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2016 DIGILAW 3898 (ALL)

Ram Prasad Shukla v. Suraj Lal

2016-12-02

ADITYA NATH MITTAL

body2016
JUDGMENT Aditya Nath Mittal,J. Heard learned counsel for the review petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties and perused the record. 2. This review petition has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 06.04.2015 passed by this court in writ petition No.115 (R/C) of 2000 (Ram Prasad Shukla vs. Suraj Lal and others), whereby the writ petition was dismissed. The operative portion of the order, on reproduction, reads as : "In the present case, 31.10.1991 was fixed for final hearing and although the counsel for both the parties were present but the file was not available in the court. Had the file was available in the court, 31.10.1991 would have been the first date of hearing. On 31.08.1992 the file was available in the court and the counsel for both the parties were also present but the tenant instead of moving any application under section 20(4) of the Act or depositing the rent to get the protection under section 20(4) of the Act had chosen to take the adjournment and thereafter he remained absented, which resulted in ex-parte decree against him, which was subsequently set aside on 18.03.1994. I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that after setting aside the ex-parte decree on 18.03.1994, 22.04.1994 was the first date of hearing because had it been so, the defendant could again had chosen to remain absent and to compel the court to proceed ex-parte. The proceedings of the court are not to be run as per the wishes of the parties but they are to be conducted in accordance with law. In the present case, after the appearance on the first date of hearing i.e. 31.10.1991, if the petitioner wanted the protection of section 20(4) of the Act, he should have deposited the rent on 31.10.1991 or at the most on 31.08.1992 but not thereafter. From the conduct of the petitioner, it also appears that he has been careless not only in paying the rent to the landlord but also in attending the court, due to which the ex-parte decree was passed against him. From all the circumstances of the case, I agree with the findings of the learned Trial Court as well as the learned revisional court that 31.08.1992 was the 'first date of hearing'. From all the circumstances of the case, I agree with the findings of the learned Trial Court as well as the learned revisional court that 31.08.1992 was the 'first date of hearing'. The learned revisional court has also come to the conclusion that in any situation, the first date of hearing cannot be held beyond 31.08.1992. I do not find any error of law or perversity in the said findings. Both the courts below had rightly taken the first date of hearing as 31.08.1992. Admittedly, the arrears of rent and the expenses were not deposited on or prior to 31.08.1992. Therefore, the protection of Section 20(4) of the Act was not available to the petitioner. In view of above, I do not propose to discuss the issue that whether the amount deposited was deficient by Rs.75.00 or by Rs.155.15 or not. The learned Trial court has also passed the decree of ejectmnet on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the title unnecessarily. In the evidence as well as in the cross examination of the petitioner, it has come that Nanhu Lal Vaish had executed the Will in favour of Suraj Jal and after getting satisfied by that, the tenant had started payment of rent to the landlord Suraj Lal. Even in the receipts issued by Suraj Lal and relied upon by the petitioner dated 13.11.1989 and 12.12.1989, the name of the landlord has been mentioned as Suraj Lal and the petitioner has been mentioned as tenant. The learned court below relying upon 1988 (14) ARC 381 has rightly held that it is not the option of the tenant to deny the title of the landlord and to pay rent to the same landlord as and when he wishes. Both the courts below have considered all the aspects of the matter in detail and I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned orders. The petitioner has defaulted in paying the rent and therefore, he is not entitled for the protection under section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. I do not find any substance in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to vacate the premises in question within one month from today, failing which, he may be evicted in accordance with law. " 3. I do not find any substance in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to vacate the premises in question within one month from today, failing which, he may be evicted in accordance with law. " 3. Learned counsel for the review-petitioner has submitted that the trial court as well as the revisional court have committed an error in holding that the petitioner had committed default in payment of rent by ignoring the deposit made by the petitioner under section 30(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (''Act' for short). It has also been submitted that there were no arrears of rent against the petitioner and this court also did not appreciate the legal proposition that the rent under section 30(2) of the ''Act' is sufficient compliance and the petitioner was not at default. It has also been submitted that the dispute regarding the title of the property is still adjudication. Therefore, the petitioner could only have deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act. It has also been submitted that the petitioner is of 77 years old and has no other accommodation and non-consideration of vital point particularly the deposit of rent under section 30(2) of the ''Act' is apparent error on the face of record, therefore, the judgment dated 06.04.2015 deserves to be reviewed. 4. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following cases: S. Nagaraj and others vs. State of Karnataka and others; 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption, which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice, then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption, which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice, then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law (para 18). Rectification of an order stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, the Supreme Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice (para 19). Board of Control for Cricket in India and another vs. Netaji Cricket Club and others; (2005) 4 SCC 741 wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 5. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit". 6. It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Another Vs. The Most Rev. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit". 6. It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Another Vs. The Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others [ (1955) 1 SCR 520 ], this Court made observations as regard limitations in the application of review of its order stating : "Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule.", but the said rule is not universal. 7. Yet again in Lily Thomas vs. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 , this Court has laid down the law in the following terms: "52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error" (Emphasis supplied). 8. It is also not correct to contend that the court while exercising its review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the court accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in the AGM of the Board held on 29th September, 2004, the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. 9. Inderchand Jain (Dead) through LRs versus Moti Lal (Dead) through Lrs; ( 2009) 14 SCC 663 wherein it has been held that the High Court had rightly noticed the review jurisdiction of the court, which is as under: "The law on the subject - exercise of power of review, as propounded by the Apex Court and various other High Courts may be summarized as hereunder: i. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. ii. Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may be conceivable be two opinions. iii. Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. iv. Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. v. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'." 10. In our opinion, the principles of law enumerated by it, in the facts of this case, have wrongly been applied. 11. Wahiduddin Malik vs. State of U.P. and others; Writ Petition No.11671 of 2015 decided on 15.10.2015; wherein it has been held that in the light of the above referred settled legal position on the scope of review and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the fact of the petitioner-institution being a minority institution was required to be given due consideration to examine the orders passed by the educational authorities. It has escaped attention of the Court and this was not even pleaded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the review petition is not maintainable because the review petition has not been argued by the counsel who argued the writ petition. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the case of Kaniz Fatima vs. ADJ Meerut; 2008 (70) ALR 361 in which in para 19, it has been held as under: "Even in the order dated 20.3.2007 the Court has observed that Inspite of undertaking given by the petitioner for vacating the shop in dispute, they are not complying with the judgment and order and has also imposed cost upon them amounting to Rs. 20,000. 20,000. It is pertinent to mention here that the review application was filed by the petitioners beyond the time by a subsequent counsel, which was not maintainable at his instance as it was not filed by Sri I. K. Chaturvedi the counsel who had filed and argued the case." 13. Learned counsel for the opposite party has further relied upon the case of Shri Prakash Mishra vs. State of U.P. and others; 2010 (79) ALR 51 in which in paragraph 3, it has been held as under: "Though, normally, in recall/review application moved by another counsel, it is not appropriate to hear a different counsel but in the interest of justice, I give full opportunity to Sri Ashutosh Tripathi to address the Court and to show any error in my judgment dated 14.09.2009." 14. Learned counsel has further relied upon Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another vs. Raju Reddiar and another; AIR 1997 SCC 1005 wherein it has been held that no review can be filed; that too by the advocate on record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. 