JUDGMENT : A.V. Chandrashekara, J. This appeal is filed under Section 100 of CPC challenging the judgment passed in O.S.No.7/1992 pending on the file of Civil Judge (Sr. Dvn.), Bangalore Rural District. As against the judgment, an appeal had been filed in R.A. No. 2/1999 which was pending on the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTC-IV, Bangalore Rural District. The same is allowed in part directing the defendant to refund the advance amount received by her. Appellant is the sole plaintiff in O.S. No. 7/1992 and respondent is the sole defendant in the said suit. Parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as per their ranking before the trial Court. 2. The facts leading to the case are as follows: 1.27 acres of land in Sy. Nos. 38/3 and 38/4 situated in Kurubarahalli Tavarekere Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk is the subject matter of the suit. According to the plaintiff, the suit schedule property measuring 1.2 acres of land absolutely belongs to Smt. Uma, the defendant and that she had agreed to sell the same in his favour for a total consideration of Rs. 87,100/-, at the rate of Rs. 1300 per gunta. According to the plaintiff, an agreement of sale was executed by the defendant-Uma on 23.04.1990 and she received a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as advance. 3 months was the time stipulated in the agreement for performing of the contract. According to the plaintiff it was agreed between them that by the time the sale deed would be executed, the survey of land must be conducted by the defendant and boundaries must be fixed. b. According to the plaintiff, he was a tenant under the defendant in the ground floor of a residential building of the defendant and he had paid a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as advance to the defendant towards the rent and vacated on 8.6.1990. At that time, the plaintiff agreed for adjustment of advance of Rs. 40,000/- to be repaid to the plaintiff towards the balance of consideration. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he had entered into a previous agreement of lease with the defendant on 10.07.19689 (sic) and the defendant - Uma had authorised to the plaintiff to do certain act in respect of the plaint schedule property, having leased the same to the plaintiff under the terms mentioned in the plaint. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he had entered into a previous agreement of lease with the defendant on 10.07.19689 (sic) and the defendant - Uma had authorised to the plaintiff to do certain act in respect of the plaint schedule property, having leased the same to the plaintiff under the terms mentioned in the plaint. It is the case of the plaintiff that he was put in possession of the suit schedule property in part performance of the agreement of sale executed in his favour. Plaintiff is stated to have erected tiled roofed three sheds and an A.C.C. roofed house in the suit property. He is stated to have planted 60 coconut saplings all around. He is stated to have enclosed the plaint schedule property with barbed wire fence. The water from the bore-well got dug up is being utilised by the plaintiff for all his needs in relation to the plaint schedule property is the further averment. c. Plaintiff is stated to have always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by repaying the balance of sale price and bear all necessary expenses in regard to the cost of stamp duty and registration. The Karnataka (Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings) Act was repealed and hence there was no necessity for obtaining any survey from the Department and therefore he approached the defendant orally to execute sale deed in his favour several times. She postponed the same on one pre-text or the other and as such he had got issued a legal notice on 18.11.1991 calling upon the defendant to execute a sale deed. The reply notice was acknowledged by the defendant and it was replied by the defendant taking up untenable stand denying the execution of the agreement of sale and adjustment of advance amount towards sale consideration etc., Cause of action arose on 23.04.1990 when the defendant executed the agreement of sale and delivered the possession on 08.06.1990 to him and subsequently, when his request was turned down by getting a reply notice. Therefore, the plaintiff chose to file a suit seeking the following prayer as found in paragraph No. 12 of the plaint. “12. PRAYER Wherefore the plaintiff prays that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant a decree in his favour and against the defendant; 1. Therefore, the plaintiff chose to file a suit seeking the following prayer as found in paragraph No. 12 of the plaint. “12. PRAYER Wherefore the plaintiff prays that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant a decree in his favour and against the defendant; 1. For specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 23.4.1990 executed by the Defendant in the Plaintiff’s favour in respect of the plaint schedule land, and calling upon her to execute a proper deed of conveyance after receiving the balance of consideration and at the cost and expenses of the Plaintiff for stamp and registration. 