JUDGMENT : Hon'ble DR. KOTHARI, J.—Having lost before the two Courts below concurrently, the present second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellants-plaintiffs-landlord in a suit for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and for compensation for use and occupation in respect of the suit property in question viz a shop situated at K.E.M. Road, Bikaner a main market area of Bikaner against the judgment and decree dated 18.1.2002 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner. Appeal Decree No. 129/1996 "Ramdev & Ors. vs. Smt. Amara Devi & Ors." by which, the learned First Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs and affirmed the impugned judgment and decree dated 4.12.1992 passed by the learned Additional Munsif & Judicial Magistrate. First Class, No. 1. Bikaner in Civil Original Suit No. 33/1985 "Ramdev & Ors. vs. Smt. Amara Devi & Ors." by which the learned Trial Court, while refusing the eviction decree had only partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for payment of monthly rent of Rs. 100/- per month for the suit shop in question. 2. After framing of the relevant issues arising out of the plaint and written statement and after recording of the evidence, the learned Trial Court had only partly decreed the suit (No. 33/1985) of the appellants-plaintiffs on 4.12.1992. 100/- per month for the suit shop in question. 2. After framing of the relevant issues arising out of the plaint and written statement and after recording of the evidence, the learned Trial Court had only partly decreed the suit (No. 33/1985) of the appellants-plaintiffs on 4.12.1992. The relevant portion of the findings and final order of the learned Trial Court is quoted below for ready reference:- ^^lk{; ds lexz foospu ls fo}kuksa vf/koDrkvksa ds rdZ fordZ esa ,oa U;k; n`"VkUrksa ls ekxZ n'kZu ysrs gq,s esjh fouez jk; esa oknhx.k bl ckr dks lkfcr djus esa loZFkk vleFkZ jgs gSa fd izfroknh la- 1 us izfroknh la- 7 dks fookfnr ifjlj mifdjk;s ij fn;k ;k ikVZfon its'ku dh vuqefr nhA ch-ds- csxk.kh }kjk vejknsoh dks fdjk;s dh dksbZ jde lank; dk rF; Hkh lkfcr ugha gSA izfroknh us lk>snkjh foys[k izLrqr dj bl ckr dks lkfcr fd;k gS fd izfroknh la- 7 izfroknh la- 1 ds lkFk Hkkxhnkj gS ,sls esa izfroknh la- 7 dks izfroknh la- 1 dk mifdjk;snkj ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA ;gka ;g rF; Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd lu~ 73 esa gh Hkkxhnkjh ch-ds- csxk.kh dh Hkhdepan ds lkFk gqbZ vkSj mlh vlsZ esa ifjlj dk fdjk;k 35@& :i;s ls c<+kdj 100@& :i;s fd;k x;k gSaA bu lHkh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igqapk gwa fd e`rd Hkhdepan ds okfjlku us fdlh Hkh izdkj ls bl ifjlj dks izfroknh la- 7 dks lc ysV ;k ikVZfon its'ku ugha fd;k vr% ;g fook|d oknhx.k ds fo:) izfroknhx.k ds i{k esa fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSA fook|d la- 2 bl fook|d dks lkfcr djus dk Hkkj oknhx.k ij FkkA bl laca/k esa oknhx.k dh vksj ls lk{; esa izLrqr lkf{k;ksa ds l'kiFk dFku esa ih-MCyq- 1 dk ;g dFku gS fd vHkh fooknxzLr nwdku esa diM+s dk /kU/kk gksrk gS tks mldh vuqefr ls ugha gks jgk gSA izfr ijh{kk esa bl lk{kh dk dFku gS fd mls irk ugha fd 12-7-73 ls gh mlesa diM+s dk O;kikj gks jgk gSaA ih-MCY;q- 3 us izfrijh{kk esa bl lq>ko dks xyr crk;k fd 12-7-73 dks fooknxzLr nqdku jgh gks ih-MCyq- 3 us viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa ;g crk;k gS fd fooknxzLr nwdku mlus e`rd Hkhdepan dks jaxisaV dk /kU/kk djus ds fy, fdjk;s ij nh Fkh rFkk izfroknh ds thoudky esa Hkhdepan izfroknh jaxisV dk gh /kU/kk djrk jgkA fooknxzLr nwdku ds fiNys Hkkx esa vHkh Hkh izfroknh Hkhdepan dk jaxisasV dk lkeku cSad }kjk lhy'kqnk rkyk yxk gqvk iM+k gSA lquk gS fd cSd us Hkhdepan ij nkok dj j[kk gSA fo}ku vf/koDrk oknhx.k us rdZ fn;k fd izfroknh Hkhdepan dks fooknxzLr ifjlj jaxisaV dk /ka/kk djus ds fy, fdjk;s ij fn;k x;k Fkk ijUrq mlesa diM+s dk O;kikj gks jgk gSa ;g ckr mUgksaus iw.kZr;k lkfcr dh gS ,oa izfroknh la- 7 ch-ds- csxk.kh us Lo;a bl rF; dks Lohdkj fd;k gS vr% ;g mi;ksx esa ifjorZu gSa ,oa oknhx.k us bl rF; dks iw.kZr;k lkfcr fd;k gSaA fo}ku vf/koDrk izfroknhx.k us rdZ fn;k fd lu~ 73 ls gh blesa diM+s dk O;olk; oknhx.k dh vuqefr ls fd;k tk jgk gS vkSj ,slk Hkhdepan ds thoudky esa Hkh py jgk Fkk vr% bl ij oknhx.k dh ekSu Lohd`fr Fkh rFkkfi vHkh Hkh bl fooknxzLr ifjlj esa O;kikj gh gks jgk gS ifjlj ds mi;ksx esa ifjorZu rc ekuk tk ldrk gS tc ifjlj O;kikj ds dke esa ugha vk jgk gks] ;g ifjlj vHkh Hkh O;kikj ds dke esa vk jgk gSa vr% mls mi;ksx esa ifjorZu ;k psat vkWQ ;wt ugha dgk tk ldrk gSA mHk; i{kksa ds rdZ fordksZ dks lquus ds i'pkr~ esjh fouez jk; esa ;|fi