15. It has also been submitted that admittedly there were no pleadings in the written statement regarding the alleged deposit under section 30 of the Act and the review petitioner cannot travel beyond the pleadings. In this regard, learned counsel for the opposite party has relied upon : 16. Shambhu Nath vs. ADJ III; 2014 (32) LCD 1505 wherein it has been held that as far as question of material alteration involved in this case is concerned, the revisional court in para-11 onward discussed this aspect. The case of the tenant was that landlady in writing had permitted him to make alterations. The written permission was to the effect that as the condition of the shop in tenancy occupation of Shambhu Nath had become very bad hence landlady permitting him (the tenant) for necessary repair in walls, floor to roof. It was also mentioned in the said written permission that the permission was being granted for room and stair case for going on the floor. It was further mentioned that it should be done on the expense of the tenant. The allegation was that a new room had been constructed over the first floor. The version of the tenant was that on the first floor there were only the walls, however he had got the roof placed. It was further mentioned that it should be done on the expense of the tenant. The allegation was that a new room had been constructed over the first floor. The version of the tenant was that on the first floor there were only the walls, however he had got the roof placed. The revisional court held that the permission which had been granted was misrepresented by the trial court and under the permission tenant could not construct and altogether new room over first floor. However lower revisional court itself quoted the written permission where the word room was twice used (on ground floor, there is only one room shop). The permission was granted for constructing the stair case for going to the room and roof. If stair case is required to reach a room, it means that room is on the first floor. Moreover in the permission, it was mentioned that ''for reaching the room and the roof' which further established that sort of room over the first floor was already there. 17. Certified copy of the plaint has been supplied by learned counsel for petitioner along with supplementary affidavit. In para-4 of the same, the allegation regarding material alteration and damaged to the shop have been made. There is no mention in the said para that a new room had been constructed on the first floor. A thing, which is not pleaded cannot be permitted to be supported by evidence. No amount of evidence can be looked into, if there is no pleading to that effect. 18. State of U.P. vs. Ajai Singh; 2012 (11) ADJ 761 (DB) wherein in para 41 and 44, it has been held that a perusal of the plaint reveals that the fact that they have received the land in place of their land which submerged in pili dam has not been pleaded. In the case of Union of India Vs. R. Bhushal, (2006) 6 SCC 36 , the Apex Court has held that "no evidence can be led on a plea not raised in the pleading." 19. In the case of Ravinder Singh Vs. Nanmeja Singh and others (2000) 8 SCC 191 , Apex Court has held that "no evidence can be lead on a plea not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings." 20. In the case of M.M.B. Catholicos Vs. In the case of Ravinder Singh Vs. Nanmeja Singh and others (2000) 8 SCC 191 , Apex Court has held that "no evidence can be lead on a plea not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings." 20. In the case of M.M.B. Catholicos Vs. T. Paulo Avira AIR 1959 Supreme Court 31, it has been held that plaintiff cannot be allowed to set up a new case in his evidence. He cannot be allowed to go out side his pleading and lead evidence on a fact not pleaded. 21. The Apex Court recently in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Others v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (Dead), JT 2012 (3) SC 451 has again reiterated the importance of pleadings of the parties. The following observations are apt to reproduce : - "52. Truth is the foundation of justice. It must be the endeavour of all the judicial officers and judges to ascertain truth in every matter and no stone should be left unturned in achieving this object. Courts must give greater emphasis on the veracity of pleadings and documents in order to ascertain the truth. 53. Pleadings are the foundation of litigation. In pleadings, only the necessary and relevant material must be included and unnecessary and irrelevant material must be excluded. Pleadings are given utmost importance in similar systems of adjudication, such as, the United Kingdom and the United States of America." "Thereafter, in para 61 it concluded that "pleadings are extremely important for ascertaining the title and possession of the property in question." 22. Kalyan Singh vs. C.P. Joshi; 2011 (29) LCD 512 , Hon'ble the Apex Court relied upon Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat & Anr. v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 2284 ; held that the court cannot consider any fact which is beyond the pleadings of the parties. The parties have to take proper pleadings and establish by adducing evidence that by a particular irregularity/illegality the result of the election has been materially affected. 23. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. 23. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide : Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195; M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 ; Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh & Ors.; AIR 1961 SC 1097 ; Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665 ; Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165 ; and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518 .) 24. This Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1242 held as under: "It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet........ In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question." 