JUDGMENT Raghvendra Kumar, J. – Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The plaintiff-respondent no.1 instituted original suit No. 445 of 1995 against the appellants/defendant and Shia Central Board of Waqf U.P. for relief of praying that the defendant be restrained from raising construction over the property in dispute and making interference over the property in dispute of the plaintiff and further prayed that the sale deed dated 17.8.1995 executed by Ram Prasad in favour of appellants-defendant nos. 1 and 2 be declared as void with a further prayer to order for possession in case the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is not found in possession. 3. The suit was contested by respondent and pleadings were exchanged. After receipt of the pleadings, 9 issues were framed by learned trial court. The learned Trial Court vide its order dated 20.2.2015 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (S.D.-I) Banda decreed the suit and cancelled sale deed dated 17.8.1995 and directed the appellant-defendant to hand over the possession to the plaintiff. 4. Being aggrieved by order passed in Original Suit No. 445 of 1995, the appellants-defendants preferred a Civil Appeal No.06 of 2015 before the District Judge, Banda. The District Judge, Banda vide its order dated 17.8.2016 dismissed the civil appeal and affirmed the judgment and order passed by learned Additional Civil Judge ( S.D.-I) Banda in original suit. 5. While proceedings with the adjudication of the original suit, issue nos. 3 and 4 relating to the valuation of suit, was decided vide order dated 15.5.2007. It was decided that the suit was correctly valued and sufficient court fee was paid. 6. The further issue nos. 6 & 7 were also decided vide order dated 22.10.2014. Issue No. 8 was with respect to section 85 of the Waqf Act of 1995 which ousts the jurisdiction of civil court with respect to Waqf property. Issue Nos. 6 and 7 again is related to the payment of court fee with respect to relief of ejectment. 7. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that the suit is barred by the provisions of section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Admittedly, the appellants are deriving title from their predecessors-in-interest. Patta was executed in their favour by Ram Prasad alias Prasadi Lal in the capacity as Manager of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. 8. 7. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the appellants that the suit is barred by the provisions of section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Admittedly, the appellants are deriving title from their predecessors-in-interest. Patta was executed in their favour by Ram Prasad alias Prasadi Lal in the capacity as Manager of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. 8. It has further been argued on behalf of plaintiff-respondent No.1 that the suit is not barred by the provisions of section 85 of Waqf Act of 1995, firstly because the Act came into force from Ist January, 1996, whereas the suit was instituted by plaintiff-respondent no.1 in the year 1995. The legal position is settled that the bar would not operate retrospectively since the Act was not given effect to on the date of institution of the suit. 9. The counsel for the respondent in support of his submission further explained that the controversy has been taken care of by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhanwar Lal and another v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf and others reported in AIR 2014 S.C.758. 10. Paragraph 23 containing the observation of Hon'ble Apex Court about the nature of suits cognisable by civil court is extracted herein below : "23. The suit is for cancellation of sale deed, rent and for possession as well as rendition of accounts and for removal of trustees. However,pleading in the suit are not filed before us and, therefore, exact nature of relief claimed as well as averments made in the plaint or written statements are not known to us. We are making these remarks for the reason that some of the reliefs claimed in the suit appeared to be falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal whereas for other reliefs civil suit would be competent. Going by the ratio of Ramesh Gobind Ram (supra), suit for possession and rent is to be tried by the civil court. However, suit pertaining to removal of trustees and rendition of accounts would fall within the domain of the Tribunal. In so far as relief of cancellation of sale deed is concerned this is to be tried by the civil court for the reason that it is not covered by Section 6 or 7 of the Act whereby any jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunal to decided such an issue. In so far as relief of cancellation of sale deed is concerned this is to be tried by the civil court for the reason that it is not covered by Section 6 or 7 of the Act whereby any jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunal to decided such an issue. Moreover, relief of possession, which can be given by the civil court, depends upon the question as to whether the sale deed is valid or not. Thus, the issue of sale deed and possession and inextricably mixed with each other. We have made these observations to clarify the legal position. In so far as present case is concerned, since the suit was filed much before the Act came into force, going by the dicta laid down in Sardar Khan case, it is the civil court where the suit was filed will continue to have the jurisdiction over the issue and civil court would be competent to decide the same." 11. In view of the legal position as propounded by Hon'ble Apex Court it can safely be inferred that the learned trial court and the learned First Appellate Court have not committed any error of law in holding that suit in nature filed before the trial court was cognisable by the Civil Court. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants-defendants submitted that the Court fee paid is not sufficient and has placed reliance upon the case A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam reported in 2012 (117) RD 249 (Supreme Court). In the aforesaid proposition of law the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 20 has made an observation that : "The question of Court fee is a matter between the plaintiff and the Court is a principle which has been followed for a long time." 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court has approved the observation made by Apex Court in earlier pronouncement in the case of Rathnavarma Raja v. Smt.Vimala ( AIR 1961 SC 1299 ), which is being reproduced herein below : "The Court Fee Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action." 14. The counsel for the appellants-defendants has also placed reliance upon the case Rajkumar Singh v. Ranvir Singh and others : 2011 (113) RD 521 (Allahabad High Court). 15. The counsel for the appellants-defendants has also placed reliance upon the case Rajkumar Singh v. Ranvir Singh and others : 2011 (113) RD 521 (Allahabad High Court). 15. The position is settled in this regard. The matter of payment of Court fee is matter between the plaintiff and the Court/State. The proposition of law reported in 2011 (113) RD 521 propounded by Allahabad High Court is of not of much avail since the facts involved in the Rulings are not identical to the facts of the Second Appeal in hand. 16. So far as the valuation aspect is concerned, the learned courts below have recorded a concurrent finding. The finding recorded by the trial court about the proper valuation and payment of court-fee has been upheld by the First Appellate Court. Learned courts below do not appear to have committed any error of law. As such no substantial question of law arises in the appeal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction in Second appeal. 17. The appeal is bereft of merit and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.