2. On the Defendant’s failure to do so, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to execute such a deed of conveyance according to law; 3. Restraining the Defendant, her agents, assigns, supporters, labourers, contractors or anybody-else on her behalf from causing any sort of interference with the Plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land by himself by a decree of permanent injunction; 4. Award court costs and such other reliefs as the Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant as the situation demands in the interest of justice. 3. Defendant chose to file a detail written statement denying all the material averments. According to her, the property in question belonged to her husband. Herself and her daughter have inherited the property after the death of her husband and she does not have absolute right to sell the property. She has not at all received any advance amount much less adjusted Rs. 40,000/- as advance towards the sale consideration. The averment that the possession of the land had been handed over is also specifically denied. 4. According to the defendant her husband was working in a private concern abroad and was sending money periodically to her and out of the savings of the money, she purchased the property, at the instance of her husband and therefore her husband was the absolute owner for all practical purpose. The averment that the plaintiff has improved the suit schedule property by constructing certain structures, erected bore-well etc., including the coconut trees is totally denied. 5. Defendant is stated to be a helpless widow with three grown up daughters and at no point of time she sold the suit schedule property. The averment that the plaintiff has improved the suit schedule property by constructing certain structures, erected bore-well etc., including the coconut trees is totally denied. 5. Defendant is stated to be a helpless widow with three grown up daughters and at no point of time she sold the suit schedule property. She has further deposed that she lost her husband prematurely and was in a state of coma for almost 2 days and returned from the shock after a long time. During that time, plaintiff, with the help of one person Papanna, had got her signature in the guise of executing additional lease deed to augment her income. 6. She has further averred that plaintiff was a lessee under her and had agreed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 700/- per month after a lapse of first four years from 10.7.1989, the date of the lease agreement and for the next period of three years the monthly rental agreed was Rs. 1,000/-. Plaintiff had paid rent at the rate of Rs. 400/- only for four months and thereafter stopped the rent. As such a legal notice was issued on 26.02.1992 calling upon him to settle the arrears of rent, failing which she would be constrained to file a suit for the possession of the suit schedule property. Intact suit in O.S. No. 124/1992 is filed by her and it is stated to be pending. With these pleadings, she has requested the trial Court to dismiss the suit. 7. On the basis of the above pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Trial Court: “1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a sum of Rs. 87,100/- and executed an agreement dated 23.4.1990 by receiving an advance amount of Rs.10,000/? 2. Whether he further proves that he had paid Rs. 40,000/- as an advance to the defendant while securing the ground floor of the defendant on lease and the defendant has agreed to adjust that amount towards the balance of the sale consideration amount while he has vacated the said house on 8.6.1990 and made an endorsement to that effect on the agreement and handed over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff? 3. 3. Whether the defendant proves that the agreement of sale relied on by the plaintiff is concocted and got up document as contended in para-3 of her written statement the instigation of her relative Papanna? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought for in this suit? 5. What order of decree?” 8. The plaintiff is examined as PW-1 and has examined three witnesses on his behalf and got marked 18 documents as Exs.P1 to PI 8. Defendant is examined as DW-1 and got marked 5 documents as Exs.D-1 to 5. Ultimately, the learned Judge of the Trial Court dismissed the suit by answering issues 1, 2 and 4 in the Negative and issue No. 3 in the affirmative vide order dated 04.12.1998. 9. Against the said judgment and decree, defendant had preferred regular second appeal before this Court in RSA No. 885/2000 and the same came to be allowed on 21.09.2005 remitting the matter to the First Appellate Court to dispose of the matter in accordance with law and also direction was given to consider the suit in the light of readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act (for short the Act’) and hardship to be considered under Section 20 of the Act. 10. Consequent upon the remitting the order made by this Court, appeal was re-registered and considered afresh in the light of the direction given by this Court in RSA No. 885/2000. Ultimately, R.A. No.2/1999 came to be partly allowed directing the defendant to return a sum of Rs. 50,000/- along with additional sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the plaintiff. This judgment is dated 26.06.2006. Two additional issues came to be framed by the First Appellate Court as found in paragraph No. 8. The same is as follows: “1. Whether the appellant/plaintiff proves that he was willing to perform his part of the contract as contended in para -8 of the plaint? 2. Whether the respondent/defendant will be put to hardship if decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 23.04.1990 is granted and its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the appellant/plaintiff?” 