JUDGMENT : Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. This second appeal, at the instance of the landlords is against the judgment and decree dated July 24, 1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 14th Court, Alipore thereby, affirming the judgment and decree dated March 30, 1987 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore dismissing the ejectment suit being Title Suit No. 112 of 1961 (in short “the said suit”). Since the ejectment suit had its origin way back in the year 1961 and this case has a chequered background it is necessary to mention the following facts. It was the appellants’ father who had filed the said suit way back in the year 1961 claiming a decree for eviction against the respondent company from the suit property, being the ground and first floor of premises no. 23/21, Gariahat Road situate in the heart of city of Kolkata (hereinafter referred to as “the suit property”). One of the grounds urged by the original plaintiff in the said suit was that he required the suit property for the use and occupation of himself and the members of his family. The suit property comprises nine rooms, two verandas, two privies, a mezzanine floor (15’ 6”/10’ 2”), four rooms used as servants quarter, two privies and two bathrooms for the servants. The respondent company contested the said suit. In its written statement the respondent alleged, inter-alia, that the rent of the suit property, comprising ground floor and the first floor was enhanced from Rs. 650/- to Rs. 750/- per month and that the original plaintiff and his family have suitable accommodation and they do not reasonably require the suit property. During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff died, leaving behind his wife, since deceased and children (the present appellants) who were substituted as the plaintiffs in the said suit. Apart from the said suit, the father of the appellants filed another eviction suit being Title Suit No. 122 of 1962 against Bijay Kumar Karnani, one of the directors of the respondent company a tenant in respect of the second and the third floor of the same premises no. 23/21, Gariahat Road, Kolkata. By a common judgment and decree dated February 28, 1967 the learned trial Judge dismissed the Title Suit No. 122 of 1962 filed against the said Bijay Kumar Karnani, but decreed the said suit against the respondent. 23/21, Gariahat Road, Kolkata. By a common judgment and decree dated February 28, 1967 the learned trial Judge dismissed the Title Suit No. 122 of 1962 filed against the said Bijay Kumar Karnani, but decreed the said suit against the respondent. The respondent, being the defendant in the said Title Suit No. 112 of 1961 preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 529 of 1967, against the said judgment and decree for eviction passed by the learned trial Judge. The appellants and their mother, since deceased also challenged the said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing Title Suit No. 122 of 1962 against the said Bijay Kumar Karnani. By a common judgment and decree, the learned first appellate Court allowed both the said appeals and remanded both the suits to the learned Court below. The trial Judge appointed an advocate commissioner for inspecting the suit property. The said advocate commissioner inspected the suit property and filed his report before the learned trial Judge stated the particulars of the suit property mentioned above. After retrial, by the judgment and decree dated June 16, 1969 the learned trial Judge once again decreed the said suit and directed eviction of the respondent from the suit property but, dismissed the said Title Suit No. 122 of 1962 against the said Bijay Kumar Karnanai. The respondent challenged the judgment and decree for eviction passed against it in the said suit, in Title Appeal No. 1128 of 1969 which was dismissed on contest by the learned first appellate Court. The respondent then challenged the said judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court, by preferring a second appeal before this Court which was admitted and numbered as S.A. No. 1350 of 1970. This Court disposed of the appeal and remanded the said suit to the learned trial Court on limited remand by framing two additional issues, (i) whether after the death of the original plaintiff, the substituted plaintiffs still require the suit premises reasonably for their own occupation, and (ii) whether the present plaintiffs are in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation. Admittedly, the plaintiffs appellants were and still residing at Premises No. 24, Ripon Street comprising a two storied building (hereinafter referred to as “the Ripon Street property”) purchased by their mother, since deceased. Admittedly, the plaintiffs appellants were and still residing at Premises No. 24, Ripon Street comprising a two storied building (hereinafter referred to as “the Ripon Street property”) purchased by their mother, since deceased. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as per their array in the trial Court. After remand of the said suit, the learned trial Court appointed another advocate commissioner to inspect the Ripon Street property where the plaintiffs are presently residing. The said advocate commissioner inspected the Ripon Street property and filed his report before the learned trial Judge which was marked as (Exbt. 13) in the suit. As per the said report of the said second advocate commissioner, there are seven rooms together with kitchen, Thakur ghar and bathroom on the first floor of the said the Ripon Street property. In his report, the said advocate commissioner also stated that there are seven rooms in the ground floor of the Ripon Street property, where certain printing machineries and press articles were lying. The field note prepared by the said advocate commissioner dated August 09, 1978 and annexed to his report filed before the learned trial Judge (Exbt.-13) recorded his finding that the height of the ground floor of the Ripon Street property was abnormally low, in comparison with that of the first floor and water was woozing out from the floor. The said advocate commissioner was cross- examined before the learned trial Judge. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the height the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is only 6 feet, the ground floor of the said property was all along used for running their press and the same cannot be used for residential purpose. In his cross-examination, the said advocate commissioner stated that while he was a person of 6 feet height, though the roof of the ground floor did not actually touch his head, but it was about 2” to 3” above his head. After considering the report of the said advocate commissioner and his oral evidence, as also the evidence adduced by the plaintiff no. 5, on behalf of all the plaintiffs, the learned trial Judge held that the family of the plaintiffs consisted of six members, including their married sister and they required six rooms at best which are available on the first floor of the present accommodation at the Ripon Street property. 