JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. -- Heard Shri Nirvikar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The instant writ petition arises out of a release application under Section 21 (1) (A) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 filed by the respondent-landlord for release of a shop occupied by the petitioner as tenant. 3. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 23.04.2010 and the consequential appeal has been dismissed on 05.02.2016. Hence this writ petition challenging the aforesaid two orders. 4. The release application was filed by the landlord stating that he was a Doctor having a lucrative practice. The shop in question was required by him for setting up a Pathology Centre equipped with Cardiogram, X-ray and Ultrasound Machine, which would be beneficiary for his profession as a private practitioner enabling him to obtain accurate reports for arriving at a correct diagnosis. His need for the shop was pressing and bona fide. 5. The release application was contested by the petitioner-tenant alleging that the landlord was a propertied person, possessed of several properties wherein he could set up the Pathology Centre. It was also alleged that the place where the landlord was running his clinic comprised of a large area and that its incorrect dimensions had been mentioned in the release application. Another vacant shop had recently been let out by the landlord. The petitioner was a tenant since more than 30 years. Earlier, a compromise had been entered into between the parties, wherein it has been decided that the petitioner would not be evicted till such time he continued to pay rent which would be enhanced by 25 per cent each year. The petitioner had not defaulted in paying rent. The shop in question was the only place available to the petitioner for carrying out his business and in case he was evicted, he would fact starvation. 6. It was also alleged that the need set up, was not bona fide. The landlord wanted to enhance the rent of Rs. 600 per month to 1,500 per month and on the petitioner's refusal, the release application had been filed, to pressurise him. 7. 6. It was also alleged that the need set up, was not bona fide. The landlord wanted to enhance the rent of Rs. 600 per month to 1,500 per month and on the petitioner's refusal, the release application had been filed, to pressurise him. 7. The contention raised on behalf of petitioner for assailing the impugned orders are that in view of Rule 16 (1) (A) and 2 (c) of the Rules framed under the Act, the petitioner was entitled to be offered alternative accommodation by the landlord who possessed several other properties. Since this was not done nor this aspect has been adverted to by the two courts below, the impugned orders are vitiated. 8. The second contention raised is that the petitioner had applied for issuance of a commission for determining the actual area and properties in possession of the landlord. Even though this application was not opposed by the landlord, the Prescribed Authority wrongly and illegally dismissed the same. This has prevented the correct facts from coming before the Court. 9. The next contention is that one shop adjacent to the shop in question had been let out in favour of one Dinesh Kumar Sharma during the pendency of the proceedings. This aspect, though specifically raised, has not been considered by the two courts below. 10. The finding on the question of comparative hardship has been assailed on the ground that the shop in question was the only shop available to the petitioner for his livelihood. He had made an application for allotment of another shop but no shop was allotted to him. A copy of the allotment application filed by the petitioner before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been filed but the same has not been considered by the courts below. 11. It is lastly contended that the interim order was granted to the petitioner in the appeal filed by him. Unfortunately the appeal was dismissed for default and the interim order was vacated. The landlord hurriedly obtained possession of the shop in question, in execution proceedings. 12. The petitioner however, upon restoration of the appeal and revival of the interim order, forcibly occupied the shop. The petitioner is therefore an unauthorized occupant of the shop in question and can only be evicted by means of a civil suit. Therefore also the impugned orders are vitiated. 13. 12. The petitioner however, upon restoration of the appeal and revival of the interim order, forcibly occupied the shop. The petitioner is therefore an unauthorized occupant of the shop in question and can only be evicted by means of a civil suit. Therefore also the impugned orders are vitiated. 13. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the record. 14. The first contention of the petitioner is that in view of Rule 16 (2) (c), the petitioner was liable to be offered alternative accommodation, which though not adequate or suitable for the landlord, but could have been used by the tenant for shifting his business. This aspect has not been considered by the courts below. 15. Sub rule 2 (c) of Rule 16 requires that this aspect be considered on an application filed by the tenant. It has neither been averred nor there exists any material on record, to show that any such application was, in fact, filed by the tenant-petitioner. In the absence of any such application, there was no occasion for the courts below to have been adverted to this aspect of the matter. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is therefore without substance and is repelled. 16. The second contention that that the petitioner's application for issuance of a commission for determining the exact dimensions of properties in possession of the landlord had been dismissed, even though the same had not been opposed by the landlord, is also, in my considered opinion, without substance for two reasons. First, despite rejection of this application it was open for the petitioner to have adduced evidence in this regard. Nothing prevented him for adducing evidence but no evidence in this regard appears to have been adduced. Secondly, the appellate Court, while dealing with this submission, has clearly observed that the application filed by the petitioner was all together vague and devoid of specifics. 17. Besides, even if contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the dimensions of the clinic of the landlord had wrongly been given is accepted, the same does not in my considered opinion alter his need which has been found to be genuine. 18. 17. Besides, even if contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the dimensions of the clinic of the landlord had wrongly been given is accepted, the same does not in my considered opinion alter his need which has been found to be genuine. 18. It is not in dispute that the clinic was running and the entire area was divided into three parts, the actual clinic/chamber of the Doctor, a waiting area for the patients and a counter for dispensing and selling medicines prescribed to the patients. It has only been submitted that wrong dimensions had been mentioned in the release application. It is not the petitioner's case that this area could have also accommodated the Pathology Centre proposed to be set up. 19. Moreover, the pleadings appear to be that there was lot of open land at the place the clinic existed. In my considered opinion, a landlord, owner of constructed shop, applying for its release, cannot be directed by the court to construct a new shop over some vacant land that may be owned by him. 20. The next contention that a shop situated adjacent to the shop in question had been let out during the pendency of the release application, is again, factually incorrect. The written statement filed by the petitioner was to the effect that this shop had been released prior to the filing of the release application itself. 21. On the question of comparative hardship, it is no doubt true that the finding returned by the Prescribed Authority that no attempt had been made by the petitioner to search for alternative accommodation, appears to be perverse. However, this lacuna has been filed in at the appellate stage when the appellate Court has considered the application filed by the petitioner before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, for allotment of a shop. In this regard the appellate Court has observed that although this application for allotment was filed, however there is nothing on record to show as to what transpired thereafter. Nor any evidence has been adduced to show that after the filing of the allotment application any further steps were taken by the petitioner to search for alternative accommodation. This observation of the appellate Court has not been specifically refuted, either in the writ petition or during the course of arguments. Nor any evidence has been adduced to show that after the filing of the allotment application any further steps were taken by the petitioner to search for alternative accommodation. This observation of the appellate Court has not been specifically refuted, either in the writ petition or during the course of arguments. Neither has counsel for the petitioner referred to any other evidence filed by the petitioner to establish that he had made further efforts to search for alternative accommodation. 22. Under the circumstances, the finding recorded by the appellate court on the question of comparative hardship cannot be said to be either illegal or perverse and the same therefore calls for no interference. 23. The last contention that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside, since, during pendency of the appeal the decree of the appellate Court had been duly executed and thereafter admittedly the petitioner became an authorized occupant having forcibly occupied the property, also cannot be accepted. 24. The challenge in the writ petition is to the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Authority. The question as to whether their orders, can or cannot be executed, is a question to be considered by the executing Court. There may exist a situation where an order passed is legal yet the executing court finds it to be unexecutable. This, by itself, would not render the order illegal. The execution proceedings, if any, drawn for execution of the eviction order passed against the petitioner are not under challenge in the writ petition and I therefore do not consider it expedient or necessary to enter into this controversy. 25. In view of the above discussion, the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner do not make out a case for interference. 26. The impugned orders are neither illegal nor perverse and are therefore, liable to be affirmed. 27. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.