11. The defendant has not chosen any appeal or cross-objection insofar as it relates to the order directing the defendant to pay the money to the plaintiff. 12. Appellant had been represented by Sri. The defendant has not chosen any appeal or cross-objection insofar as it relates to the order directing the defendant to pay the money to the plaintiff. 12. Appellant had been represented by Sri. G D. Ashwanthnarayana, learned counsel and he had argued in part. After arguing the matter for sometime, the file was returned by Sri . G D. Ashwanthnarayana to the appellant. On 01.04.2016 argument had been heard from Sri. G.D. Ashwanthnarayana learned counsel in part and had been posted to 04.04.2016 for hearing further argument. On 04.04.2016, time was granted till 06.04.2016 to submit further argument, on which date i.e., on 06.04.2016, Sri. G.D. Ashwanthnarayan, learned counsel submitted to the Court that his party was insisting to give ‘No Objection Certificate’ and hence he had returned the file to the appellant. His submission was placed on record. Nagaraj-appellant was present and was requested to submit his argument by 12.04.2016, on which date, learned counsel appearing for the parties were present. Sri. G.D. Ashwanthnarayana, learned counsel again submitted that he already returned the file to the appellant and therefore it was treated that appellant had no further argument. Hence, case was posted to hear the counsel for the respondent on 21.04.2016 at 2.30 p.m. The following is the order passed by this Court on 21.04.2016. The same is as follows:- “Appellant’s counsel has already retired and file is handed over to the appellant as per the submission made by Sri. G.D. Ashwanthnarayana, learned counsel on 06.04.2016. Appellant is continuously absent. Hence, name of appellant - Sri. Nagaraj be shown as party-in-person. Memo filed on 20.04.2016 by the appellant stating that he is suffering from obesity and obstivetive sleep apnea/IVDP and on the night of 07.04.2016 at 9.00 p.m. he was admitted to Gayathri Hospital. Medical certificate issued on 19.04.2016 is produced. It is stated that he requires treatment for another two weeks. Hence, as a last chance, time is granted till 25.04.2016 to engage his counsel. It is made clear that respondent and her daughters have been regularly appearing before the Court requesting this Court to dispose of the matter at the earliest. Admittedly, first respondent is a widow and hence case needs to be disposed of on priority. Hence, call this case on 25.04.2016 at 2.30 p.m.” 13. It is made clear that respondent and her daughters have been regularly appearing before the Court requesting this Court to dispose of the matter at the earliest. Admittedly, first respondent is a widow and hence case needs to be disposed of on priority. Hence, call this case on 25.04.2016 at 2.30 p.m.” 13. Admittedly, defendant is an aged widow and she has been attending this Court on every date of hearing and learned counsel appearing on her behalf had been insisting the Court to dispose of the appeal as early as possible. Apart from this, appeal is 10 years old and it needs to be disposed of as early as possible. 14. The appeal is admitted to consider the following substantial question of law framed on 6.12.2010:- “Whether the dismissal of the suit by the lower Appellate Court is contrary to Sections 16 & 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?” Reasons 15. Plaintiff who seeks equitable relief of specific performance must not only plead readiness and willingness, but also to prove the same. This is the mandate of Section 16(c) of the Act. Admittedly, agreement of sale is dated 23.04.1990. The said agreement is marked as Ex.P1. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.P1 that plaintiff was expected to obtain a regular sale-deed from the defendant within three months from 23.04.1990 by paying balance consideration of Rs. 77,100/-. According to the plaintiff on 08.06.1990, a sum of Rs. 40,000/- was paid by him as advance to the defendant pertaining to the house was adjusted. Even if Rs. 40,000/- stated to have been adjusted by the defendant out of the advance amount paid by the plaintiff, still a sum of Rs. 37,100/- was due. 16. The plaintiff got issued a legal notice on 18.11.1991 calling upon her to execute regular sale-deed by receiving balance consideration amount and the said document is marked as Ex.P2. Defendant replied through her advocate and the copy of the reply is marked as Ex.P5. Of course, First Appellate Court after remitting of the case by this Court in RSA No. 885/200 has directed the plaintiff to receive a sum of Rs. 50,000/- out of the agreed consideration. There is no challenge to that finding given by the trial Court. 17. Readiness as contemplated under Section 16(c) of the Act indicates the financial capacity of a person to have a sale-deed by paying the balance consideration amount. 50,000/- out of the agreed consideration. There is no challenge to that finding given by the trial Court. 