ORDER : Shyamlal (A1) and Satendra Kumar Tiwari (A2) [father and son] were prosecuted for commission of offence punishable under Section 302, 307 and 307 of the IPC respectively in S.T.No.91/93 and vide jugment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.1.1999 passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, appellant No. 1 was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for three months under Section 302 of the IPC and R.I. for ten years and fine of 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for three months under Section 307 of the IPC and appellant No.2 was sentenced to undergo R.I. for ten years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo R.I. for three months under Section 307 of the IPC. 2. Case of the prosecution as unfolded during the course of trial are as under :- (i) Appellant No. 1 and complaint father at the time of date of occurrence were serving in the Police Department and complainant-s father had already retired a week's before the date of occurrence and has vacated the government quarter and shifted to Santoshi Nagar, Raipur. Prior to the date of occurrence, motor-cycle and scooter owned by appellant No.1 were subjected to fire, against which appellant No.1 has made a report in the Police Station and for which complainant Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar was prosecuted and criminal prosecution was pending and for which on, 6.10.92 appellant No.1 met the complainant and decided to settle the dispute amicably. (ii) On the date of occurrence i.e. 7.10.92, the appellants were residing in the second/middle floor of the building. (iii) Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 7.10.1992 at 10.45 p.m., a report was lodged by Munna @ Shrawan Kumar that pursuant to the meeting dated 6.10.1992, he along with Shailendra Chandrakar, Santosh Pathak and Sushil Oza met appellant No. 1 Shyamal in his house situated at Traffic Colony, Police quarters (where appellant No.1 was residing) and on reaching appellant No. 1 Shyamlal made a gun shot injury in which Shailendra Chandrakar fell down, his son Satendra Tiwari (A2) assaulted by sword, by which he suffered injury in his left leg. He has also informed that Sushil Oza has suffered gun shot injury on his report Ex.P/55. He has also informed that Sushil Oza has suffered gun shot injury on his report Ex.P/55. Dhehati nalishi was registered vide Ex. P/ 55A. and FIR Ex.P/55 was also registered by Police of Police Station, Purani Basti, Raipur. Thereafter, wheels of investigation started running and after completing the investigation, the jurisdictional police submitted the charge-sheet under Section 173 of the CrPC against the appellants for commission of offence under Sections 302, 307 and 307 of the IPC. (v) The prosecution in order to support its case examined PW-1 to PW-28 witnesses, and hibited the documents Exs.P/1 to P/63 to bring home the offence. (vi) The accused persons abjured the guilt and entered into defence. However, no witness has been examined in support of their defence, but exhibited one document Ex.D/1 and also explained the incriminating evidence put to them and pleaded in statement made under Section 313 of the CrPC that complainant Munna Tiwari and Shailendra Chandrakar came to their house in the night armed with deadly weapons and misbehaved with female members present in the house and therefore, in exercise of right of private defence of the person and property, four rounds of fire were made in the floor by appellant No.1 and have also made complaint in the Police Station against the complainant. (vii) The trial Court by its impugned judgment dated 13.1.1999 convicted the appellants for offence punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 307 of the IPC and sentenced them for the period already stated in opening paragraph of this judgment by the appellants herein. 3. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court, this criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been filed by the appellants herein. 4. Mr. S.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel with Mr. Arun Kochar, learned counsel for the appellants, would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt as no sufficient material has been brought on record to prove that the appellants have committed the offence. He would further submit that on their report, offence has been registered against complainant Munna Tiwari and he has been tried separately and convicted also, which is the subject-matter of Criminal Appeal No.247 of 1999 and present appellant Shyamlal Tiwari has exercised his right of self-defence in disciplined manner. He would further submit that on their report, offence has been registered against complainant Munna Tiwari and he has been tried separately and convicted also, which is the subject-matter of Criminal Appeal No.247 of 1999 and present appellant Shyamlal Tiwari has exercised his right of self-defence in disciplined manner. He would also submit that complainant Munna Tiwari and his companion were aggressors and to protect the life of himself and his family members and property including service revolver, such a right of private defence has been exercised, therefore, the impugned conviction recorded and sentence awarded deserves to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, learned Deputy Government Advocate, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as sufficient material has been brought on record. He would further submit that the appellants have exceeded their right of private defence and as such, no interference is warranted to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trail Court and the criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length, considered their rival submissions, perused the judgment impugned and record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 7. The first question for consideration would be whether death of Shailendra Chandrakar was homicidal in nature and second whether the injury caused to Sushil Oza and Munna Tiwari by the appellants were caused with intention to cause their death and sufficient to cause their death. 