JUDGMENT & ORDER : Both the second appeal and the connected cross-objection are directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.09.2011 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Agartala, West Tripura (Court No.4) in Title Appeal No. 13 of 2011, whereunder the learned Addl. District Judge partly upheld and partly set aside the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Jr. Div.), Court No.2, Agartala, West Tripura in Title Suit No. 25 of 2007. 2. Heard learned counsel, Ms S. Deb Gupta for the appellant and learned senior counsel, Mr. D Chakraborty assisted by learned counsel, Mr. H Laskar, for the respondents in the appeal and vice-versa in the cross-objection. 3. This common judgment shall govern both the second appeal and the cross objection. 4. The second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the appellate court below has misread the evidence in regard to the limitation? and other substantial questions of law, which may be required for just decision of the second appeal.” 5. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the plaintiff-appellant is that the suit land described in the schedule of the plaint was allotted in the name of Lt. Khetramohan Dey, father of the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent No.1. Khetramohan Dey died on 30.01.1987 leaving behind the plaintiff, defendant No.1, another daughter namely, Smt. Maya Rani Dey and the legal heirs of deceased son Rabilal Dey. A partition suit vide T.S.(P)26/2006 was filed in respect of the property left by Khetramohan Dey and from the plaint of that suit, the plaintiff came to know on 12.05.2006 that the land described in the schedule of the plaint was gifted by khetramohan Dey to defendant No.1, Sri Sukumar Dey by executing a gift deed No.I-3396 dated 21.05.1986 in violation of the conditions of allotment and therefore, the appellant prayed for declaration that the said gift deed is void ab initio and prayed for cancellation of the deed. 6. The defendant No.1, Sri Sukumar Dey contested the suit by filing written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and stated that the suit was barred by limitation and that the gift deed was validly made and was not liable to be cancelled. The defendant No.2 also submitted written statement that the suit was barred by limitation and the defendant No.2 also prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. The defendant No.2 also submitted written statement that the suit was barred by limitation and the defendant No.2 also prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. The trial court framed four issues, namely: “(i). Whether the suit is maintainable in law and facts? (ii). Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree declaring the gift deed bearing No.I-3396, dated 21.05.1986 executed by Kshetramohan Dey is void ab initio? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of cancellation of the gift deed vide No.I-3396, dated 21.05.1986 along with a direction to District Sub-Registrar Sadar, Agartala for cancellation of its registration? (iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any other relief or reliefs in this case? (v) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?” 8. In course of trial, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and also examined two more witnesses namely, Sri Subash Debbarma (PW2) and Sri Subash Brata Chakma (PW3). The plaintiff proved the following documents:- (i) Ext.1-The certified copy of Khatian No.27344; (ii) Ext.2-The original Death Certificate of Khetramohan Dey; (iii) Ext.3- The certified copy of gift deed vide No.1-3396 dated 21.05.1986. The defendant No.1 examined himself as DW1 and proved the following documents:- (i) Ext.A1- The Khatian No.27940; (ii) Ext.A2- The certified copy of Khatian No.27334; (ii) Ext.B1-The Khatian No.1877; (iv) Ext.B2- The certified copy of Gift Deed No.1-3396, dated 21.05.1986. On behalf of defendant No.2 also, one witness was examined, namely, Sri Subash Brata Chakma and the witness proved one document, namely, Ext.X-1. 9. The trial court decided the material issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 10. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No. 13 of 2011 and the appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.2011 partly allowed the appeal holding that the gift deed dated 21.05.1986 was not enforceable and has no force since it was executed within 10 years from the date of allotment but has upheld the finding of the trial court that the suit was barred by limitation. 11. By filing the present second appeal the plaintiff challenged the judgment of the appellate court to the extent that the finding in respect of limitation is not justified and therefore, liable to be interfered. 12. 11. By filing the present second appeal the plaintiff challenged the judgment of the appellate court to the extent that the finding in respect of limitation is not justified and therefore, liable to be interfered. 12. Defendant No.1 by filing cross objection contended that the finding of the appellate court to the extent that the gift deed was not enforceable is wrong and thereby challenged the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court. 13. The first point to be decided is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. Admittedly, the suit is instituted by the plaintiff seeking declaration that the gift deed dated 21.05.1986, i.e. Ext-3 is void ab initio. The plaintiff instituted the suit on 23.02.2007. Article 59 of the schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes thus: “Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period beings to run PART-IV SUITS RELATING TO DECREES AND INSTRUMENTS “59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. Three years. When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.” 14. It is, therefore, clear that the limitation is three years from the date of knowledge of the execution of deed in question. The plaintiff in his pleadings stated that when Title Suit (P) 26/2006 was filed he first came to know about the execution of the gift deed and that was on 12.05.2006. No copy of the Title Suit (P) 26/2006 proved by the plaintiff. No order sheet of that suit was also placed as to on which date the suit was instituted. The plaintiff simply made a statement that the cause of action arose on 12.05.2006 when he knew about the gift deed pursuant to the plaint of that partition suit. In his cross-examination, he made a clear statement “my father died in the month of January, 1987 and I came to know about the gift deed immediately after his death”. The plaintiff simply made a statement that the cause of action arose on 12.05.2006 when he knew about the gift deed pursuant to the plaint of that partition suit. In his cross-examination, he made a clear statement “my father died in the month of January, 1987 and I came to know about the gift deed immediately after his death”. While the plaintiff made such a statement that he came to know about the gift deed immediately after the death of his father who admittedly died on 31.01.1987, whereas the suit was filed on 23.02.2007 and the trial court and the appellate court rightly observed that the suit was not filed within three years from the date of knowledge of execution of gift deed. Since, the trial court and the appellate court arrived at a concurrent finding on the issue I find no reason at all to interfere with the said concurrent finding of the courts below. 