ORDER : Jayant Patel, J. As in all these matters a common order has been passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal for short) they are being considered simultaneously. 2. Admit. 3. Mr. K.M. Shivayogiswamy, Learned Addl. Government Advocate appears for the respondents and waives service of notice of admission. 4. With the consent of Learned Advocates appearing on both the sides, these petitions are finally heard. 5. The facts of the case are that the petitioner is engaged in trading electrical goods. For the assessment year of 2005-06, petitioner filed KVAT Returns in Form No. 100. After sometime, the petitioner filed revised return and further annual returns in Form No. 240 before the concerned authority. In the said return petitioner also claimed input tax benefit as per Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as 'the KVAT Act' for the sake of brevity). Assessment was done by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, whereby the tax, interest and penalty were levied. On 10.09.2008, petitioner preferred appeals before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) (hereinafter referred to as 'the First Appellate Authority/Appellate Authority' for brevity). Those appeals were partly allowed but the order on penalty and the interest was not fully set-aside. In so far as it related to non-allowing of the appeal by the First Appellate Authority petitioner preferred appeals before the Tribunal being Appeals No. 809-820/2009. Tribunal vide order dated 14.10.2015 dismissed the appeals. Under the circumstances, the present petitions are before this Court. 6. We may record that pending the appeals before the Tribunal against order dated 10.09.2008 passed by the First Appellate Authority, revisional powers were also exercised under Section 64(1) of the KVAT Act, by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and in exercise of the revisional power, order dated 10.09.2008 which was subject matter of the appeals before the Tribunal was Set-aside and the order of the assessing authority was restored. The Tribunal did record the said aspect and the contention of the State representative that the Tribunal has no power to adjudicate upon the said order of the revisional authority, but the Tribunal did not go into the reasons recorded in the revisional order and decided the appeals on merits and ultimately dismissed the appeals. 7. We have heard Mr. Mallahar Rao, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.M. Shivayogiswamy, Learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 7. We have heard Mr. Mallahar Rao, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. K.M. Shivayogiswamy, Learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 8. As such, First Appellate Authority had partly allowed the appeals preferred by the petitioner. The operative portion of the order of the First Appellate Authority can be extracted for ready reference which is as under: (a) The appeals filed in VAT. AP. Nos. 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 & 240/07-08 are dismissed as per observations made in paragraph 4 of this appeal order. (b) The appeals filed in VAT. AP. Nos. 528 to 533/06-07 and VAT.AP. Nos. 1236 to 1241/07-08 are partly allowed by modifying the impugned re-assessment orders, penalty orders and interest levied by the Respondent as per the observations made in paragraph 8, 9, 10 & 11 of this appeal order. The Respondent is directed to re-calculate the output tax payable, penalty amount payable and interest leviable and thereafter issue revised notice of demand accordingly for each tax period under appeal. 9. The Tribunal in the grounds of appeal at para-4 has specifically taken note that the appeals of the petitioner was regarding penalty levied by the Assessing Officer but it did not interfere with the order of the First Appellate Authority, coupled with the fact that the penalty imposed and the interest levied were excessive and arbitrary and were liable to be deleted. 10. The Tribunal on the aspect of the merit of the appeals did record that the appeals of the appellant-appellant before the Tribunal were allowed by the First Appellate Authority and therefore there was no reason to prefer the appeals before the Tribunal. In our view, no fault can be found by the Tribunal in making the said observation nor can such observations be said to be erroneous. Thereafter, the Tribunal ought not to have made further observation with regard to the input credit claimed by the appellant in the revised return filed by the petitioner and the acceptance of the revised return was not in consonance with the provisions of Section 35(4) of the Act, as the revised return was not filed within a period of six months and there are no powers to condone the delay by the First Appellate Authority. 11. 11. As such, in our view such observations were uncalled for because the First Appellate Authority had accepted the return and based on the same, the appeal was partly allowed. The State Government was not in appeal against the order of the First Appellate Authority. But it was the assessee-petitioner herein who had preferred the appeals on the limited point of levying of interest and the penalty. Therefore, when the Tribunal at the first instance found that the claim of the assessee was accepted by the First Appellate Authority and that there was no reason to prefer the appeal, the Tribunal ought to have ended the matter there and it was not required to make further observations on the aspects of allowing of the claim partly by the First Appellate Authority, since the State Government had not preferred any cross appeal or cross-objections in response to the order of the First Appellate Authority. 