25. This Court in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Ors. , AIR 2009 SC 1103 , held as under: "The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. This Court in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Ors. , AIR 2009 SC 1103 , held as under: "The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court for its consideration. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue........ Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc." 26. In J.K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd, Kanpur v. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, AIR 1956 SC 231 , this Court observed: "It is not open to the Tribunals to fly off at a tangent and, disregarding the pleadings, to reach any conclusions that they think are just and proper." 27. It has also been submitted that to claim the benefit of section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the petitioner should have unconditionally deposited the entire rent/damages for use and occupation together with interest @9% per annum as well as the landlord cost of the suit but the petitioner deposited only Rs.1470/- as against the dues of Rs.2940/-. It has also been submitted that to claim the benefit of section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, the petitioner should have unconditionally deposited the entire rent/damages for use and occupation together with interest @9% per annum as well as the landlord cost of the suit but the petitioner deposited only Rs.1470/- as against the dues of Rs.2940/-. It has also been submitted that the only point argued in the writ petition was regarding the first date of hearing and in the judgment dated 06.04.2015, such submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has been mentioned as "learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the sole issue in the present writ petition is that what shall be the first date of hearing." Therefore, no other point was argued or pressed and these arguments cannot be taken in the review petition. It has also been submitted that the court has also calculated the exact amount in the judgment, according to which also, there was short fall of Rs.155.15 and it has been held that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. There are concurrent findings of trial court as well as revisional court that the first date of hearing was 31.08.1992 and this Court has also upheld the said date and has specifically held that protection of Section 20(4) of the Act was not available to the petitioner. 28. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to have established from his pleadings or the evidence that the deposit has been made in accordance with the Rule 21 (4) of the U.P. Rules regarding Act no.13 of 1974 but no such plea has been raised in the written statement. It has also been submitted that by means of the present review petition, the petitioner intends that the matter may be re-heard, which is not permissible in view of the following judgments: 29. Saeed Ahmad vs. Inayatullah; 2012 (3) LCD 1537 wherein it has been held that "further, in the present case with the consent of landlord , the tenants/ review petitioners had made certain repairs in the premises in question which is under the tenancy so it is established that the premises in question is dilapidated condition." 30. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other " sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in the said provision of C.P.C. 31. In View of the above discussion , the law of review can be summarized that it lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC . The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other' sufficient reason' must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 CPC. Under the garb of review, a party cannot be permitted to re-open the case and to gain a full-fledged inning for possible for the Court to take a view contrary to what had been taken earlier. Review lies only when there is error apparent on the fact of the record and that fallibility is by the over-sight of the Court. 32. Rishi Ram vs. Board of Revenue; 2006 (24) LCD 641 , wherein in paragraph 7, it has been held that after framing the issue the trial court had fixed 8/8/97 for recording the evidence. Therefore, the Additional Commissioner proceeded to decide the review application on wrong assumption of facts and without taking into consideration the material on record. The Additional Commissioner has proceeded to decide the review application with a wrong angle, as if, he was hearing appeal or revision against the order of his predecessor in the office. In para 2 of the order he posed a question as to whether an issue which could have been raised or ought to have been raised before the consolidation authorities could be raised, subsequently, after close of the consolidation operation in a suit under Section 229 -B or not. With this background in his mind he proceeded to decide the review application. With this background in his mind he proceeded to decide the review application. The Additional Commissioner has failed to take notice of this fact that he was dealing with a review application and possesses only a very limited jurisdiction. The question posed by him was not at all germane for the decision of the review application. At the most he could consider while deciding the review application if there is any error apparent on the face of the record in the order dated 12.12.1998 passed by his predecessor. It is now well settled that while deciding a review application it is not open to the Court to correct an error of judgment. The Apex Court in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma AIR 1979 SC 1047 with regard to the extent and scope of power of review vested in Court has observed as follows : - "Power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person making review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake error apparent on the face of record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused that the appellate power which may enable the appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court". 