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Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 3799 (ALL)

SATYA NARAIN SINGH v. DISTRICT JUDGE BARABANKI

2016-11-25

ANIL KUMAR

body2016
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mohd. Shadab Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri M. E. Khan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel and perused the record. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 7.11.2003 (Annexure No. 6) passed by opposite party No. 1/District Judge, Barabanki and 5.2.2003 (Annexue No. 5) passed by opposite party No. 2/Civil Judge (Junior Division), Barabanki, whereby trial Court had directed the plaintiff/petitioner to implead Gaon Sabha as a necessary party. 3. Facts in brief of the present case as submitted by Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate are that Suit No. 312/2000 has been filed by the plaintiffs/revisionists claiming permanent injunction over the land shown with letters ABCD in their plaint sketch map restraining the defendants-respondent/Block Development Officer and U. P. State from constructing any road therein. The plaintiffs have claimed that entire disputed land is their sahan Abadi which has been in their occupation since long and that the defendants have no concern with the same but they are forcibly attempting to construct a road over the same in order to oblige some influential persons of the village. Defendants contested the suit on the grounds that the disputed land is not the property of the plaintiffs and is a part of the village Parti regarding plot No. 491. The said fact is in the knowledge of the plaintiffs but they concealed the said fact in their plaint. It is further stated that the Gaon sabha is the owner of the disputed property and the plaintiffs had not deliberately made the Gaon Sabha as a party, hence the suit is bad for mis-joinder of the party. 4. On the basis of the above pleadings, issue No. 2 has been framed as to whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Gaon Sabha. 5. The trial Court, by the impugned order dated 5.2.2003, had decided the issue No. 2 against the plaintiffs and directed them to implead Gaon Sabha as a party because it is a necessary party for adjudicating of the dispute involved in the suit. 6. Order dated 5.2.2003 passed by opposite party No. 2/Civil Judge (Junior Division), Barabanki was challenged by the plaintiffs/petitioners by filing Civil Revision No. 19 of 2003. 6. Order dated 5.2.2003 passed by opposite party No. 2/Civil Judge (Junior Division), Barabanki was challenged by the plaintiffs/petitioners by filing Civil Revision No. 19 of 2003. By order dated 7.11.2003, revisional Court had dismissed the said revision with the following observations : “I have gone through all the above referred case laws which to my mind do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The first three cases relate to Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. wherein the concerned party himself has applied to be impleaded as party to the suit and the Courts have found them not necessary parties to the suit and therefore their applications were rejected. The fourth case law relates to a writ petition wherein the Hon’ble High Court has opined that the applicant’s night was not affected by the writ petition and therefore his application for impleadment was rejected. In the circumstances of the present case, it is the Court itself which has found that the local Gaon Sabha is a proper party to the suit and therefore it has itself directed the plaintiffs to get their plaints amended and impleaded the Gaon Sabha as a party where the Court cannot be said to have caused any illegality or beyond jurisdiction and therefore in revision, this order should not be varied on the basis of principle mentioned in Order 1 Rule 10 Cr.P.C.” Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate has challenged the impugned orders on the following grounds : “(a) As per maxim dominus litus, “plaintiff is the best judge to implead a person as a party and no person can be impleaded as a party in a suit against wishes of the plaintiff”. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgment given by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the cases of Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra and others, 2008 (26) LCD 656 and Raj Kumari and others v. IVth Additional District Judge, Azamgarh and others 2014 (102) ALR 178. (b) As per the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. in the instant matter, trial Court/opposite party No. 2 has got no jurisdiction to implead Gaon Sabha as a party because Gaon Sabha is not a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the dispute involved in the present case. (b) As per the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. in the instant matter, trial Court/opposite party No. 2 has got no jurisdiction to implead Gaon Sabha as a party because Gaon Sabha is not a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the dispute involved in the present case. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgment given by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the cases of Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and other, 1992 SCC 227 and Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. v. Segency Conventional Centre and Hotels Private Ltd. and others, (2010) 7 SCC 417 . 7. Accordingly, it is submitted by learned Senior Advocate that the impugned orders under challenge in the present writ petition are contrary to law and are liable to be set aside. 8. Shri M. E. Khan, learned Standing Counsel while opposing the contention raised by Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate submits that in the present case, admittedly suit filed by the plaintiff/petitioner is a permanent injunction and trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings made on behalf of the parties, issue No. 2 is framed whether Gaon Sabha is a necessary party to the suit or not. 9. While deciding the said suit, trial Court came to the conclusion that the controversy involved in the present case is in regard to grant of permanent injunction in regard to plot No. 491 and the identity of the said clause is not being fully established on the basis of the document on record whether plaintiff/petitioner is owner of the land. So taking into consideration the said fact, trial Court decided issue No. 2 against the plaintiffs/petitioners directing them to implead Gaon Sabha as a defendant/opposite party, the same was confirmed by the revisional Court. 