oknhx.k bl ckr dks lkfcr fd;k gS fd iwoZ esa jax isaV dk /kU/kk gqvk Fkk vkSj vc diM+s dk O;kikj gks jgk gS rFkkfi ih-MCY;q- 3 us viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd vHkh Hkh nqdku ds ihNs ,d dejs esa Hkhdepan ds jaxisaV dk lkeku iM+k gS ,oa 'ks"k esa diM+s dk O;kikj gks jgk gSa vkSj diM+s dk Hkh O;kikj Hkh O;kikj gh gSaA psat vkWQ ;wt rc ekuk tk ldrk gS tc jgokl ds fy;s fy;k x;k ifjlj dk mi;ksx nwdku ds :i esa ;k nqdku ds :i esa fy;s x;s ifjlj dk mi;ksx jgoklh edku ds :i esa fd;k tkrk jgk gks bl izdj.k esa ,slk dksbZ rF; ugha gSA iwoZ esa Hkh O;kikj gh fd;k tk jgk Fkk vkSj vc Hkh diM+s dk O;kikj gh fd;k tk jgk gSa ,oa izfroknh Hkhdepan dk jaxisaV dk lkeku Hkh vHkh mlesa iM+k gSa ,slh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa bldks psat vkWQ ;wt ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA vr% ;g fook|d oknhx.k ds fo:) izfroknhx.k ds i{k esa fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gSA xxx vkns'k oknhx.k dk nkok fo:) izfroknhx.k vkaf'kd :i ls Lohdkj fd;k tkdj fMØh bl vk'k; dh ikfjr dh tkrh gS fd oknhx.k izfroknhx.k ls nk;jh nkok rd 3600@& :i;s rFkk mlds i'pkr~ vkt rd 100@& :i;s izfrekg ls fdjk;k ikus ds vf/kdkjh gksaxsA fMØh ipkZ rS;kj gksaA i{kdkjkus viuk viuk O;; Lo;a ogu djsaA lgh@& ¼lw;Z izdk'k dkdM+k½ vij eqfUlQ ,oa U;kf;d eftLVªsV] izFke oxZ] la- 1 chdkusj** 3. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 4.12.1992 of the learned Trial Court the plaintiffs filed the first appeal before the First Appellate Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner, Appeal Decree No. 129/1996 "Ramdev & Ors. vs. Smt. Amara Devi & Ors." which was also dismissed on 18.1.2002 and impugned judgment and decree dated 4.12.1992 of the learned Trial Court was affirmed. vs. Smt. Amara Devi & Ors." which was also dismissed on 18.1.2002 and impugned judgment and decree dated 4.12.1992 of the learned Trial Court was affirmed. The relevant portion of the findings and the final order of the learned First Appellate Court for affirming the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court is quoted herein below for ready reference:- ^^32- eSaus nksuksa i{kksa ds rdksZ ij fopkj fd;kA lk{kh ih-MCY;w- 1 jkenso vkSj ih-MCY;w- 3 kadj ;g dFku djrs gSa fd fd'ku csjkstxkj gS vkSj ijpwu dh nqdku vFkok euhgkjh dh nqdku bl ifjlj esa djuk pkgrk gSA ih-MCY;w- 3 kadj us ;g izdV fd;k gS fd orZeku esa fd'ku vius edku ds uhps cus ?kqekfj;s esa [kV~Vh&feBh xksfy;ka cspus dk dk;Z djrk gS vkSj ih-MCY;w- 1 jkenso ;g dFku dj jgk gS fd og orZeku esa ?kj ds vanj gh ijpwu dk O;kikj dj jgk gSA 'kadj ;g Hkh dg jgk gS fd [kV~Vh&feBh xksfy;ksa dks cspus ls mldk ?kj [kpZ ugha pyrk gSA tgka rd fd'ku ds }kjk orZeku esa dk;Z fd;s tkus dk iz'u gS] bu lkf{k;ksa dh lk{; ls nks izdkj ds dk;Z mlds }kjk fd;s tkus] lkeus vk jgk gSA fd'ku Lo;a lk{; esa ugha vk;k gSA ?kj esa ijpwu dk O;kikj fd;k tkuk lqfo/kktud ugha dgk tk ldrk vkSj ?kqekfj;sa dks Hkh og mfpr LFkku ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd tgka ij fd'ku [kV~Vh&feBh xksfy;ka cspus dk dk;Z dj jgk gSA blls fd'ku dks nqdku dh vko';drk gksuh rks izdV gks jgk gS] ftlesa fd og viuk dkjksckj dj ldsA 33- vc ;g iz'u ;g mBrk gS fd D;k mlds ikl O;kikj gsrq vU; dksbZ ifjlj miyC/k ugha gS\ bl laca/k esa lk{kh jkenso ih-MCY;w- 1 us izfrijh{kk esa bl rF; dks Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlds edku esa pkj nqdkusa gS] ftuesa ls rhu nqdkus fdjk;s ij mBk j[kh gSa vkSj ,d fjDr iM+h gS] tcfd 'kadj yky vius edku ds uhps rhu nqdkusa gksuk gh cryk jgk gSA bl izdkj 'kadj yky [kkyh nqdku dks fNik jgk gSA oknh jkenso dh lk{; ls ;g fLFkfr Li"V gks tkrh gS fd orZeku esa muds ikl ,d nqdku fjDr iM+h gqbZ gSA vc ;g nqdku [kkyh iM+h gqbZ gS vkSj mls vius iq= ds O;olk; ds fy, nqdku dh vko';drk gS rks fQj oknh vius iq= fd'ku dks bl fjDr nqdku esa O;olk; yEcs vlsZ ls D;ksa ugha djok jgk gSA 34- fo- vf/koDrk vihykFkhZx.k dk rdZ gS fd ;g nqdku mUgsa O;kikj gsrq lwV ugha djrh gS] blfy, fookfnr ifjlj dh O;kikj gsrq vko';drk gS] ftldk fojks/k izR;FkhZx.k dh vksj ls fd;k x;k gS vkSj ;g rdZ j[kk x;k gS fd ;g nqdku Hkh vkcknh esa fLFkr gS vkSj ;g nqdku jkenso vkSj 'kadj us viuh lk{; esa dqN Hkh ugha dgk gSA 35- eSaus nksuksa i{kksa ds rdksZ ij fopkj fd;kA bl laca/k esa eSa eku- mPpre U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; ,-vkbZ-vkj- 1981 ¼,llh½ 1113 ,e ,e D;wfle cuke ,e ,y 'kekZ dk mYys[k dj jgk gwa] ftlesa ;g fof/k fu.khZr dh x;h gS fd fookfnr ifjlj ds vykok vU; ifjlj ;fn HkwLokeh ds dCt esa gS rks mls ;g lkfcr djuk gksxk fd tks ifjlj mlds ikl miyC/k gS] og mlds O;kikj gsrq mfpr ugha gSaA orZeku ekeys esa Hkh ,slh fLFkfr gSA orZeku ekeys esa oknh ds ikl esa ,d