JUDGMENT : The writ petitions, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016 [Sri Dulal Nath Bhowmik Vs. The State of Tripura & Ors.] and W.P.(C) No.74/2016 [Sri Sri Bikas Biswas & Anr. Vs. The State of Tripura & Ors.], are combined for disposal by a common judgment and order as in both these writ petitions common grounds have emerged for challenging the order dated 19.12.2015 passed in Revenue Case No.321/2015 under Section 96 of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 [Annexure-10 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016] and order dated 19.12.2015 passed in Revenue Case No.321/2015 under Section 96 of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 [Annexure-11 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.74/2016]. 2. Apparent it is, on the face of the records that, the order passed under Section 96 of the TLR and LR Act 1960, is instrumental in setting aside the order dated 10.07.2013 under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act 1960. By the said order dated 10.07.2013, it was directed that R.S. Plot No.3048 (sabek plot Nos.2482 and 2488(p)] measuring 0.200 acre from the Government khas khatian No.1/126 be recorded in favour of Shri Rajeev Kumar Jadav and Smt. Neena Jadav in a new jote khatian in equal share. The said order dated 10.07.2013 [Annexure-5 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016], was so passed as according to the petitioners the said sabek plots of mouja Kunjaban were purchased by one Ramabatar Prasad Jadav. Even possession of said Ramabatar Prasad Jadav was confirmed by the civil court by the judgment dated 12.06.1976 delivered in T.S.93/1973 [Annexure-6 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016], as was instituted by one Shantimoy Chakraborty. However, the land measuring 10 gandas was recorded as khas land belonging to the Education Department. In that perspective, correction in the entry of the Record of Right was made and the said petition for correction under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act was allowed by the order dated 10.07.2013. By the order dated 19.12.2015 delivered in Revenue Case No.321/2015, the said order dated 10.07.2013 has been interfered and set aside. 3. After the said order dated 10.07.2013 under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act 1960 was passed, the Municipal Commissioner of the Agartala Municipal Corporation, had approached the Collector by the communication under No.F.105/North Zone/AMC/2014/127-130 dated 07.03.2015. A detailed report on the basis of the said communication was obtained. 3. After the said order dated 10.07.2013 under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act 1960 was passed, the Municipal Commissioner of the Agartala Municipal Corporation, had approached the Collector by the communication under No.F.105/North Zone/AMC/2014/127-130 dated 07.03.2015. A detailed report on the basis of the said communication was obtained. It has been observed in the order dated 19.12.2015 [Annexure-10 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016] that, before passing the order dated 10.07.2013 the District Collector did not issue any notice to the respondents i.e. the Government of Tripura and thus the State did not get any opportunity to place their version. Even the Collector did not conduct any enquiry through the SDM or DCM or equivalent Revenue Officer nor even tried to verify the original record from the office of the Director of Settlement and Land Records (DSLR), Government of Tripura, who is the official custodian of all old land records pertaining to khas and jote rather, the Collector only relied on the order of the Munsiff, Sadar. He simply arrived at his decision based on the decree passed by the Munsiff, Sadar in T.S.93/1973, ignoring the sanctity of the finally published land records. The Collector converted the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 11(3) of the TLR and LR Act into a petition under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act keeping the Government of Tripura in dark. It has been further observed by the District Magistrate & Collector in the said order dated 19.12.2015 that : “As the status of land was Khas, the Ld. Collector in my opinion had no locus standi to convert the case to U/S 95 as any dispute over any Khas Land can be dealt by the Collector under Section 11 of TLR & LR Act, 1960. Thus disposal of case U/S 95 by the Ld. Collector appears to be improper as the said case does not attract the provision of said section. Under the circumstances as explicated above I feel that there is sufficient reason to disagree with the findings of the then Ld. Collector(my predecessor in interest) and besides I am fully convinced that Revisional Survey plot No. 3048 corresponding to old plot No. 2482(p) and 2488(p) of mouja Kunjaban is purely Govt. Khas land. Therefore, the order passed by the Ld. Collector(my predecessor in interest) and besides I am fully convinced that Revisional Survey plot No. 3048 corresponding to old plot No. 2482(p) and 2488(p) of mouja Kunjaban is purely Govt. Khas land. Therefore, the order passed by the Ld. Collector (my predecessor in interest) on 10/07/2013 u/s 95 of TLR & LR Act, 1960 is treated to be null and void. Also all the subsequent Mutation Orders passed by the SDM Sadar or by his subordinate Revenue Officers in connection with this land are also quashed.” 4. Exactly similar order is the order dated 19.12.2015 [Annexure-11 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.74/2016]. Therefore, the land in question in both the writ petitions are the old plot Nos. 2482(p) and 2488(p) of mouja Kunjaban, and as such, this court does not find it necessary to record the fact elaborately from both the writ petitions rather, reference would be made only to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016. 