15. The next point which falls for consideration is whether the gift deed dated 21.05.1986 (Ext.3) is void ab initio or whether there is no force of that deed. The plaintiff produced the order of allotment marked as Ext.4. DW2 also produced the copy of the order of allotment marked as X-1. It shows that the allotment was made as per the provisions of TLR & LR (Allotment of Land Rules) Act, 1962. Rule 15 of the Allotment of Land Rules, 1962 prescribes certain conditions in respect of allotment. Rule 15 is quoted below which reads as follows:- “15. An allotment of land under sub-section (1) of section 14 shall be subject to the following conditions, namely- (i) the land shall not be transferred by the allottee within ten years from the date of allotment, without the written consent of the Collector: provided that the land may be mortgaged to a co-operative society, a co-operative bank or land mortgage bank or the Government without such consent; (ii) an allottee on giving three months’ notice before the end of an agricultural year and on payment of all Government dues in respect of the allotted land upto the end of the said agricultural year may surrender the land allotted to him. On such surrender being made, the land shall revert to the Government; (iii) in case the allottee is a co-operative farming society and the registration of such society is cancelled within ten years from the date of allotment the land allotted to such society shall thereupon be deemed to have been resumed by the Government and the Government shall not be liable to pay any compensation; Any person holding or retaining possession of such land thereafter shall be deemed to be a trespasser; (iv) in case of waste land allotted for agricultural purposes, the allottee shall bring the whole area under cultivation within three years from the date of allotment; (v) the allottee shall be liable to pay such amount as land revenue as may assessed under the Act and the Rules made thereunder; (vi) the allottee shall within the time fixed in the allotment order pay to the Government an amount equal to the market value of the trees and structures, if any, standing on the land; (vii) the allotment shall be liable to be cancelled if, except in cases falling under clause (iv), the land is not used within 2 years of the date of allotment for the purpose for which it was allotted or if the allottee commits a breach of any of the conditions of allotment or the provisions of these rules and the Collector may re-enter on the land: provided that no such cancellation or re-entry shall be made unless the allottee is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; (viii) no compensation shall be payable by the Government on account of cancellation of any allotment or re-entry by the Collector under these rules, but if the allottee has built any constructions on the land he shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to remove the same.” 16. There is nothing in the above provision that any transfer without consent of the Collector shall be void ab initio or that any such transfer shall have no force at all. The Rules contemplate that if a transfer is made by the allottee within ten years of the allotment without written consent of the Collector, i.e. the allotting authority, it shall be liable to be cancelled and the Collector may re-enter in the land. The Rules contemplate that if a transfer is made by the allottee within ten years of the allotment without written consent of the Collector, i.e. the allotting authority, it shall be liable to be cancelled and the Collector may re-enter in the land. The proviso to clause-vii of the provisions clearly speaks that no such cancellation or re-entry shall be made unless the allottee is given opportunity of being heard. A careful reading of the above provisions makes it abundantly clear that the transfer cannot be held to be void ab initio or illegal automatically even if it is made without the consent of the Collector. What law contemplates is that if a transfer is made within 10 years of allotment without written consent of the Collector, such Collector may cancel the allotment and re-enter the land after giving opportunity of hearing to the allottee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the allotment will be automatically cancelled and there cannot be any transfer at all. A transfer made validly by execution of a registered deed cannot be held to be void ab initio only because of certain conditions put in the allotment Rules. The allotting authority, i.e. the Collector has been made a party in this suit as defendant No.2 and the defendant No.2 effectively contested the suit and therefore it amounts to tacit consent of the Collector in the transfer of the allotted land. The plaintiff has no right to seek cancellation of deed referring to the conditions of the Rules. The condition of allotment only has authorized the Collector to cancel the order of allotment and to re-enter the allotted land in case any transfer is made in violation of any of the provisions as contained in Rule 15. While the Collector even after he was made a party to the suit did not take any such step to cancel the allotment in respect of the gifted land, it was altogether wrong on the part of the appellate court to arrive at a conclusion that the transfer was void and that the gift deed has no force. 17. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty has referred to the decision of Noharlal Verma Vs. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 , particularly paragraph 32 wherein the Apex Court has stated: “32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. 17. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Chakraborty has referred to the decision of Noharlal Verma Vs. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur reported in (2008) 14 SCC 445 , particularly paragraph 32 wherein the Apex Court has stated: “32. Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits.” 18. The appellate court though held that the suit was barred by limitation but arrived at a conclusion that the gift deed was valid. Such finding of the appellate court, in view of the law explained by the Apex Court, is not tenable and liable to be set aside. 19. In view of the discussions made above, the second appeal filed by the appellant stands dismissed. The cross objection filed by the defendant-respondent No.1 is allowed. The finding of the appellate court that the gift deed is void and not enforceable is set aside. Send back the LC records along with a copy of this judgment.