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Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 3765 (ALL)

KULVEER SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2016-11-22

AJAI LAMBA, VIJAY LAXMI

body2016
JUDGMENT By the Court.—This petition seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 15.1.2016 passed by Superintendent of Police, Bahraich in relation to Case Crime No. 701 of 2013, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali Nanpara, District Bahraich. 2. Order dated 26.5.2016 notices the gist of the contention made on behalf of the petitioner and brief facts of the case. For brevity’s sake, order dated 26.5.2016, is extracted here below : 1. This petition seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing order dated 15th January, 2016 passed by Superintendent of Police, Bahraich, directing further investigation in Case Crime No. 701 of 2013, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code, Police Station Kotwali Nanpara, District Bahraich. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/complainant has argued that investigation in regard to crime registered on 2.8.2013 was concluded by way of filing charge-sheet in Court on 18th November, 2013. The Magistrate took cognizance of offence on 19th February, 2014. Thereafter, the accused were required to appear in Court, however, they did not appear. Non-bailable warrant had to be issued more than twenty times for procuring presence of the accused. When in normal course non-bailable warrant could not be executed, Superintendent of Police, Bahraich was asked to take necessary action vide Annexure-3 dated 14.1.2016. Rather than executing non-bailable warrant, impugned order has been passed on 15.1.2016. 3. It has been further argued that defect in earlier investigation has not been pointed out by the Superintendent of Police, Bahraich in the impugned order. There is no reason spelt out in the order for further investigation. On the asking of accused side, the impugned order has been passed in mala fide exercise of power, which has frustrated administration of criminal justice. 4. Learned counsel, in the above noted facts and circumstances, seeks time to cite law. 5. List on 6th June, 2016.” 3. It is evident that vide the impugned order, re-investigation has been ordered by Superintendent of Police, Bahraich. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on judgement rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak and others, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , to contend that the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction. 5. The Court has taken into account that the petitioner is the complainant. 6. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on judgement rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak and others, (2013) 5 SCC 762 , to contend that the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction. 5. The Court has taken into account that the petitioner is the complainant. 6. Learned counsel for the investigating agency has not been able to dispute the legal position to the effect that “re-investigation” or “de novo” investigation cannot be ordered by the police functionaries. 7. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case, in context of the law. 8. Relevant portion of Section 173 (1) and (8) of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) reads as under : “173(1). Every investigation under this chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. XXXXXXXXX (8) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-Section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed ; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Tyagi’s case (supra), has considered the scope of ‘investigation’ as provided under Section 173 Cr.P.C., and report to be filed under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. The judgement further details scope of ‘further investigation’ under sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. The difference between ‘investigation’, ‘further investigation’, and ‘re-investigation’ or ‘de novo investigation’ has also been considered at some length. The power of the investigating agency in directing ‘further investigation’ and lack of jurisdiction in ordering ‘re-investigation’ or ‘de novo investigation’ has also been provided. Likewise, the powers of the magistrate in the process of ‘investigation’, ‘further investigation’, and ‘re-investigation’ and ‘de novo investigation’ have been considered. 10. In Vinay Tyagi’s case (supra), the following question No. 2. has been framed for adjudication by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India : “Question 2. 1.2. Likewise, the powers of the magistrate in the process of ‘investigation’, ‘further investigation’, and ‘re-investigation’ and ‘de novo investigation’ have been considered. 10. In Vinay Tyagi’s case (supra), the following question No. 2. has been framed for adjudication by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India : “Question 2. 1.2. Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short “CBI”) is empowered to conduct “fresh”/“reinvestigation” when the cognizance has already been taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of a police report under Section 173 of the Code ?” 11. The aforesaid question has been answered in following words in paragraph 54 (Vinay Tyagi’s case) : “Answer to Question 2 54. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a “fresh”, “de novo” or “reinvestigation” in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is only upon the orders of the higher Courts empowered to pass such orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher Courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the Court of the learned Magistrate.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while considering questions posed before that Court, has considered in detail various aspects of the investigation, as noted above. The following portions from the judgement of Vinay Tyagi’s case (supra) (paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 54) are required to be referred to : “14. After the investigation has been completed by the Investigating Officer and he has prepared a report without unnecessary delay in terms of Section 173 of the Code, he shall forward his report to a Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance on a police report. The report so completed should satisfy the requirements stated under clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 of the Code. Upon receipt of the report, the empowered Magistrate shall proceed further in accordance with law. The report so completed should satisfy the requirements stated under clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 of the Code. Upon receipt of the report, the empowered Magistrate shall proceed further in accordance with law. The Investigating Officer has been vested with some definite powers in relation to the manner in which the report should be completed and it is required that all the documents on which the prosecution proposes to rely and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code accompany the report submitted before the Magistrate, unless some part thereof is excluded by the Investigating Officer in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 173(6) of the Code. 15. A very wide power is vested in the investigating agency to conduct further investigation after it has filed the report in terms of Section 173(2). The legislature has specifically used the expression ‘nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate’, which unambiguously indicates the legislative intent that even after filing of a report before the Court of competent jurisdiction, the Investigating Officer can still conduct further investigation and where, upon such investigation, the officer in charge of a police station gets further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the prescribed form. In other words, the investigating agency is competent to file a supplementary report to its primary report in terms of Section 173(8). The supplementary report has to be treated by the Court in continuation of the primary report and the same provisions of law i.e. sub-section (2) to sub-section (6) of Section 173 shall apply when the Court deals with such report. 