5, on behalf of all the plaintiffs, the learned trial Judge held that the family of the plaintiffs consisted of six members, including their married sister and they required six rooms at best which are available on the first floor of the present accommodation at the Ripon Street property. The learned trial Judge further held that presently no business of printing press is being carried on by the plaintiffs in the ground floor of the Ripon Street property. Based on such findings, by the judgment and decree dated March 13, 1987, the learned trial Judge held that both the aforementioned issues framed by this Court at the time of remand, against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit against the defendant with costs. The plaintiffs carried the said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge in appeal, being Appeal No. 472 of 1987 before the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Alipore. After considering the report of the said advocate commissioner (Exbt.- 13) and his evidence, as also the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, by a judgment dated July 24, 1991 the learned lower appellate Court upheld the finding of the learned trial Judge that after the death of the original plaintiff, the family of the present plaintiffs comprises six members including one married sister, there are seven rooms on the first floor of the Ripon Street property, the plaintiffs have sufficient accommodation in the Ripon Street property and they do not reasonably require the suit property for their own use and occupation. Accordingly, by the impugned judgment and decree the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. It is against this judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the plaintiffs filed the present second appeal in 1992, as S.A.T. No. 1552 of 1992 and the same was renumbered as S.A. No. 328 of 2002. During the pendency of the second appeal, the wife of the original plaintiff (the appellant no. 1) died. On September 26, 2003, the Division Bench of this Court directed that the second appeal will be heard on the following added ground. During the pendency of the second appeal, the wife of the original plaintiff (the appellant no. 1) died. On September 26, 2003, the Division Bench of this Court directed that the second appeal will be heard on the following added ground. “Whether in view of the subsequent facts relating to the enlargement of the size of the plaintiffs’ family and in view of the notice of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation dated 06.01.2003, the plaintiffs reasonably require the premises in suit for their own use and occupation.” During the pendency of the second appeal, the plaintiffs filed an application for amendment of the plaint filed in the said suit to the effect that at present the family members of the plaintiffs have increased to thirteen and they require fourteen rooms which are not available with them in their present accommodation at the Ripon Street property; that the said property is in dilapidated condition, it has become inhabitable and may collapse at any time, and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (in short “Municipal Corporation”) has issued a notice under Section 411(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The plaintiffs further alleged that following the issuance of the said notice by Municipal Corporation, the plaintiffs engaged a licensed building surveyor attached to the Municipal Corporation, who made a report that the said property is a dilapidated building and in any event that the Ripon Street property is unfit for accommodation of any person for residential purpose; the ground floor rooms are not at all habitable, the height of the ground floor rooms are only 6 feet and there is leakage of water to the ground floor of the said building. By the order dated July 15, 2008, a learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the amendment application of the plaintiffs and pending final decision in the second appeal directed remand of the said suit to the learned trial Judge for a fresh decision on the following issues: (i) Whether at all or to what extent, if any, the premises at 24, Ripon Street, Calcutta – 16 is dilapidated or not. (ii) Whether any part of the premises requires immediate repairing or not. (iii) Whether at all or to what extent, if any, any part of the building is unsafe for human inhabitation. (ii) Whether any part of the premises requires immediate repairing or not. (iii) Whether at all or to what extent, if any, any part of the building is unsafe for human inhabitation. The learned Single Judge allowed the defendant to file its additional written statement to the amended plaint of the plaintiffs and directed the learned trial Court to appoint an engineer commissioner to inspect the Ripon Street property and to obtain a report from him on the aforementioned points and also on the issue whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises. Thereafter, the plaintiffs amended their plaint by incorporating the aforementioned subsequent facts and the defendant also filed additional written statement denying the allegations incorporated in the plaint by way of amendment. In terms of the aforesaid direction passed this Court, the learned trial Court appointed an engineer commissioner to file his report on the aforementioned three points. The said engineer commissioner inspected the Ripon Street property and filed his report before the learned trial Judge which was marked as (Exbt.