JUDGMENT : By means of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the action of the respondents for refusing the petitioner employment under the die-in-harness scheme for death of his father, namely, Karan Chowhan in the harness. 2. The facts which are not in dispute is that Karan Chowhan was serving as a Class IV (Group-D) employee under the Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited (TSECL), the respondent no. 3 herein and in a road traffic accident he died on 24.12.2001 leaving behind his wife, two sons and one daughter, namely, Smt. Namita Chowhan, who is the petitioner in this writ petition. The deceased employee has also left behind her aged mother. Under the die-in-harness scheme, the petitioner applied for a suitable job with all relevant documents to the respondent No.3 but nothing has happened till date and as a result this petition has been filed for direction on the respondents to give her a suitable employment under the die-in-harness scheme. 3. In reply to the averments made in the writ petition, the respondent No. 1, 2 and 4 have admitted the facts as asserted by the petitioner but stated also as under:- “after scrutiny and enquiry it was revealed that one of the surviving family member of the Ld. Karan Chowhan is working under Government of India (Border Security Force), which has been confirmed by the SDM’s report dated F.1(25)/A/SDM/SDR/Estt/1503, dated 01.08.2003 and the TSECL in their 93rd Board Meeting the matter was considered and not recommended the case of the petitioner by the selection Committee for the die-in-harness scheme. As per the Government order No. 1(2)-GA/77, dated 27.10.1983, the employment under die-in-harness scheme is to be provided only in those cases where there is no earning member in the deceased’s family, and as per Government order No. F.1(2)-GA/77, dated 13.08.1996, employees, who are working in Government/public Sector undertakings/Autonomous bodies will be treated as earning member. Hence, the claim of the petitioner for suitable job under Die-in-harness Scheme does not come under the purview of the scheme. Hence, the facts and circumstances stated above the instant Writ petition is devoid of merit and deserved to be dismissed. ” 4. Mr. A.C. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in the rejoinder what the petitioner has averred that has not been contested by the respondents. Hence, the facts and circumstances stated above the instant Writ petition is devoid of merit and deserved to be dismissed. ” 4. Mr. A.C. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in the rejoinder what the petitioner has averred that has not been contested by the respondents. The petitioner has asserted as under:- “In this regard the petitioner states that though there is an earning member but the said earning member is living separately from the family of the deceased Karan Chowhan hence the prayer of the petitioner may kindly be considered by this Honourable High Court. It is further to be noted here that the brother of the petitioner is also working as BSF prior to the death of her father. And in that case the petitioner is not eligible for getting job under the scheme will be an arbitrary decision of the Government.” Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has further submitted that in order to expand the scope of the die-in-harness scheme by the notification dated 26.12.2015, it has been incorporated as under:- “Provided that a married son or daughter-in-law or widowed daughter, if he/she lives/used to live separately from other members of the family on or before the death of the Government employee shall not be considered as family member and at the same time he/she shall not be treated as earning member of the family of the government employee for the purpose of providing benefits under the Scheme only”. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has quite strenuously submitted that since the earning brother of the petitioner has been living separately, by operation of the proviso added below the para 2, the embargo that has been indicated in the counter affidavit shall be deemed to have been removed by its retrospective operation. Thus, the petitioner is to be held eligible to get employment under the die-in-harness scheme for death of her father, as stated. In the alternative, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that the State Government has the power to relax the rules under the die-in-harness scheme, as published on 26.12.2015 as para 15 provides as under:- “Power to relax : Where the State Government is of the opinion that if it is felt necessary or expedient to do so, it may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing relax any of the provisions of this scheme”. Mr. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has again urged this Court to direct the State Government to relax the rules to accomodate the petitioner and to give her an employment under the die-in-harness scheme. 5. Mr. G.S. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 1,2 and 4 has contended that the petitioner is not eligible to be considered in the die-in-harness scheme as one of the family members of the deceased employee is working as a Central Government employee. 6. Having due regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel and on having scrutinized the records placed before this Court this Court is of the opinion that the proviso as added below Clause 2 of the die-in-harness scheme by the notification dated 26.12.2015 cannot be given retrospective operation for the reason that a statute or a rule which affects the substantive rights is presumed to be proscriptive in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute or a rule which merely affects the procedure unless such a construction is textually impossible is presumed to be retrospective in its application and should not be given as extended meaning and should strictly be confined to its clearly defined limits. The Apex Court in Videocon International Ltd versus Securities & Exchange Board of India reported in (2015) 4 SCC 33 , the Apex Court has observed as under:- “From the law settled by this Court in various cases, the illustrative though not exhaustive, principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows :- (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation, unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a Statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is texturally impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning, and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal, even though remedial, is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no such right exists in procedural law. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal, even though remedial, is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural Statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively, where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations, or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A Statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities, shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication”. 7. As such, this Court is of the view that the proviso added by the notification dated 26.12.2015 cannot have any retrospective operation and as such the petitioner cannot derive any benefit out of the said new proviso as added by the notification dated 26.12.2015. 8. The other limb of submission as extended by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel is discarded by this Court as whether a provision under the die-in-harness scheme should be relaxed or not, it does not fall within the domain of this Court. The State Government can only make such relaxation in terms of the para 15 of the Die-in-Harness scheme, as reproduced above. 9. The petitioner may file appropriate representation to the State Government seeking relaxation in terms of the para 15 of the Die-in-Harness scheme to accommodate her by way of an appointment under the die-in-harness scheme and the State Government in their wisdom may take the appropriate decision in the matter. 10. Having held so, this writ petition is dismissed. However, the dismissal of the writ petition shall not stand in the way of the State Government to consider relaxation, if the petitioner submits any representation in this regard. There shall be no order as to cost.