JUDGMENT : These writ appeals are preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 2nd of March, 2016 in W.P. No. 58103/2015 dismissing the writ petition preferred by the appellant as not maintainable and consequently dismissing five interlocutory applications which were listed before him on that day. 2. The appellant is presently the incumbent Upa-Lokayukta in the State of Karnataka. His case is after a span of over 20 years of law practice, he was appointed as a Judge of the Karnataka High Court in the year 2006. He was appointed as Upa-Lokayukta in the year 2013 under the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’) and he continues to hold the said office since then. 3. It is his further case that a notice of motion signed by 78 members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly has been given to the Hon’ble Speaker for his removal as Upa-Lokayukta on 27.11.2015. The information of the said notice of motion was not officially conveyed to him. The Registrar of Karnataka Lokayukta sent a communication dated 30.11.2015 to the 1st respondent-the Secretary, Karnataka Legislative Assembly to know about the notice of motion dated 27.11.2015 which was widely published. The Registrar of Karnataka Lokayukta received the motion communication dated 30.11.2015 on 4.12.2015. The said communication informs that “a motion for removal of Justice Subhash B. Adi, Hon’ble Upa-Lokayukta was moved in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly by Shri Tanvir Sait, Hon’ble Member of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly on 27.11.2015”. Thereafter, it proceeds to draw attention to Sub-section (14) of Section 6 of the Act which provides that when such a motion is moved before the House or the Houses of the State Legislature for his removal, the Upa-Lokayukta is precluded from discharging his duties during the pendency of the motion for his removal before the House or Houses of the State Legislature. It is submitted that contrary to what has been stated in the aforesaid communication at Annexure-A, records disclose that on 27.11.2015 the Hon’ble Member of the Legislative Assembly had given the notice of motion to the Speaker and on the same day, the Speaker has admitted the notice of motion. Even after such admission, the 1st respondent has been corresponding with many persons and has been collecting/gathering information and material against the appellant. Even after such admission, the 1st respondent has been corresponding with many persons and has been collecting/gathering information and material against the appellant. In this regard, the correspondence between the respondents and the Registrar of Lokayukta are collectively produced as Annexure-C. Therefore, the appellant preferred writ petition seeking quashing of the communication dated 3.12.2015 issued by the 1st respondent vide Annexure-A and also sought a declaration that the respondents are not empowered to seek any information from any source after the notice of motion is admitted. He also sought for an interim order in the like terms. This writ petition came to be filed on 17.12.2015. 4. The said writ petition came up for consideration in Preliminary Hearing before the learned Single Judge on 18.12.2015. On 18.12.2015, after hearing the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Advocate General for the State, the submission of the learned Advocate General on the instructions of the Secretary of the Speaker to the effect that on examination of Annexure-A, which is impugned in the writ petition would not indicate that it precludes Upa-Lokayukta from discharging the duties as at present. The said submission was recorded and time was granted to file statement of objections. 5. The respondent filed a statement of objections on 31.12.2015. In fact, what they filed according to them was a preliminary objections and they reserved the liberty to file a detailed statement of objections. It is submitted that as can be noticed from the reading of the prayers and the averments in support thereof, it would indicate that the petitioner has moved the Writ Petition, on an assumption that ‘the notice of motion’ given under sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act seeking his removal has been “admitted” by the Hon’ble Speaker as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. Further at paragraph 10 it would indicate that the petitioner, for reasons best known, has assumed that ‘the notice of motion’ moved by the members of the Legislative Assembly; seeking removal of the petitioner as Upalokayuktha came to be admitted by the Hon’ble Speaker on 27.11.2015. Based on such assumption, averments are made in the Writ Petition to the effect that, the Hon’ble Speaker, despite having admitted the motion on 27.11.2015 is thereafter proceeding to collect and gather information and materials against the Writ Petitioner. 6. Based on such assumption, averments are made in the Writ Petition to the effect that, the Hon’ble Speaker, despite having admitted the motion on 27.11.2015 is thereafter proceeding to collect and gather information and materials against the Writ Petitioner. 6. A reading of the impugned communication does not seek to convey or mentions at any place of any such motion moved in the House as having been admitted and kept pending. In fact, when the Writ Petition was listed before this Court for preliminary hearing on 18.12.2015 itself, it was pointed out and a statement was made to this Court on instructions that plain reading of the impugned communication by itself does not seek to convey of the petitioner being precluded from discharge of his duties. The impugned communication at Annexure-A only states that the motion was signed and moved by 78 members of the Assembly on 27.11.2015. The petitioner has conveniently assumed that the motion was admitted on 27.11.2015 without any basis, when the records disclose to the contrary. Their correspondence dated 1.12.2015 produced by the petitioner himself clearly mentions notice of motion is given to the Hon’ble Speaker and Hon’ble Speaker is examining the motion in terms of the provisions of the Act and seeks for certain documents. Every other correspondence produced as Annexure-C series only mentions of notice of motion and process of consideration by the Speaker and it is not known as to on what basis the petitioner assumes the motion to have been admitted and kept pending in the House. 7. The Hon’ble Speaker is now seized of the motion for removal of the Upalokayuktha, who is in the process of consideration of the said motion in terms of Section 6(3) and (4) of the Act. Then they have referred to the notice of motion moved for removal of Lokayukta and the joint meetings held by the Speaker and Chairman of the Legislative Council. Subsequently, the Hon’ble Lokayukta has tendered resignation which is accepted by the Government and thus motion moved against him has become infructuous. 8. In so far as the motion for removal of Upalokayukta is concerned was formally moved on the floor of the House on 27.11.2015 as per listed agenda. The Hon’ble Speaker having acknowledged the motion on the floor of the House has recorded it and the process in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 6 are underway. 9. 8. In so far as the motion for removal of Upalokayukta is concerned was formally moved on the floor of the House on 27.11.2015 as per listed agenda. The Hon’ble Speaker having acknowledged the motion on the floor of the House has recorded it and the process in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 6 are underway. 9. The rules of procedure and conduct of business in the Karnataka Legislative Assembly contemplates any motion that is sought to be moved or required to be put in the agenda and moved on the Floor of the House. Therefore, even though the notice of motion signed by the requisite number were handed over to the Speaker and acknowledged as received on 23.11.2015, it was formally placed on the floor of the House as an agenda item and received by the Speaker on 27.11.2015 also keeping in view the mandates of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. The matter thus being under consideration in terms of the provisions of sub-clause (3) and (4) of Section 6, it is impermissible for the petitioner to seek intervention of this Court on such assumptions as averred in the Writ Petition. 10. The Hon’ble Speaker has initiated process of consultation and consideration of relevant materials to examine the prima facie case contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. The Writ Petition is filed with the intention of preventing the Speaker from discharging his functions contemplated under Section 6 of the Act and, therefore, is indicative of lack of bona fides. Therefore, they sought for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 11. After filing of the said preliminary objections, the petitioner filed a rejoinder. It is pointed in the rejoinder that the function of the Hon’ble Speaker in receiving the notice and either admitting it or rejecting it is not part of the function on the floor of the House. The Hon’ble Speaker acts as a statutory authority and his actions are justiciable in the given circumstances. The fact of the notice of motion being admitted by the Hon’ble Speaker on 27.11.2015 was printed in the proceedings of the said day and uploaded in the website of the Legislative Assembly. In view of the print across every sheet “uncorrected, not for publication” the same was not produced along with the Writ Petition. The fact of the notice of motion being admitted by the Hon’ble Speaker on 27.11.2015 was printed in the proceedings of the said day and uploaded in the website of the Legislative Assembly. In view of the print across every sheet “uncorrected, not for publication” the same was not produced along with the Writ Petition. The proceedings of the Assembly on 27.11.2015 was widely published in press and electronic media on 28.11.2015. The electronic media has telecast the news item regarding the proceedings of the House wherein the Hon’ble Speaker has announced that he has admitted the motion. For the first time, the respondents took a stand in public in or about 21.12.2015 that the notice of motion is not admitted. The press report contains earlier and later versions of the proceedings dated 27.11.2015 both of which purport to be the official versions. 12. The stand of the respondent that the notice of motion has not been admitted by the Hon’ble Speaker is an after thought, evidently put forward to get over the legal contention urged in the Writ Petition to the effect that after admitting the motion, the Hon’ble Speaker has no power or right to gather any further material. If the proceedings recorded on 27.11.2015 is modified subsequently, after it is uploaded in the website and after copies are issued to some of the applicants it raises a serious issue. The entire procedure of the receipt of the notice under Section 6(2) followed by the respondents is not in consonance with the amended scheme of Section 6 of the Act. The same is vitiated. The law does not provide that the notice is to be moved in the House and the members in the House could discuss the same. It is the specific and reliable information to the petitioner in the Annexure to the notice submitted on 23.11.2015 only two allegations were made, with regard to the case of Dr. Shylaja Patil and that of Gangadharaswamy. In view of the above and the records and the circumstances give raise to a reasonable inference that allegations 3 to 5 were not included in the notice of originally given. 13. After filing of the rejoinder, the petitioner filed I.A. 1/2016 for amendment of the Writ Petition setting out certain additional facts and also seeking additional prayer and interim prayer. 13. After filing of the rejoinder, the petitioner filed I.A. 1/2016 for amendment of the Writ Petition setting out certain additional facts and also seeking additional prayer and interim prayer. Additional prayer sought for is for a declaration that the entire procedure adopted in pursuance of the notice dated 20.11.2015 at Annexure-R2 is null, void and quash the same. He also sought for an interim prayer of stay of all further proceedings in pursuance of the notice dated 20.11.2015. In support of the said prayers he has set out the facts. 14. The sum and substance of the said facts pleaded is that the notice dated 20.11.2015 became a subject matter of discussion on the floor of the House between the members of the Ruling party and the opposition. Certain disparaging statement was made by one of the members. One of the Senior Ministers made an inappropriate statement touching upon the notice. The discussion was again done on 25.11.2015 on the floor of the House. The subject of removal of Upalokayuktha was in the agenda of the Assembly on 27.11.2015. The said procedure is not provided for in the scheme of amended Section 6 of the Act. Further again a member of the Assembly sought the permission of the Speaker to move the proposal for removal of the petitioner again and the Speaker permitted the same and has recorded that he has examined the contents of the proposal, consulted the Registrar, Lokayuktha, the enquiry officer and the learned Advocate General and he proposes to secure some information from the DPAR and that he would take action according to the Act. He has referred to the reporting of these proceedings in the press. Further he contends that allegations on 5 counts are contained in Annexure to the complaint and the same is not signed by the requisite number of members of the Assembly but it is signed by only one member. Since all the allegations are contained in Annexures only and the same is signed by only one member, the notice of motion does not satisfy the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act. Hence, the Hon’ble Speaker could not have entertained or admitted the same. There is reason to believe that the novel method of attaching an Annexure containing allegations is admitted to facilitate alterations/additions without the knowledge of the members who have signed the notice. Hence, the Hon’ble Speaker could not have entertained or admitted the same. There is reason to believe that the novel method of attaching an Annexure containing allegations is admitted to facilitate alterations/additions without the knowledge of the members who have signed the notice. Mainly the allegation against the petitioner is that he has overstepped his jurisdiction in dealing with certain issues stated therein. In this regard, proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act provides that such an action shall not be open the question on the said ground. The decision of the Hon’ble Speaker on 27.11.2015 in admitting the notice of motion is vitiated on account of the non-application of mind with regard to the form in which it was given, with regard to its contents and also with regard to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act as amended. The decision of the Hon’ble Speaker admitting the notice of motion as recorded in the proceedings is taken after allowing a debate in the House on 23rd and 25th November 2015 which is illegal and the decision of the Hon’ble Speaker having been influenced by such debate, the said order is vitiated. In view of the same, the procedure adopted by is per se illegal and the entire action is vitiated. 