nqdku vkcknh ds chp esa fjDr iM+h gqbZ gS] ijUrq mlesa O;kikj izkjaHk oknh }kjk ugha djok;k x;k gSA ;fn mUgsa nqdku dh okLrfod :i ls vko';drk gksrh vkSj ;g vko';drk lnHkkfod gksrh rks blesa O;kikj izkjaHk fd;k tk ldrk FkkA ;fn ;g nqdku O;kikj gsrq mfpr ugha gS rks bldk dkj.k oknhx.k dks viuh lk{; esa izdV djuk pkfg;s Fkk] ijUrq ,slh dksbZ lk{; oknhx.k ds mDr xokgku us ugha nh gSA ,slh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd oknhx.k dh tks vko';drk gS] og okLrfod vkSj lnHkkfod vko';drk gSA ,slk gh er v- U;k;ky; dk jgk gS vkSj mUgksaus bl rudh dk fu.kZ; lgh izdkj ls vihykFkhZx.k ds fo:) ,oa izR;FkhZx.k ds i{k esa fd;k gS] ftldh iqf"V dh tkrh gSA xxx vkns'k 40- Qyr% vihykFkhZx.k dh ;g vihy fujLr dh tkdj v- U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; ,oa fMØh dh iqf"V dh tkrh gSA vihy dk O;; i{kdkjku viuk viuk Lo;a ogu djsaxsA rnuqlkj fMØh cuk;h tkosA lgh@& ¼ch-,e- xqIrk½ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k la- 2] chdkusj ¼jkt-½** 4. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees refusing eviction of the tenants by the both the learned Courts below the appellants plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal in this Court on 12.4.2002 and while admitting the present second appeal after hearing both the parties on 18.8.2008 the following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court:- 1. Whether the learned appellate Court committed an error of law in relying upon 1989(2) RLR 308 Smt. Ramjeevani vs. Narsi Bai, which impliedly stands over ruled by Apex Court in 1990(3) SCC 526 ? 2. Whether appellate Court wrongly interpreted provisions of Section 3(vii) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950? 3. Whether the partnership of Smt. Amri Devi with defendant No. 7 does not confer tenancy rights on defendant No. 7? 4. Whether the tenant made default in payment of rent and the deposit made by defendant No. 7 can be said to be invalid deposit? 5. Whether finding recorded on the question of sublet is perverse? 6. Whether the finding recorded on the question of reasonable bonafide necessity of comparative hardship is perverse?" 5. The learned counsel Mr. R.R. Nagori Senior Advocate with Mr. Alkesh Agarwal, appearing for the appellants-plaintiffs submitted that the original tenant-Bhikham Chand to whom the tenancy was originally given in the year 1973, expired on 24.3.1979 and thus, after his death, the sub-tenant, Mr. Basant Kumar Begani, is said to have entered into the partnership with the wife of the deceased-tenant, namely. Smt. Amri Devi widow of Bhiham Chand who did not fall within the definition of "tenant" as defined in Section 3(viii)(b) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and, therefore the subletting in favour of Mr. Basant Kumar Begani by the original tenant/this wife was proved. The learned counsels submitted that in present case the plaintiffs had established that the original tenant-Bhikham Chand had sublet the suit shop in question to the defendant No. 7 Mr. Basant Kumar Begani, but still the two Courts below did not grant eviction decree in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. Basant Kumar Begani by the original tenant/this wife was proved. The learned counsels submitted that in present case the plaintiffs had established that the original tenant-Bhikham Chand had sublet the suit shop in question to the defendant No. 7 Mr. Basant Kumar Begani, but still the two Courts below did not grant eviction decree in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. The learned counsels also submitted that the both the Courts below have erred in holding that it is not a case of subletting while relying upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Ramjeevani vs. Smt. Narati Bai reported in 1989(2) RLR 308 (FB) = RLW 1991(1) Raj. 222 which stood impliedly over ruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand vs. Ram Prasad reported in 1990(3) SCC 526 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "Section 3(vii)(b) of the Rajasthan Rent Act, as introduced by Act 14 of 1976 provides that in respect of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, it must be established that the surviving spouse or son of daughter and the heir, as the case may be ordinarily had been carrying on the business during the lifetime of the tenant as members of the family in the demised premises and continued to do the business even after the death of the tenant. Thus, to avail of the status of statutory tenant under Section 3(vii) (b) there must continue to subsist the continuity of business of the family between the deceased tenant and the spouse etc. The break in either of the links snaps of the right denuding the continuity of the statutory tenancy. 