Gajraj. Submission also is that while the testimony of Gajraj says that deceased Ramdhani fell on his face but this fact has not been mentioned in the F.I.R. It has been also argued by counsel for the appellants that the fact that appellant Brijesh Singh first got down from Chabutara and fired upon deceased, has not been mentioned in the F.I.R. Further submission is that these discrepancies render the prosecution case untrustworthy and reliance cannot be placed on such evidence. 22. We have carefully perused these so called discrepancies and we believe that they are minor in nature and insignificant. Ordinarily witnesses are not expected to give minute details of the incident. The power of observation and description defers from person to person. 22. We have carefully perused these so called discrepancies and we believe that they are minor in nature and insignificant. Ordinarily witnesses are not expected to give minute details of the incident. The power of observation and description defers from person to person. We do not deem it proper to reject the testimonies of eye-witnesses merely on account of these minor discrepancies. By and large witnesses cannot describe the incident like a photographic or xerox machine. The complainant Gajraj, his family members, deceased Ramdhani and others were going for their morning rituals in routine manner. Suddenly at 5:30 a.m. in the morning complainant’s cousin brother was assassinated before all of them. Mental condition of distraught family members could merely be guessed. Thus mental conflict, pain and terror on this sudden murderous attack could distract anyone but P.W. 1 Gajraj has narrated the story in a very graphic manner. He has stated that first he arranged for transport of dead body of deceased to place of his residence as he also feared for disappearance of corpse of Ramdhani, therefore, he put the dead body of deceased on a cot (Charpai). Complainant Gajraj has also specified that one Chedia was asked to bring the cot from his residence. Chedia, Vaishali etc. took the corpse to the residence of Ramdhani. He has specified that he remained present on the spot around 25-26 minutes then he dictated the F.I.R. to one Chandra Kishore which took half an hour and then he travelled on foot to the police station Bisinda. He has given description of virtually every minutes of time spent in lodging the F.I.R. in a very careful manner. He has testified that he again came back to the place of occurrence by Government bus. However, Sub Inspector and Constable came by motor and thereafter the inquest proceedings were conducted. The claim of learned counsels for appellants regarding lack of details in F.I.R. are not sustainable. The date, time and incident have been given in the F.I.R. Motive is spelt out in it. Name of assailants, weapons used by them, manner of attack and presence of witnesses have been delineated in detail. FIR (Ext. Ka-1) also demonstrates the presence of Phula and deceased’s son Raju contrary to the claim of counsel for appellants. The date, time and incident have been given in the F.I.R. Motive is spelt out in it. Name of assailants, weapons used by them, manner of attack and presence of witnesses have been delineated in detail. FIR (Ext. Ka-1) also demonstrates the presence of Phula and deceased’s son Raju contrary to the claim of counsel for appellants. To say that complete details, found in oral evidence, should also have been mentioned in F.I.R. is not acceptable for the simple reason that F.I.R. is not suspected to be encyclopedia of entire case. The Apex Court in Susanta Das and others v. State of Orissa with Ashok Das alias Gopal Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 2016 SC 589 , has held thus : “23. That apart, we find the decisions relied upon by the learned standing counsel for the State as reported in Rotash (supra) and Mritunjoy Biswas (supra) duly supported the submissions. In the decision reported in Rotash (supra), in paragraph 14, this Court has held as under: “14. The First Information Report, as is well known, is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. It need not contain all the details. We, however, although did not intend to ignore the importance of naming of an accused in the First Information Report, but herein we have seen that he had been named in the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that P.W.1 did not name him in the First Information Report, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement of Mooli Dev, P.W.6. The question is as to whether a person was implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the case......” 24. In the decision reported in Mritunjoy Biswas (supra) in paragraphs 22 and 23, this Court by referring to the earlier decisions has noted the legal principles as to how a person not named in the F.I.R when proceeded against can be considered. Paragraphs 22 and 23 can be usefully referred, which are as under : “22. In Mulla v. State of U.P., the accused persons were not named in the FIR. Paragraphs 22 and 23 can be usefully referred, which are as under : “22. In Mulla v. State of U.P., the accused persons were not named in the FIR. Taking into consideration the material brought on record, the Court observed that though none was named in the FIR, yet subsequently the names of the appellants had come into light during investigation and, hence, non-mentioning the names of the accused persons would not be fatal to the prosecution case. 23. In Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., after referring to the authorities Rotash, Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., Sone Lal v. State of U.P., Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh and Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam, the Court opined that: (Ranjit Singh case, SCC p.344, para 14) “14....in case the informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.” 