15. Another application – I.A.2/2016 was also filed seeking an interim direction. In the said application it is stated that, along with the rejoinder he has produced certain press reports which discloses that the proceedings recorded in the Assembly on 27.11.2015 appear to have modified subsequently. In one of the press reports dated 12.1.2016 it is reported that the Speaker has power to modify the recording of the proceedings of the House. Whereas in another report it is reported that Speaker has said that the original version is not authenticated one. There is a controversy as to any application was submitted to the first respondent for issuance of the copies of the proceedings on 27.11.2015. In this regard it is just and necessary that this Court should direct the first respondent to file an affidavit with the particulars of the applications received for grant of the proceedings dated 27.11.2015 and the fact of issuing the same along with the original records pertaining to the same. 16. Again one more application I.A.3/2016 is filed for interim direction. 16. Again one more application I.A.3/2016 is filed for interim direction. In this application, the permission was sought to the respondents to produce the entire file pertaining to Annexure-R2 dated 20.11.2015 along with its enclosures and the proceedings emanating there from till date, all the correspondence emanating from the office of the first respondent in furtherance of Annexure-R2 till date, all the correspondence emanating from the office of the second respondent to various persons in furtherance of the directions, instructions and the correspondence made by the first respondent in respect of Annexure-R2 dated 20.11.2015 till date, to produce the file containing the entire proceedings/office notes maintained in respect of Annexure-R2 till date, the original inward ledger maintained by the first respondent to record the receipt of representations, letters, etc., pertaining to petitioner till date and the proceedings of the Hon’ble Speaker modifying the recording of the proceedings on 27.11.2015 in respect of Annexure-R2 having been recorded as admitted. 17. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that on 05.02.2016 he has filed a transcript of the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, which took place on 27.11.2015 with regard to the motion moved by Mr. Tanveer Sait for removal of the Karnataka Upalokayuktha, which shows that the Speaker admitted the motion against the petitioner on 27.11.2015 itself. 18. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General submitted the transcript of the proceedings dated 27.11.2015, which does not show that the motion was admitted on that day. In the rejoinder, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the information placed on the website on 27.11.2015 has been tampered with. Although initially, the website reflected the fact that the Speaker had admitted the motion, subsequently, after tampering the sentence quoted above had been inserted. 19. In view of the said conflicting submissions made and the reliance was placed on transcriptions, which are different, this Court felt that it is essential that any cloud cast on the functioning of the Secretariat of the Legislative Assembly and the authenticity of the document submitted by the Advocate General, have to be cleared before this Court. Therefore, time was given to the learned Advocate General to produce the certificate issued by the server as well as to file the objections to the interlocutary application seeking a direction from this Court that the records should be produced by the respondents. 20. Therefore, time was given to the learned Advocate General to produce the certificate issued by the server as well as to file the objections to the interlocutary application seeking a direction from this Court that the records should be produced by the respondents. 20. Thereafter, I.A.4/16 is filed for impleading by appellant. In the meanwhile, on 05.02.2016, a memo was filed by the respondents stating that the impugned communication dated 03.12.2015 has been withdrawn. In the said application, after referring to the proceedings before the Court till such time, it was stated that it is being reported in the media that the Hon’ble Speaker has forwarded the notice of motion dated 20.11.2015 with the Hon’ble Chief Justice for further action as per the scheme of Section 6 of the Act. The said action if it is true, it runs counter to the submission made by the learned Advocate General before this Court that the further proceedings are held up due to the pendency of this petition. The Hon’ble Speaker ought not to have referred the matter to the Hon’ble Chief Justice since the issue as to “whether the proceedings of the Hon’ble Speaker are vitiated in view of the conflicting versions of the proceedings?” are placed before this Court. Further, in the order dated 05.02.2016, this Court was pleased to raise a specific issue for adjudication and call upon the respondents to produce the necessary certificate from the server when the learned Advocate General has taken time to produce the same. When the matter stood thus, the Hon’ble Speaker has proceeded to precipitate the matter without apprising this Court. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant sought for stay of all further proceedings in pursuance to the notice of motion dated 20.11.2015. This application was filed on 29.02.2016. 21. On 01.03.2016, the respondent No.1 filed additional statement of objections. In the said additional statement of objections, what is contained in paragraphs 1 to 15 is a repetition of the contents of the preliminary objections. Then they have referred to the memo filed on 05.02.2016 withdrawing the communication dated 03.12.2015. Then there is a reference to Section 6 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, Article 124 of the Constitution of India and Judges’ (Enquiry) Act, 1968 and various provisions. Then they have tried to explain what transpired on 27.11.2015. Then they have referred to the memo filed on 05.02.2016 withdrawing the communication dated 03.12.2015. Then there is a reference to Section 6 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, Article 124 of the Constitution of India and Judges’ (Enquiry) Act, 1968 and various provisions. Then they have tried to explain what transpired on 27.11.2015. It is said that there were commotions and chaotic situation for a period of one week preceding the closure on account of certain protests by the Members of the opposition party, who were expressing the grievances against the conduct of a particular Minister and demanding his resignation. The Members of the opposition had prevented conduct of any useful business, occupying the well of the House and shouting slogans. Despite repeated requests by the Speaker, there was no orderly conduct of the business on account of which, most of the proceedings that were recorded were incoherent. It is, under these circumstances, the motion having been moved in terms of the agenda, while the Speaker had announced of having received the notice of motion and considering the notice of motion in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (3) and (4) of Section 6. It appears, some of the reporters manually noting the proceedings had recorded the proceedings indicating the motion to have been admitted while others had recorded in terms of the announcement made by the Speaker. The main Server of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly website is located at the National Informatics Centre premises. The uploading process of the Assembly Debates is done through Client system at the Computer Wing of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly Secretariat. The day to day debates of the Assembly will be manually noted by the Reporters (Stenographers) typed and then uploaded in the website for the immediate use of the Press Members/Officers/General Public and other dignitaries. Whenever changes/corrections are indicated by the respective members/Hon’ble Speaker, such changes will be incorporated in the debates from time to time. Hence, the debates always bear the superscription “UNCORRECTED COPY”. The Editing Branch of the Secretariat will edit the debates, consolidate all the written version of answers/statements/annexure and after the entire process of editing and consolidation is over, send it to the Government Press for printing and after the debates are printed it will become corrected version. Until this process is over, the debates are treated as “Uncorrected/Un-edited version” only. The Editing Branch of the Secretariat will edit the debates, consolidate all the written version of answers/statements/annexure and after the entire process of editing and consolidation is over, send it to the Government Press for printing and after the debates are printed it will become corrected version. Until this process is over, the debates are treated as “Uncorrected/Un-edited version” only. This has been the procedure and convention followed in Parliament and all the State Legislatures. As per this procedure, the Debates dated 27.11.2015 of the assembly were uploaded in the website of the Assembly on 02.12.2015 at 4.18 p.m. On the relevant day i.e., on 27.11.2015, the house was not in order, there was pandemonium, chaos and interruptions on the floor of the House on account of the ‘Dharna’ staged before the Hon’ble Speaker while perusing the debates noting the wrong recording of debates revising certain portions and directed uploading of revised debates. Accordingly, as per the directions of the Hon’ble Speaker revised debates dated 27.11.2015 were uploaded in the Website on 21.12.2015 at 4.53 p.m. Any debates that are existing in the website are only incorrect/un-edited version. The debates of the assembly will be construed as “Un-edited and Uncorrected only” till the editing process is completed and volumes are printed in the Government Press. Hence, the Debates that are uploaded in the website always bear the superscription in water mark “Un-corrected/un-edited”. Therefore, the Debates of the Assembly dated 27.11.2015 bear the superscription “Uncorrected/unedited”. This has been the procedure and convention followed in both the Houses of the Parliament and all the State Legislatures in India. Till editing process of Debates is completed and they are printed, the debates will be construed as Un-edited/Un-corrected. 22. The 1st respondent had filed the statement of objections on the basis of the notings in the file and proceedings, which were uploaded in the website of the assembly on 21.12.2015 wherein it was noticed that the information available is that the motion for removal of the petitioner from the post of Upa Lokayuktha was yet to be admitted. This Court, by its order dated 05.02.2016 having directed this respondent to submit a certificate issued by the Server to show that he has particulars of the documents of the transcript, which was uploaded on 27.11.2015, the 1st respondent has not verified the whole aspect of the matter i.e., what has transpired after 27.11.2015. This Court, by its order dated 05.02.2016 having directed this respondent to submit a certificate issued by the Server to show that he has particulars of the documents of the transcript, which was uploaded on 27.11.2015, the 1st respondent has not verified the whole aspect of the matter i.e., what has transpired after 27.11.2015. On the basis of the information available in the website uploaded on 27.11.2015, the 1st respondent had filed the statement of objections earlier. After verification, now he has come to know that on 02.12.2015 at 4.18 p.m., the proceedings of 27.11.2015 was uploaded where it was recorded that the motion of removal of the petitioner was admitted. With regard to uploading of the proceedings dated 27.11.2015, on 02.12.2015 and 21.12.2015, the 1st respondent had a discussion with the Speaker and it was noticed that on the relevant date i.e., 27.11.2015, the house was not in order. There was pandemonium, chaos, interruptions on the floor of the House on account of the ‘Dharna’ staged by the members of the house. Under such circumstances, it was noticed that the proceedings dated 27.11.2015 were wrongly recorded and the Hon’ble Speaker revised certain portions and directed to file a revised debate. Thereafter, on 21.12.2015 at 4.53 p.m., the revised debates of the proceedings of 27.11.2015 were uploaded. Therefore, they pleaded that it is a bonafide mistake and sought permission of the Court to withdraw the said part of the statement of objections. Then they have referred to the rules framed by the Assembly under Article 208 of the Constitution of India. They also referred to the procedure prescribed under the Act for removal of Upalokayuktha. Then they referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of SAROJINI RAMASWAMY VS. UNION OF INDIA reported in (1992) 4 SCC 506 and extracted paras 95, 96, 97 and 98 and contended that if according to the petitioner, motion is moved in the House and the proceedings were uploaded on 02.12.2015, as “motion was admitted” and on 21.12.2015 it was re-uploaded as “action will be taken in accordance with the law”, then, the proceedings of the House are immune from judicial scrutiny as provided under Article 212 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the writ petition is also not maintainable. “It was specifically contended that unless and until such an order is passed under the signature of the Speaker/Chairman, either admitting the motion or refusing to admit the motion, it cannot be said that the motion to remove Lokayuktha or Upalokayuktha either as admitted or not admitted.” 