33. Prahlad Chand vs. Dinesh Gupta; 2002 (20) LCD 791 wherein in paragraph 2, it has been held that : Sri Rajesh Tandon, senior Advocate, has made following 4-submissions - (i) The writ petition was heard on 1-11-2001 and judgment was dictated in the open Court. Whatever arguments were raised the same find place in the said judgment apart from the ground taken in the memorandum of the review petition. The submission of SRI Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate, is that he was out of station on the date when the petition was taken up for hearing. Another Counsel, appearing along with him Mr. Ashok SRIvastava had appeared and argued the case. The submission of SRI Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate, is that he was out of station on the date when the petition was taken up for hearing. Another Counsel, appearing along with him Mr. Ashok SRIvastava had appeared and argued the case. The grievance raised in the review petition is that said learned Counsel SRI Ashok SRIvastava could not make certain submissions. It may be noted that a Counsel had argued the case. It is irrelevant that other Counsel appearing for the same party was not available. Moreover the judgment once having been dictated and signed, question of granting indulgence for further hearing in the same matter did not arise. (ii) The learned Counsel for the tenant applicant, SRI Rajesh Tandon, Senior Advocate argued that under Rule 17 (1) of the Rules framed under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (for short called 'the Act') there ought to have been a finding that accommodation in question required demolition and it was not enough that the landlord required the building for demolition. The learned Counsel for the tenant applicant placed reliance on the decision in the case of Abdul Hai v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Basti and others, 2001 (2) JCLR 858 (All); 2001 (44) ALR 154 para 16. The aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable since the Court below specifically applied its mind to the essential ingredients of the Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and, after considering relevant material on record, came to the conclusion that accommodation in question required demolition. The aforesaid argument of the learned Counsel is thus misplaced. In fact no such ground was even taken in the writ petition, nor pressed and thus it does not provide good ground for reviewing my judgment. (iii) Learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant then referred to clause (iii) of Rule 17 which reads - "that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law. . . . . . . . . . . . . " and argued that there must be a sanctioned plan proposed construction. The argument is misconceived. In my judgment and order dated 1-11-2001 dismissing the petition, requirement of Rule 17, to the extent argument was made is already considered. 34. . . . . . . . . . . . . " and argued that there must be a sanctioned plan proposed construction. The argument is misconceived. In my judgment and order dated 1-11-2001 dismissing the petition, requirement of Rule 17, to the extent argument was made is already considered. 34. The view taken in the judgment is based upon the Division Bench decision rendered in the case of Binda Prasad v. III Additional District Judge, Faizabad and others, 1984 (2) ARC page 306 (Para 9 ). For ready reference relevant portion of the said para is quoted - ". . . . . . . . . . . . . We are, however, not inclined to accept the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Of course, where only a plan has been prepared, but it is still to be sanctioned by the competent authority, then, no doubt, the Prescribed Authority must examine whether the plan conforms to the building bye-laws or regulations, has itself sanctioned the plan, it is not open to the Prescribed Authority or to the Appellate Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the said competent authority. The requirement of Rule 17, in this behalf, has to be reasonably interpreted and it cannot be so interpreted as to confer a part of appellate jurisdiction on the Prescribed Authority to sit in judgment over the decision of the local body or other competent authority on which the jurisdiction to examine the building plans has been conferred by the legislature. In view of learned Single Judge in Ram Aatar (supra) on this point is overruled. " 35. The learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant does not dispute that there is any other contrary judgment on the point. 