17. Readiness as contemplated under Section 16(c) of the Act indicates the financial capacity of a person to have a sale-deed by paying the balance consideration amount. Willingness indicates eagerness to have a sale-deed at the earliest. The legal notice was got issued on 18.11.1991 almost one year 7 months after the execution of the agreement of sale. Suit came to be filed on 21.01.1992. If the plaintiff had paid the entire sale consideration it would have been something different. The plaintiff was expected to pay about Rs. 37,100/- and what made him not to make the payment of balance of consideration is not forthcoming. He has admitted the filing of a suit against plaintiff for possession of the suit schedule property. He has admitted that the husband of the defendant died and that his wife-the defendant herein was residing in the house along with her children. It is also mentioned in Ex.P 1 that he could recover double the amount, in case the defendant refused to execute a sale-deed. He has not spoken as to when he actually met the defendant requesting her to execute sale-deed. 18. Article 54 of the Limitation Act speaks about two situations. If time is fixed in the agreement of sale, it must be performed within three years from the time fixed in the agreement and if no time is fixed it must be performed from the date of refusal. Therefore, it is relevant to rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2)(dead) by proposed LRs. v. Bibijan and Ors. - 2009 (5) SCC 462 . It is also to be remembered that the property in question is situated in the vicinity of the limits of the Municipal Corporation and it is a valuable land. Proof of refusal by the defendant to perform will not in any way exempt the need of plaintiff to prove readiness and willingness. The same is reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha- (2010) 10 SCC 512 . Proof of refusal by the defendant to perform will not in any way exempt the need of plaintiff to prove readiness and willingness. The same is reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha- (2010) 10 SCC 512 . Whereas it is further held in the case of I.S. Sikandar v. K. Subramani and others - (2013) 15 SCC 27 that stipulation regarding time in an agreement is an essential one and surrounding circumstances will have to be examined by the Court. On both these aspects, default of owners in the agreement of sale is also considered. This important aspect of the term is to be looked into by the First Appellate Court while refusing to grant the equitable relief of specific performance. 19. If a default clause in agreement of sale is formed it is almost in the nature of inhibition to grant the equitable relief of specific performance. Paragraph 29 of the decision rendered in the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha - (2010) 10 SCC 512 is relevant and is extracted below: “29. We may attempt to clarify the position by the following illustrations (not exhaustive): (A) The agreement of sale provides that in the event of breach by the vendor, the purchaser shall be entitled to an amount equivalent to the earnest money as damages. The agreement is silent as to specific performance. In such a case, the agreement indicates that the sum was named only for the purpose of securing performance of the contract. Even if there is no provision in the contract for specific performance, the Court can direct specific performance by the vendor, if breach is established. But the Court has the option as per Section 21 of the Act, to award damages, if it comes to the conclusion that it is not a fit case for granting specific performance. (B) The agreement provides that in the event of the vendor failing to execute a sale-deed, the purchaser will not be entitled for specific performance but will only be entitled for return of the earnest money and/or payment of a sum named as liquidated damages. (B) The agreement provides that in the event of the vendor failing to execute a sale-deed, the purchaser will not be entitled for specific performance but will only be entitled for return of the earnest money and/or payment of a sum named as liquidated damages. As the intention of the parties to bar specific performance of the contract and provide only for damages in the event of breach, is clearly expressed, the Court may not grant specific performance, but can award liquidated damages and refund of earnest money. (C) The agreement of sale provides that in the event of breach by either party the purchaser will be entitled to specific performance, but the party in breach will have the option, instead of performing the contract, to pay a named amount as liquidated damages to the aggrieved party and on such payment, the aggrieved party shall not be entitled to specific performance. In such a case, the purchaser will not be entitled to specific performance, as the terms of the contract give the party in default an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance.” 20. In the case of Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi & Ors. - AIR 2011 SC 3234 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held that time is not the essence of contract in respect of sale of immovable property situated in and around urban areas. Paragraph Nos. 23 to 25 are relevant and they are re-produced below: “23. It is of some interest to note that the distinction between contracts relating to immovable properties and other contracts was not drawn by section 55 of Contract Act (or any other provisions of Contract Act or Specific Relief Act, 1963). Courts in India made the said distinction, by following the English law evolved during the nineteenth century. It is of some interest to note that the distinction between contracts relating to immovable properties and other contracts was not drawn by section 55 of Contract Act (or any other provisions of Contract Act or Specific Relief Act, 1963). Courts in India made the said distinction, by following the English law evolved