8. Dr. D.C. Jain (PW-16), Professor, Medical College, Raipur, conducted post-mortem over the body of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar and has given his report vide Ex.P-4. He found nine contusions, four lacerated wounds one gun shot injury over the body of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar. He opined that cause of death was haemorrhage due to gun shot injury and death of Shailendra Chandrakar was homicidal in nature. He has been examined as PW-16. He has proved the injury and cause of death in his evidence before the Court. It is established that death of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar was homicidal in nature and it has been caused due to excessive heamorrhage by gun shot injury. It is pertinent to mention that even otherwise, homicidal nature of death of Shri Shailendra Chandrakar is not in serious dispute. 9. Complaninant Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar (PW-27) was examined by Dr. It is established that death of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar was homicidal in nature and it has been caused due to excessive heamorrhage by gun shot injury. It is pertinent to mention that even otherwise, homicidal nature of death of Shri Shailendra Chandrakar is not in serious dispute. 9. Complaninant Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar (PW-27) was examined by Dr. S.K. Bose (PW-12) and he found four injuries on the body of complainant Munna Tiwari. One incised wound of 4xlcmxbone deep on the forehead and one incised wound of 3x1cmxmuscle deep near-joint of left tow and foot. Dr. S.K. Bose further said that injury No.1 and 2 were caused by hard and sharp object and injury No.3 abrasion was caused by hard and blunt object. Similarly, Sushil Oza (PW-1) was also examined by Dr. S.K. Bose (PW-12) who stated that Sushil Oza has suffered gun shot injury in right side of chest caused by fire-arm. 10. PW-17 Raj Bahadur is Police Constable. He was at the relevant point of time posted as Assistant Armour. He has stated before the Court that one revolver and six cartridges were allotted to appellant No. I Shyamlal Tiwari on 2.10.1992 vide Ex.P/45 as appellant No.1 Shyamlal at that time was posted as Assistant Sub-Inspector. Appellant No. 1 had given the receipt vide Ex.P-46 and his application is Ex.P/47 Thus, it is also established that on the date of occurrence, appellant No.1 Shyamlal was having service revolver in his possession and six live cartridges in his possession allotted to him in the capacity of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. 11. Investigating Officer H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28) has proved the seizure of revolver from appellant No.1 Shyamlal. He has further proved that appellant No.1 Shyamlal was issued with one 38 bore revolver bearing No. 122/161/21306. It is established that service revolver + live cartridges were issued by the Department of Home to appellant No.1 Shyamlal. 12. Dr. D.C. Jain (PW-16) has stated that bullet received at the time of postmortem of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar was handed over to Vishnu Narayan Singh (PW-21), which was duly seized by Investigating Officer H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28) vide Ex.P/50 and seizure memo is Ex.P/53 and it was sent for chemical examination to the FSL vide Ex.P/42 and report of FSL is Ex.P/59. D.C. Jain (PW-16) has stated that bullet received at the time of postmortem of deceased Shailendra Chandrakar was handed over to Vishnu Narayan Singh (PW-21), which was duly seized by Investigating Officer H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28) vide Ex.P/50 and seizure memo is Ex.P/53 and it was sent for chemical examination to the FSL vide Ex.P/42 and report of FSL is Ex.P/59. Vide FSL report Ex.P/59, it has been opined that Article A is 38 bore revolver No. 122 and bullets Article B, C and D were fired from Article A and Article A1 is workable condition and all three cartridges were fired through the said revolver. 13. Now, the question is whether such a fire was made by appellant. No. 1 Shyamlal. Appellant No. l-Shyam Lal in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC while giving answer to question No.237 has clearly stated that on 7.10.1992 at about 11.30 to 11.45 p.m. when he and all family members were sleeping, complainant Munna Tiwari and three other persons came to his house armed with deadly weapons and forcefully opened the door, complaninant Munna Tiwari demanded Rs. 8000/- against the expenses which he allegedly incurred in obtaining bail and prosecuting the case, then to protect his life and life of his family members and to protect his property, he made four rounds fire in the floor and thereafter they ran away from his house, his son Satendra Kumar Tiwari in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC has also made the similar statement that his father in order to protect their life and property as complainant Munna Tiwari and his companion have entered their house forcefully and misbehaved with his mother and sister. Appellant No.1 has explained that he made four rounds of fire in the floor and he did not make any gun shot injury to deceased Shailendra Chandrakar of Sushil Oza (PW-1), he exercised his right of private defence, but the prosecution has led evidence to show that service revolver No. 122 was issued to appellant No.1 and six live cartridges were also issued to him. Service revolver No. 122 issued to appellant No.1 was seized and empty cartridges from the body of Shailendra Chandrakar was recovered and seized and it was sent for chemical examination, in which it has clearly been established that on the date of occurrence, appellant No.1 with the service revolver and cartridges issued by the Police Department made firing, by which Shailendra Chandrakar suffered gun shot injury, and died and Sushil Oza (PW-1) also suffered gun shot injury, therefore, the plea raised in this behalf by the appellants are not acceptable. 