36. Sri Tandon places reliance upon the case of Kandaswamy v. Board of Management, H. S. I. Said Mosque, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1269 (Para 12 ). The aforesaid decision is based upon interpretation of certain provisions of Karnataka Rent Control Act (1961) wherein Section 21 (1) of the Act, in clear terms, required that for construction of building there was a approved plan or the competent authority had permitted the landlord to build on the land. 37. The aforesaid decision is based upon interpretation of certain provisions of Karnataka Rent Control Act (1961) wherein Section 21 (1) of the Act, in clear terms, required that for construction of building there was a approved plan or the competent authority had permitted the landlord to build on the land. 37. The expression used in Rule 17 of the Rules framed under the Act is clearly distinguishable : (iv) The learned Counsel for the tenant-applicant in the last submitted that this Court is bound to give direction to the landlord for reconstructing the building within a specified time and thereafter let it out to the tenant applicant. In support of his aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the following decisions - (A) 1997 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 173 (pr. 9) State of U. P. v. Additional District Judge, Special Judge, E. C. Act Dehradun and others, (B) AIR 1991 SC 455 (pr. 4) Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v. Tuffail Mohammed. (C) 2000 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases 589 (pr. 12), Manendra Kumar Gupta and others v. Special Judge Allahabad and others. 38. Chairman Town Area vs. State of U.P.; 2014 (32) LCD 2119 wherein in paragraph 9, it has held that Supreme Court in Haridas Das v. Usharani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 , held in order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. 39. State of Kerala and others vs. P.T. Thomas; 2005 (12) SCC 347; wherein in paragraph 6, it has held that "firstly the question regarding payment of interest was not put in issue in the main writ petitions. It would not, therefore, be appropriate for the Bench deciding the review petitions to go into that question. Secondly, the direction given by the High Court to pay the interest cannot be tested merely by reference to the clause pertaining to interest relied upon by the appellant's counsel. The High Court while granting time for payment of admitted amount which was withheld for a considerable time gave an incidental direction that in case of further default, the admitted amount shall carry interest. This is a direction which was meant to ensure that the payment was made to the aggrieved party without further delay. Whether or not the High Court should have entertained the writ petitions under Article 226 pertaining to grievances arising out of a contract is a larger issue which need not be gone into in this case, as the power of the High Court as such has not been challenged at any stage. 40. The point relating to the deposit made under the Act has been heard and decided finally, which cannot form a ground for review, even assuming that the view taken in the judgment under review is erroneous. 41. I have gone through the law cited by learned counsel for both the parties and have given a thoughtful consideration. 42. With regard to review, the following legal position may be summarised. 43. 41. I have gone through the law cited by learned counsel for both the parties and have given a thoughtful consideration. 42. With regard to review, the following legal position may be summarised. 43. At the very outset, I may refer to the statutory grounds as provided under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for seeking review of a judgment or order passed by this court. They are : (a) that there is discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) that some important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) that there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or there is any other sufficient reason. 44. It is also settled that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. 45. In the judgment of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tiruymale passed by Hon'ble the Apex Court which is reported in (1960) 1 SCR 890 , it has been held as under: "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ." 46. Further, that ratio has been reiterated in the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumiri Devi reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 . The observations made by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the judgment are as: "Under Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia, if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The observations made by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the judgment are as: "Under Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia, if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1, CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise." 47. The aforesaid views were reiterated by Hon'ble the Apex Court also in a later judgment reported in AIR 2006 SC 1634 (Haridas Das vs. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and others). Similar views have also been taken in another judgment reported in JT 2009 (9) SC 537 : (2009) 14 SCC 663 (Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs. Vs. Motilal (D) through L.Rs.). 48. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases reported in (1995) 1 S.C.C. 170 , Meera Bhanja (Smt.) vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary (Smt.) and (1997) 8 S.C.C. 715 , Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others has held that the scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is very limited and this jurisdiction can be invoked only, if there is mistake or error apparent on the face of record. In the instant case, there is no error apparent on the face of record of the judgment. 