16. Once the Court examines the records, applies its mind, duly complies with the requisite formalities of summoning the accused and, if present in Court, upon ensuring that the copies of the requisite documents, as contemplated under Section 173(7), have been furnished to the accused, it would proceed to hear the case. XXXXXX 21. The “initial investigation” is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct in furtherance to registration of an FIR. XXXXXX 21. The “initial investigation” is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct in furtherance to registration of an FIR. Such investigation itself can lead to filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit the investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct in furtherance of an order for investigation passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. 22. ‘Further investigation’ is where the Investigating Officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the Court in terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the Executive. It is the continuation of a previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as ‘further investigation’. The scope of such investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as ‘supplementary report’. ‘Supplementary report’ would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in complete contradistinction to a ‘reinvestigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation. 23. However, in the case of a ‘fresh investigation’, ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo investigation’ there has to be a definite order of the Court. The order of the Court unambiguously should state as to whether the previous investigation, for reasons to be recorded, is incapable of being acted upon. Neither the Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any power to order or conduct ‘fresh investigation’. This is primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential that even an order of ‘fresh’/’de novo’ investigation passed by the higher judiciary should always be coupled with a specific direction as to the fate of the investigation already conducted. This is primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential that even an order of ‘fresh’/’de novo’ investigation passed by the higher judiciary should always be coupled with a specific direction as to the fate of the investigation already conducted. The cases where such direction can be issued are few and far between. This is based upon a fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right of a suspect or an accused to have a just and fair investigation and trial. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the investigation ex facie is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the Courts would set aside such an investigation and direct fresh or de novo investigation and, if necessary, even by another independent investigating agency. As already noticed, this is a power of wide plenitude and, therefore, has to be exercised sparingly. The principle of rarest of rare cases would squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the investigation is such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters to the extent of quashing an investigation and directing a ‘fresh investigation’. 24. In Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1 , the Court stated that it is not only the responsibility of the investigating agency, but also that of the Courts to ensure that investigation is fair and does not in any way hamper the freedom of an individual except in accordance with law. An equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that high responsibility lies upon the investigating agency not to conduct an investigation in a tainted or unfair manner. The investigation should not prima facie be indicative of a biased mind and every effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law de hors his position and influence in the society. The maxim contra veritatem lex nunquam aliquid permittit applies to exercise of powers by the Courts while granting approval or declining to accept the report. 25. The maxim contra veritatem lex nunquam aliquid permittit applies to exercise of powers by the Courts while granting approval or declining to accept the report. 25. In the case of Gudalure M.J. Cherian and others v. Union of India and others, (1992) 1 SCC 397 , this Court stated the principle that in cases where charge-sheets have been filed after completion of investigation and request is made belatedly to reopen the investigation, such investigation being entrusted to a specialized agency would normally be declined by the Court of competent jurisdiction but nevertheless in a given situation to do justice between the parties and to instil confidence in public mind, it may become necessary to pass such orders. 26. Further, in R.S. Sodhi, Advocate v. State of U.P., 1994 SCC Supp. (1) 142, where allegations were made against a police officer, the Court ordered the investigation to be transferred to CBI with an intent to maintain credibility of investigation, public confidence and in the interest of justice. Ordinarily, the Courts would not exercise such jurisdiction but the expression ‘ordinarily’ means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. It means in the large majority of cases but not invariably. ‘Ordinarily’ excludes extra-ordinary or special circumstances. In other words, if special circumstances exist, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction to direct ‘fresh investigation’ and even transfer cases to Courts of higher jurisdiction which may pass such directions. 27. Here, we will also have to examine the kind of reports that can be filed by an investigating agency under the scheme of the Code. 27.1. Firstly, the FIR which the investigating agency is required to file before the Magistrate right at the threshold and within the time specified. 27.2. Secondly, it may file a report in furtherance of a direction issued under Section 156(3) of the Code. 27.3. Thirdly, it can also file a ‘further report’, as contemplated under Section 173(8). 27.4. Finally, the investigating agency is required to file a ‘final report’ on the basis of which the Court shall proceed further to frame the charge and put the accused to trial or discharge him as envisaged by Section 227 of the Code. 28. Next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’. 