23. Similarly, the question of minor discrepancies is not enough to reject the eye-witnesses account of witnesses whose presence has been demonstrated by evidence on record. In the present case P.W.1 complainant Gajraj lodged the FIR. He was following deceased Ramdhani at the time of incident. He lodged F.I.R. within two hours of incident. He has unwittingly given a reasonable and satisfactory account of even these two hours. The Apex Court in Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2016 SC 1160 , has held that minor discrepancies are not enough to discard the otherwise trustworthy evidence of witnesses. 24. Learned counsel for appellant has also raised the question of stated inconsistency between the medical evidence and ocular evidence. He has submitted that P.W. 1 complainant Gajraj who was following deceased Ramdhani has claimed that single fire-arm shot discharged by Brijesh Singh hit the deceased Ramdhani on his chest while medical report discloses that wound of entry was found on the back of deceased. Counsel for appellants have also claimed that injuries No. 1 & 3 must have been caused by two different gun shots. Learned counsels for appellants have submitted that this discrepancy is fatal to the prosecution story. We are not in agreement with that. Counsel for appellants have also claimed that injuries No. 1 & 3 must have been caused by two different gun shots. Learned counsels for appellants have submitted that this discrepancy is fatal to the prosecution story. We are not in agreement with that. The core of prosecution story is that in the early morning in the month of June at about 5:30 a.m. Ramdhani was going to attend the nature’s call and P.W. 1 Gajraj was following him and suddenly deceased Ramdhani was attacked and shot and he fell down. The incident occurred in a fleeting moment. P.W. 1 complainant Gajraj was not expecting this attack otherwise neither complainant, Gajraj nor deceased Ramdhani would have taken that particular road. Two fire-arm shots were fired in quick succession by accused persons who were standing near Chabutara. However, second shot fired by appellant Phullu failed to discharge. Site plan (Ext. Ka-18) discloses that P.W.1 Gajraj was nearby. The first reaction of any normal human would be to save himself. In such a scenario probably Gajraj (P.W. 1) was only able to see that his cousin Ramdhani had been shot by these two accused and that; Ramdhani had fallen on the road. To expect him (P.W. 1 Gajraj) to describe the seat of each shot on every part of deceased’s body with mathematical precision is neither feasible nor reasonable. The medical evidence is never compared with ocular testimony in mechanical fashion. The Apex Court in Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 476 , has held thus: “....So far as the question of inconsistency between medical evidence and ocular evidence is concerned, the law is well-settled that, unless the oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, the oral evidence would have primacy. In the event of contradictions between medical and ocular evidence, the ocular testimony of a witness will have greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence and when medical evidence makes the oral testimony improbable, the same becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of such evidence. It is only when the contradiction between the two is so extreme that the medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of the ocular evidence being true at all, that the ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved” 25. Evidence of prosecution that deceased Ramdhani was shot on 28.6.1982 at about 5:30 a.m. by assailants is trustworthy. It is only when the contradiction between the two is so extreme that the medical evidence completely rules out all possibilities of the ocular evidence being true at all, that the ocular evidence is liable to be disbelieved” 25. Evidence of prosecution that deceased Ramdhani was shot on 28.6.1982 at about 5:30 a.m. by assailants is trustworthy. P.W. 3 Dr. P.C. Chandel has reconciled two wounds of entry by saying that these two injuries could have been caused by single fire shot. We believe that it is not always possible in such frenzied scenario to calculate the number of shots fired by accused persons. Injury in the back of deceased can be explained very easily. As soon as deceased Ramdhani was seen by accused persons and as they exhorted each other, it was natural for deceased Ramdhani to turn around and try to escape. In the process he sustained injuries on the back side. This has been explained by P.W. 3 Dr. P.C. Chandel in his testimony. Over all narration of incident by witnesses is highly reliable. P.W. 2 Bahori is an independent witness. He too was coming back after attending the nature’s call and he has reinforced the prosecution story as unfolded in F.I.R. and the testimony of P.W. 1 Gajraj. 26. We have carefully examined all material on record. The evidence on record clearly establishes the guilt of accused persons. As stated earlier FIR was lodged within two hours. The previous enmity is admitted to both parties. There is no reason for complainant to spare the real culprit and to falsely implicate the accused persons especially in the light of independent testimony of P.W. 2 Bahori. 