7. The learned counsels for the plaintiffs Mr. Thus, to avail of the status of statutory tenant under Section 3(vii) (b) there must continue to subsist the continuity of business of the family between the deceased tenant and the spouse etc. The break in either of the links snaps of the right denuding the continuity of the statutory tenancy. 7. The learned counsels for the plaintiffs Mr. R.R. Nagori Senior Advocate, therefore submitted that since nothing was brought on record by the defendants to establish that Smt. Amri Devi widow of the original tenant Bhikham Chand had used to carrying on the business with the original tenant Bhikham Chand prior to his death on 24.3.1979 therefore in view of the pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand (supra), there was no question of treating the widow (Smt. Amri Devi) of the original tenant (Bhikham Chand) to be the statutory tenant, after his death on 24.3.1979 under Section 3(vii)(b) of the Act and for this reason, the partnership of sub-tenant the defendant No. 7 Mr. Basant Kumar Begani with the wife of the deceased original tenant, namely. Smt. Amri Devi and after the death of Smt. Amri Devi during the pendency of the first appeal with the other legal representatives of Smt. Amri Devi is of no consequence and thus, the findings of both the learned Court below of there being no subletting are perverse and the present second appeal of the appellants-plaintiffs deserves to be allowed. 8. On the question of the bonafide need of the landlord and his family members, the learned counsel Mr. R.R. Nagori, Senior Advocate submitted that though both the learned Courts below have found that there was need of the landlord for the suit shop in question for the purpose of business need of his son as his son. Kishan was carrying on the business of Parchun and toffees in a very small place situated in the residential house itself but the suit shop was needed for his livelihood but the learned Courts below have said that since the requirement of the landlord is satisfied as his son was doing the business in the small portion situated in the residential house, the need asserted by the landlord for his son could not be said to be bonafide and therefore, the eviction decree was refused. In support of his contention about the landlord is the `best judge' of his need and therefore, neither the Courts nor the tenant can dictate the terms to the landlord the learned counsels have relied upon the following decision which are as under:- (1) Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors.- (2005) 8 SCC 252 (2) Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan- (1996) 5 SCC 35, (3) Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India - (2008) 5 SCC 287 , (4) State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Super Max International Private Ltd. & Ors. - (2009) 9 SCC 772 = 2010(2) RLW 1263 (SC) and, (5) Denzil Najrath vs. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors. reported in 2011(3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel, Mr. Jai Kishan Bhaiya, appearing for the respondents-defendants-tenants vehemently submitted that there was no subletting of the suit shop in question in favour of the defendant No.7- Mr. Basant Kumar Begani either by the original-tenant-Bhikham Chand or his wife, namely Smt. Amri Devi. The learned counsel further submitted that the original tenant Bhikham Chand and Basant Kumar Begani have been carrying on the business in the suit shop in question under the partnership deed executed at the earlier point of time and Smt. Amri Devi had become the partner of the said Basant Kumar Begani, soon after the death of the original tenant-Bhikham Chand; and further after the death of Smt. Amri Devi the partnership has continued with her legal representatives and, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant No.7 is a sub-tenant in the suit shop in question to the exclusion of the original tenant. The learned counsel also submitted that the learned Courts below have rightly not granted the eviction decree in favour of the plaintiffs as the fact of sub-letting not proved by the landlords. 10. Refuting the ground of bonafide need of the landlord and his family members, the learned counsel. Mr. Jai Kishan Bhaiya appearing for the defendants also submitted that the said need cannot be said to be bonafide since the son of the landlord was carrying on the business of Parchun & Toffees in a portion situated in the residential house whereas, the established business of the defendants who are running the Raymond Showroom there, cannot be disturbed now after long years since 1973. 