14. Thus, from the aforesaid circumstances, it is established that appellant No.1 Shyamlal was issued with service revolver and he made fire by which Shailendra Chandrakar suffered gun shot injury and died and Sushil Oza (PW-1) also suffered gun shot injury, which is duly established by the FSL report also. 15. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the appellants were not an aggressor, Complainant Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar (PW-27) and his companions armed with lethal weapons were aggressors and entered their house and demanded money and on being refused they started demanding, service revolver and also misbehaved with their family members with (which should be) cause reasonable apprehension particularly in the mind of appellant No.1 as to threat to his life and his daughter and wife and therefore, appellant No.1 had no option except to fire from his service revolver in right of private defence. The alleged act of appellant No.1 cannot in any manner be said to be in excess of his right of private defence as appellant No.1 has exercised his right of private defence available to him as defined under Sections 96 to 106 of the IPC. 16. Section 96 of the IPC declares that nothing is an offences which done in exercise of right of private defence. Section 97 provides that every person has right of defence of person as well as property subject to restriction contained in Section 99 of the IPC. Section 100 describes the contingencies in which right of private defence of the body extends to causing death. Section 100 provides as under : "100. Section 97 provides that every person has right of defence of person as well as property subject to restriction contained in Section 99 of the IPC. Section 100 describes the contingencies in which right of private defence of the body extends to causing death. Section 100 provides as under : "100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death-The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding Section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely :- First Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Secondly Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Thirdly An assault with the intention of committing rape; Fourthly An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; Fifthly As assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting; Sixthly An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release. Seventhly An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act. 17. Section 101 provides that when such right of private defence extends of causing any harm other than death. Section 102 provides that the right or private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. Section 103 provides that when the right of private defence of the property extends to causing death. Section 103 provides that when the right of private defence of the property extends to causing death. Thus, in order to exercise right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death accused must establish that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable ground for apprehending that either death or the grievous injury would be caused to him, and it well settled that whether or not a right of private defence of person or property was available to the offender is the very first question to be addressed. 18. Exception 2 to Section 300 of the IPC provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Right to private defence is, in turn, recognised by Section 96 of the IPC which provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. 19. Very recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 6 SCC 268 stated about the right of private defence by holding as under:- "16..........To claim right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The law of private defence docs not require that the person assaulted or facing apprehension of an assault must run away for safety. It entitles him to defend himself and law gives him right of private defence. There is no right of private defence where there is no apprehension of danger. Necessity of averting an impending danger must be present, real or apparent." 20. In Raj Singh 1, (supra), Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur (as then His Lordship was) in his separate but concurring judgment summarized the principle of right of private defence as under :- "32. There is no right of private defence where there is no apprehension of danger. Necessity of averting an impending danger must be present, real or apparent." 20. In Raj Singh 1, (supra), Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur (as then His Lordship was) in his separate but concurring judgment summarized the principle of right of private defence as under :- "32. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 96 to 103 and Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC leaves no manner of doubt that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or properly, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence, provided that such right is exercised without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. A fortiori in cases where an accused sets up right of private defence, the first and the foremost question that would fall for determination by the court would be whether the accused had the right of private defence in the situation in which death or other harm was caused by him. If the answer to that question is in the negative, Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC would be of no assistance. Exception 2 presupposes that the offender had the right of private defence of person or property but he had exceeded such right by causing death. It is only in case answer to the first question is in the affirmative viz. that the offender had the right of defence of person or property, that the next question viz. whether he had exercised that right in good faith and without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of such defence would arise. Should answer to any one of these questions be in the negative, the offender will not be entitled to the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC. 33. Absence of good faith in the exercise of the right of private defence, premeditation for the exercise of such right and acts done with the intention of causing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence would deny to the offender the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC. 33. Absence of good faith in the exercise of the right of private defence, premeditation for the exercise of such right and acts done with the intention of causing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence would deny to the offender the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC. The legal position on the subject is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court to which copious reference has been made by Banumathi, J. No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by referring to them over again. All that need be said is that whether or not a right of private defence of person or property was available to the offender is the very first question that must be addressed in a case of the present kind while determining the nature of the offence committed by the accused, whether or not a right of private defence was available to an offender is, in turn, a question of fact or at least a mixed question of law and fact to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each individual case that may court up before-the court." 21. In the matter of Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333 , the Supreme Court has indicated that when right of private defence has to be exercised and held as under :- "When there is real apprehension that the aggressor might cause death or grievous hurt, in that event the right of private defence of the defender could even extend to causing of death. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self-defence into operation, but it is also a settled position of law that a right of self-defence is only a right of defend oneself and not to retaliate. It is not a right to take revenge." 22. Very recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEEVFAA) and another v. Union of India and another, AIR 2016 SC 3400 , considered the distinction between right of self defence and use of excessive force and held as under :- "118. At the outset, distinction must be drawn between the right of self-defence or private defence and use of excessive force or retaliation. At the outset, distinction must be drawn between the right of self-defence or private defence and use of excessive force or retaliation. Very simply put, the right of self-defence or private defence is a right that can be exercised to defend oneself but not to retaliate, (2014) 5 SCC 697 . This view was reiterated but expressed somewhat differently in Rajesh Kumar v. Dharamvir, (1997) 4 SCC 496 when it was said. "To put it differently, the right is one of defence and not of requital or reprisal. Such being the nature of right, the High Court could not have exonerated the accused persons of the charges levelled against them by bestowing on them the right to retaliate and attack the complainant party. 122. From the above, it is abundantly clear that the right of self-defence or private defence falls in one basket and use of excessive force or retaliatory force falls in another basket. Therefore, while a victim of aggression has a right of private defence or self-defence (recognised by Section 96 to 106 of the IPC) if that victim exceeds the right of private defence or self-defence by using excessive force or retaliatory measures, he then becomes an aggressor and commits a punishable offence. Unfortunately occasionally, use of excessive force or retaliation leads to the death of the original aggressor... - 23. Sushil Oza (PW-1) is injured witness. He has also suffered serious injuries. He has stated in his statement before the-Court that on the date of occurrence he was going to his house by scooter, then near the office of Electricity Board, fuel of his scooter came to an end, he took lift from Santosh Pathak in his bullet, when they reached near the police line chowk they heard some noise, then they stopped there, at that time he suffered bullet and thereafter both came to D.K. Hospital in which he became unconscious. No suggestion has been made to this witness that complainant Munna Tiwari and Shailendra Chandrakar entered into the house of Shyam Lal Tiwari and endangered the life of appellant No.1 Shyamlal Tiwari and his family members. 24. PW-27 is Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar, who is complainant. He has stated that on 7.10.92 at about 11 to 10.30 p.m. he was staying in Telibandha Chowk. 