12. It further appears that the Tribunal lost sight of the important aspect that the appeal of the petitioner was in so far as not deleting penalty and interest by the First Appellate Authority but in so far as those aspects of charging of interest and penalty are concerned, there is no discussion whatsoever in the impugned order of the Tribunal, as to whether interest and penalty could be levied or not. 13. Under the circumstances, when the appeal of the appellant was limited to the levying of interest and penalty, but the said aspect is not examined at all by the Tribunal, the order by the Tribunal dismissing the appeals cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 14. However, there is one additional development which has also been taken note of by the Tribunal in that the order of the First Appellate Authority dated 10.09.2008 was already set-aside by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revisional jurisdiction. If the order of the First Appellate Authority dated 10.09.2008 was already set-aside, one of the options available to the Tribunal was to dispose of the appeals as having become infructuous. Further the question may also arise with regard to invoking of the revisional jurisdiction by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revision when the appeal was pending against order dated 10.09.2008 passed by the First Appellate Authority before the Tribunal. 15. Further the question may also arise with regard to invoking of the revisional jurisdiction by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revision when the appeal was pending against order dated 10.09.2008 passed by the First Appellate Authority before the Tribunal. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner during the course of hearing submitted that against order dated 24.03.2010 passed by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revisional jurisdiction, whereby the order of the First Appellate Authority dated 10.09.2008 was set-aside, the petitioner did submit the application before the revisional authority at the relevant point of time pointing out that the appeals were pending before the Tribunal against the order dated 10.09.2008, but in spite of the same, the impugned order dated 24.03.2010 has been passed by the revisional authority. He submitted that after the order of the Tribunal was passed, representation was made by the petitioner to the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to reconsider the matter, but the said representation has not been accepted. He submitted that against the said decision, petitioner has preferred a separate appeal being STA No. 126/2016 and the same is pending before this Court. 16. Whereas Mr. K.M. Shivayogiswamy, Learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that as per the provisions of Section 64(1) of the KVAT Act, the revisional powers may not be exercised if on the very subject matter, appeals, were pending before the Tribunal. In his submission, the First Appellate Authority had partly allowed the appeals and to the extent appeals were disallowed, the petitioner had preferred the appeals before the Tribunal and therefore if the revisional powers were exercised against the order of the First Appellate Authority in so far as it related to allowing the appeals partly in contra-distinction to disallowance of the appeals partly, it cannot be said that the revisional powers were unavailable to the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. However, he submitted that what approach could have been taken by the Tribunal at the time of disposal of the appeal in the impugned order is a separate matter but thereby it cannot be said that the order of the revisional authority was without jurisdiction or such order ought not to have been passed by the revisional authority. 17. However, he submitted that what approach could have been taken by the Tribunal at the time of disposal of the appeal in the impugned order is a separate matter but thereby it cannot be said that the order of the revisional authority was without jurisdiction or such order ought not to have been passed by the revisional authority. 17. We find that we need not express any view on the legality and validity of the order dated 24.03.2010 passed by the revisional authority since the same is a subject matter of a separate appeal as referred to herein above i.e., STA No. 126/2016. 18. In any case, subject to the outcome of the proceedings against the order of the revisional authority dated 24.03.2010, it can be said that the order passed by the Tribunal in any case on merits cannot be sustained more particularly, when the Tribunal did not touch at all the subject matter of levy of interest and the penalty for which the appeals were preferred by the petitioner before the Tribunal. 19. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be set-aside and the matters are required to be remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the observations made by this Court in the present order after giving opportunity of hearing to both sides but with a clarification that it is only after the legality and validity of the order dated 24.03.2010 passed by the revisional authority against the order dated 10.09.2008 passed by the First Appellate Authority is finalized, the Tribunal may be required to examine the matter in accordance with law and not prior thereto since as on today, the order dated 10.09.2008 no more exists but may be put to life in the proceedings of STA No. 126/2016 referred to herein above which has been separately preferred by the petitioner herein. 20. In view of the aforesaid observation and discussion, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set-aside with a further direction that all appeals being STA Nos. 809-820/2009 shall stand restored to the file of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to await final conclusion of the aforesaid litigation against the order dated 24.03.2010 passed by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revisional jurisdiction against the order dated 10.09.2008. 809-820/2009 shall stand restored to the file of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is directed to await final conclusion of the aforesaid litigation against the order dated 24.03.2010 passed by the Addl. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in revisional jurisdiction against the order dated 10.09.2008. After the conclusion of the aforesaid matter, the Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the sides keeping in view the observations made by this Court in the present judgment. 21. All appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances, there is no order as to costs. 22. In view of the disposal of the petitions, I.A. No. 1/2016 does not survive and shall stand disposed of. Sales Tax Revision Petitions are Allowed.