23. Further, they stated that the Speaker in accordance with the statutory powers vested in him, now, after the process, as contemplated under Section 6(3) and 6(4) has admitted the Motion, has kept the motion pending by his proceedings dated 26.02.2016 and has referred the matter to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka for the purpose of making investigation into the grounds on which the removal is prayed for. On the Speaker taking actions in terms of Section 6(3) and 6(4), the provisions of Section 6(14) are attracted and the petitioner is now precluded from discharging the functions of Upalokayuktha. Thus, the writ petitions being misconceived and not maintainable nor justiciable is liable to be dismissed. 24. The 1st respondent has also filed statement of objections to all the I.As. 25. When the case was listed before the learned Single Judge for consideration of the five interlocutary applications, the learned Advocate General appearing for the State raised the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition itself before the Court. Therefore, before dealing with the interlocutary applications, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge proceeded to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the Advocate General. 26. The contention of the learned Advocate General was once a proceeding is initiated for removal of the Upalokayuktha under the Act, the power of judicial review is no longer available. The petitioner could challenge and invoke the writ jurisdiction only after an order of removal has been passed by His Excellency, the Governor of Karnataka. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sarojini Ramaswamy’s case referred to supra. 27. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SUB-COMMITTEE OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1992 SC 320 and contended that the proceedings for removal of a Judge/Upalokayuktha can be divided into two parts. 27. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SUB-COMMITTEE OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1992 SC 320 and contended that the proceedings for removal of a Judge/Upalokayuktha can be divided into two parts. The first part deals with the notice of motion submitted by the Legislature and existends to the point of reference made by the Speaker to the Hon’ble Chief Justice. The second part deals with the motion for address to be made to the Governor. The first part is statutory in nature, the second part is a legislative process. The first part is amenable to judicial review and the second part is beyond the scope of judicial review and therefore, he submitted that the writ petition is maintainable and that the petitioner has a right to challenge even the reference made by the Speaker to the Hon’ble Chief Justice. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and taking note of the aforesaid two constitutional Bench judgments of the Apex Court, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the right to invoke power of judicial review would be available only to the concerned Judge, that too, after the order of removal has been passed. Once a notice of motion is moved and the matter has been referred by the Speaker to the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the petitioner would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction until the order of his removal has been passed. Therefore, in his opinion, the writ petition was clearly not maintainable as during the process, the Court does not have the power of judicial review as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarojini Ramaswamy. Accordingly, he dismissed the writ petition without going into the merits of the pending inter locutary applications. 28. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner is before this Court in this appeal. 29. Sri B.V. Acharya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the notice of motion under the scheme of the Act in particularly, Section 6 of the Act could be admitted only once. In view of the additional statement of objections filed in this case, it is now admitted that admission of motion on 27.11.2015 is a mistake and therefore, it was admitted only on 26.2.2016. In view of the additional statement of objections filed in this case, it is now admitted that admission of motion on 27.11.2015 is a mistake and therefore, it was admitted only on 26.2.2016. The admission of motion on 27.11.2015 was in the assembly whereas the admission of the motion on 26.2.2016 was outside the assembly and therefore, the admission of motion is illegal on the face of it and is liable to be quashed. Now from the material on record, it is clear that the correction to the proceedings of the assembly on 27.11.2015 was made on 21.12.2015, but the writ petition was filed on 17.12.2015. In the statement of objections filed, it is specifically contended that the notice of motion is not admitted. In fact, the proceedings of the House dated 27.11.2015 was uploaded on 2.12.2015 and objections was filed after the same was corrected on 21.12.2015, the fact which was not pleaded at all. In the entire scheme of the Act, the Speaker is not vested with the power to review his earlier order and therefore, the order correcting the proceedings of 27.11.2015 is void ab initio, more particularly when the Court was seized of the matter. Even assuming that some mistakes have crept in, that could not have been corrected without prior permission of the Court. The correction without permission and passing an order on 26.12.2015 amounts to interfering with the administration of justice by this Court in the very same proceedings. In fact, in the statement of objections filed on 31.12.2015, there is no mention about this correction. It is only on 1.3.2016 after the appellant filed an application for amendment of pleadings, calling for documents and Court also passed an order taking serious note of the illegality, for the first time, the mistake was admitted and a request was made to permit them to withdraw the said mistake and place on record the correct stand of the respondents. The learned Single Judge though took serious note of these irregularities as is clear from its order dated 5.2.2016 but did not go into same and dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground that it is not maintainable. Therefore, he submits that the impugned order is not sustainable. 30. The learned Single Judge though took serious note of these irregularities as is clear from its order dated 5.2.2016 but did not go into same and dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground that it is not maintainable. Therefore, he submits that the impugned order is not sustainable. 30. Relying on the report of the Sub-Committee of Judiciary Accountability in Sub-Committee of Judiciary Accountability’s case, he submitted that making the allegations, initiation of proceedings, investigation and the proof of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge are governed entirely by a statute which would be open to judicial review as the parliamentary process commences only after a finding is recorded that the alleged misbehavior or incapacity is proved in the enquiry and conducted in accordance with law and therefore, contends that as what is challenged in this proceeding is the receipt of the notice of motion of a Speaker and passing an order admitting the said motion and then referring the matter to the Chief Justice is amenable to the judicial review. 31. Once the judicial review is maintainable, the fact set out above, clearly demonstrates that the action of the Speaker is perse illegal, void and is liable to be quashed. Reliance by the learned Single Judge on the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court is erroneous because in the case of Sarojini Ramaswami Vs. Union of India reported in (1992) 4 SCC 506 , the Constitution Bench reiterated the law laid down in the Sub-Committee of the Judicial Accountability and in that case, it was held that the judicial review could not be exercised to secure a copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee to enable the Judge to challenge such report as under the Scheme after the Committee submits its report to the Speaker for consideration by the Parliament, not only he would be supplied by a copy of the report but also he will be heard and thus the principles of natural justice would be complied with. Again in the event of Parliament accepting the report and passing an order of impeachment, he has a right to challenge the same before the Supreme Court. That judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case and the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in following that subsequent judgment and in holding that this writ petition is not maintainable. 32. That judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case and the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in following that subsequent judgment and in holding that this writ petition is not maintainable. 32. Secondly, he contended that on merits also, when we are looking into the imputations made against the Upa-Lokayukta, even if the entire allegations are said to be correct, they do not constitute mis-behaviour on his part. Assuming that those allegations are true, it amounts to irregularity in discharging the functions by the Upa-Lokayukta and those irregularities do not constitute misbehaviour so as to attract Section 6 of the Act resulting in removal of Lokayukta. Though the scope of judicial review in these matters is very much limited, the case on hand calls for such judicial interference as in public interest in protecting institution of Lokayukta which is under attack and if on these flimsy grounds, Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are made to face such enquiries, no person with reputation and character would come forward to shoulder the said responsibilities and therefore, he submitted that a case of interference is made out at this stage. 33. Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik, the learned Advocate General contended as is clear from the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sarojini Ramaswami’s case, the judicial review of the impeachment proceedings though they are statutory in nature is permissible only if an order for removal of the Upalokayukta is made by the Governor of the State. Whatever may be the illegality at the initial stages, the provision for judicial review at the end of the process permits its correction without interdicting the process in between and, therefore, in the aforesaid Sarojini Ramaswami’s case the Apex Court declined to interfere with the statutory process though judicial review is permissible by categorically declaring the law that statutory part of the process, by which a finding of guilty is made by the enquiry committee subject to judicial review as held in Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability’s case but in the manner indicated herein, i.e. only in the event of an order of removal being made and then at the instance of the aggrieved Judge alone and, therefore, he submits the learned single Judge was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition as premature and not maintainable. In so far as the illegalities pointed out by the appellant is concerned, that is a matter no doubt calls for judicial review after the order of removal is made and, therefore, this Court need not go into the legality of the said proceedings at this stage and, therefore, he submitted no case for interference is made out. 34. In the light of the aforesaid facts and the rival contentions, the points that arise for our consideration in these appeals are as under :- i) Whether judicial review is permissible at the initial stage of giving notice of motion, admitting the said motion and keeping the motion pending referring the matter to the Chief Justice for investigation, in the light of the two Constitutional judgments of the Apex Court? ii) If a judicial review is permissible, then whether any case for interference is made out in the facts of this case? Point No. (i) 35. Article 124 of the Constitution of India provides for establishment and constitution of Supreme Court. Sub-Article (4) provides for the removal of the Judge of the Supreme Court on the ground of proved misconduct or incapacity. Sub-Article (5) provides that the Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4). It is in pursuance of the power conferred on the Parliament by this Constitutional provision, the Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Section 3 of the said Act provides for investigation into misbehaviour or incapacity of Judge by Committee. Section 4 speaks about the report of the Committee. Section 5 speaks about the powers of the Committee and Section 6 deals with consideration of report and procedure for presentation of an address for removal of the Judge. Article 121 of the Constitution provides for restriction on discussion in Parliament about the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court. Article 122 places an embargo on the Courts not to enquire into the proceedings of the Parliament. Article 118 of the Constitution empowers each House of the Parliament to make Rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business. 