10. So keeping in view the above said facts, the maximof dominus lits will not apply in the present case, rather the matter is being covered as per provisions as provided under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. by which the Court has got jurisdiction to implead a party as defendant at any stage of the matter. Shri M. E. Khan, learned Standing Counsel submits that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order under challenge in the present writ petition and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. Shri M. E. Khan, learned Standing Counsel submits that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order under challenge in the present writ petition and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 12. As per admitted facts, petitioners filed a suit for permanent injunction with a prayer that opposite party Nos. 3 and 4 may be restrained from constructing the road over the land which is Sahan Abadi Land. Accordingly, Original Suit No. 312/2000 has been registered before the opposite party No. 2 in which issue No. 2 was framed to the effect that whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of the parties.” 13. While deciding the said issue, trial Court came to the conclusion that identity of the plot/land i.e. Plot No. 491 is not established whether it belongs to plaintiff/petitioner or Gaon Sabha on the basis of the material on record, hence, directed the plaintiff/petitioner to implead Gaon Sabha as a defendant. The said order was confirmed by the revisional Court. 14. So far as argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners that as per maxim of dominus lits, plaintiff is the best judge to implead a person as a party and no person can be implead as a party in a suit against the wishes of the plaintiff. The said maxim does not involve in the present case, rather the matter is to be considered and adjudicated in the light of the provisions as provided under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. While interpreting the maxim dominus lits, this Court in the case of Committee of Management, Ratan .... v. III Additional Civil Judge, Agra.... AIR 1995 All 7 held as under : “The theory of dominus litus should not be over-stretched because it is the duty of the Court to ensure that if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is necessary party, the Court can order such person to be impleaded. Merely because the plaintiff does not choose to implead a person, is not sufficient for rejection of an application for being impleaded. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. are very wide and the powers of the Court are equally extensive. Merely because the plaintiff does not choose to implead a person, is not sufficient for rejection of an application for being impleaded. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. are very wide and the powers of the Court are equally extensive. Even without an application to be impleaded as a party, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the name of any party, who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” In view of the above said facts, the said argument has got no force, rejected. Further, order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC. covers two types of of cases : (a) of a party who ought to have been joined but not joined and is a necessary party, and (b) of a party without whose presence the question involved in the case cannot be completely decided. The former is called a necessary party and the latter a proper party. Sub-R. (2) of O.1, R.10, therefore, is attracted when the question is covered by one of the above. A party seeking such a joinder as a proper party will have to prima facie establish that such a party has interest in the subject-matter of the litigation and as such should be before the Court. 15. The simple test in such controversy would be as to whether the presence of such a party is appropriate in view of the subject-matter in adjudication. If the answer be in the affirmative, joinder can be permitted. By reason of direct interest in the subject-matter or even by reason of eventual reliefs sought, such a test would be answered. Power being there, it is all a matter of appreciation of the controversy in issue and its possible ramifications. 16. O. 1, R. 10 (2), C.P.C. gives a very wide discretion to the Court to deal with any such situation which may result in prejudicing the interest of affected party if not impleaded in the suit and where the impleadment of the said party is necessary and vital for the decision of the suit. 16. O. 1, R. 10 (2), C.P.C. gives a very wide discretion to the Court to deal with any such situation which may result in prejudicing the interest of affected party if not impleaded in the suit and where the impleadment of the said party is necessary and vital for the decision of the suit. It is true that the discretion has to be exercised judicially but at the same time the concerned civil or appellate Court where the suit on appeal is pending has also to take into consideration that the party which is necessary to be impleaded will be put to a greater difficulty if not impleaded by the plaintiff who may have ulterior motives of not impleading such party and if the decision is given which may affect the interest of the said party greater prejudice would be caused to the said party as a result of not impleading while no prejudice or loss would be caused to the plaintiff because he will have full opportunity to defend his rights and interest as against aggrieved party who has been impleaded as a party to the suit. 17. The important aspect which should be looked into by the Civil Courts while deciding the applications under O.1, R.10(2), C.P. Code is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also conflicting decisions being passed in different suits which will be safeguarded as a result of allowing necessary party to be impleaded in the suit (See Baijnath v. Ganga Devi, AIR 1998 Raj 125 ). The expression “to settle all questions involved” used in O.1, R.10(2), is susceptive of liberal and wide interpretation so as to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to the subject-matter thereof. 18. The Parliament in its wisdom while framing this rule must have thought that all the material questions common to the parties to the suit and to the third parties should be tried once for all and the Court is clothed with the power to secure the aforesaid result with judicious discretion to add parties, including third parties (See Abdul Jaleel v. Aishabi, AIR 1992 Karn 380). 19. The word “At any stage” in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC means that there is no requirement of law that an application for addition of a party as defendant must be made at any particular stage of the trial. 20. 19. The word “At any stage” in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC means that there is no requirement of law that an application for addition of a party as defendant must be made at any particular stage of the trial. 20. The use of the expression “at any stage of proceedings” in O.1, R.10(2) shows that the power vested in the Court under it can be exercised only when the proceedings before it are alive and still pending. Once the adjudication itself of all the issues in the case is over, this provision cannot be made use of by any party (See Sardar Ali Khan v. Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1973 Andh Pra 298 (DB). 21. Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) C.P.C., the power to add a party to a proceeding cannot depend solely on the question whether he has interested in the suit property. The question is whether the right of a person may be affected if he is not added as a party. Such right, however, will include necessarily an enforceable legal right. 22. In the instant matter, as stated above, trial Court had given a reason to the effect that plaintiff/petitioner is not able to satisfy the Court whether the land in dispute i.e. Plot No. 491 belongs to him or Gaon Sabha, so in order to adjudicate that whether the plaintiff/petitioner has got nay enforceable legal right to get the injunction in his favour, trial Court had passed an order dated 5.2.2003 by which plaintiff/petitioner was directed to implead Gaon Sabha as a party and the said order was confirmed by the revisional Court. 23. Thus, argument advanced by learned Senior Advocate that provision of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. is not applicable in the case so the trial Court has got no jurisdiction to decide the dispute involved in the present case. Further in the case of Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal (Supra) Hon’ble the Apex Court held as under : “The power of the Court to add parties under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C., came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, (1959) SCR 1111. Further in the case of Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal (Supra) Hon’ble the Apex Court held as under : “The power of the Court to add parties under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C., came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, (1959) SCR 1111. In that case it was pointed out that the Courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be the questions relating to movable or immovable property.” The said case is not applicable in the present case because in the said matter, Hon’ble the Apex Court held that parties who have to direct interest to the subject-matter may be addied as a party to a sit, rather taking into consideration the said law, order passed by the trial Court thereby directing to implead Gaon Sabha as a party is perfectly valid as it is to be seen whether the Gaon Sabha is to be implead as a direct interest in regard to which suit for permanent injunction has been filed. 24. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. (Supra) while considering the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) C.P.C. in a suit for specific performance held as under : “The appellant alleged that the information Memorandum proposing to privatise the management did not exclude the area which was the subject-matter of the suit; and that the suit plot could not however be leased to the appellant in view of the interim order in the pending suit of the first respondent. The appellant therefore claimed that it had, or would have, an interest in the suit land; and at all events, it was interested in acquiring it by lease depending upon the decision in the suit and therefore it was a necessary party and in any event a proper party. The said application was resisted by the first respondent inter alia on the ground that the appellant did not have any interest in the suit property and therefore the appellant was neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the suit. The said application was resisted by the first respondent inter alia on the ground that the appellant did not have any interest in the suit property and therefore the appellant was neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the suit. It was also contended that AAI itself being a substantial shareholder, having 26% share in the appellant company, would protect the interest of the appellant by contesting the suit and therefore appellant was not a necessary party. AAI has also filed a response to appellant’s application for impleadment raising two contentions : (i) any impleadment at that stage of the suit would delay the recording of evidence and final hearing thereby seriously affecting the interests of AAI; and (ii) the suit plot measuring 31000 sq.m. was not leased to the appellant. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave. The question for consideration is whether the appellant is a necessary or proper party to the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure (‘’Code’ for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure (‘’Code’ for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: “Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” The said provision makes it clear that a Court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the Court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. A ‘’necessary party’ is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a ‘’necessary party’ is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A ‘’proper party’ is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. A ‘’proper party’ is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the following observations of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. [ 2007 (10) SCC 82 ] to contend that a person need not have any subsisting right or interest in the suit property for being impleaded as a defendant, and that even a person who is likely to acquire an interest therein in future, in appropriate cases, is entitled to be impleaded as a party: “9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperuma [ 2005(6) SCC 733 ]. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute...... 14...It cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute...... 14...It cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. If C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment.” The learned counsel for the first respondent on the other hand submitted that the decision in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82 is not good law in view of an earlier decision of a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal [ 2005 (6) SCC 733 ]. In Kasturi (Supra), this Court reiterated the position that necessary parties and proper parties can alone seek to be impleaded as parties to a suit for specific performance. This Court held that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the Court or those persons against whom there is a right to some relief in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings; and that proper parties are those whose presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. Referring to suits for specific performance, this Court held that the following persons are to be considered as necessary parties: (i) the parties to the contract which is sought to be enforced or their legal representatives; (ii) a transferee of the property which is the subject-matter of the contract. This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a proper party, on his application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party. The first respondent contended that Kasturi held that a person claiming a title adverse to the title of defendant-vendor, could not be impleaded, but effect of Sumtibai would be that such a person could be impleaded; and that therefore, the decision in Sumtibai is contrary to the larger bench decision in Kasturi. On a careful consideration, we find that there is no conflict between the two decisions. The two decisions were dealing with different situations requiring application of different facets of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1. This is made clear in Sumtibai itself. It was observed that every judgment must be governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found; that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision and that even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect; that there is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. The decisions in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [ 1992 (2) SCC 524 ] and Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra [ 1995 (3) SCC 147 ] also explain in what circumstances persons may be added as parties. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the Court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The Court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the Court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the Court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. This Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, 1981 (1) SCC 80 , reiterated the classic definition of ‘’discretion’ by Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes - 1770 (98) ER 327, that ‘’discretion’ “when applied to Courts of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, ‘’but legal and regular’. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said Sub-Rule. If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the Court may implead him having regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order I. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual possession. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the Court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the Court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the Court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bonfides etc., the Court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and Court finds him to be a proper party, the Court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the Court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the Court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if ‘’D’ claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of ‘’P’ representing that he is the co-owner with half share, and ‘’P’ files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the Court may permit the other co-owner who contends that ‘’D’ has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the Court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the Court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance, that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. In other words, the Court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. If the principles relating to impleadment, are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be nonexistent. The observations in Kasturi and Sumtibai are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective case. In Kasturi, this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. First respondent - plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title, in the property in dispute. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Mumbai airport being one of the premier airports in India with a very high and ever increasing passenger traffic, needs to modernise and develop every inch of the airport land; that the suit land was a part of the airport land and that for the pendency of first respondent’s suit within an interim order, AAI would have included the suit land also in the lease in its favour. It was submitted that therefore a note was made in the lease that the land measuring 31000 sq.m. was not being made a part of the lease but may become part of the demised premises subject to the Court verdict. This does not in any way help the appellant to claim a right to be impleaded. If the interim order in the suit filed by the first respondent came in the way of granting the lease of the suit land, it is clear that the suit land was not leased to appellant. This does not in any way help the appellant to claim a right to be impleaded. If the interim order in the suit filed by the first respondent came in the way of granting the lease of the suit land, it is clear that the suit land was not leased to appellant. The fact that if AAI succeeded in the suit, the suit land may also be leased to the appellant is not sufficient to hold that the appellant has any right, interest or a semblance of right or interest in the suit property. When appellant is neither claiming any right or remedy against the first respondent and when first respondent is not claiming any right or remedy against the appellant, in a suit for specific performance by the first respondent against AAI, the appellant cannot be a party. The allegation that the land is crucial for a premier airport or in public interest, are not relevant to the issue. 25. Keeping in view the above said facts, plaintiffs/petitioners cannot derive any benefit in the present case from the said judgment as in the instant matter, suit is of permanent injunction and before granting the same, the Court has to see whether any enforceable right has to be occurred to the petitioners/plaintiffs in respect to land in dispute or not and for the said purpose, the Court had directed the plaintiff/petitioner to implead Gaon Sabha as a party. 26. The matter arising out of the suit for specific performance Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Ltd. (Supra) held that the person who has moved an application for impleadment as respondent has got no direct interest in a suit for specific performance of contract, as such, the case of the said facts stands on the different footing and from which petitioner cannot derive any benefit. 27. Accordingly, in view of the above said facts, the Court has to adjudicate and decide the present case whether the land in question in regard to which petitioners/plaintiffs, who filed a suit for permanent injunction has got any right/title, is a Gaon Sabha. 27. Accordingly, in view of the above said facts, the Court has to adjudicate and decide the present case whether the land in question in regard to which petitioners/plaintiffs, who filed a suit for permanent injunction has got any right/title, is a Gaon Sabha. Gaon Sabha is a necessary and proper party for adjudication of the dispute involved in a suit, as such, trial Court while exercising its power under order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC is rightly to direct the petitioner to implead Gaon Sabha as a party in order to decide the controversy on merit. For the foregoing reasons, I don’t find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order under challenge in the present writ petition. In the result, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.