11. 11. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the record of the case including the judgments cited at bar. 12. This Court is satisfied that the both the learned Courts below have erred in refusing the eviction decree on both the aforesaid grounds viz., subletting and bonafide need of the landlord and his family members. 13. As far as the question of subletting is concerned, it is noticed that the suit shop in question was originally given to the original tenant Bhikham Chand who died on 24.3.1979. There is no evidence on record brought by the defendants to establish that the wife of the original tenant Bhikham Chand namely, Smt. Amri Devi was ordinarily carrying on the business with her husband prior to his death on 24.3.1979. It is also noticed that the first entry of Smt. Amri Devi into the business was with her introduction as partner with Respondent No. 9 B.K. Begani by executing the partnership deed on 4.4.1979 may be soon after the death of the original tenant Bhikham Chand on 24.3.1979 it is also noticed that there was no partnership of the sub-tenant Basant Kumar Begani with the original tenant Bhikham Chand and, therefore, upon his death, the tenancy could not devolve upon the legal representatives of the original tenant Bhikham Chand including upon his wife Smt. Amri Devi in terms of Section 3(vii)(b) of the Act of 1950. It was not established by the defendants that the wife Smt. Amri Devi of the original tenant was ordinarily carrying on the business with her husband Bhikham Chand prior to his death. Thus, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand (supra) which impliedly over ruled the earlier decision in the case of Ramjeevani (supra), for the purpose of the present case, the defendant No. 7 Basant Kumar Begani is held to be sub-tenant and the ground of subletting stands proved. 14. This Court in the case of Achal Raj vs. LRs. of Smt. Ashiya (S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 145/1996, decided on 9.12.2015) while following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand (supra) has held as under:- "16. The term "Ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family upto his death makes it clear that protection of Sec. 3(vii)(b) of Act. The term "Ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family upto his death makes it clear that protection of Sec. 3(vii)(b) of Act. No. 17 of 1950 is extended to only those heirs and legal representatives of deceased-tenant who continued to do business along with the tenant upto his death. The person who carried on business with the tenant till his death only be treated as tenant under the Amended Act No. 14 of 1950. If the heirs and legal representatives of deceased-tenant Mangi Lal were not carrying on business along with the deceased-tenant at the time of his death, they would not be treated as tenants under the aforesaid Act. All heirs and legal representatives of deceased-tenant will not become ipso facto statutory tenant under the Act. In fact, only those heirs and legal representatives who are members of the family plus who carried on business with the original tenant upto his death are entitled to get benefit of Sec. 3(vii) (b) of the Act. Subsequently, carrying on business after death of original tenant in the premises will not make such heir and legal representatives as tenant under the Act." 17. Again in Navneet Rai vs. Otmal- (1996) 1 All India RCJ = RLW 1994(2) Raj. 32 this Court held that- "9. Admittedly the ejectment was sought for on the ground of personal need of business and deceased Navneet Rai was carrying on business in the suit premises. Thus, to be a tenant within the meaning of Section 3 (vii)(b) of the Act, it is necessary for a person to show that he was ordinarily carrying on with him in such premises as member of his family upto his death. Subsequently carrying on the business in the same premises will not make the legal representative a tenant. Tenant will be person, who is a member of the family plus who carried on business with the original tenant. The person, who was not carrying on business along with the tenant during his life time will not be a tenant of the premises after his death, in respect of the premises leased out for commercial and business purposes. Tenant will be person, who is a member of the family plus who carried on business with the original tenant. The person, who was not carrying on business along with the tenant during his