27. Learned counsel for the appellants have also argued that the investigation was conducted indifferently. We are afraid this argument is not sustainable. The testimony of P.W. 5 Devendra Singh Bhadoriya (investigator) and the documents prepared on the place of occurrence would reveal that the investigation was conducted properly. The incident occurred at 5:30 am. FIR was lodged almost within two hours and investigation started immediately. Devendra Singh Bhadoriya reached the place of occurrence at 9:10 a.m. in the morning. Inquest proceedings were conducted immediately, though it has been claimed that dead body was sent late to the autopsy. But a careful perusal of the evidence would reveal that dead body was sent on the same day for autopsy. Devendra Singh Bhadoriya reached the place of occurrence at 9:10 a.m. in the morning. Inquest proceedings were conducted immediately, though it has been claimed that dead body was sent late to the autopsy. But a careful perusal of the evidence would reveal that dead body was sent on the same day for autopsy. Though autopsy was conducted next day i.e 29.6.1982. 28. Investigating Officer Devendra Singh Bhadoriya, P.W.5 has clearly stated that blood stained sample of earth was taken. He has also explained that north-south lane (gali) was dry and clear. Deposition of P.W. 1 Gajraj is not contrary to P.W. 5 D.S. Bhadoriya. Gajraj has merely said that there was some muck or mud near the root of well. He has denied the existence of mud in the entire lane. This description has been supported by P.W.5 D.S. Bhadoriya. He has also pointed out that on this clear lane blood stains were found. The absence of Ramdhani’s lota (vessel) in our opinion is not fatal to the prosecution story. 29. The Apex Court in Dhanaj Singh @ Shera and others v. State of Punjab, 2004 (48) ACC 940, has stated that the faulty investigation by itself is not sufficient for acquittal of accused persons whose guilt has been established by trustworthy eye-witness account. 30. Similarly in Ram Singh @ Chajju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) (1) SCC (Cri) 1496, the Apex Court has held that every defect in investigation would not entitle accused persons of acquittal. 31. In so far as the stated delay in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate Banda is concerned, we believe that same was dispatched on the same day as has been stated by P.W.4, constable Vinod Kumar Dubey. Learned counsel for Amicus Curiae has submitted that copy of the F.I.R. was dispatched before Magistrate with considerable delay. He has submitted that the FIR was received in the Court of concerned Magistrate after several days. We have perused the record. The evidence discloses that the copy of FIR was dispatched on the same day i.e on 28.6.1982. Special report was also sent. G.D. entry had been made. Constable Aman Singh was sent for this purpose and he came back on 29.6.1982 at 7:30 in the morning and again an entry was made in G.D. The extract of this G.D. is available on record as Ext. Ka-9. The Chik report (Ext. Special report was also sent. G.D. entry had been made. Constable Aman Singh was sent for this purpose and he came back on 29.6.1982 at 7:30 in the morning and again an entry was made in G.D. The extract of this G.D. is available on record as Ext. Ka-9. The Chik report (Ext. Ka-5) also discloses that Circle Officer sent this report on 30.6.1982 to the Magistrate Banda. Apparently, it was received late in the Court of Magistrate. Reasons for delay have not been delineated by the rival parties during trial. We do not propose to speculate though we are aware some times the bundles of document and chik reports are placed before clerk concerned and they are not able to make relevant entries immediately in the record. But the relevant entries in the G.D. and the acknowledgment of Circle Officer on 30.6.1982 obviates any manipulation. 32. It is evident that the copy of the F.I.R. had been dispatched on 28.6.1981 itself. Therefore, manipulation, fabrication or antedating of F.I.R. was simply not possible. The purpose of sending copy of FIR to Magistrate precisely is to avoid any manipulation. If other evidence reveals that manipulation was not done or that it could not have been done then accused persons cannot be acquitted merely because the copy of FIR was sent to the Magistrate with some delay. If evidence reveals that copy of FIR was indeed received little late in the Court of Magistrate but it was not possible to manipulate it on account of its dispatch from police station then some delay in dispatch or in receipt in the Court of Magistrate per-se would not be sufficient for concluding that FIR had been manipulated. 33. Learned counsel for appellant Phullu has also argued that appellant Phullu was charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Prosecution story says that deceased was done to death by the shot fired by appellant Brijesh Singh. He has submitted that there is no evidence on record to show that appellant Phullu shared the common intention with appellant Brijesh Singh. Learned counsel for appellant Phullu has submitted that appellant Phullu has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC despite the fact no specific and cogent role has been assigned to appellant Phullu. He has submitted that there is no evidence on record to show that appellant Phullu shared the common intention with appellant Brijesh Singh. Learned counsel for appellant Phullu has submitted that appellant Phullu has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC despite the fact no specific and cogent role has been assigned to appellant Phullu. Therefore, the submission is that appellant Phullu cannot be held guilty of offence under Section 302 I.P.C. in the absence of any specific evidence that; he too shared common intention with appellant Brijesh Singh. In this connection learned counsel has relied upon judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Rohan Singh, 1996 CRI LJ 2884, Nankau Singh and another v. State of U.P., 2016 (92) ACC 381 and Apex Court in Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrai and others v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 SCC (Cri) 698. 