- 17). In his said report, the engineer commissioner stated that the ground floor of the main building of the Ripon Street property is 7 feet in height, the floors of the ground floor are all dampy and cracked in some places. So far as the first floor rooms of the said Ripon Street building is concerned, the height of the hall is 15 feet and other surrounding rooms are of 14 feet height. The engineer commissioner further found that the building of the Ripon Street property particularly, the ground floor and rooms in verandah, corridor, passage rooms including the central hall of the first floor require repairing, the building can be repaired and is safe for habitation, the building cannot be said to dilapidated, it is reparable and no part of the building is unsafe for habitation. The plaintiffs filed their objection to the report of the engineer commissioner denying its correctness. The engineer commissioner was examined before the learned trial Judge. In his cross-examination, the engineer commissioner admitted to be aware of the Building Rules of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (presently named, as Kolkata Municipal Corporation) that a habitable room normally has a height of about 10 feet and that the height of the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is about 7 feet. In his cross-examination, the engineer commissioner admitted to be aware of the Building Rules of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (presently named, as Kolkata Municipal Corporation) that a habitable room normally has a height of about 10 feet and that the height of the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is about 7 feet. He further maintained that the entire building of the Ripon Street property is safe and no part of the said building is in dangerous condition or is unsafe for habitation. Before the learned trial Judge, the plaintiff no. 5 (PW-1) who had already adduced evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, adduced additional evidence. In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 stated that the plaintiff nos. 1 and 2, being bachelors needs one room each; the plaintiff no. 4 and his wife require one room for themselves and one room for their son. He himself requires four rooms; one room for himself and his wife, one room for his unmarried daughter, one room for his handicapped son and one room for the whole time attendant who looks after his son. He further stated that the plaintiff no. 3, though a married daughter of the original plaintiff, is the co-owner of the suit property and she is entitled to one room as per her share in the suit property, so that she along with her family members may stay at the suit property during their visit. PW-1 also stated that since the plaintiffs are in joint mess they require one drawing room, one dining room and two kitchens. He further stated that one room is required for the married daughter of the plaintiff no. 4, who occasionally visits and stays with her parents and another room is required for the maid servant of the family members of the plaintiff nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. Thus, in his examination-in-chief PW-1 claimed that the plaintiffs require at least thirteen rooms, two kitchens and toilets. In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 further stated that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is not habitable for human being, there is no window, the floor of the ground floor of the said building is lying in very bad condition and water comes from underneath the floor during rainy season and the ground floor cannot be seen without electric light in the day time. In his cross-examination, PW-1 reiterated that the plaintiff nos. In his cross-examination, PW-1 reiterated that the plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 being bachelors require one room for each of them, he requires four rooms for his family, his elder brother the plaintiff no. 4 requires two bed rooms for his family and it would be suitable if he gets another room for his married daughter who stays in Kolkata. PW-1 further denied the suggestion put to him that the accommodation available at the Ripon Street property is more than sufficient for the family members of the plaintiffs. The report of the engineer commissioner, along with the writ issued by the trial Court to him were marked as (Exbt. 17 series). After considering the additional evidence adduced by PW-1, by the order dated September 25, 2008 the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiff nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 require altogether eight rooms, that is, seven rooms for themselves and one room for accommodating the married sister (the plaintiff no. 3) and/or the daughter, whenever they visit the premises and stays overnight and as such the total requirement of the plaintiffs’ family is for eight rooms. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the defendant. Considering the additional evidence adduced by PW-1 and the report of the engineer commissioner and his cross-examination, the learned trial Judge further held that none of the Municipal Corporation people came suo motu to declare the Ripon Street property as an old building and/or calls for demolishion of the same, the alleged notice issued by the Municipal Corporation under Section 411(1) of the C.M.C. Act, 1980 are based on surmises and conjectures and the same are bad, both in facts and in law. The learned trial Judge further recorded that the report of the engineer commissioner was exhibited on consent of both sides and accepted the said report that it cannot be said that the Ripon Street property is dilapidated, the building of the Ripon Street property as a whole particularly the ground floor and the rooms in veranda, corridor, passage rooms including the central wall of the first floor require repair and that at present no part of the said building is unsafe for habitation. The learned trial Judge also held that though the engineer commissioner has been cross-examined at length, but nothing has been elicited to discredit his report. The learned trial Judge also held that though the engineer commissioner has been cross-examined at length, but nothing has been elicited to discredit his report. So far as the issue with regard to the reasonable requirement of the suit property by the plaintiffs, the learned trial Judge held that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient. The learned trial Judge forwarded order dated September 25, 2008 with his above findings to this Court. Against the above findings of the learned trial Judge in the aforesaid order dated September 25, 2008 the plaintiffs have filed an objection to this Court under Order XL1 Rule 26(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is also to be decided in this appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal, as also the objection filed by the plaintiffs passed against the aforesaid order dated September 25, 2008 passed by the learned trial Judge, the plaintiffs filed another application, being C.A.N. 2300 of 2011, under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code, for amendment of the plaint filed in the said suit for bringing on record the fact of the marriage of one of their family members namely, Siddhartha Dasgupta with one Srirupa Gupta as recorded in the marriage certificate dated March 31, 2010. By an order dated August 17, 2011, this Court allowed the said amendment application and the plaintiffs duly amended the plaint filed in the said suit by incorporating the averments of the requirement of at least fourteen rooms for their urgent accommodation in view of the marriage of