36. These provisions fell for the consideration in the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability. Article 118 of the Constitution empowers each House of the Parliament to make Rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business. 36. These provisions fell for the consideration in the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability. In order to appreciate the law declared by the Apex Court in the said case, it is necessary to take note of the factual background. In the said case notice was given by 108 Members of the Ninth Lok Sabha, the term of which came to an end upon its dissolution, of a motion being presenting an address to the President for the removal of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami of the Supreme Court. On 12.3.1991, the motion was admitted by the then Speaker of the Lok Sabha who also proceeded to constitute a Committee. Soon after that decision of the Supreme Court to admit the motion and constitute a Committee to investigate the charges was made, the term of the 9th Lok Sabha came to premature end upon its dissolution. 37. The occasion for such controversy as is raised in the said proceedings is the refusal of the Union Government to act in aid of the decision of the Speaker and to decline to notify that the services of the two sitting Judges on the Committee would be treated as "actual-service" within the meaning of Para 11(b)(i) of Part D of the II Schedule to the Constitution. It is said that without such a notification the two sitting Judges cannot take time off from their court work. The Union Government sought to justify its stand on its understanding that both the motion given notice of by the 108 Members of the Lok Sabha for presenting an Address to the President for the removal of the Judge concerned as well as the decision of the Speaker of the 9th Lok Sabha to admit the motion and constitute a Committee under the provisions of the Judges Inquiry Act have lapsed with the dissolution of the 9th Lok Sabha. The Union of India contended the effect of dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha is to "pass a sponge across the Parliamentary slate" and all pending motions lapse. The motion for removal, is no exception. The Union of India contended the effect of dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha is to "pass a sponge across the Parliamentary slate" and all pending motions lapse. The motion for removal, is no exception. Therefore, the question for consideration in the said case was, whether the motion for the removal of the judge has lapsed or not is a matter pertaining to the conduct of the business of the House of which the House is the sole and exclusive judge, no aspect of the matter is justiciable before Court. Though the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court formulated several points for consideration, the real controversy which was before the Court was about the consequences of the motion for removal lapsing on account of dissolution of the Lok Sabha. As the said question fell for consideration for the Apex Court for the first time, the Constitution Bench took note of the procedure followed in various democracies and the provisions contained in their Constitutions and keeping in mind the Constitutional provisions of this country and the law enacted by the Parliament under Section 124(5) of the Constitution held as under :- “43. ….. Accordingly, the scheme is that the entire process of removal is in two parts the first parts under clause (5) from initiation to investigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity is covered by an enacted law, Parliament's role being only legislative as in all the laws enacted by it; and the second part only after proof under clause (4) is in Parliament, that process commencing only on proof in accordance with the law enacted under clause (5) Thus the first part is entirely statutory while the second part alone is the parliamentary process”. Again, art para 37 it was held as under :- “37. …….. In this connection, the parliamentary procedure commences only after proof of misbehaviour or incapacity in accordance with the law enacted under clause (5), the machinery for investigation and finding of proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity being statutory, governed entirely by provisions of the law enacted under clause (5). Again at para 39 it was held as under :- “39. In this connection, the parliamentary procedure commences only after proof of misbehaviour or incapacity in accordance with the law enacted under clause (5), the machinery for investigation and finding of proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity being statutory, governed entirely by provisions of the law enacted under clause (5). Again at para 39 it was held as under :- “39. This means that making of the allegation, initiation of the proceedings, investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge are governed entirely by the law enacted by the Parliament under clause (5) and when that stage is reached, the Parliament comes into the picture and the motion for removal of the Judge on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity is moved for presentation of the address to the President in the manner prescribed. The matter not being before the Parliament prior to this stage is also indicated by Article 121 which lifts the bar on discussion in Parliament only upon a motion for presenting an address to the President as provided later in Article 124(4). The bar in Article 121 applies to discussion in Parliament but investigation and proof of misconduct or incapacity cannot exclude such discussion. This indicates that the machinery for investigation and proof must necessarily be outside Parliament and not within it. In other words, proof which involves a discussion of the conduct of the Judge must be by a body which is outside the limitation of Article 121. The word 'proved' also denotes proof in the manner understood in our legal system i.e. as a result of a judicial process. The policy appears to be that the entire stage upto proof of misbehaviour or incapacity, beginning with the initiation of investigation on the allegation being made, is governed by the law enacted under Article 124(5) and in view of the restriction provided in Article 121, that machinery has to be outside the Parliament and not within it. If this be so, it is a clear pointer that the Parliament neither has any role to play till misconduct or incapacity is found proved nor has it any control over the machinery provided in the law enacted under Article 124(5). The Parliament comes in the picture only when a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity has been proved. 38. The Parliament comes in the picture only when a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity has been proved. 38. Thereafter, they proceeded to answer the said question as under :- “55. The constitutional process for removal of a Judge upto the point of admission of the motion, constitution of the Committee and the recording of findings by the Committee are not, strictly, proceedings in the Houses of Parliament. The Speaker is a statutory authority under the Act. Upto that point the matter cannot be said to remain outside the Court's jurisdiction. …. The Speaker while admitting a motion and constituting a Committee to investigate the alleged grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity does not act as part of the House. The House does not come into the picture at this stage.” Therefore it was held that the validity of the law enacted by the Parliament under clause (5) of Article 124 and the stage up to conclusion of the enquiry in accordance with the law being governed entirely by statute would be open to judicial review as the parliamentary process under Article 124(4) commences only after a finding is recorded that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is proved in the inquiry conducted in accordance with the law enacted under clause (5). 39. Further, it was held, whether a notice of motion issued for removal of a Supreme Court Judge lapsed on the dissolution of the Parliament is a matter of interpretation of the Constitutional provision and the Supreme Court is competent to pronounce on the said question. 40. Accordingly, the majority opinion concluded as under:- “….. 70. All that is necessary to do is to declare the correct constitutional position. No specific writ or direction need issue to any authority. Having regard to the nature of the subject matter and the purpose it is ultimately intended to serve all that is necessary is to declare the legal and constitutional position and leave the different organs of the State to consider matters falling within the orbit of their respective jurisdiction and powers.” 41. Having regard to the nature of the subject matter and the purpose it is ultimately intended to serve all that is necessary is to declare the legal and constitutional position and leave the different organs of the State to consider matters falling within the orbit of their respective jurisdiction and powers.” 41. After declaration of the legal and Constitutional position in this behalf on the point in controversy in the above decision, the Union of India took the necessary steps to act in aid of the decision of the Speaker of the Ninth Lok Sabha and the requisite notification was also issued in respect of the two sitting Judges of the Committee as required by Part 11(b)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Committee constituted by the Speaker under the Act then proceeded to inquire into the allegations made against the Judge concerned Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and the Committee completed the Inquiry and also prepared its Report for being submitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as required by Section 4(2) of the Act. 42. At that juncture, the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami sent a letter to the Presiding Officer of the Inquiry Committee, requesting that a copy of the report of the Committee be forwarded to him giving him sufficient time to seek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary, as a result of the findings of the Committee: He also requested them not to submit the report in haste to the Hon’ble Speaker and render infructuous his valuable Constitutional right. However, in terms of the said letter, a copy of the report was not made available to him. In the meanwhile, his wife-Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami filed a Writ Petition seeking a direction to the committee to supply a copy of the report of the Committee to Justice Ramaswami and to withhold forwarding of the said report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha simultaneously to enable Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami to seek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary, against the findings of the Committee in its report. This relief is sought on the basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench, namely Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability. Justice V. Ramaswami to seek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary, against the findings of the Committee in its report. This relief is sought on the basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench, namely Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability. The question which arose for consideration in the said Writ Petition was, whether as a result of the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami is entitled to be supplied a copy of the report of the Committee containing its findings before submission of that report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Act to enable him to challenge the adverse, findings, if any, against him at this stage in a Court of law? The argument canvassed was, judicial review to test the legality of the Committee's findings is available either 'now' before commencement of the parliamentary process on submission of the report to the Speaker under Section 4(2) of the Act 'or never'. Therefore, the question was judicial review “now or never” is correct or the law is that judicial review on permissible grounds is not now but only later in case an order of removal is made by the President under Article 124(1) of the Constitution? 43. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, how the Constitution Bench understood the judgment of the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability is set out in para 96: “96. The view we have taken is in complete accord with the majority opinion in subcommittee on Judicial Accountability that the statutory part of the process of removal of a Judge is subject to judicial review. The question of the stage and the situation in which the remedy of judicial review becomes available and by whom it can be availed did not arise for consideration in the earlier case and, therefore, this further question which now arises before us was not dealt with therein. The real controversy in the earlier decision was whether the entire process of removal of a Judge in our constitutional scheme is parliamentary to attract the doctrine of lapse to the motion for removal of the learned Judge on dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha or a part thereof was statutory to which the doctrine of lapse of motions in the Parliament could have no application. It was in this context that the majority in that decision took the view that the process was statutory till the Parliament takes up the motion for consideration on a finding of 'guilty' being made by the Inquiry Committee in its report which is submitted to the Parliament; and the Ninth Lok Sabha having been dissolved before commencement of the Parliamentary process, there was no question of the motion lapsing at that stage which was statutory. 