life time will not be a tenant of the premises after his death, in respect of the premises leased out for commercial and business purposes. It must be established that the surviving spouse or the son or daughter and the heir, as the case may be, ordinarily had been carrying on the business during the life time of the tenant as member of the family in the demised premises and continued to do business till the date of the death of the tenant. In other words to avail the statutory right under Section 3(vii)(b) of the Act, the person should carry on business along with the tenant until his death then alone he can be treated as a tenant of the suit premises. Reliance is placed on Tara Chand vs. Ram Prasad. 10.....It is clear that all the legal representatives were employed and were not carrying on business along with the deceased Navneet Rai till his death. The person who carries on business with the tenant till his death shall only be treated as a tenant under the Act. But the legal representative were not carrying on business along with deceased Navneet Rai at the time of his death. They are not the tenants within the meaning of the Act and thus, have no right to challenge the decree for ejectment passed against the tenant deceased Navneet Rai. 18. Recently in Dwarkadass vs. Narayandas.- (2006) CJ (Rent Control) 554 = RLW 2007(1) Raj. 446 this Court reiterated this position as under:- 11. So far the contention raised on the basis of Ramjeevani's case is concerned from a bare perusal thereof it is clear that Ramjeevani's case does not take in account rather even does not refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tara Chand's case. Obviously it could not be referred as the judgment in Ramjeevani's case was rendered on 22.12.1989, while the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Tara Chand's case is dated 3.5.1990. Obviously it could not be referred as the judgment in Ramjeevani's case was rendered on 22.12.1989, while the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Tara Chand's case is dated 3.5.1990. Since in Tara Chand's case the view taken is, as quoted in the judgment in Usha's case and Chiman Lal's case, therefore obviously in view of the subsequent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court the judgment in Ramjeevani's case cannot be said to be holding the field at all. 12. The obvious result is, that in order to entitle to protection of the Act each of the heir or legal representatives, claiming protection has to satisfy the other requirement also, about living with the deceased tenant, or carrying on business with him. In case of residential and commercial premises, respectively. Therefore the first submission made by the learned counsel is negatived." 15. In view of the above, the possession of the suit shop in question with the respondent No. 9 the sub-tenant Basant Kumar Begani who is carrying on the business of selling the Raymond clothes and garments in the suit shop in question to the exclusion of the original tenant Bhikham Chand stands proved and the subsequent partnership with the family members of the original tenant Bhikham Chand did not undo the case of subletting as established by the landlord and, therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the case falls in the mischief of Section 13(1)(e) of the Act of 1950. 16. On the ground of bonafide need of the landlord and his family members as in the present case the plaintiff has asserted the need of the suit shop in question for his son for carrying on the business for earning his livelihood the settled legal position in this regard that the landlord is the `best judge' for his needs and neither the Courts can substitute their wisdom or opinion nor the tenant can dictate the terms to the landlord about his needs. This Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held in this regard in a catena of judgments, some of which are reproduced hereunder. (1) In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. This Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held in this regard in a catena of judgments, some of which are reproduced hereunder. (1) In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors. - (2005) 8 SCC 252 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the eviction is sought for bonafide requirement of landlord, the relevant date on which the said need has to be adjudged is the date of filing the suit and subsequent events taking place during the period of litigation like engaging in other activity or business for which premises in question is required do not upset such bonafide need unless