49. It is true that while arguing the writ petition, the then counsel for the petitioner had pressed the sole point regarding the ''first date of hearing', which has been dealt with in detail and the conclusion is that 31.08.1992 was the first date of hearing, on which date, the petitioner should have deposited the whole of the arrears of rent unconditionally. 50. It appears that the petitioner had deposited some rent in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), South, Lucknow but failed to demonstrate it in the written statement filed by him. 51. 50. It appears that the petitioner had deposited some rent in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), South, Lucknow but failed to demonstrate it in the written statement filed by him. 51. I find substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the petitioner cannot travel beyond the pleadings and there were no pleadings in the written statement to the effect that the rent has been deposited under section 13 of the ''Act'. Admittedly, the benefit of section 20(4) of the Act was also not argued or claimed by the petitioner. 52. A legal plea was also raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party that when Section 20(4) provides for adjustment of deposit under section 30(1) of the Act, then how any deposit made under section 30(2) could be adjusted for taking the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. In this regard, learned counsel for the review petitioner has relied upon the provisions of Section 30(6) of the Act as well as the case of Kailash Chandra and another vs. Mukundi Lal and others; 2002 (1) ARC 342 in which Hon'ble the Apex Court considering the same question has held that the effect of deposit under two different circumstances as provided under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 30 is the same. It has further been held that omission of sub-section (2) of Section 30 in sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act, cannot lead to an inference, which would negate or nullify the express and statutory effect provided under sub-section (6) of Section 30 regarding deposits made under section 30(2) of the Act. Thus, the legal position is settled that whether the deposit has been made under section 30(1) or section 30(2) of the Act, that shall be deemed to be a payment of rent to the landlord. 53. It is not disputed that on the date of first hearing, the amount of rent along with the damages for use and occupation together with interest @ 9% per annum, landlord's cost of suit should have been deposited unconditionally to claim the benefit of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 54. 53. It is not disputed that on the date of first hearing, the amount of rent along with the damages for use and occupation together with interest @ 9% per annum, landlord's cost of suit should have been deposited unconditionally to claim the benefit of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 54. As per the mode of calculation given in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh vs. District Judge, Fatehpur and others; 1999 (17)LCD 1131, the mode of calculation of deposit under section 20(4) of the Act has been given. This court while deciding the writ petition has also applied the said formula and has come to the conclusion that Rs.2909/- was due upon the petitioner while the petitioner had deposited Rs.2753.85, which was short by Rs.155.15. In these circumstances, such aspect has been considered at length and I do not find any apparent error of fact or law. 55. I also find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the review petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that it has not been filed by the counsel, who had argued the writ petition. I also find substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the plea of deposit under section 30(1) or 30(2) was not agitated before the trial court in the written statements. Therefore, now the petitioner cannot travel beyond the pleadings. 56. As far as deposits up to 18.03.1994 / 30.04.1994 are concerned, this aspect has been considered in the judgment. As far as the dismissal of regular suit no.198 of 1994 is concerned, that suit was regarding declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, there is no adverse consequence upon the rights of the petitioner because that suit was filed by Om Prakash and Kamla Devi against Sri Krishna Gopal Vaish and Suraj Lal claiming themselves to have succeeded the estate of Krishna Gopal Vaish through the alleged ''Will' dated 20.02.1989. 57. Submissions of the learned counsel for the review petitioner is that the first deposit of Rs.114/- was made to cover the period of rent for the period 01.12.1989 to 28.02.1990 and thereafter continued to deposit the rent in the court of Civil Judge concerned, which also relates to the deposit of rent. 57. Submissions of the learned counsel for the review petitioner is that the first deposit of Rs.114/- was made to cover the period of rent for the period 01.12.1989 to 28.02.1990 and thereafter continued to deposit the rent in the court of Civil Judge concerned, which also relates to the deposit of rent. Nowhere, it has been demonstrated or pleaded that in view of the judgment passed in the case of Raj Bahadur Singh (supra), lawyers fee as per Rule 585 of the General Rules, Court Fees and the expenses of notice have ever been paid. The review petitioner cannot take the benefit of his own latches and the protection under section 20(4) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was not available to the review petitioner. 58. In view of the above, I do not find any apparent error in the judgment dated 06.04.2015. 59. The review petition is dismissed.