5. So far the title of the land is concerned, this court does not find any material how Ramabatar Prasad Jadav, since deceased [predecessor of Rajeev Kumar Jadav and Smt. Neena Jadav respectively, son and daughter of Ramabatar Prasad Jadav], became the legal holder of title of the said land, part of which has been sold to the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.73/2016 and the remaining part to the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.74/2016 by executing the sale deeds. Even it is found that Ramabatar Prasad Jadav was not ever shown as the holder of title of the said land, till the order dated 10.07.2013 was passed by the District Collector, West Tripura, Agartala in Revenue Case No.344/2013 under Section 11(3) of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 and later converted under Section 95 of the TLR & LR Act, 1960. 6. The petitioners have heavily relied on the sale deed that was executed by Rajeev Kumar Jadav and Smt. Neena Jadav respectively, son and daughter of Ramabatar Prasad Jadav, in favour of the petitioners, and one judgment dated 12.06.1976 delivered in T.S.93/1973, as was instituted by one Shantimoy Chakraborty. In the suit, Ramabatar Prasad Jadav was the defendant. For adjudication of the suit, one Commissioner (Harendra Chandra Saha) was engaged for surveying the suit land and for report to the trial court. In the suit, Ramabatar Prasad Jadav was the defendant. For adjudication of the suit, one Commissioner (Harendra Chandra Saha) was engaged for surveying the suit land and for report to the trial court. In the report, the Commissioner has observed that the suit land is not a khas land belonging to the Education Department [C.S. plot Nos.2482/1445] as the land acquired for Basic Training College situate at mouja Jagatpur, but not in Kunjaban. The land acquired by the Government for Basic Training College by L.A. Case No.5/SN of 1959, is bounded on the West by taluk land of Maharaja Kirit Bikram Kishore Manikya Bahadur. The Survey Commissioner’s report was accepted by the court and the claim of the plaintiff was discarded by way of dismissing the suit. There is no material to show how Jagmohan Goala became the owner of the land or had the competence to sell the same to Ramabatar Prasad Jadav, predecessor of Sri Rajeev Kumar Jadav and Smt. Neena Jadav, son and daughter of Ramabatar Prasad Jadav. Moreover, the State was not a party in that suit and for obvious reasons the said judgment cannot be utilised for eclipsing any right of the State. While passing the order dated 10.07.2013, the District Collector has observed as under : “I agree with the verdict & decree of Civil Court in favour of the Defendant i.e. Lt. Ram Abatar Prasad Jadav, father of the petitioners. As the Civil Court has decided that the Sabek Plot No.2482 & 2488 and corresponding to R.S. Plot No.3048 is purchased jote land of Ram Abatar Prasad Jadav of mouja Kunjaban record should be corrected accordingly and not necessary for further field enquiry and also hearing.” Based on that finding, the said order contained a direction for correction of the Record of Right showing the title of the land in favour of Sri Rajeev Kumar Jadav and Smt. Neena Jadav in equal share against the old plot Nos. 2482(p) and 2488(p) measuring 0.200 acre. 7. While scrutinising the record, this court could not find that the civil court came to the conclusion that the said land was the jote land of the defendant based on any title deed, but on oral deposition, which has been recorded and analysed by the said civil court in the following manner : “Whereas the Defendant examined three witnesses. D.W.1 is the Defendant. D.W.1 is the Defendant. D.W.2 Jagmohan Goala Doala and D.W.3 Sachindra Kr. Debnath corroborated statement of D.W.1 regarding possession of the suit land. D.W.2 in his deposition states that he purchased sit land from Kisan Dose before about seven years and sold said land to the Defendant and that in the north of suit land D.W.2 possesses 12 gandas of land. It is seen from kabala that Defendant purchased suit land from D.W.2. D.W.3 in his cross-examination volunteers that he has got homestead near their suit land. So D.W.2 and D.W.3 possess land near the suit land. The D.W.2 and D.W.3 corroborated well the statement of D.W.1 regarding act of possession of the defendant in the suit land.” It further appears from the said judgment that, DW.2 purchased the land seven years before the deposition, i.e. sometime in 1966, but how the said transaction can be termed as legally valid, that issue was not part of the subject matter of the suit. The important question is, how Kisan Dose became the owner of the said land, who in turn executed so called kabala in favour of Jagmohan Goala. 8. Agartala Municipal Corporation or its former entity, which was not a party in the suit, made a communication for review of the order dated 10.07.2013 passed by the Collector under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act, 1960 and the impugned order is the outcome of the said review. It has been held by the order dated 19.12.2015 passed in Revenue Case No.321/2015 very categorically that: “As per available Record of Right from the office of the Directorate Settlement & Land Records (DSLR) and the land of old plot no. 1445/2482 and 1435/2488 measuring area 1.34 acres and 1.60 acres classified as Bhiti and Bill respectively recorded in Khas Khatian no. 756. In revision of Record of Right, the plot no. 3048 corresponding to part of original survey plot nos. 2482(p)/2488(p) was also recorded as Govt. Khas land in Khatian no. 1/126. During the period of original settlement operation as