44. This observation of the Apex Court makes it very clear that the Constitution Bench in the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability did not go into the question at what stage the judicial review is permissible in respect of finding out the legality of the statutory process which is a part of the impeachment proceedings? In para 94, the Constitution Bench made it clear the question in the context of the process and progress of the statutory inquiry prior to recording of the findings in the report of the Inquiry Committee does not arise in this case and has not been raised at the instance of the Judge concerned even in the connected matter, W.P. (C) No. 149 of 1992 Shri Krishna Swami v. Union of India & others , which was filed earlier and, therefore, we express no opinion on the scope of judicial review during the progress of inquiry prior to its conclusion. Therefore, from the aforesaid observations it is clear that, in the second Constitution Bench judgment in Sarojini Ramaswami’s case, the legality of the proceedings prior to referring the matter to the Inquiry Committee was not gone into. They considered only the legality of the proceedings after the Committee prepared a report and before it is submitted to the Speaker whether a learned Judge was entitled to a copy of the same and the refusal to furnish a copy could be subject matter of judicial review. 45. After hearing the learned counsel they held that, the Constitutional scheme indicates that it is only the Members of Parliament acting jointly in the specified minimum number who can bring about initiation of the procedure for removal of a Judge, all other modes and persons being excluded. 45. After hearing the learned counsel they held that, the Constitutional scheme indicates that it is only the Members of Parliament acting jointly in the specified minimum number who can bring about initiation of the procedure for removal of a Judge, all other modes and persons being excluded. There is a total exclusion of judicial review at the instance of any one, including the concerned Judge and Members of Parliament who gave the notice of motion, as well as any debate even in Parliament, in case the finding by the Inquiry Committee, whether unanimous or by majority, is that the Judge is 'not guilty' of any misbehaviour. The Judge not being aggrieved and all others being excluded when the finding is 'not guilty', any interdiction by the Court is automatically ruled out, notwithstanding the process till then being statutory. The incidents of statutory process are to be considered in this perspective. In view of a judicious blend of the political and judicial processes in the constitutional scheme in India, no one need look askance at the exclusion of judicial review at the instance of everyone in case the Inquiry Committee makes a finding that the Judge is 'not guilty'. If the constitutional scheme envisages and provides for an opportunity to the Judge concerned to show cause against his removal from office on the finding of 'guilty' recorded by the Inquiry Committee being placed before the Parliament for its consideration and the Parliament is required to take it into account before it decides to accept the finding of 'guilty' and act on it by adopting the motion of removal by the requisite majority or not to adopt the motion which would terminate the proceedings for removal, it would indicate that the opportunity of this kind in the scheme to show cause is against the inchoate finding of guilty prior to the stage of making the final decision which alone is required to be subject to judicial review. The clear intendment is that in such a situation it is the Parliament 'which should first consider the question without there being any need for judicial review at that stage. This is so because the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved, according to Section 6(3) of the Act, only when the Parliament adopts the motion in the manner prescribed. The clear intendment is that in such a situation it is the Parliament 'which should first consider the question without there being any need for judicial review at that stage. This is so because the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved, according to Section 6(3) of the Act, only when the Parliament adopts the motion in the manner prescribed. The remedy of judicial review to Judge concerned is available only when his misbehaviour is 'deemed to be proved' in law and not against the inchoate finding of 'guilty' made by the Inquiry Committee which may or may not be acted upon by the Parliament. 46. Another reason to support this view appears to be that the proceedings for removal of a Judge are required to be concluded at the earliest in public interest and therefore, no interdiction of the process is contemplated at the stage of an inchoate finding of ‘guilty’ by the Inquiry Committee. An opportunity to the Judge concerned at that stage also to show cause against that inchoate finding of ‘guilty’ fully safeguards his interest without the need for judicial review at that stage, the scope of Parliament’s scrutiny of the Committee’s finding of guilty being very wide. The finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Committee is only a recommendation to the Parliament to commence its process and to act on that finding which, at best, is tentative and inchoate at the stage of submission of the report under Section 4 of the Act. This being so, the remedy of judicial review to the Judge concerned has to be only after the stage of his ‘proved misbehaviour’ is reached on adoption of the motion by the Parliament which leads inevitably to the order of removal made by the President in accordance with Article 124(4). Resort to judicial review by the Judge concerned between the time of conclusion of the inquiry by the Committee and making of the order of removal by the President is premature and is unwarranted in the Constitutional scheme. Thus Constitution, while protecting the interest of the Judge concerned gives full effect and due importance to the role of all the high dignitaries involved in the process of removal, there being no reason to doubt that each one of them would be fully alive to the significance of his role and extent of obligation under the constitutional scheme. Thus Constitution, while protecting the interest of the Judge concerned gives full effect and due importance to the role of all the high dignitaries involved in the process of removal, there being no reason to doubt that each one of them would be fully alive to the significance of his role and extent of obligation under the constitutional scheme. If however, any illegality occurs even then, the provision for judicial review at the end of the process permits its correction without interdicting the process in between. In the constitutional scheme adopted in India, judicial review of the finding of guilty recorded by the Inquiry Committee during the statutory part of the process is impermissible after that tentative finding matures into ‘proved misbehaviour’ culminating in the order of removal. The argument of ‘now or never’ does not appeal to us and what appears more consistent in the constitutional scheme is that judicial review on permissible grounds is available not now but at the end of the process after the order of removal, if that stage is reached. In our view this conclusion adequately protects the right of the Judge concerned, ensures expeditious conclusion of the process once it is commenced in the manner prescribed and accords with the view that the scheme is a judicious blend of the political and judicial processes for the removal of Judges. It ensures preservation of the right, interest and dignity of the learned Judge and is commensurate with the dignity of all the institutions and functionaries involved in the process. It also excludes the needless meddling in the process by busybodies confining the participation in it to the members of the Parliament, the Speaker/Chairman and Inquiry Committee comprising of high judicial functionaries apart from the Judge concerned, if the allegations permitted to be made only in the prescribed matter justified an inquiry into the conduct of the Judge. 47. Therefore, from the aforesaid two Constitutional Bench Judgments, it is clear that the entire process of removal of a Judge is composite in nature. Broadly it could be bifurcated into two portions. First portion is a statutory process, the second process is a Parliamentary process. Parliamentary process commences after the conclusion of the statutory process. 47. Therefore, from the aforesaid two Constitutional Bench Judgments, it is clear that the entire process of removal of a Judge is composite in nature. Broadly it could be bifurcated into two portions. First portion is a statutory process, the second process is a Parliamentary process. Parliamentary process commences after the conclusion of the statutory process. The Constitutional Bench in the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial accountability, has categorically declared that the legality of the statutory process is amenable to judicial review, whereas the legality of the Parliamentary process is not amenable to judicial review. In the latter Constitutional Bench, it was held that though judicial review is permissible in respect of the statutory process, the stage at which it is available is after the passing of an order of removal by the President. But as pointed out earlier, they did not go into the question of legality of the statutory process up to the stage of referring the matter to the Committee and they were only concerned about the legality of the process after the conclusion of the inquiry, preparation of the report before it is submitted to the Speaker. It is in this background, we have to decide the instant case as both the learned Counsel appearing for the parties strongly relied on the law declared by the Apex Court in these two judgments. 48. The present case arises under the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984. The Administrative Reforms Commission had recommended the setting up of the Institution of the Lokayukta for the purpose of improving the standards of public administration, by looking into the complaints against administrative actions, including cases of corruption, favouritism and official indiscipline in administration machinery. Therefore, the Karnataka State Legislature enacted this Act. 49. Section 3 of the Act deals with appointment of Lokayukta and Upalokayukta. Clause (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 3 provides that a person to be appointed as an Upa-lokayukta shall be a person who has held the office of a Judge of a High Court for not less than five years. A person appointed as Upalokayuktha shall, before entering upon his office shall make and subscribe, before the Governor, or some person appointed in that behalf of him, an oath or affirmation in the form set out for the purpose in the First Schedule. A person appointed as Upalokayuktha shall, before entering upon his office shall make and subscribe, before the Governor, or some person appointed in that behalf of him, an oath or affirmation in the form set out for the purpose in the First Schedule. Apart from the qualification prescribed in Section 3, Section 4 also prescribes dis-qualifications to become a member of the Upalokayukta. Section 5 deals with the term of office and other conditions of service of Lokayuktha and Upalokayukta. Section 6 of the Act provides for removal of Upalokayukta. 50. Section 6 of the Act reads as under: 6. Removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta.- (1) The Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Governor passed after an address by each House of the State Legislature supported by a majority of the total membership of the House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the Governor in the same Session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. (2) A notice of motion for removal of Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta may be given in writing to; (a) the Speaker of the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly duly signed by not less than one-third of the total membership of that House; or (b) the Chairman of the Karnataka State Legislative Council duly signed by not less than one-third of the total membership of that House. (3) Soon after the receipt of notice of motion referred in sub-section (2), the Speaker or Chairman, as the case may be, after consulting such persons, if any, as he thinks fit and after considering such materials, if any, as may be available to him and after satisfying himself as to the prima facie case regarding incapacity or misbehaviour of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be, either admit the motion or refuse to admit the same. (4) Where a notice of a motion referred to in sub-section (2) is admitted, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, shall keep the motion pending and refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka for the purpose of making an investigation into the grounds on which the removal of Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta is prayed for. Provided that where notices of a motion referred to in sub-section (2) are given on the same day in both the Houses of the Legislature, no reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka shall be made unless the motion has been admitted in both the Houses and where such a motion is admitted in both Houses, the matter shall be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman: Provided further that where notices of a motion as aforesaid are given in the Houses of Legislature on different dates, the notice which is given later shall stand rejected. (5) When the motion is referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, the Chief Justice of Karnataka or as the case may be, by such other Judge of the High Court nominated by him. Shall frame definite charges against the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta, as the case may be, on the basis of which the investigation is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a Statement of the grounds on which each such Charge is