the said Siddhartha Dasgupta, being one of their family members. The defendant has also filed its additional written statement alleging that the plaintiffs in their own pleading in the plaint, claimed that they require fourteen rooms, including one separate room for Siddhartha Dasgupta and his wife and from the report of the Commissioner it is clear that the premises in which the plaintiffs are presently residing have fourteen rooms, which include several large rooms which can be partitioned into two and as such the marriage of Siddhartha Dasgupta does not give rise to requirement of any additional room. When the appeal was taken up for hearing on May 18, 2012 the defendant contended that in view of the amendment of the plaint recording the marriage of the said Siddhartha Dasgupta, the matter should once again be remanded to the learned trial Court for additional evidence. However, considering the fact that the eviction suit is pending since 1961 and that the defendant did not dispute the marriage of the said Siddhartha Dasgupta, and in the unamended plaint, the plaintiffs landlords had already projected the requirement of one separate room for Siddhartha as being unmarried son of the plaintiff no. 4, this Court rejected the contention of the defendant tenant to remand the suit once again to the learned trial Court. In view of the enlarged scope of the present second appeal, by reason of the aforementioned subsequent facts and the objection filed by the plaintiffs, under order XL1 Rule 26(1) of the Code against the findings of the learned trial Judge in the said order dated September 25, 2008, after hearing the learned counsel appearing for both sides, on February 25, 2016 this Court framed another substantial question of law for the decision in second appeal which is as follows: “Whether and how far the appellants in the second appeal can challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge in the present case on remand?” Mr. Asis Chandra Bagchi, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs first contended that by the order dated July 15, 2008 this Court remanded the suit and directed the learned trial Court to take additional evidence and to return his finding on the aforementioned issues to this Court and in view of Order XL1 Rule 26(1) of the Code, the plaintiffs filed their objection to the findings of the learned trial Judge on remand to this Court. He contended that in the instant case, instead of remanding the said suit to the learned lower appellate Court, this Court had remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge and, therefore, the plaintiffs, as the appellants are entitled to challenge the findings of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 on both questions of fact and law in this second appeal. In support of such contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasirul Haque vs. Jitendranath Dey reported in AIR 1984 SC 1799 . Mr. In support of such contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nasirul Haque vs. Jitendranath Dey reported in AIR 1984 SC 1799 . Mr. Bagchi strenuously urged that the finding of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 that the plaintiff nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 require seven rooms and one room for accommodating both the married sister and the married daughter of the plaintiff no. 4 is vitiated by perversity, inasmuch as the same is contrary to the pleadings of the parties, as also the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs’ witness, that is, PW-1 after remand. He further contended that it has all along been the case of the plaintiffs, in their amended plaint as also through the evidence of PW-1, that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is not fit for human habitation, the same was all along used as a press for their earlier printing business, the height of the ground floor is 6 feet only. Mr. Bagchi placed the cross-examination of both the second advocate commissioner as also the engineer commissioner appointed by the learned trial Judge. He submitted that the second advocate commissioner, in his cross-examination, admitted the height of the ground floor of the Ripon Street property to be 6’-2” to 6’-3”. He also pointed out that in his cross-examination the engineer commissioner admitted that as per the Building Rules of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, a habitable room normally has a height of about 10 feet whereas, the height of the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is about 7 feet. According to Mr. Bagchi from the report of both the said advocate commissioner and the engineer commissioner it is beyond doubt that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property was all along used for running a press and although the printing business of the plaintiffs is presently closed, but the ground floor of the said property would never be used by the plaintiffs for their residential accommodation. It was the further submission of Mr. It was the further submission of Mr. Bagchi that in his examination-in-chief before the learned trial Judge, after remand, when PW-1 stated that there is no window in the ground floor of the Ripon Street property and the ground floor of the said building cannot be seen without electricity connection even during the day time, there was no cross-examination of PW-1, by the defendant, with regard to such facts. Thus, he submitted that apart from the short height there is no ventilation available in the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property and the plaintiffs landlords cannot be compelled to use the ground floor of the Ripon Street property, all along used for running a press, for their residential accommodation. Mr. Bagchi further urged that when the plaintiffs in their amended plaint categorically mentioned that their present family consists of fourteen members and they require fourteen rooms, not even a suggestion was put to PW-1, during his cross-examination before the learned trial Judge, to dispute that the plaintiffs’ family comprises fourteen members or that the plaintiffs do not require fourteen rooms for their family. Relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet vs. A.Y. Derderian reported in AIR 1961 Cal 359 , he contended that when no suggestion was put to PW-1 in his cross-examination disputing the plaintiffs’ claim for fourteen rooms for the residential purpose of the family, the defendants accepted the said case of the plaintiffs. Thus, according to him, once again when the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property cannot be used for the plaintiffs’ residential accommodation, the finding of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008, on remand, that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at