well as in revisional operation commencing from 1961 to 1996, none appeared before the Competent authority to claim over the said Khas Land. After gap of more than 40(forty) years of final publication of Record of right (first survey settlement operation) the present petitioners applied before the Ld. 1/126. During the period of original settlement operation as well as in revisional operation commencing from 1961 to 1996, none appeared before the Competent authority to claim over the said Khas Land. After gap of more than 40(forty) years of final publication of Record of right (first survey settlement operation) the present petitioners applied before the Ld. Collector on 20/06/13 U/S 11(3) of T.L.R. & L.R. Act, 1960 for recording the land of plot no. 3048 corresponding to original survey plot no. 2482(p) and 2488(p) as Jote Land on the pretext that this much area is within the extent of the land purchased by their father Ramavatar Prasad Jadab vide regd. Deed No. 1-6969 dt. 27/04/73 executed by Jagmohan Goala.” It has been further held in the said order that: “As regards decree passed in T.S. Case No. 93 of 73 by the Ld. Sadar Munsiff, it to be noted that one Santimoy Chakraborty, a teacher of Education Department attempted to occupy Govt. land then Ramavatar Prasad Jadab raised objection claiming the land to be his purchased land. Said Santimoy Chakraborty filed T.S. Case No. 93 of 73 in the Court of Sadar Munsiff for declaring injunction over the land restraining the O.P. Ramavatar Prasad Jadab to enter the suit land. Ld. Munsiff, Sadar rejected the prayer of Chakraborty and admitted the report of Survey Commissioner to the effect that the suit land surveyed in plot No. 2482 had been comprised with the schedule of land purchased through deed by Ramavatar Prasad Jadab. Basically the said Case was between two private parties regarding possession over Govt. land but the State of Tripura was not made a party to this case. The scope of this case was to settle Civil dispute i.e. possession over the said land. As prior to the case, the nature of land was Khas as published in Revisional Survey records in 1972 and therefore this Court is not bound by the order/decree of the Ld. Munsiff, Sadar. The then Ld. Collector while disposing the Case on 10/07/2013 did not issue any notice to the Respondent i.e. Govt. of Tripura thus the State was not given opportunity to be heard. The Ld. Munsiff, Sadar. The then Ld. Collector while disposing the Case on 10/07/2013 did not issue any notice to the Respondent i.e. Govt. of Tripura thus the State was not given opportunity to be heard. The Ld. Collector did not conduct any field enquiry through SDM/DCM or equivalent Revenue Officer nor tried to verify the original Land Records from the office of the Director of Settlement and Land Records (DSLR) Government of Tripura who is official custodian of all the old land records pertaining to khas and jote, rather Ld. Collector only followed the order of Ld. Munsiff, Sadar in toto. He simply arrived his decision based on the decree passed by the Ld. Munsiff, Sadar in T.S. case No. 93 of 73 ignoring the sanctity of the finally published Land records which was prepared in Revisional Survey which is quasi-judicial process in itself as prescribed in TLR & LR Rules, 1961. Even, the Ld. Collector did not prove the genuineness of Jote land No. 172 and 175 under Kayami Taluk No. 205, consequent upon the enforcement of Section 134 of TLR & LR Act, 1960. It is to be stated again that the Registered Deed of Purchase cannot be an absolute evidence for declaration of right, title over land without examination of Patta, Map and Khatian etc related to relevant land. Further, while passing order, Ld. Collector included the area of old plot No. 2488(p) but in the decree, the Ld. Munsiff, Sadar did not mention the old plot No. 2488(p) which is highly unexplainable. Apart from the above said matter, the then Ld. Collector suo moto converted the petition of U/S 11(3) into U/S 95 of the T.L.R. & L.R. Act, 1960 keeping the State Respondent completely in dark. There has been no any request or petition to the Ld. Collector from the petitioner in question for correction of record under Section 95 of T.L.R. & L.R. Act, 1960. Instead the ld. Collector should have heard the case U/S 11 of TLR & LR Act, 1960 as the original records pertaining to this land available in the office of the Ld. Collector and DSLR were Khas. As the status of land was Khas, the Ld. Instead the ld. Collector should have heard the case U/S 11 of TLR & LR Act, 1960 as the original records pertaining to this land available in the office of the Ld. Collector and DSLR were Khas. As the status of land was Khas, the Ld. Collector in my opinion had no locus standi to convert the case to U/S 95 as any dispute over any Khas Land can be dealt by the Collector under Section 11 of TLR & LR Act, 1960. Thus disposal of case U/S 95 by the Ld. Collector appears to be improper as the said case does not attract the provision of said section. Under the circumstances as explicated above I feel that there is sufficient reason to disagree with the findings of the then Ld. Collector(my predecessor in interest) and besides I am fully convinced that Revisional Survey plot No. 3048 corresponding to old plot No. 2482(p) and 2488(p) of mouja Kunjaban is purely Govt. Khas land. Therefore, the order passed by the Ld. Collector (my predecessor in interest) on 10/07/2013 u/s 95 of TLR & LR Act, 1960 is treated to be null and void. Also all the subsequent Mutation Orders passed by the SDM Sadar or by his subordinate Revenue Officers in connection with this land are also quashed.” As stated, the said order dated 19.12.2015 is under challenge in these writ petitions. 9. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.73/2016, has clearly conceded that the sale deed executed by Kisan Dose in favour of Jagmohan Goala is not traceable or available. He has further stated that the sale deed executed by Jagmohan Goala in favour of Ramabatar Prasad Jadav has been overlooked while passing the impugned judgment under Section 96 of the TLR and LR Act, 1960. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has submitted that the office of the Agartala Municipal Corporation and that of the District Collector, are held by the same person. In view of that, the impugned order is against the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the complainant has become the arbiter of his own cause. He has submitted that, by filing the reply, what the respondents have asserted is truly a desperate dispensation. In view of that, the impugned order is against the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the complainant has become the arbiter of his own cause. He has submitted that, by filing the reply, what the respondents have asserted is truly a desperate dispensation. In the para 31 of the reply, it has been stated that the Government has discretion to entrust more than one responsibilities to one officer depending upon necessity, but in the case in hand, no prejudice has been canvassed by the petitioners for such entrustment. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel has stated that the land in question is part of kayemi taluk No.205 and tauji No.175, which according to the petitioner, is the original identity of the land in question and has quite distinctly been described in patta No.1-9365 dated 23.03.1956. According to the petitioners, the land in question is bounded in the North – path of orange garden, in the South – lake and road, in the East – road and in the West – Subal Majumder. In the additional affidavit filed by the petitioners on 09.11.2016, it has been averred as follows : “2. That, I crave leave to file this additional affidavit for the purpose of placing on record a document namely a registered deed of settlement (jotdari patta) given by the then Maharaj Kirit Bikram Kishore Debbarma Manikya Bahadur in favour of predecessors of the petitioner in respect of the 6 kanis of land under Mouza Kunjaban Kayemi Taluk No.205, Tauji No.175 which includes the land belonging to the petitioner recorded in Khatian No.2378 of Mouza Kunjban, subject matter of the writ petition. 3. That, the petitioner states that in the writ petition petitioner stated that he purchased the land in question namely 0.10 Acres of homestead land in hall plot No.3048/5149 under Khatian No.2433 of Mouza Kunjaban from Shri Rajib Kumar Yadav alias Rajib Kumar Choudhury and Smt. Nina Yadav vide registered sale deed No.1-8127, dated 20.12.2013 and that it was duly mutated in a separate Khatian in favour of the petitioner. It was also stated that there was a civil suit bearing case No.93 TS of 1973 against Shri Ram Avatar Yadav, father of the said vendors and in that suit it was held that jote No.172/175 was recorded in the name of Sachindra Kumar Debnath and two others and they had sold it to one Kisen Duse on 02.10.1956 by registered deed and Kisen Duse transferred the land to Jogmohan Goala by a document dated 10.03.1966. The Vendors of the title deed of the petitioner are the legal heirs of Ram Avatar Prasad Yadav who had purchased the land from Jogmohan Goala. The Deed executed by Jogmohan Goala is available on record as Annexure 7 to the Writ petition and it shows that the land in question is a part of plot No.2482 under Jote No.172/175 under Kayemi Taluk No.205 of Mouza Kunjaban. Because of passage of time it has not been possible to collect all connected deeds relating to transfer of the said land from time to time but the petitioner has been able to collect a certified copy of the registered patta (deed of settlement) No.1-9365, dated 23.03.1956 executed by Maharaj Kirit Bikram Kishore Debbarma Manikya Bahadur in favour of Shri Sachindra Kumar Debnath, Shri Ananta Kumar Debnath and Shri Iswar Chandra Debnath whereby 6 kani of land under Kayemi Taluk No.205, Touji No.175 of Mouja Kunjaban was transferred. A copy of the said deed No.1-9365 dated 23.03.1956 along with English translation thereof is annexed hereto and marked Annexure-11. 4. That, your petitioner humbly states that there is reference of Shri Sachindra Kumar Debnath and two others in the judgment passed by Ld. Civil Court and from the above document in Annexure-11, it would be evident that the land which is purchased by the petitioner laws a jote land since 1956 and subsequently there is no scope on the part of the Government to claim it to be a Government land inasmuch as there is no record to show that the said land was ever taken over by the Government in any manner whatsoever.” 10. For the first time, the petitioners have made such clear statement as to the evolution of title and boundaries of the land, but still there is no document to prove that on 02.10.1956 by registered deed one Kisan Dose purchased the land in question from Sachindra Kumar Debnath and two others and according to them Kisan Dose had transferred the land to Jagmohan Goala by a document dated 10.03.1966. This document is also not available before this court, but the deed executed by Jagmohan Goala is available in the writ petition at Annexure-7. Therefore, the source of title could not be proved in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. 11. Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General has clearly stated that when Ramabatar Prasad Jadav purchased the land in question, at that time the land was recorded as khas land in the finally published khatian and such record continued in khatian No.756. In the title suit, the State was not a party and it was between two individuals regarding the possession over the Government land and the Collector had wrongly followed the judgment dismissing the suit on ignoring the land records. Since the status of the land was always khas such dispute ought to have been determined under Section 11(3) of the TLR and LR Act, 1960, but the Collector while considering that, converted the said proceeding to a proceeding under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General, has further submitted that the Collector did not have any authority to reopen the entire matter and decide in a proceeding under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act, as if he was hearing an appeal. Since the error was apparent on the face of the records and following the procedure as provided under Section 96(3) of the TLR and LR Act, 1960, the review proceeding was set in motion. The provisions of Section 96 of the TLR and LR Act, according to Mr. Das, learned Advocate General is structured on the doctrine of actus curiae nemenem gravabit. Since the order was passed under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act, it was amenable to review jurisdiction. In this regard, Mr. The provisions of Section 96 of the TLR and LR Act, according to Mr. Das, learned Advocate General is structured on the doctrine of actus curiae nemenem gravabit. Since the order was passed under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act, it was amenable to review jurisdiction. In this regard, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has placed his reliance on a few decisions of the apex court on the limited jurisdiction of review circumscribed by the definitive limits, fixed by the language deployed in the provision : 12. In Moran Mar Basselios Chatholicos & Anr. Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 , the apex court has enunciated as under : 32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47, Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicants knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule". See - Chhajju Ram v. Neki', AIR 1922 PC 112 (D). This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in -'Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath', AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by our Federal Court in - 'Hari Shankar v. Anath Nath', AIR 1949 PC 106 at pp. 110, 111(F). See - Chhajju Ram v. Neki', AIR 1922 PC 112 (D). This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in -'Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath', AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by our Federal Court in - 'Hari Shankar v. Anath Nath', AIR 1949 PC 106 at pp. 110, 111(F). Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" or some ground analogous thereto.” [Emphasis added] 13. In Lily Thomas & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 , the apex court has been observed thus : The dictionary meaning of the word “review” is “the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement”. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) 595 held : (SCC pp. 619-20, para 19) “19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1 the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh, (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: “… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in…. The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.” Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under : “It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.” Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, “for any other sufficient reason” in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength. [Emphasis added] 14. In Rajesh D. Darbar & Ors. Vs. Narasingrao Krishanji Kulkarni & Ors., reported in (2003) 7 SCC 219 , the apex court while dwelling upon the extent of the review jurisdiction, has further held that : “These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, (1976) 1 SCC 194 . The courts can take notice of the subsequent events and can mould the relief accordingly. But there is a rider to these well-established principles. This can be done only in exceptional circumstances, some of which have been highlighted above. This equitable principle cannot, however, stand in the way of the court adjudicating the rights already vested by a statute. This well-settled position need not detain us, when the second point urged by the appellants is focused. This can be done only in exceptional circumstances, some of which have been highlighted above. This equitable principle cannot, however, stand in the way of the court adjudicating the rights already vested by a statute. This well-settled position need not detain us, when the second point urged by the appellants is focused. There can be no quarrel with the proposition as noted by the High Court that a party cannot be made to suffer on account of an act of the court. There is a well-recognised maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of the court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim is, lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. the law does not compel a man to do that what he cannot possibly perform. The applicability of the abovesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey : (1987) 4 SCC 398 , Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee : (1996) 2 SCC 459 and Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P. : (2000) 4 SCC 342 . [Emphasis supplied] 15. In Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr. Vs. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 741 , having approvingly quoted the passage as reproduced above from Moran Mar Basselios Chatholicos (supra), the apex court has restated the law as under : 89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words “sufficient reason” in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine “actus curiae neminem gravabit”. [Emphasis supplied] 16. Even though the learned Advocate General has referred the decisions for the same purpose in Rajender Singh Vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Ors., reported in AIR 2006 SC 75 and Dhanani Shoes Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2008 (5) GLR 459, but this court finds that the observations made by the apex court and Gauhati High court are structured on the reports as referred above. 17. Having referred paragraph 36 of the writ petition, being W.P.(C) NO.73/2016, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted that the submission of the petitioners is entirely misplaced inasmuch as two different persons at the relevant point of time acted as the Municipal Commissioner and the District Collector. On 07.03.2015 when the District Collector was approached for looking into the order passed under Section 95 of the TLR and LR Act, the post of Municipal Commissioner was being occupied by one Sri Abhishek Chandra, whereas at the relevant point of time the post of the District Collector was held by Dr. Milind Ramteke. However, later on Dr. Milind Ramteke had taken over the office of the Municipal Commissioner. In this background, according to Mr. Das, learned Advocate General, a reasonable conclusion cannot be drawn that there was likelihood of bias or real danger of bias. He has further submitted that, by turn of circumstances one person may be obligated to hear and determine the matter on the doctrine of necessity. In this case, when the statute authorises the District Collector [namely, Dr. Milind Ramteke] to pass the order and there is no question of substitution or escaping the responsibility. The order passed by him cannot be assailed on the ground of bias. To drive his contention, Mr. In this case, when the statute authorises the District Collector [namely, Dr. Milind Ramteke] to pass the order and there is no question of substitution or escaping the responsibility. The order passed by him cannot be assailed on the ground of bias. To drive his contention, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the following decisions of the apex court and statement from two authoritative commentaries: 18. Learned Advocate General for nourishing submission on the developing concept of ‘bias’ and the real danger of bias has referred Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar Pant & Ors., reported in (2001) 1 SCC 182 , where the apex court has observed as under : 27. The concept of “bias” however has had a steady refinement with the changing structure of the society: modernisation of the society, with the passage of time, has its due impact on the concept of bias as well. Three decades ago this Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. : (1974) 3 SCC 459 proceeded on the footing of real likelihood of “bias” and there was in fact a total unanimity on this score between the English and the Indian Courts. 28. Mathew, J. in Parthasarathi case observed : (SCC pp. 465-66, para 16) “16. The tests of “real likelihood” and “reasonable suspicion” are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right-minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the inquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon : (1968) 3 WLR 694 , 707. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the “reasonable suspicion” test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.” 29. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 30. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 31. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 32. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 33. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 34. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 35. The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom - in the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias, the administrative action cannot be sustained: If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular court, Tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and it is in this context that we do record our concurrence with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Locabail case : 2000 QB 451 . [Emphasis added] 19. On the doctrine of necessity on illustrative decision in Election Commission of India & Anr. Vs. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy & Anr., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 104 , it has been held by the apex court that : 15. The next question then is if the Chief Election Commissioner, for reason of possible bias, is disqualified from expressing an opinion, how should the Election Commission conduct itself? Vs. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy & Anr., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 104 , it has been held by the apex court that : 15. The next question then is if the Chief Election Commissioner, for reason of possible bias, is disqualified from expressing an opinion, how should the Election Commission conduct itself? As pointed out earlier Shri Sanghi, the learned counsel for the appellant, has very frankly and with his usual fairness stated that the Chief Election Commissioner preferred this appeal only because he genuinely believed that the scheme of Article 324 did not conceive of a decision by majority, but if the Court comes to the conclusion that a decision can be reached without the Chief Election Commissioner participating in decision-making in the special circumstances of the case, the latter is not at all keen or anxious to hear and adjudicate upon the matter at issue before the Election Commission. We are quite