28. Next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’. As far as the latter is concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation. However, once the report is filed, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial. But there are no provisions in the Code which empower the Magistrate to disturb the status of an accused pending investigation or when report is, filed to wipe out the report and its effects in law. Reference in this regard can be made to K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 223 ; Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar, (2008) 5 SCC 413 , Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab and others, (2009) 1 SCC 441 ; Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 332 ; and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254 . XXXXXXX 40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various judgments as afore-indicated, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code : 40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’ (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police report. 40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct ‘further investigation’ after filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code. 40.3. The view expressed in sub para 40.2 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant Singh’s case (supra) by a three Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedent. 40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. 40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8). 40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the Court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the Court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own. 40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the police has to seek permission of the Court to continue ‘further investigation’ and file supplementary charge-sheet. This approach has been approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such would support the view that we are taking in the present case. 41. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kind of reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The first and the foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is the First Information Report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police is required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case of the prosecution before the Court. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the magistrate to direct ‘further investigation’ is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as a part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code. 42. Both these reports have to be read conjointly and it is the cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto to which the Court would be expected to apply its mind to determine whether there exist grounds to presume that the accused has committed the offence. If the answer is in the negative, on the basis of these reports, the Court shall discharge an accused in compliance with the provisions of Section 227 of the Code. 43. At this stage, we may also state another well-settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the superior Courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct ‘further investigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ and even ‘reinvestigation’. ‘Fresh’, ‘de novo’, and ‘reinvestigation’ are synonymous expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior Courts are even vested with the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior Courts very sparingly and with great circumspection. 44. The superior Courts are even vested with the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior Courts very sparingly and with great circumspection. 44. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code do not control or limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge-sheet has been submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen the investigation, especially by entrusting the same to a specialised agency. It can safely be stated and concluded that in an appropriate case, when the Court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and that in order to do complete justice and where the facts of the case demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the investigation to a specialised agency. These principles have been reiterated with approval in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State of Gujarat and others, (2011) 13 SCC 337 . Vineet Narain and others v. Union of India and another, (1998) 1 SCC 226 , Union of India and others v. Sushil Kumar Modi and others, 1996 (6) SCC 500 and Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and others, (2010) 2 SCC 200 . 45. The power to order/direct ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo’ investigation falls in the domain of higher Courts, that too in exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct ‘further investigation’, or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused. 46. Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct ‘further investigation’, or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused. 46. The Code does not contain any provision which deals with the Court competent to direct ‘fresh investigation’, the situation in which such investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the manner in which the report so obtained shall be dealt with. The superior Courts can direct conduct of a ‘fresh’/’’de novo’ investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to be part of the record. Once it is part of the record, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from the record of the case. In other words, but for a specific order by the superior Court, the reports, whether a primary report or a report upon ‘further investigation’ or a report upon ‘fresh investigation’, shall have to be construed and read conjointly. Where there is a specific order made by the Court for reasons like the investigation being entirely unfair, tainted, undesirable or being based upon no truth, the Court would have to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand cancelled and will not form part of the record for consideration by the Court of competent jurisdiction. XXXXXX Answer to Question No. 2 54. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a ‘fresh’, ‘de novo’ or ‘re-investigation’ in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is only upon the orders of the higher Courts empowered to pass such orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher Courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the Court of the learned magistrate.” 