Premises No. 24, Ripon Street does not appear to be insufficient is perverse and liable to be set aside by this Court. So far as the finding of the learned trial Judge, on remand, with regard to the three issues framed by this Court, as to whether if any portion of the Ripon Street property is dilapidated, whether any part of the said property requires immediate repairing and whether any part of the building is unsafe for human habitation, Mr. So far as the finding of the learned trial Judge, on remand, with regard to the three issues framed by this Court, as to whether if any portion of the Ripon Street property is dilapidated, whether any part of the said property requires immediate repairing and whether any part of the building is unsafe for human habitation, Mr. Bagchi contended that when the plaintiffs had filed their objection to the report of the engineer commissioner before the learned trial Judge, pointing out various discrepancies in the said report, the recording of the learned trial Judge that the said report was exhibited on consent of both sides is also vitiated by perversity and the learned trial Judge committed an error of law to accept the report of the engineer commissioner that the Ripon Street property cannot be said to be dilapidated, that the building is repairable and no part of the building is unsafe or habitation. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pushkar Singh vs. Ansuiya reported in (2006) 6 SCC 799 , Mr. Bagchi submitted that when the plaintiffs have established that their present accommodation at the Ripon Street property is insufficient and not suitable, while passing the order dated September 25, 2008 the learned trial Judge committed grave error of law to hold that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient and, therefore, this Court in second appeal should set aside the said finding the learned trial Judge and pass a decree for eviction against the defendants. He further cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani, reported in AIR 1998 SC 3012 and submitted that although in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff landlord of the suit property, the defendant tenant is entitled to put up a defence that the landlord has other reasonably suitable residential accommodation, but in the present case the defendant could not substantiate its defence that the present accommodation of the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property is either reasonable or suitable. He next cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons vs. Pushpa Trading Co. He next cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons vs. Pushpa Trading Co. reported in (1998) 5 SCC 572 and contended that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit property by the plaintiff landlord, in order to establish a defence that the plaintiff landlord has alternative accommodation the defendant tenant must prove that such accommodation is reasonably suitable for the plaintiff and if it is not so, then mere availability of the alternative accommodation of the landlord will not be a ground to refuse a decree for eviction, if otherwise the Courts are satisfied about the genuine requirement of the landlord. Mr. Bagchi further relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Hemangani Devi vs. Sukumar Basu and Anr. reported in 59 CWN 395 and submitted that it is settled law that, in a suit for eviction under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the reasonable requirement of the landlord has to be decided on his existing accommodation. He urged that in any event, when the report of the engineer commissioner disclosed that the Ripon Street property of the plaintiffs require thorough repairing, the learned trial Judge committed a grave error of law in rejecting the claim of the plaintiffs for reasonable requirement of the suit property. He strenuously contended that it is well settled that it is for the landlord in an eviction suit for reasonable requirement of the suit property for his own accommodation, to decide how and in what manner he should live and in the present case when the ground floor of the Ripon Street property cannot be used for residential purpose and the report of the engineer commissioner discloses that the Ripon Street property requires thorough repairing, the plaintiffs being the best judges of their residential requirement are entitled to get a decree for eviction against the defendant from the suit property. However, Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel led by Mr. Samit Talukdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant contended that the right of the plaintiffs in the present case to challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 is very restricted. However, Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, learned senior counsel led by Mr. Samit Talukdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant contended that the right of the plaintiffs in the present case to challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 is very restricted. According to him, by the order dated July 15, 2008 this Court remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge for deciding three specific issues and the same was not an open remand. With regard to the substantial question of law framed by this Court on February 25, 2016 whether and how far the appellants in the second appeal can challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge in the present case upon remand he submitted that of course, the plaintiffs can challenge the finding of the learned trial Judge in his order dated September 25, 2008, but such challenge has to be circumscribed by the tests laid down in Section 100 of the Code. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, the challenge under Order XL1 Rule 26 of the Code is also to be guided by Section 100 of the Code and must involve a substantial question of law. He further submitted that as provided in Clause (b) of Section 103 of the Code, in order to successfully assail any finding of the learned trial Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 the plaintiffs must establish that the finding of the learned trial Judge results in wrong determination of an issue, giving rise to a question of law as referred to in Section 100 of the Code. He further submitted that the second question of law framed by this Court in this appeal on February 25, 2016 has two aspects, first, with regard to the requirement of the plaintiffs due to the enlargement of their family size and the second, requirement due to the notice of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation dated January 06, 2003 describing the Ripon Street property to be in dilapidated condition. With regard to the issue as to whether the Ripon Street property is in dilapidated condition or not, Mr. With regard to the issue as to whether the Ripon Street property is in dilapidated condition or not, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that from the evidence of PW-1, before the learned trial Judge on remand, it is evident that the Municipal Corporation issued said notice dated January 06, 2003 at the instance of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs called none from the Municipal Corporation to prove the said notice before the learned trial Judge. He further submitted that in any event, when this Court remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge to decide the aforementioned three issues, with regard to the present condition of building of the Ripon Street property, the said notice dated January 06, 2003 issued by the Municipal Corporation paled into insignificance. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, the landlord’s requirement is to be tested from two angles first, why does he require the suit premises and second, how much of it does he require. Relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satyendra Nath Tagore vs. Barindra Kumar Dutta Gupta reported in 92 CWN 758, he contended that the first question as to the quality or purpose of requirement of the landlord may give rise to a question of law under Section 100 of the Code, requiring the High Court to consider the ground of requirement of the plaintiff landlord to be reasonable or not, but the finding of the learned Courts below as to the quantity or extent of the requirement of the landlord is a question of fact and this Court in a second appeal should not interfere with the said finding of fact arrived at the learned Courts below. Thus, he contended that in the present case the plaintiffs cannot invite this Court, in second appeal to interfere with the finding of the learned trial Judge that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet (supra) cited by the plaintiffs have no application in the present case. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. vs. Kasinath Pujari and Ors. Mr. Bhattacharya further submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet (supra) cited by the plaintiffs have no application in the present case. Relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. vs. Kasinath Pujari and Ors. reported in (1999) 7 SCC 275 and in the case of Kempaiah vs. Lingaiah and Ors. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 718 , Mr. Bhattacharya further contended that it is well settled that in order to succeed in a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground of his reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit property, the plaintiff landlord must substantiate that his requirement of the suit property is not based on his “desire” and his need for the suit property is bona fide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. He urged that in the present case when the learned trial Judge after considering the report of the engineer commissioner and his evidence in cross-examination, as also the evidence adduced by PW-1, held that the plaintiffs available accommodation at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient, it can be safely said that it is only the desire of the plaintiffs to occupy the suit property and they have no bona fide or genuine or honest need of the suit property. Thus, according to Mr. Bhattacharya, the plaintiffs have failed to meet the essential test for obtaining a decree for eviction against the defendants and the decision of the learned trial Judge rejecting the case of the plaintiffs for reasonable requirement of the suit property suffers from no infirmity to be interfered with by this Court in second appeal. He further submitted that it is trite that this Court hearing a second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code, shall not interfere with the finding of the learned trial Judge arrived after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties to the suit, rejecting the claim of the plaintiffs for reasonable requirement of the suit property. In support of such contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Taliparamba Education Society vs. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. and Ors. reported in (1997) 4 SCC 484 . On these grounds, Mr. Bhattacharya strenuously urged for dismissal of the second appeal. In support of such contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Taliparamba Education Society vs. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. and Ors. reported in (1997) 4 SCC 484 . On these grounds, Mr. Bhattacharya strenuously urged for dismissal of the second appeal. I have considered the facts of the case, all the materials lying in the records of this appeal, as well as the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. The substantial question of law framed at the time of admission of the second appeal, as quoted above, involve an issue whether the subsequent enlargement of the size plaintiffs’ family and issuance of aforementioned notice by Municipal Corporation substantiate their claim for reasonable requirement of the suit property. By the order dated July 15, 2008 this Court, without finally deciding the second appeal, remanded the said suit to the learned trial Judge to appoint an engineer commissioner and for a decision on the three issues about the condition of the Ripon Street property already mentioned above, as also on the issue whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises and directed the learned trial Judge to return his finding to this Court after taking additional evidence. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasirul Haque (supra) cited on behalf of the plaintiffs, when the High Court calls for a finding from the trial Court, by-passing the appellate Court and thus depriving the right of the respective parties to appeal before the first appellate Court, the parties can assail the decision the trial Court, on both questions of fact and law. Thus, I find force in the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs that in the present second appeal, they are entitled to challenge all the findings of the learned trial Judge in the impugned order dated September 25, 2008, including his finding that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient. Consequently, the ratio of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Satyendra Nath Tagore (supra), cited on behalf of the defendant, has no bearing in the present case and I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the defendant on the strength of the said decision. Consequently, the ratio of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Satyendra Nath Tagore (supra), cited on behalf of the defendant, has no bearing in the present case and I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the defendant on the strength of the said decision. On the same ground, even the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Taliparamba Education Society (supra) also cited on behalf of the defendant has no application in the present case. In this case, the suit for eviction was filed on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs of the suit property under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short “the Act of 1956”) and for convenience, the said provision is set out hereunder. “13. Protection of tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) to (f) ** * (ff) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3A), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation.” From a bare reading of the above provisions of Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956 it is clear that if, the present accommodation of the plaintiff landlord is reasonably suitable, then he is not entitled to get a decree against the tenant for his eviction from the suit property. In other words, if the defendant tenant in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit property succeeds to establish that the plaintiff is already in possession of a reasonably suitable accommodation, the suit shall fail. Now let us consider, if the plaintiffs’ present accommodation at the Ripon Street property is reasonably suitable for them or not. As already discussed above, in their amended plaint the plaintiffs explained their requirement of fourteen rooms for their residential accommodation with the increased size of their family. Now let us consider, if the plaintiffs’ present accommodation at the Ripon Street property is reasonably suitable for them or not. As already discussed above, in their amended plaint the plaintiffs explained their requirement of fourteen rooms for their residential accommodation with the increased size of their family. In his examination-in-chief before the learned trial Judge, after remand, PW-1 explained the requirement of at least thirteen rooms. During his cross-examination, in answer to the questions put to him, the PW1 reiterated the requirement of one room each for each of his two bachelor brothers, his own family requires four rooms, the plaintiff no. 4 requires at least two bed rooms for his family and it would be suitable if he gets another room for his married daughter who visits her parents and they maintain two kitchens. In his cross examination PW-1 stated that the plaintiffs have one domestic help. However, the defendants put no question, not even a suggestion to PW-1, in his cross-examination with regard to the plaintiffs’ claim for one room for the family of the plaintiff no. 3, the married daughter of the original plaintiff or about the requirement of one drawing room and one dinning room for the entire family or about the requirement of one room for the married daughter of the plaintiff no. 3 and one room for the maid servant/domestic help. In fact, in the cross-examination of PW-1 no suggestion was put on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiffs do not require thirteen rooms for their residential accommodation. Thus, I find that the ratio of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet (supra), cited on behalf of the plaintiffs, that wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all is squarely applicable here and the defendant accepted the plaintiffs’ requirement of thirteen records for their residential accommodation. The only suggestion put to PW-1 that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property is more than sufficient for their family was denied by him. The only suggestion put to PW-1 that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property is more than sufficient for their family was denied by him. Further, in the amended plaint the plaintiffs stated that the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property are not habitable, inasmuch as those rooms do not contain any window in strict sense, the height of the ground floor is around 6 feet and there is leakage of water to the ground floor rooms. In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 asserted the said statements about the condition of the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property. However, in cross-examination, not even a suggestion was put to PW-1 to dispute the case of the plaintiffs that the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property is not habitable and cannot be used for residential purpose. Thus, once again I find that the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.E.G. Carapiet (supra) cited on behalf of the plaintiffs already quoted above is squarely applicable in this case. Further, the field note of the second advocate commissioner appointed by the learned trial Judge forming part of his report (Exbt.-13) and considered in the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Judge and the learned lower appellate Court, recorded that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is of abnormally low height in comparison with that of the first floor and water was woozing out from the floor. From the said report of the advocate commissioner (Exbt.-13) it is proved beyond doubt that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property was used for running the plaintiffs’ business of press which has since been closed. Even the engineer commissioner in his cross-examination admitted that when as per the Building Rules of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, a habitable room normally has a height of about 10 feet, the ground floor rooms of the Ripon Street property is about 7 feet only and the floor of the ground floors rooms is dampy. The defendant has not at all adduced any evidence to deny or dispute all these facts. For all these reasons, I cannot but hold that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property cannot be used by the plaintiffs for residential purpose. The defendant has not at all adduced any evidence to deny or dispute all these facts. For all these reasons, I cannot but hold that the ground floor of the Ripon Street property cannot be used by the plaintiffs for residential purpose. Further, in his report the engineer commissioner (Exbt.