during the nineteenth century. This Court held that time is not of the essence of the contracts relating to immovable properties; and that notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, specific performance will ordinarily be granted, if having regard to the express stipulation of the parties, nature of the property and surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant such relief, [vide Gomathinayagam Pillai (supra), Govind Prasad Chaturvedi (supra) and Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor - 1988 (2) SCC 188 and Chand Rani (supra) following the decision of Privy Council in Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai - AIR 1915 PC 83 and other cases]. Of course, the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani made a slight departure from the said view. 24. The principle that time is not of the essence of contracts relating to immovable properties took shape in an era when market value of immovable properties were stable and did not undergo any marked change even over a few years (followed mechanically, even when value ceased to be stable). As a consequence, time for performance, stipulated in the agreement was assumed to be not material, or at all events considered as merely indicating the reasonable period within which contract should be performed. The assumption was that grant of specific performance would not prejudice the vendor-defendant financially as there would not be much difference in the market value of the property even if the contract was performed after a few months. This principle made sense during the first half of the twentieth century, when there was comparatively very little inflation, in India. The third quarter of the twentieth century saw a very slow but steady increase in prices. But a drastic change occurred from the beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century. There has been a galloping inflation and prices of immovable properties have increased steeply, by leaps and bounds. Market values of properties are no longer stable or steady. The third quarter of the twentieth century saw a very slow but steady increase in prices. But a drastic change occurred from the beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century. There has been a galloping inflation and prices of immovable properties have increased steeply, by leaps and bounds. Market values of properties are no longer stable or steady. We can take judicial notice of the comparative purchase power of a rupee in the year 1975 and now, as also the steep increase in the value of the immovable properties between then and now. It is no exaggeration to say that properties in cities, worth a lakh or so in or about 1975 to 1980, may cost a crore or more now. 25. The reality arising from this economic change cannot continue to be ignored in deciding cases relating to specific performance. The steep increase in prices is a circumstance which makes it inequitable to grant the relief of specific performance where the purchaser does not take steps to complete the sale within the agreed period, and the vendor has not been responsible for any delay or non-performance. A purchaser can no longer take shelter under the principle that time is not of essence in performance of contracts relating to immovable property, to cover his delays, laches, breaches and ‘non-readiness’. The precedents from an era, when high inflation was unknown, holding that time is not of the essence of the contract in regard to immovable properties, may no longer apply, not because the principle laid down therein is unsound or erroneous, but the circumstances that existed when the said principle was evolved, no longer exist. In these days of galloping increases in prices of immovable properties, to hold that a vendor who took an earnest money of say about 10% of the sale price and agreed for three months or four months as the period for performance, did not intend that time should be the essence, will be a cruel joke on him, and will result in injustice. Adding to the misery is the delay in disposal of cases relating to specific performance, as suits and appeals therefrom routinely take two to three decades to attain finality. As a result, an owner agreeing to sell a property for Rs. Adding to the misery is the delay in disposal of cases relating to specific performance, as suits and appeals therefrom routinely take two to three decades to attain finality. As a result, an owner agreeing to sell a property for Rs. One lakh and received Rs.ten thousand as advance may be required to execute a sale-deed a quarter century later by receiving the remaining Rs. Ninety thousand, when the property value has risen to a crore of rupees.” 21. In the light of the same, this Court is of the opinion that the First Appellate Court and trial Court are justified in refusing to grant equitable relief of specific performance. 22. Insofar as Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is concerned, the defendant has specifically averred that she lost her husband prematurely and was in a state of coma for almost 2 days and returned from the shock after a long time. Admittedly, she does not have any male children and she has got three grown up daughters. It is her case that she does not have any property, other than the suit schedule property. Admittedly, relief of specific performance is an equitable relief. The Court is not bound to grant equitable relief of specific performance just because agreement is proved. Court can refuse the equitable relief of specific performance, if it would cause hardship to the defendant. 