conscious of the high office the Chief Election Commissioner occupies. Ordinarily we would be loath to uphold the submission of bias but having regard to the wide ramification the opinion of the Election Commissioner would have on the future of Ms J. Jayalalitha, we think that the opinion, whatever it be, should not be vulnerable. The participation of the Chief Election Commissioner in the backdrop of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court would certainly permit an argument of prejudice, should the opinion be adverse to Ms J. Jayalalitha. Therefore, apart from the legal aspect, even prudence demands that the Chief Election Commissioner should recuse himself from expressing any opinion in the matter. However, the situation is not so simple, it is indeed complex, in that, what would happen if the two Election Commissioners do not agree and there is a conflict of opinion between them? That would lead to a stalemate situation and the Governor would find it difficult to take a decision based on any such opinion. In such a situation, can the doctrine of necessity be invoked in favour of the Chief Election Commissioner? 16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. In such a situation, can the doctrine of necessity be invoked in favour of the Chief Election Commissioner? 16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked. [Emphasis supplied] 20. In an earlier decision in J. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa & Anr., reported in (1984) 4 SCC 103 , the apex court has, on considering the rule of his cause has carried out the exception succinctly holding that : 12. There is, however, an exception to the above rule that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, namely, the doctrine of necessity. Vs. State of Orissa & Anr., reported in (1984) 4 SCC 103 , the apex court has, on considering the rule of his cause has carried out the exception succinctly holding that : 12. There is, however, an exception to the above rule that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, namely, the doctrine of necessity. An adjudicator, who is subject to disqualification on the ground of bias or interest in the matter which he has to decide, may be required to adjudicate if there is no other person who is competent or authorized to adjudicate or if a quorum cannot be formed without him or if no other competent tribunal can be constituted. In such cases the principle of natural justice would have to give way to necessity for otherwise there would be no means of deciding the matter and the machinery of justice or administration would break down. Thus, in The Judges v. Attorney-General for Saskatchewan, (1937) 53 TLR 464 the Judges of the Court of Appeal were held competent to decide the question whether Judges of the Court of Appeal, of the Court of King?s Bench and of the District Courts of the Province of Saskatchewan were subject to taxation under the Income Tax Act, 1932, of Saskatchewan on the ground that they were bound to act ex necessitate. The doctrine of necessity applies not only to judicial matters but also to quasi-judicial and administrative matters. The High Court, however, wrongly applied this doctrine to the author-members of the Assessment Sub-Committee. It is true, the members of this Sub-Committee were appointed by a Government Resolution and some of them were appointed by virtue of the official position they were holding, such as, the Secretary, Education Department of the Government of Orissa, and the Director, Higher Education, etc. There was, however, nothing to prevent those whose books were submitted for selection from pointing out this fact to the State Government so that it could amend its Resolution by appointing a substitute or substitutes, as the case may be. There was equally nothing to prevent such non-official author-members from resigning from the committee on the ground of their interest in the matter. [Emphasis added] 21. S. Parthasarathi Vs. There was equally nothing to prevent such non-official author-members from resigning from the committee on the ground of their interest in the matter. [Emphasis added] 21. S. Parthasarathi Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 459 , has been discussed in Girja Shankar Pant (supra) and hence further reference is avoided, even this report has been relied by the respondents. 22. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has relied on the comment on the indivisible authorities and cases of necessity made in Wade & Forsyth’s Administrative Law [10th Edn., page 392], where it has been observed as under : “In most of the cases so far mentioned the disqualified adjudicator could be dispensed with or replaced by someone to whom the objection did not apply. But there are many cases where no substitution is possible, since no one else is empowered to act. Natural justice then has to give way to necessity, for otherwise there is no means of deciding and the machinery of justice or administration will break down. The Article 6(1) requirement of an independent and impartial decision-maker is, as the Human Rights Courts has made clear, more absolute and less mindful of administrative convenience. Compliance with the Convention standard will thus sometimes pose difficulties. These will be discussed below, but first an account of the common law necessity principle is required. Necessity made an appearance in Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, already recounted. Before the appeal could proceed from the Vice-Chancellor to the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor had to sign an order for enrolment. But it was held that his shareholding in the company, which disqualified him from hearing the appeal, did not affect the enrolment, since no one but he had power to effect it. “For this is a case of necessity, and where that occurs the objection of interest cannot prevail”. Comparable situations have occurred in modern cases. For instance, the government of Saskatchewan called upon the court to determine whether the salaries of judges were liable to income tax; and the Privy Council confirmed that the court was right to decide it, as a matter of necessity.” [Emphasis added] 23. Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.74/2016, has adopted the submission of Mr. Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.74/2016, has adopted the submission of Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.73/2016 without any distinction and he has even not supplemented any part. 24. In the midst of hearing, as the hearing continued for quite long time, by the order dated 09.06.2016, three points were formulated by this court for hearing of the writ petitions, which are as under : (i) Whether the review jurisdiction within the ambit of Section 96 of the TLR & LR Act has been correctly invoked and exercised? (ii) Whether the Collector who is also the Commissioner of Agartala Municipal Corporation should have heard the matter as he is the custodian of interest of Municipal Corporation? and (iii) Whether the reasoning that the finally published khatian has to be made the basis and the title deeds or the judgment of the suit between two private parties cannot be given the lee-way for altering the records is tenable?” Another additional point that was formulated by the said order dated 09.06.2016, reads as under :- “Whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensation for the arbitrary demolition of the building or of the structure of the petitioner?” 25. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel has also produced the records from the Revenue Department in respect of the said land. 26. There cannot be any amount of doubt that the fulcrum of the dispute is on the touchstone of “whether the sale deed dated 22.03.1973 executed by Jagmohan Goala under No.1-6969 [Annexure-7 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016] attracts the land as described in the patta No.1-9365 dated 23.03.1956, as the petitioners have based their title on that document. If for any reason can it be proved that the said patta does not relate to the land as described in the sale deed dated 22.03.1973 [Annexure-7 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016], then all other issues will be academic as the very foundation of the claim would be demolished. 27. There cannot be any amount of doubt that Section 11(3) of the TLR & LR Act only authorises the Collector to exercise the power relating to the khas land. 27. There cannot be any amount of doubt that Section 11(3) of the TLR & LR Act only authorises the Collector to exercise the power relating to the khas land. Even if the general power of revision under Section 95 of the Act is exercised, the District Collector has to restrict himself within the parameters of that section. When the Collector was satisfied that the order passed under Section 95 of the TLR & LR Act was wholly without jurisdiction and in breach of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Government of Tripura was not given any notice, the District Collector had the jurisdiction under Section 96 of the TLR & LR Act for reviewing the order dated 10.07.2013 and quashing the same by restituting the earlier position of the land i.e. khas land. No prejudice could be shown when the Collector exercised his review jurisdiction on necessity, despite some discomfiture, it cannot be interfered on the ground of bias or on danger of bias. Let us now examine the boundaries of the land in question. In the sale deed dated 22.03.1973, the following boundaries are set in the schedule : In the North - Krishna Dusad and Jagmohan Goala In the South - Malati Naha In the East - Government Road and In the West - Lake, and after that the land of Ram Abatar Prasad Jadav 28. In the schedule of patta, the boundaries are described as under : In the North - path of orange garden In the South - lake and road In the East - road, and In the West - Subal Majumder In the east of both the lands pertaining to the sale deed dated 22.03.1973 [Annexure-7 to the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016] and the patta, there exists the road, but in the south of the patta land, there exists lake and road, whereas in the sale deed, the lake is in the western boundary. As such, both the lands cannot be the same land. Moreover, how Jagmohan Goala became the owner of the land could not be established by the petitioner, even after filing of the additional affidavit. As such, both the lands cannot be the same land. Moreover, how Jagmohan Goala became the owner of the land could not be established by the petitioner, even after filing of the additional affidavit. When the title cannot be proved and it is manifest that there is no record relating to the title of Jagmohan Goala, his transfer of land cannot be held illegal to interfere with the order dated 19.12.2015 delivered in Revenue Case No.321/2015 under Section 96 of the TLR & LR Act, 1960. In a writ proceeding unless such fact is prima facie established, this court may not exercise its jurisdiction to make a fact-finding exercise beyond what is available on record, and hence when the petitioner fail to prove their jote right over the land in question, they are not entitled to any relief as prayed for. 29. Accordingly, both the writ petitions, being W.P.(C) No.73/2016 and W.P.(C) No.74/2016 are dismissed. The records produced by Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel shall be returned under sealed cover. There shall be no order as to costs.