34. The question for consideration is whether Section 34 IPC can be used in the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 34 IPC reads as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons, is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” 35. As far as criminal liability is concerned, ordinarily person who actually commits an offence is held responsible for his act. Section 34 IPC, however is exception to this rule. The said section brings within the ambit of penal liability even those persons who have not actually committed crime but there existed a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such common intention. Thus to attract Section 34, which infact enumerates one of the principle of constructive liability, two conditions must be satisfied : (i) There must be common intention to commit a criminal act; and (ii) There must be participation by all the persons in doing such act in furtherance of that intention. In order to attract Section 34 IPC, the Court should be able to draw an inference that result reached was concerted action of the person said to have been liable. 36. In order to attract Section 34 IPC, the Court should be able to draw an inference that result reached was concerted action of the person said to have been liable. 36. In Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 , the Apex Court construed Section 34 IPC and held that common intention within the meaning of section implied a prearranged plan and the criminal act done pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. The said plan may also develop on the spot during the course of commission of the offence; but crucial circumstance is that the said plan must precede the act constituting the offence. If that be so, before a Court can convict a person under Section 34 read with specific provision under which the person is charged, it should come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more other persons, named or unnamed, for committing the said offence. 37. In Hethubha alias Jithuba Madhuba and others v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 1266 , the Court observed that dominant feature of Section 34 is the element of participation in actions. This participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert. Prior concert and pre-arranged plan is the foundation of common intention to establish liability and guilt. 38. Coming back to the facts of the present case evidence discloses that appellant Phullu bore enmity with deceased Ramdhani alongwith other accused persons on account of alleged murder of his own brother in prior incident. The fact that all four accused persons were siting on Chabutara together in wee hours of the morning is itself revealing. Both Brijesh and Phullu were armed with fire-arm weapons. Appellant Brijesh Singh opened fire on deceased Ramdhani which hit deceased. The evidence reveals that appellant Phullu also opened fire on deceased. This fact has been reiterated by P.W. 1 Gajraj Singh and P.W. 2 Bahori. The core of evidence of P.W. 3 Dr. P.C. Chandel is also consistent with the prosecution story. 39. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in doing the criminal act. To invoke Section 34 IPC, it must be established that the criminal act was done by more than one person in furtherance of common intention of all. The core of evidence of P.W. 3 Dr. P.C. Chandel is also consistent with the prosecution story. 39. Section 34 IPC embodies the principle of joint liability in doing the criminal act. To invoke Section 34 IPC, it must be established that the criminal act was done by more than one person in furtherance of common intention of all. It must, therefore, be proved that there was common intention on the part of several persons to commit a particular crime and the crime was actually committed by them in furtherance of that common intention. The facts as established by evidence disclose that appellant Phullu Raliha was not only sitting in wee hours of morning with appellant Brijesh, he was also armed and he infact used the weapon. The fact that gun failed to discharge is irrelevant. His conduct is important. His conduct and his act discloses sharing of common intention. The aforesaid fact completely and absolutely brings the act of appellant No. 2 Phullu Raliha within the ambit of Section 34 IPC. 40. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. It is evident that there was a prior concert and the appellants had acted in furtherance of common intention. We believe that appellant Phullu Raliha has been rightly convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 41. In view of the above, the judgment and order dated 26.2.1983 passed by the then Sessions Judge, Banda in S.T. No. 414 of 1982 (State v. Santosh Singh and others) arising out of Crime No. 57 of 1982 under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C., Police Station (P.S.) Bisinda, District Banda does not warrant any interference by this Court. The criminal appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Let a copy of this order be sent to concerned Court through Sessions Judge, Banda for compliance within ten days. The concerned Court will report the compliance to this Court within a month thereafter.