23. In the case of Vimleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmad Sheriff and Ors. - AIR 2011 SC 2057 , Hon'ble Apex Court has held that power vested under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act is a discretionary one, either to decree the suit for specific performance or decline the same. The discretion vested under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, is expected to take into account the circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties. In the present case, defendant is a widow lady having three grown up daughters. At the time when the suit was filed, the marriage of the daughters had been not performed. Because of the unexpected death of her husband, she was not able to come out of the said shock for several years. If the discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to grant specific performance, normally it would not be interfered with appeal unless it is perverse or contrary to the judicial principles. Because of the unexpected death of her husband, she was not able to come out of the said shock for several years. If the discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to grant specific performance, normally it would not be interfered with appeal unless it is perverse or contrary to the judicial principles. The first Appellate Court has discussed it and the same is found at paragraph 23 of the judgment of the First Appellate Court. 24. Learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has reassessed the entire oral and documentary evidence and has pointed out that the defendant is a widow and she has three unmarried daughters and therefore more hardship would be caused to the defendant than to the plaintiff. This Court is of the opinion that there are no good grounds are made out to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Court. 25. Whereas it is held in the case of Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) (Dead) by Proposed LRs. v. Bibijan and Ors. - 2009(5) SCC 462 expression ‘date fixed for the performance’ is a crystallized notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part “time from which period begins to run” refers to a case where no such date is fixed. Though the suit was filed within 3 years from the date of agreement of sale but notice was got issued one year 7 months after the agreement of sale. Hence, conduct of plaintiff suffers from serious laches. 26. Certain documents have been filed before this Court under Order 41, Rule 27 of CPC seeking permission to lead additional evidence. One application filed under Section 151 of CPC dated 27.06.2007 seeking production of certain documents. They are certified copies of Exs.P1 to P5 and they have already been considered by the First Appellate Court. 27. Another application dated 11.07.2007 is one under Order 41, Rule 27 of CPC is filed by the appellant to produce pass book issued by the Syndicate Bank, Vishwaneedam dated 10.07.1991. Normal rule is to furnish evidence at the trial stage and additional evidence at the appellate stage. If really this document was absolutely required, nothing came in his way to press into service when the matter was remitted by this Court to the First Appellate Court. Even in the legal notice issued, there is no reference about the bank statement. Normal rule is to furnish evidence at the trial stage and additional evidence at the appellate stage. If really this document was absolutely required, nothing came in his way to press into service when the matter was remitted by this Court to the First Appellate Court. Even in the legal notice issued, there is no reference about the bank statement. Another application dated 22.10.2008 under Section 151 of CPC producing certain income clearance certificate issued in the year 1994. If really he was an Income tax assesse nothing came in his way to lead evidence to that effect. The suit was filed in the year 1991 and 25 years have already lapsed. Defendant has three daughters, whose marriages had not been performed when the suit was filed. Admittedly, the property in question is within the limits of Municipal Corporation and they were valuable properties. The appellant has not been able to show as to why he could not lead evidence in the trial Court. No good grounds are made out to allow these applications. Accordingly, they are liable to be dismissed. 28. Taking into consideration, the over all facts and circumstances of the case and the status of the parties, first Appellate Court is justified in rejecting the relief of specific performance invoking the discretion vested under Section 20 of the Act and also on the ground of non-fulfilment of mandatory Section 16(c) of the Act. The first Appellate Court is justified in refusing to grant the relief of specific performance holding that it would cause more injustice to the defendant than to the plaintiff. Accordingly, no good grounds exist to allow the appeal and accordingly, substantial question of law framed on 6.12.2010 is to be held in the negative. 29. The appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC is dismissed with costs. Insofar as possession is concerned, defendant has already filed suit for possession in the trial Court and it is pending and defendant is at liberty to pursue the same and have appropriate relief from the Court. The trial Court shall dispose of the matter without undue delay preferably within six months from today. Appeal dismissed.