JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Present appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 29/08/2000, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana, camp at: Patan in Sessions Case No. 203 of 1999, whereby, while acquitting original accused Nos. 2 to 5 from the charges levelled against them, the original accused No. 1, the appellant of Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2000, came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part (II) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, 'the IPC') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2000 has been filed by the original accused No. 1 against conviction, whereas, Criminal Appeal No. 964 of 2000 has been filed by the State against acquittal of original accused Nos. 1 to 4 for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 304-B, 498-A and 114 of the IPC. 2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are that marriage of deceased Arunaben and original accused No. 1 - Rathod Shaktisinh Kanubha was solemnized on 12/12/1998. It was the case of the prosecution that after the marriage, the deceased was being physically and mentally harassed for want of dowry, which the deceased could not fulfill and hence, all the accused, who happened to be the husband and the in-laws of the deceased, on 4-5/03/1999 between 21:00 and 6:00 hours, done the deceased to death by strangulation at her matrimonial house itself and thereby, committed the offence under various sections of the IPC as well as of the Dowry Prohibition Act, for which a complaint came to be lodged against them. 2.1 Pursuant to the complaint, investigation was carried out. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and as the case was triable by the Court of Sessions, it was committed to the Sessions Court at Mahesana, camp at: Patan. 2.2 The trial Court framed charge against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence. 2.3 In order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined following witnesses and also produced several documentary evidence, as under : ORAL EVIDENCE S/n. Name of Witness Exh. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence. 2.3 In order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined following witnesses and also produced several documentary evidence, as under : ORAL EVIDENCE S/n. Name of Witness Exh. 1 Rupabhai Veerabhai Solanki, Circle Officer 47 2 Prakashbhai Khemaji Hadula, Mamlatdar 52 3 Jashuben Suryakantbhai Raval 53 4 Harubhai Ratansinh Jadeja, complainant 54 5 Dattaba Harubhai Jadeja, Mother of the deceased 59 6 Geetaba Vijaysinh Parmar 60 7 Vijaysinh Balsinh Parmar 61 8 Bharatsinh Balsinh Parmar 62 9 Bharatkumar Dahyalal Darji 63 10 Dr. Dashrathbharthi Pashabharthi Swami 65 11 Vaidh Pravinbhai Kanjibhai 71 12 Thakor Meghaji Gandaji 72 13 Younusbhai Mohammadbhai Shaikh 74 14 Manojkumar L. Ninama, DySP 75 15 Raghuji Gamirji Dabhi, ASI 77 16 Himmatsinh Bhupatsinh Rajput, PI 81 17 Ashwinkumar Jamanadas Gondaliya, PSI 82 DOCUMANTRY EVIDENCE S/n. Document Exh. 1 Report of accused No. 1 submitted to Harij Police Station as to suicidal death of the deceased 41 2 Yadi by Harij Police Station to Executive Magistrate for Inquest Panchnama 42 3 Inquest Panchnama 43 4 Panchnama of place of offence 44 5 PM Report 46 6 Yadi by Harij Police Station to Mamlatdar 48 7 Map of place of offence 49 8 Investigation Order as to accidental death No. 5/99 40 9 Complaint of the complainant 55 10 Letters, written by the deceased 56 to 58 11 Police Yadi 66 12 FSL Report 67 13 PM Report 68 14 Report as to time of death 70 15 Panchnama of Walking Stick Jeda produced by the accused 73 16 Report of the police officer as to registering the complaint 76 17 Copy of extract of station Diary 78-79 18 Investigation Order for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the FSL 80 19 Muddamal Despatch Note 83 20 Forwarding letter of FSL 84 21 Receipt of FSL 85 2.4 At the end of the trial, Further Statements of the accused under Section 313 of Code were recorded in which, they pleaded not guilty and stated that they have been falsely implicated in the crime in question. Thus, after recording above-referred Further Statements and hearing the arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge came to aforesaid conclusion by impugned judgment and order. Thus, after recording above-referred Further Statements and hearing the arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge came to aforesaid conclusion by impugned judgment and order. 2.5 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court, the State as well as the original accused No. 1 have preferred the present appeals, as aforesaid. 3. We have heard Mr. Y.S. Lakhani, learned senior advocate for the appellant - original accused No. 1 and Mr. Hardik Soni, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State. 3.1 Mr. Lakhani, learned senior advocate for the original accused No. 1, contended that in view of the fact that the appellant - original accused No. 1 has already undergone a period of four years, as has been awarded by the trial Court and though the matter is arguable on merits, it has become academic now. He also contended that the offence is of 1998 and in view of lapse of almost a period of 17 years, this Court may not interfere in the acquittal appeal. 4. Whereas, Mr. Soni, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State, took us through the oral as well as the documentary evidence, more particularly, the evidence of complainant - Harubha Ratansinh Jadeja, exh. 54, who is the father of the deceased, evidence of Dattaba Harubha Jadeja, exh. 59, the mother of the deceased and the medical evidence and contended that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, however, the learned trial Judge has failed to appropriate the same in its true perspective and accordingly, has committed a grave error in acquitting the original accused Nos. 1 to 4 for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 304-B, 498-Aand 114 of the IPC and eventually, he requested to dismiss the appeal filed by the original accused No. 1 against conviction and allow the appeal against acquittal filed by the State. 5. We have examined the matter carefully and gone through the evidence on record. We have re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence on the touchstone of the latest decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. We have, in particular, gone through the evidence of Dr. Dashrathbharthi Pashabharthi Swami, exh. 65. 5. We have examined the matter carefully and gone through the evidence on record. We have re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence on the touchstone of the latest decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. We have, in particular, gone through the evidence of Dr. Dashrathbharthi Pashabharthi Swami, exh. 65. Taking into account the cross-examination of this witness, more particularly, para 19 onwards, more particularly, para 24, and on going through the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the learned trial Judge, while appreciating and evaluating the evidence on record, has dealt each and every aspect minutely, leaving no stone unturned and thereafter, has come to such a conclusion, giving cogent and plausible reasons for the same. Undoubtedly, the sentence imposed by the trial Court upon the original accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part (II) of the IPC appears to be inadequate as minimum punishment provided for such offence is imprisonment of five years, however, considering the fact that the trial Court, while imposing aforesaid sentence, has also awarded a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, which is directed to be paid to the parents of the deceased and also considering the time gap of almost 17 years, we see no reason to interfere in appeal. 5.1 Moreover, so far as the appeal filed by the State against acquittal is concerned, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court have been very succinctly explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has narrated about the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the court below." 5.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the following principles: "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 5.3 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 5.4 Even in a recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr., reported in (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 5.5 Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. state of MP, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589. Thus, the powers which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 5.6 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors., reported in (2009) SCC 749, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so-called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in a running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 5.7 Even in a recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mookiah and Anr. v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges levelled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal.[Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4520 : 2004 AIR SCW 4321)]" 5.8 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under: "...This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary ( (1967)1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 5.9 Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary. 6. In view of the aforesaid discussion, Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2000, filed by the original accused No. 1 against his conviction as well as the Criminal Appeal No. 964 of 2000, filed by the State against acquittal of original accused Nos. 1 to 4, fail and are dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 29/08/2000, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana, camp at: Patan in Sessions Case No. 203 of 1999, is hereby confirmed. The original accused No. 1 is reported to have undergone the sentence as has been imposed by the trial Court, and accordingly, he is not required to surrender to custody, except he is required in any other offence and his bail bond stand cancelled. Registry to return the R&P to the trial Court forthwith.