24. PW-27 is Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar, who is complainant. He has stated that on 7.10.92 at about 11 to 10.30 p.m. he was staying in Telibandha Chowk. After leaving his friend he came to Budha Para where he met with Santosh Pathak, Sushil Oza and Shailendra Chandrakar, than he proceeded for taking lunch at dhaba. He has further stated that he along with his friend reached to English liquor shop near traffic colony and Sushil Oza was silting in bike itself and Santosh Pathak started urinating, he came back from liquor shop after taking wine, at that time Shailendra Chandrakar has already seated in scooter and as soon as Sushil Oza started running he heard firing as appellant No.1 Shymal Lal came with revolver in front of liquor shop and started firing, appellant No.1 Shyam Lai made three rounds of firing and as soon as Shailendra Chandrakar received bullet, he fell down, he also fell down and Satendra Tiwari, son of Shyamlal came running along with sword and assaulted, Satendra Tiwari also assaulted him by sword by which he suffered injury in his leg. He admitted in his evidence that he had an affair with daughter of appellant No.1 Shyam Lai. 25. Spot map has been filed as Ex. P/58 and it has been prepared by H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28), in which house of the appellants has shown at serial No.1, which is three storied building, whereas serial No.2 is the place where staircase steps start for reaching to second floor i.e. house of appellant No.1 and from the place No.2 gun shot been made and place No.3 has been shown where deceased Shailendra Chandrakar was standing and suffered gun shot injury. The aforesaid spot map clearly shows that gun shot has neither been made from the house of appellant No.1 nor the deceased was at the time when gun shot was made was in the house of the appellants. Place No.4 is the main road and place No.5 is the place from where scooter and shoe were seized and country-made pistol and cartridges were seized from dickey of the said scooter. Place No.4 is the main road and place No.5 is the place from where scooter and shoe were seized and country-made pistol and cartridges were seized from dickey of the said scooter. Thus, it is quite vivid that deceased Shailendra Chandrakar and Sushil Oza (PW-1) were not in the house of the appellants at the time of incident and appellant No.1 after coming down from his house by stairs has made gun shot injury from place No.1 to Shailendra Chandrakar who was standing at the place No.2. The aforesaid site map has been prepared by H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28) In his evidence H.K. Chaturvedi (PW-28) has affirmed the fact so stated about the place of incident in Ex.P/58, but no effective cross-examination has been made with respect to the place No.2 from where appellant No.1 made firing and the place No.3 where Shailendra Chandrakar was standing suffered gun shot injury and died subsequently. 26. Apart from this, it is not established by leading legal evidence that Shailendra Chandrakar and complainant Munna Tiwari @ Shrawan Kumar were carrying any arms or deadly weapons and thus, it is established that appellant No.1 made gun shot injury, which is disproportionate to the injury which they would have sustained at the hands of the complainant party and thus, the act of appellant No. 1 which resulted into death of Shailendra Chandrakar was not at all to prevent any injury which was to be avoided of which could have given reasonable apprehension in the mind of appellant-No.1 that he or his family members would suffer death or grievous injury, rather appellant No.1 acted aggressively and made gun shot injury at the deceased after coming down from second floor of his house to ground floor at point No.2 and as such, right of self-defence was not available when appellant No.1 himself was an aggressor particularly when the complainant party was not proved to be armed with lethal weapons and appellant No.1 was admittedly armed with service revolver. Thus, it is held that no such right of private defence was available to appellant No.1 to make gun shot injury to deceased Shailendra Chandrakar and his companion and argument raised in this behalf deserves to be rejected. 27. Medical report clearly indicates as many as two incised wounds on the person of complainant Muuna Tiwari. Thus, it is held that no such right of private defence was available to appellant No.1 to make gun shot injury to deceased Shailendra Chandrakar and his companion and argument raised in this behalf deserves to be rejected. 27. Medical report clearly indicates as many as two incised wounds on the person of complainant Muuna Tiwari. One incised wound was mainly on the forehead region i.e. bone deep injury 4x1 cm and other incised wound on the left leg in the foot region. It was said to have been caused by hard and sharp object. Likewise, Sushil Kumar Oza (PW-1) also suffered gun shot injury in the chest region. The aforesaid injuries suffered by complainant Muuna Tiwari and Sushil Kumar Oza in the forehead and chest region clearly indicate that the intention of the appellants were to kill complainant Munna Tiwari and Sushil Kumar Oza. The assault made was murderous in nature, but ultimately Shailendra Chandrakar died and complainant Munna Tiwari and Sushil Kumar Oza survived despite serious injuries. Thus, in view of the nature of injuries suffered by complainant Munna Tiwari and gun shot injury suffered by Sushil Kumar Oza. it cannot be termed anything else but an attempt to cause murder. Therefore, we have no hesitation in upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 302, 307 and 307 of the IPC respectively. 28. Concludingly, learned trial Court is absolutely justified in holding that Shailendra Chandrakar died on account of firing made by appellant No.1 Shyam Lai Tiwari and deceased Shailendra Chandrakar suffered injury, which was sufficient to cause his death. Trial Court has properly analysed oral and documentary evidence brought on record and rightly reached on the conclusion that the appellants have committed the offence under Section 302, 307 and 307 of the IPC This Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment requiring interference by this Court. 29. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender forthwith before the trail Court for serving the reaming sentence.