-17) stated that the building at the Ripon Street property as a whole, particularly the ground floor require repair. Thus, in the present case when the plaintiffs have proved their requirement of at least thirteen rooms, the ground floor of the Ripon Street property is not habitable and cannot be used for their residential purpose and their present accommodation on the first floor of the Ripon Street property comprising four rooms, one drawing cum dining hall, one kitchen and one toilet and privy cannot constitute reasonably suitable accommodation for them. In these facts, I find that the contention of the plaintiffs that the finding of the learned trial Judge that the accommodation available to them at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient is perverse, is well founded. It is well settled law that in order to decide the question of “reasonably suitable alternative accommodation” under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956 the Court might consider both the extent and the character of the plaintiffs existing accommodation convenience comfort, desirability etc. An authority for this view can be found in the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sonabati Devi vs. Achytanand Dey, reported in 87 CWN 278 (para-20). As already held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narain Arora (supra), Pushkar Singh (supra) and Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah (supra) cited by the plaintiffs, it is well settled law that when a landlord sues his tenant for his eviction from the suit property, on the ground of bona fide/reasonable requirement of the suit property for his own occupation, the existence of an alternative accommodation of the landlord above shall not disentitle him to get a decree for eviction in the ejectment suit, unless his existing alternative accommodation is reasonably suitable accommodation for himself. Considering such principle of law, when in the present case it is proved beyond any doubt that the plaintiffs present accommodation in the Ripon Street property does not constitute reasonable suitable accommodation for them, the plaintiffs have established the ground of eviction of the defendant under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956. Thus, I am unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the defendant that the requirement of the plaintiffs of the suit property for their residential accommodation is only their mere desire or bona fide, genuine or honest requirement that they do not have any of the suit property. Consequently, the said decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Kempaiah (supra) and T. Sivasubramaniam (supra) cited on behalf of the defendant, dismissing the ejectment suits of the plaintiffs landlords, on the ground of lack of bona fide or genuine or honest requirement of the suit property by them, have no application in the present case. In this case, the only defence urged by the defendant against the claim of the plaintiffs for their eviction from the suit property, under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956 was that the plaintiffs have reasonably suitable accommodation at the Ripon Street property. While admitting the second appeal, the Division Bench framed the substantial question of law whether due subsequent enlargement of the size of the plaintiffs’ family and in view of the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation, the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit property for their own use and occupation. It is well settled principle of law that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956 and other local Rent Acts of different States, the High Court in second appeal can interfere with the decree passed by the lower appellate Courts in view of any subsequent increase or decrease of the plaintiff’s requirement. By the said order dated July 15, 2008 the learned Single Judge, pending final decision in the second appeal, remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge for a fresh decision on the aforementioned issues relating to subsequent facts. By the said order dated July 15, 2008 the learned Single Judge, pending final decision in the second appeal, remanded the suit to the learned trial Judge for a fresh decision on the aforementioned issues relating to subsequent facts. Of course, the learned trial Judge cannot be faulted for holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the alleged notices issued by the Municipal Corporation under Section 411(1) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 or to accept the report of the engineer commissioner with regard to the condition the Ripon Street property. However, in the present case, when the plaintiffs have established that the Ripon Street property does not constitute any “reasonable suitable accommodation” for them under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act of 1956 they have substantiated a ground for eviction of the defendants from the suit property. However, as already discussed above while arriving his finding in the said order dated September 25, 2008 that the accommodation available to the plaintiffs at the Ripon Street property does not appear to be insufficient, the learned Judge wrongly addressed the core issue of reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs by not considering the evidence already on record, resulting in miscarriage of justice. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge in the order dated September 25, 2008 to the effect that the plaintiffs’ present accommodation at the Ripon Street property is not insufficient, cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree passed by both the learned Courts below, mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, stand set aside. There shall be a decree for eviction against the defendant respondent from the suit property, being the ground floor and first floor of Premises No. 23/21, Gariahat Road, Kolkata . The respondent defendant is directed to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within August 31, 2016, failing which the plaintiffs appellants shall be entitled to execute this decree. The respondent defendant is directed to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs within August 31, 2016, failing which the plaintiffs appellants shall be entitled to execute this decree. In the event of the failure of the defendant respondent to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs appellants on or before August 31, 2016, there shall also be a decree for mesne profit against the defendant respondent, with effect from April 29, 2016 till the date of actual delivery of possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs appellants and the plaintiffs appellants shall be entitled to approach the learned trial Court for ascertaining the rate and quantum of mesne profit to be paid by the respondent defendant. The department is directed to forthwith send down the lower Courts’ records to the learned Courts below. Let the decree be drawn up expeditiously. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent certified server copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.