such subsequent events are of such a nature & dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it lose significance altogether and the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying the landlord relief when litigation at last reaches the final stage. (ii) In Prativa Devi vs. T.V. Krishnan- (1996) 5 SCC 353 , the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement observed as under:- "The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dicate to the landlord how and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court was rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thought that because of her age she needed to be looked after. That was a lookout of the appellant and not of the High Court. The gratuitous advice given by the High Court was uncalled for. There is nothing to show that she had any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of the family friend. On the other hand, she was there merely by sufferance. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bonafides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bonafides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bonafide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances." (iii) More over, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court itself in a recent decision of two Judges bench in Satyawati Sharam vs. Union of India- (2008) 5 SCC 287 , which has been later on reaffirmed by three Judges bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Super Max International Private Ltd. & Ors.- (2009) 9 SCC 772 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly noticed that even the trend of Apex Court has shifted from pro-tenant from 1950s to 1990s to pro-landlord from 1990s onwards. The relevant extracts from the judgments in case of Satyawati Sharma (supra) & Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. are quoted below for ready reference:- "12. There has been a definite shift in the court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily learned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant. In these cases the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguard for tenants against exploitation by landlord who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments." The relevant para 71 of the judgment of Apex Court in Super Max International (P) Ltd. (supra) is quoted below for ready reference: "71. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments." The relevant para 71 of the judgment of Apex Court in Super Max International (P) Ltd. (supra) is quoted below for ready reference: "71. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharma and emphasize the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say that the Court should learned favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate need of the Court's protection under all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq. ft. in a building situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs. 5236.58/- plus water charges at the rate of Rs. 515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point)." (iv). This Court in the case of LR's of Prakash vs. Poornima (SBCSA No. 132/2009, decided on 11.5.2011) also emphasized that landlord was the best judge of his needs in the following terms:- "5. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs Mr. S.N. Pungalia strongly opposed these submissions and urged that no substantial question of law arises in the present second appeal and the finding of facts returned by the courts below are based on cogent and relevant evidence and the second appeal deserves to be dismissed as the bonafide need of the landlord was fully established before the learned trial court and as per the catenae of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not for the tenant to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should satisfy his bonafide need for his business place and from the facts found by the courts below it was clear that the very source of livelihood of plaintiffs was the STC PCO Booth, which is presently run under the staircase and they need bigger premises for carrying out this business." (v) In the case of Denzil Najrath vs. LR's of Balwant Singh & Ors. reported in 2011(3) DNJ (Raj.) 1217 this Court has held under:- "Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and evidence recorded by the learned trial Court this Court is satisfied that the findings of the fact about the bonafide need of the landlord recorded by the learned trial Court are not perverse in any manner. They are based on cogent reasons and evidence and no