13. Perusal of the above extracted portion indicates that the ‘initial investigation’ is one which the empowered police officer conducts in furtherance to registration of an F.I.R. 14. Perusal of the above extracted portion indicates that the ‘initial investigation’ is one which the empowered police officer conducts in furtherance to registration of an F.I.R. 14. ‘Further Investigation’ is provided under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. A very wide power is vested in the investigating agency to conduct further investigation, after it has filed the report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. In the course of ‘further investigation’, the investigation obtains further oral or documentary evidence. It is in continuation of the previous investigation and therefore, is understood and described as ‘further investigation’. The scope of such investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. The purpose of ‘further investigation’ is to bring true facts before the Courts even if they are discovered at a stage subsequent to primary investigation. The report furnished after further investigation is generally described or referred to as ‘supplementary report’. A significant feature of ‘further investigation’ is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation, conducted by the investigating agency. ‘Further investigation’ is kind of continuation of the previous investigation. ‘Further investigation’ therefore is required to be understood in complete contradistinction to a ‘reinvestigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation. 15. However, in case of a ‘fresh investigation’, ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo investigation’, there has to be a definite order of the Court. The order of the Court must unambiguously state as to whether the previous investigation, for reasons to be recorded as incapable of being acted upon. 16. It has specifically been held in para 23 of the above extracted portion of the judgement that neither investigating agency nor the magistrate has any power to order or conduct ‘fresh investigation’. 17. This is primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code insomuch as the Code (Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.) only provides for ‘further investigation’. It has been specifically provided that cases where directions for ‘fresh investigation’ can be issued are few and far between. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the investigation is ex facie unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the Courts would set aside such investigation and direct ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation and, if necessary, even by another independent agency. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the investigation is ex facie unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the Courts would set aside such investigation and direct ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation and, if necessary, even by another independent agency. This power has to be exercised sparingly. The principle of rarest of rare cases would apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the investigation is such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters to the extent of quashing an investigation and directing a ‘fresh investigation’. 18. On perusal of contents of paragraph 54 (which draws the conclusion) of the judgement rendered in Vinay Tyagi’s case (supra), it becomes clearly evident that the investigating agency is not empowered to order ‘fresh’, ‘de novo’ or ‘re-investigation’ in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. Only higher Courts are empowered to pass such orders. 19. Perusal of the bare provision (Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.), extracted above, also indicates that only ‘further investigation’ may be ordered by the investigating agency or the Magistrate. Under the circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that respondent No. 2 (Superintendent of Police, Bahriach) had no jurisdiction to order ‘re-investigation’ in the matter. 20. There is another dimension to this case. As is evident on perusal of order dated 26.5.2016, the crime was registered on 2.8.2013 and the investigation was concluded by way of filing charge-sheet in Court, on 18.11.2013. The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 19.2.2014. Thereafter, although the accused were required to appear, however, they did not appear. Non bailable warrants had been issued repeatedly to procure presence of the accused. In the normal course, Non bailable warrants could not be executed therefore Superintendent of Police, Bahriach was asked to do the needful. 21. Rather than executing non bailable warrant, impugned order, has been passed. It appears to be an attempt to interfere in the judicial process of the Court, at the instance of the accused. The order, therefore, in the least is arbitrary and injudicious. 22. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that possibly ‘re-investigation’ has been ordered on the application of Smt. Gurmeet Kaur, one of the accused. It appears to be an attempt to interfere in the judicial process of the Court, at the instance of the accused. The order, therefore, in the least is arbitrary and injudicious. 22. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that possibly ‘re-investigation’ has been ordered on the application of Smt. Gurmeet Kaur, one of the accused. Surprisingly, order dated 15.1.2016(impugned order) does not disclose any reason for ordering ‘re-investigation’. The order neither refers to the contents of investigation file nor reasons considered by respondent No. 2 for ordering ‘re-investigation’. 23. Even ‘further investigation’ is required to be ordered only if the senior police functionaries find that a particular witness has not been examined ; or particular piece of evidence has not been taken into account and such evidence has been discovered after, which would be necessary for fair and effective investigation. In the case in hand, no such reason has been recorded in the impugned order. Under the circumstances, the impugned order also suffers from the vice of not assigning any reason for ordering Re investigation, after investigation had been concluded. 24. In cases such as the present one, even the administration of justice is adversely affected insomuch so cognizance of offence has been taken. The Court is proceeding with the case. The entire process of Court proceedings is frustrated by virtue of order of ‘re-investigation’. 25. We are of the considered opinion that in such circumstances, even the process of the Court has been abused by virtue of passing order for ‘re-investigation’; after charge-sheet had been filed and cognizance of the offence had been taken. 26. In view of the above, this petition is allowed. Impugned order Annexure No. 1 dated 15.1.2016 is hereby quashed. 27. Let a copy of this order be sent to Superintendent of Police, Bahriach. 28. Copy of this order be also sent to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahriach so that further proceedings can go on. 29. In case the charge-sheet/investigation file has been handed over to the Crime Branch, the same be returned to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich, within four weeks from today so that judicial proceedings in the Court may go on. 30. Shri Faisal Ahmad Khan, learned A.G.A. appearing for respondent State shall ensure compliance of this order. 31. 29. In case the charge-sheet/investigation file has been handed over to the Crime Branch, the same be returned to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich, within four weeks from today so that judicial proceedings in the Court may go on. 30. Shri Faisal Ahmad Khan, learned A.G.A. appearing for respondent State shall ensure compliance of this order. 31. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Home as also Director General of Police, U.P., Lucknow who are required to take notice of the kind of order being passed without jurisdiction, by the officers under their superintending control.