based shall be communicated to the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta and he shall be given a reasonable opportunity of presenting a written Statement of defence within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the other Judge of High Court so nominated. (6) The State Government may, if required by the Speaker or the Chairman, or by both, as the case may be, appoint an Advocate to conduct the case against the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be. (7) The Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him shall have power to regulate his own procedure in making the investigation and shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta, as the case may be, for presenting a written statement of defence, for cross-examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being heard in his defence by himself or through his Advocate. (8) For the purpose of making any investigation under this Act, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him shall have the powers of the civil court, while trying a suit, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, viz.,: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on oath; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. (9) The Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him after investigating into the matter referred to him shall prepare a report and submit the same to the Speaker or to the Chairman as the case may be, and to the Speaker and the Chairman in case the matter is referred by both, within ninety days from the date of such reference. (10) If the report of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him contains a finding that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta against whom charges were framed is not guilty of any misbehaviour or does not suffer from any incapacity, then no further steps shall be taken in either House of the State Legislature in relation to the report and no further proceeding is necessary in respect of pending motion. (11) If the report of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court contains a finding that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta against whom charges were framed is guilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity, then the motion referred to in sub-section (2) shall, together with the report of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court, as the case may be, taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses of the State Legislature in which the motion is pending. (12) If the motion referred to in sub-section (2) is adopted by each House of the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), then the misbehaviour or incapacity of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been proved and an address praying for removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta shall be presented to the Governor of the State duly signed by the Speaker and the Chairman. (13) Once the Governor gives assent to the address made under sub-section (12), the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta shall be deemed to have been removed from office in accordance with law. (14) The Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be, against whom a motion is moved before the House or the Houses of the State Legislature for his removal, is precluded from discharge of his duties during the pendency of motion for his removal before the House or the Houses of the State Legislature. 51. As could be seen from the aforesaid provision, Lokayukta or Upalokayukta can be removed on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. They can be removed by an order of the Governor passed after an address by each House of the State Legislature supported by a majority of the total membership of the House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the Governor in the same Session. Sub-Sections (2) to (13) provides for the procedure to be followed for such removal. There are six stages in the process of removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta. 52. The first stage is reached when not less than one-third of the total membership of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly are one third of the total membership of the Karnataka Legislative Council give notice of motion for presenting an address for the removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta (notice of motion) to the Speaker of the Assembly or to the Chairman of the Council as the case may be or to both of them on the same day. After the Speaker or the Chairman or both refuse to admit the notice of motion, the matter ends there. Under the scheme of this Section, no remedy is provided to the members of the State Legislature to challenge the action of the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. After the Speaker or the Chairman or both refuse to admit the notice of motion, the matter ends there. Under the scheme of this Section, no remedy is provided to the members of the State Legislature to challenge the action of the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. On receipt of the motion referred to in Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 of the Act, the Speaker or Chairman as the case may be, after consulting such persons, if any, he thinks fit and after considering such materials, if any, as may be available to him and after satisfying himself as to the prima facie case regarding incapacity or misbehaviour of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be, either admit the motion or refuse to admit the motion. The right to give notice of motion for removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is not given to any 100 persons out of the total population of the State. It is given to the members of the State Legislative Assembly or State Legislative Council. In fact it is the duty of the members of the State Legislature to join its co-members in presenting the address for removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta and if the member believes that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is guilty of misbehaviour or incapacity which could be proved before the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. Under the Act, the power to admit or reject the notice of motion for the removal of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is not conferred on any statutory authority outside the two houses of the State Legislature. On the contrary, it is conferred on the Speaker, who is a member of the Assembly and Chairman, who is a member of the Legislative Council who discharge a two-fold duty in certain situations. He represents the house and ordinarily, he conducts the business of the house. The removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta by impeachment is obviously the business of the house and the Courts are not in the picture. No Court can restrain the Speaker or the Chairman from rejecting or admitting the notice of motion presented by requisite number of members of either house. The removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta by impeachment is obviously the business of the house and the Courts are not in the picture. No Court can restrain the Speaker or the Chairman from rejecting or admitting the notice of motion presented by requisite number of members of either house. The Court themselves would not interfere at the first stage because they know that to interfere with the members of the State Legislature and with the Speaker or Chairman in the discharge of the duties would involve a gross contempt of the Houses. 53. The second stage is reached when the Speaker or the Chairman admits the notice of motion. On such admission of notice of motion, he shall keep the motion pending and refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, for the purpose of making the investigation into the grounds on which the removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is sought. Where notice of motion referred to in Sub-Section (2) are given on the same day in both the Houses of Legislature, no reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka shall be made unless the motion has been admitted in both the houses and where such a motion is admitted in both the houses, the matter shall be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka jointly by the Speaker or Chairman. However, where notices of motion are given in the Houses of the Legislature on different dates, notice which is given later shall stand rejected. 54. Therefore, it is clear that notice of motion for removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta can be made in either of the houses separately. But if they are made in both the houses on the same day, then if the motion is admitted in both the Houses, then the matter shall be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman. But if the notice of motion is given on different dates in the Houses of Legislature, the notice which is given later stands rejected. 55. The third stage is reached when after the matter reaches the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. But if the notice of motion is given on different dates in the Houses of Legislature, the notice which is given later stands rejected. 55. The third stage is reached when after the matter reaches the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. A discretion is conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka to conduct the investigation by himself personally or by nominating a Judge of the High Court of Karnataka. In either event, they shall frame definite charges against the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta as the case may be. It is on the basis of such definite charges framed against them, the investigation has to proceed. Such charges together with the statement of grounds on which such charges is based shall be indicated to the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta. Then he shall be given a reasonable opportunity of presenting a written statement of defence within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court of Karnataka so nominated. The State Government may, if required by the Speaker or the Chairman or by both, as the case may be, appoint an Advocate to conduct the case against the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta as the case may be. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him shall have power to regulate his own procedure in making the investigation and shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta as the case may be for presenting a written statement of defence, for cross-examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being heard in his defence by himself or through his Advocate. This entrustment of investigations to the Chief Justice of the High Court is broadly speaking a guarantee that persons trained in deciding the cases impartially would be investigating the charges leveled against the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta. 56. For the purpose of making any investigation under this Act, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court of Karnataka nominated by him shall have the powers of Civil Court while trying the suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the matters referred to in Sub-section (8) of Section 6 of the Act. 57. 57. The fourth stage is reached when the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him after investigating into the matter referred to him shall prepare a report and submit the same to the Speaker and the Chairman in case the matter is referred by both within 90 days from the date of such reference. If the Chief Justice or the Judge of the High Court nominated by him finds that Lokayukta or Upalokayukta concerned is not guilty of misbehaviour or does not suffer from any incapacity, the impeachment proceedings ends there. It is provided by Sub-Section (10) of Section 6 that in that event no further steps shall be taken in either house of the State Legislature in relation to the report and no further proceedings is necessary in respect of the pending motion. Thus, on finding of ‘no guilt’ being recorded by the Chief Justice and the Judge nominated by him, the entire impeachment proceedings stand terminated. If the report of the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him contains a finding that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta against whom charges were framed is guilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity, then the motion referred to in Sub-Section (2) shall together with the report of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka or the Judge of the High Court as the case may be taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses of the State Legislature in which the motion is pending. At this stage, the Court is not in the picture, because the report of the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him does not determine the rights of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta nor can the Courts in any manner override the report and hold that the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him could not possibly find Lokayukta or Upalokayukta guilty of charges made against them. This is so because the decision whether the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is guilty or innocent is not left to any Court. Sub-Section (12) of Section 6 of the Act expressly leaves it to the Legislature to decide whether the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta should or should not be removed by impeachment. This is so because the decision whether the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is guilty or innocent is not left to any Court. Sub-Section (12) of Section 6 of the Act expressly leaves it to the Legislature to decide whether the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta should or should not be removed by impeachment. The finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him is only a recommendation to the state Legislature to commence its process and to act on that finding, which at best is tentative It is only if the legislature adopts the motion in the manner prescribed, the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved i.e., when the two Houses after full debate, proceed to vote as provided in Sub-Section (12) of Section 6 of the Act. 58. The fifth stage is reached when the two houses proceed in the manner prescribed by sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. It is obvious that if the vote cast separately in the Assembly or Council falls short of majority required in either House namely not less than half the number of members of the total members of the Houses and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting, the motion for impeachment fails and the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta cannot be removed from his Office. However, if the motion referred to in Sub-Section (2) is adopted by each House of the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Section (1) then the misbehaviour or incapacity of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be shall be deemed to have been proved and an address for removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta shall be presented to the Governor of the State duly signed by the Speaker and the Chairman. 