interference in the impugned judgment is required to be made in the present first appeal of the defendant-tenant. The owner-plaintiff. Swarn Singh has clearly stated in paras 7 and 8 of his affidavit that the available house with the plaintiffs family was very small of three rooms and for a family of two married brothers and three married sisters and parents of them, the said accommodation was very short of the requirement and, therefore, they needed the suit house for their own residential purposes. Nothing in the cross-examination was even asked from the said deponent about the relationship and number of family members and, therefore the averments made in the affidavit was sufficient proof unshaken in the cross-examination of the said deponent, namely Swarn Singh. It is well settled that findings about the bonafide need of the landlord are findings of fact and unless they can be said to be perverse or without any foundation the same cannot be interfered with by the appellate court and even though this is first appeal as the trial Court was that of learned Additional District Judge, Sri Karanpur and requirement of substantial question of law may not be there as such as is required for second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. still this Court is satisfied that decree under appeal deserves no interference and the present appeal filed by the defendant-tenant has no merit." 17. This Court is of the view that once the bonafide need is pleaded in the plaint and the same is reiterated in the witness box in the light of the aforesaid judgments, nothing more is required to be gone by the landlord. It has been so done in the present case. This Court is of the view that once the bonafide need is pleaded in the plaint and the same is reiterated in the witness box in the light of the aforesaid judgments, nothing more is required to be gone by the landlord. It has been so done in the present case. Thus, the findings of both the learned Courts below, in the light of the settled legal position delineated above are perverse and are not sustainable and, therefore, the present second appeal of the appellants-plaintiffs deserves to be allowed and the questions of law, framed and quoted herein above also deserves to be answered in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs. 18. Accordingly and in view of the above the present second appeal filed by the appellants-plaintiffs LRs. of Ramdev & Ors. is allowed and all the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants-plaintiffs and against the respondents-defendants. No costs. A copy of this order be sent to both the Courts below and to the parties concerned forthwith. 19. In the circumstances of the case, it is directed that the respondents-defendants-tenants shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop in question, as mentioned above to the appellants-plaintiffs-landlord on or before 31.12.2017 and shall pay mesne profit @ 15000/- per month (Rupees Fifteen Thousand per month only) for the remaining 10 months from March, 2016 of the Year 2016 and Rs. 18,000/- per month for the Year 2017 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the appellants-plaintiffs also and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit the period of eviction as mentioned above shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The respondents-defendants tenants shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profit and pay the same to the appellants-plaintiffs landlord within three months from today otherwise the same will bear simple interest @ 9% per annum. The respondents-defendants-tenants shall also not further sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises as mentioned above, or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and if it is so done, the same would be treated as void. The respondents-defendants-tenants shall also not further sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises as mentioned above, or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and if it is so done, the same would be treated as void. The respondents-defendants shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the Trial Court within three months and one copy thereof along with affidavit in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises is not handed over to the respon-dent-plaintiff landlord on or before 31.12.2017 as mentioned above, from today or mesne profit are not paid as directed above besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the appellants-plaintiffs-landlord shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court.