59. The sixth and the final stage is reached when the Governor assents to the address made under Sub- Section (12) of Section 6 of the Act, Lokayukta or Upalokayukta shall be deemed to have been removed from office in accordance with law. 60. What is the position of the Lokayukta after a notice of motion is given by the requisite members for the State Legislatures to the Speaker or the Chairman is dealt with by Sub-Section (14) of Section 6 of the Act. 60. What is the position of the Lokayukta after a notice of motion is given by the requisite members for the State Legislatures to the Speaker or the Chairman is dealt with by Sub-Section (14) of Section 6 of the Act. It provides that the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be, against whom a motion is moved before the House or the Houses of the State Legislature for his removal, is precluded from discharging of his duties during the pendency of motion for his removal before the House or the House of the State Legislature. This is the comprehensive scheme provided under the statute for removal of Lokayukta and Upalokayukta. 61. Stage Nos.1, 2 and 3 speaks about members of the State Legislature, Speaker of the Assembly and Chairman of the Council, admission of motion in the Houses of Legislature, gives an impression that it is a part of the proceedings of the Legislature. The question is, in view of the bar contained in Article 212, whether the legality of the said procedure could be the subject matter of the judicial review by the superior Courts. In the SUB-COMMITTEE OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY’s case, identical question arose for consideration and the Supreme Court has answered the said question as under: “39. ……. The policy appears to be that the entire stage upto proof of misbehaviour or incapacity, beginning with the initiation of investigation on the allegation being made, is governed by the law enacted under Article 124(5) and in view of the restriction provided in Article 121, that machinery has to be outside the Parliament and not within it. If this be so, it is a clear pointer that the Parliament neither has any role to play till misconduct or incapacity is round proved nor has it any control over the machinery provided in the law enacted under Article 124(5). The Parliament comes in the picture only when a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity has been proved. The Judges (inquiry) Act, 1968 enacted under Article 124(5) itself indicates that the Parliament so understood the integrated scheme of Articles 121, 124(4) and 124(5). The general scheme of the Act conforms to this view. The Parliament comes in the picture only when a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity has been proved. The Judges (inquiry) Act, 1968 enacted under Article 124(5) itself indicates that the Parliament so understood the integrated scheme of Articles 121, 124(4) and 124(5). The general scheme of the Act conforms to this view. Some expressions used in the Act, particularly Sections 3 and 6 to suggest that the motion is initiated in the House or is kept pending in the House during investigation can be reconciled, if this Constitutional Scheme is accepted. Those expressions appear to have been used since the authority to entertain the complaint is 'Speaker/Chairman', the complaint is de- scribed as 'motion' and the complaint can be made only by the specified number of Members of Parliament. In substance it only means that the specified number of M.Ps. alone can make such a complaint; the complaint must be made to the 'Speaker/Chairman'; on receiving such a complaint if the Speaker/Chairman form the opinion that there is a prima facie case for investigation, he will constitute the judicial committee as prescribed; and if the finding reached is 'guilty' then the Speaker/Chairman commences the parliamentary process in accordance with Article 124(4) for removal of the Judge and the bar in Article 121 is lifted.” 62. Similarly, stage four is completely out side the State Legislature and the bar of Article 212 is not applicable to the proceedings before the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Judge nominated by him. However, the bar applies to the proceedings before the State Legislature when the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him submits his report containing the finding of guilt to the Speaker or the Chairman of the Council, as the case may. Again, once the State Legislature adopts the report containing the finding of guilt, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) and presents the address to the Governor, and the Governor gives assent to the address made under sub-section (12) of Section 6 of the Act it would be purely an Executive action and the bar contained in Article 213 is lifted. This is broadly the scheme of impeachment of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, provided under Section 6 of the Act. 63. This is broadly the scheme of impeachment of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, provided under Section 6 of the Act. 63. The argument canvassed relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability is the entire process of removal is in two parts: the first part under Clause (5) from initiation to investigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity is covered by an enacted law, Parliament's role being only legislative as in all the laws enacted by it and the second part only after proof under Clause (4) is in Parliament. That process commences only on proof in accordance with the law enacted under clause (5). Thus, the first part is entirely statutory, while the second part alone is the parliamentary process. The Constitution intended a clear provision for the first part covered fully by enacted law, the validity of which and the process there under being subject to judicial review independent of any political colour and after proof it was intended to be a parliamentary process. 64. In the aforesaid judgment, the enquiry of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge was under the statute enacted by the Parliament by virtue of sub-article (5) of Article 124. After enquiry and investigation was completed and report was submitted to the Parliament, the power of removal of the Judge flows from sub-article (4) of Article 124. In other words, the process of removal of a Judge involves the statutory process under a separate enactment and Parliamentary process under the Constitution itself. But in the instant case, the entire process of removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is provided under the statute. But the statue provides the mode in which the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta could be removed and the right to make the motion for his removal is conferred on the members of the State Legislature. Such a motion is to be given to the Speaker of the Assembly or Chairman of the Council. They are conferred the power to admit or reject the motion. If the motion is admitted the duty is cast on them to keep the motion pending in the Legislature and refer the motion to the Chief Justice for investigation. After such investigation, the report is to be submitted to the Speaker or Chairman of the Council. They are conferred the power to admit or reject the motion. If the motion is admitted the duty is cast on them to keep the motion pending in the Legislature and refer the motion to the Chief Justice for investigation. After such investigation, the report is to be submitted to the Speaker or Chairman of the Council. It is thereafter, the Houses of the Legislature are seized of the matter, is taken up for discussion and thereafter put to vote and thereafter if the motion is adopted, the Speaker or the Chairman of the Council has to place the address before the Governor for passing of the order of removal. Thus, though the process of removal of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta is statutory in nature, a portion of the process involves the members of the State Legislature, the Speaker and the Chairman of the Council and the State Legislature itself. Therefore, in this background, in view of the aforesaid two judgments of the Apex Court, the proceedings of impeachment which are purely statutory and falls out side the State Legislature, do not have any immunity under Article 212 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the said proceedings are amenable to judicial review. It is only the proceedings inside the State Legislature which falls out side the judicial review by virtue of Article 212 of the Constitution. 65. In the subsequent judgment in Sarojini Ramaswami’s case, the Constitution Bench reiterated the aforesaid legal position. But, they held in the Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability, the Court did not go into the question at what stage the power of judicial review is to be exercised by the Court. In that case the Writ Petition was filed seeking the judicial review of the action of the Committee of enquiry refusing to furnish the report of the Committee. Therefore, in the said judgment, the question which arose for consideration was such an action of the Committee is amenable to judicial review. Answering the said question, the Apex Court held the judicial review at that stage is not permissible. By elaborate reasoning it is pointed out that if the report is that the Judge is not guilty, the proceedings ends there. The Judge is in no way affected. Answering the said question, the Apex Court held the judicial review at that stage is not permissible. By elaborate reasoning it is pointed out that if the report is that the Judge is not guilty, the proceedings ends there. The Judge is in no way affected. Even if the finding is that of guilt it is possible that the Parliament may not adopt the said report and the motion of removal fails in which event also the Judge is not aggrieved as the proceedings ends there. Only in the event the Lok-Sabha adopts the motion and accepts the report of guilt and then places the matter before the President for orders and if the President passes an order removing the Judge, then the Judge has the right of judicial review against such order and in such a proceedings the legality of the enquiry culminated in a report could be gone into. In the aforesaid judgment they have also made it clear the question in the context of the process and progress of the statutory enquiry prior to recording of the findings in the report of the enquiry Committee does not arise, in the said case and has not been raised at the instance of the Judge concerned. Therefore, they did not express any opinion on the scope of judicial review of actions prior to referring the motion for enquiry to the Chief Justice. Therefore, it was contended that the second judgment do not cover the entire area and second judgment has no application to the facts of this case. 66. The question whether the notice of motion given by the members of the State Legislature to the Speaker is valid in law, whether such a motion is validly admitted by the Speaker and whether there is a valid reference to the Chief Justice is a matter which arise for consideration for the first time before us. Relying on the passages in the aforesaid two judgments, it was contended judicial review is permissible and it was further contended it is permitted even at the preliminary stages and the appellant need not wait for the order of removal to be passed by the Governor to challenge the same. 67. In this regard it is necessary for us to notice the facts which according to the appellant is so shocking which should compel this Court to interfere. 67. In this regard it is necessary for us to notice the facts which according to the appellant is so shocking which should compel this Court to interfere. It is not in dispute that 1/3rd members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly have given a notice of motion in writing for removal of Upalokayukta. It is produced at Annexure-R2. It contains the signature of 78 members. Annexure-A to the said notice contains 5 allegations against the appellant. In the end only one member has affixed his signature. The argument is as all the 78 members have not signed the Annexure at the end, the notice of motion is not valid. Per contra, it was contended that, in the second page of Annexure-R2 there is a specific reference to Annexure-A and thereafter 78 members have signed it. That satisfies the requirement of law. Therefore, notice of motion is valid. The said notice of motion is given to the Speaker. Therefore, it was listed as one of the items of agenda on 27.11.2015. On that day Sri Tanvir Sait, one of the signatory to the motion moved the resolution. Thereafter, the following order is web hosted on 2.12.2015:- “XXX XXX XXX Motion is admitted.” 68. Subsequently, on 21.12.2015 the following order of the Speaker is web hosted:- “XXX XXX XXX” 69. On 26.2.2016 the following proceedings was recorded by the Speaker. It reads as under :- “I have perused the notice of motion dated 20.11.2015 moved by 78 members of Legislative Assembly, which was moved on their behalf on the floor of the House on 27.11.2015 by Sri Tanvir Sait in furtherance of agenda item No.04. I have had consultation with Secretary, D.P.A.R Govt. of Karnataka, Secretary to Government, Department of Law, Secretary to Government, Department of Parliamentary Affairs, Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka and, Registrar Lokayukta and, had called for certain documents for further verification on materials which were referred to in the notice of motion and its accompanying articles of charges. I have had consultation with Secretary, D.P.A.R Govt. of Karnataka, Secretary to Government, Department of Law, Secretary to Government, Department of Parliamentary Affairs, Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka and, Registrar Lokayukta and, had called for certain documents for further verification on materials which were referred to in the notice of motion and its accompanying articles of charges. On detailed study and verification, being prima-facie satisfied that the notice of motion makes out case, regarding the incapacity and mis-behaviour of the Upalokayukta Sri Subhash B Adi, I ‘admit’ the motion, with a direction that, the said ‘motion’ shall be kept pending in the House, pending in the House, pending reference and further proceedings by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka, for the purpose of making an investigation into the grounds, on which the removal of Upalokayukta is framed. The ground on which, I have admitted the motion and formed an opinion on prima facie case is set out in a separate annexures to this proceedings and; same shall be forwarded to the Hon’ble Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section 4 of Section 6 of Lokayukta Act. The copy of these proceedings shall also be communicated to Sri Subhash B.Adi, drawing his attention to the operation of the provisions of the sub-section 14 of Section 6 of the Lokayukta Act.” 70. It is after the proceedings dated 26.2.2016 after admitting the motion, the same was forwarded to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act. 71. The argument is, after admitting the motion on 27.11.2015 the Speaker started collecting materials from various sources which he had no right to do under the scheme of the statute. Therefore, the appellant approached this Court seeking a declaration that the Speaker is not empowered to seek any information from any source after the notice of motion is admitted. On a submission made by the learned Advocate General that as no motion is admitted, the appellant is not prevented from attending to his office and discharging his duties, the case was adjourned for filing objections. Objections were filed on 31.12.2015 where it was contended that there is no merit in the Writ Petition as the Speaker has not admitted the motion. Objections were filed on 31.12.2015 where it was contended that there is no merit in the Writ Petition as the Speaker has not admitted the motion. Thereafter, several applications were filed as set out above and ultimately yet another additional statement of objections was filed on 1.3.2016 pointing out that what is web hosted on 2.12.2015 is not correct, it was a mistake and the correct version is web hosted on 9.2.2016 which shows the motion was not admitted. It is only on 26.2.2016 the motion was admitted by the Speaker and then the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for enquiry. According to the appellant, this procedure followed by the Speaker is ultra vires, illegal, void ab initio and liable to be struck down. Now, the question for consideration by us is, is this Court has the jurisdiction to go into the legality of the proceedings of the Speaker at this stage of the proceedings. In view of the aforesaid two judgments of the Apex Court, the judicial review of the action of the Speaker is permissible notwithstanding the fact that a part of these proceedings are a part of the State Legislature. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the subsequent Sarojini Ramaswami’s case where it was held that though judicial review is permissible it is permissible only after the order of removal is passed, whether the said law applies to the facts of this case also notwithstanding the fact that in the said judgment this question was left open. 72. It has been accepted that judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution. The Supreme Court/High Courts have constitutional duty and responsibility to exercise judicial review as sentinel on the qui vive. Judicial review is not concerned with the merits of the decision, but with the manner in which the decision was taken. Judicial review must be distinguished from the justiciability by the Court. The two concepts are not synonymous. The power of judicial review is a constituent power and cannot be abdicated by the judicial process of interpretation. However, justiciability of the decision taken by the Constitutional authorities is one of exercise of the power by the Court hedged by self imposed judicial restraints. It is a cardinal principle of the Constitution that no one however lofty, can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution. However, justiciability of the decision taken by the Constitutional authorities is one of exercise of the power by the Court hedged by self imposed judicial restraints. It is a cardinal principle of the Constitution that no one however lofty, can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution. Its actions are within the confines of the powers given by the Constitution. 73. In the instant case, the notice of motion is given by one-third membership of that House. They are the representatives of the public. They have submitted a written notice of motion for removal of Upalokayukta on the ground of misbehaviour. In the schedule to the notice, they have set out five instances of misbehaviour. It is given to the Speaker not as a Statutory Authority but as a Constitutional Authority. The Speaker has the discretion to admit or reject the motion. If the Speaker were to reject the motion, the members of the Legislative Assembly have no remedy. Similarly, after the motion is referred to the Chief Justice for enquiry, if, after investigation, a report is submitted holding that the allegations are not proved, the matter ends there. The complainants i.e., the members of the Legislative Assembly have no remedy in law. Even after the report is submitted to the Assembly and if the Assembly refuses to adopt the motion of removal, still the complainants have no remedy. Where as in the inquiry to be conducted by the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him, full opportunity to defend is conferred on the Upalokayukta. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, if the report holds Upalokayukta guilty, the Speaker before taking up the matter for discussion is obliged to send a notice along with a copy of the report giving an opportunity to the Upalokayukta to contest the matter. Thus, the interest of the Upalokayukta is fully taken care of. If the motion is adopted, which results in the order of dismissal of the Upalokayukta, again he has the remedy of judicial review against the order of removal. On the contrary, no remedy is provided to the members of the Legislative Assembly, who gave the notice of motion in writing. Under the scheme of Section 6 of the Act, a period of 90 days is prescribed for submission of the report by the Committee. On the contrary, no remedy is provided to the members of the Legislative Assembly, who gave the notice of motion in writing. Under the scheme of Section 6 of the Act, a period of 90 days is prescribed for submission of the report by the Committee. Upalokayukta was a former Judge of the High Court. It is by virtue of the said Constitution position, which is the qualification prescribed for appointment of Upalokayukta, he is appointed. In ‘Harvard Law Review’ (1912-1913 vol.), it is stated as under: “Judicial Office is essentially a public trust, and the right of the public to revoke this trust is fundamental. In a true republic no man can be born with a right to public office. Under such a system of government, office, whether elective or appointive, is in a sense a political privilege. The grant of this privilege flows from the political power of the people, and so, ultimately must it be taken away by the exercise of the political power resident in the people.” 74. The entire process of removal of Upalokayukta is composite in nature. There is judicious blend of the political and judicial process under the scheme of the Act. The Constitutional Scheme and the Statutory Scheme under the Act ensures expeditious conclusion of the process. Once it is commenced in the manner prescribed and accords with the view that the scheme is 'a judicious blend of the political and judicial processes for the removal of Judges'. No interdiction of the process is contemplated at any stage of the proceedings. The proceedings have to conducted at the earliest in public interest. In fact ninety days is the time stipulated for completion of the enquiry by the Chief Justice or the Judge nominated by him. Interdiction at any stage of the proceeding would be contrary to the scheme prescribed by the statute for removal of Upalokayukta. It would be against public interest. Judicial restraint in such cases would advance the cause of Justice. The scheme ensures preservation of the right, interest and dignity of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta and is commensurate with the dignity of all the institutions and functionaries involved in the process. It would be against public interest. Judicial restraint in such cases would advance the cause of Justice. The scheme ensures preservation of the right, interest and dignity of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta and is commensurate with the dignity of all the institutions and functionaries involved in the process. It also excludes the needless meddling in the process by busy bodies confining the participation in it, to the Members of the Legislative Assembly or Council, Speaker/Chairman of the Legislature and the Chief Justice to the High Court of Karnataka, the highest judicial functionary in the State apart from the Lokayukta. If the allegations are permitted to be made only in the prescribed manner, justify an inquiry into the conduct of the Upalokayukta. As the Office in question is a public office as public is vitally interested, the process prescribed in the Act is to be complied with expeditiously, which is also both in public interest as well as in the interest of the incumbent of the office. It is to be remembered that it is a political appointment. However the incumbent does not hold the office at the pleasure of the political master. His tenure of office is well protected by the statute. The tenure of the office is clearly protected in the enactment and the very enactment provides for the removal. Therefore, in such matters, the reasoning adopted by the Constitutional Bench in Sarojini Ramaswamy’s case declining to interfere till an order of removal is passed by the President holds good, even with reference to any illegality in the procedure adopted by the Speaker either in the matter of admitting the notice of motion or referring the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. Judicial intervention is not now, but only after the removal of the Judge, equally holds goods in the situation arising in this case. As pointed out in the said judgment, only when the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved in terms of Section 6(12) of the Act and only when the Legislature admits the motion in the manner prescribed, it is then, the remedy of judicial review to the Upalokayukta concerned is available. As pointed out in the said judgment, only when the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved in terms of Section 6(12) of the Act and only when the Legislature admits the motion in the manner prescribed, it is then, the remedy of judicial review to the Upalokayukta concerned is available. Therefore, we are of the view that the remedy of judicial review to the Judge concerned has to be only after the stage of his proved misbehaviour is reached on adoption of the motion by the Parliament, which leads inevitably to the order of removal made by the Government under sub-section (13) of Section 6 of the Act. Resort to judicial review by the Upalokayukta concerned before such order is passed would be premature and is unwarranted in the scheme of the statute. The statute while protecting the interest of the Upalokayukta concerned gives full effect and due importance to the role of all the above high dignitaries involved in the process of removal. No doubt that each one of them can be fully alive to the significance of his role and extent of obligation under the constitutional scheme. Therefore, any illegality, which may occur could be the subject matter of judicial review only, at the end of the process for correction without interdicting the process in between. 75. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that though judicial review is permissible to challenge the legality of either the notice of motion or the procedure adopted by the Speaker admitting the motion, such a judicial review can be exercised by this Court only, if, the said proceedings culminate in the order of removal of the Upalokayukta. As the enquiry is pending before the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, we decline to consider the case on merits as canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, as it would be against the interest of the appellant. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not see any merit in these appeals. Hence, writ appeals are dismissed. Consequently, I.A.s are disposed of accordingly.