JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. A. Gon Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents but there is no representation from the remaining respondent despite due notice from this court. 2. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act questioning the judgment and award dated 26.02.2014 delivered in T.S.(MAC) 174 of 2012 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Court No. 4, Agartala, West Tripura on the solitary ground that the multiplier could not have been chosen on the age of the deceased who was admittedly bachelor and instead his parents’ age ought to have been considered for determining the appropriate multiplier. 3. According to Mr. A. Gon Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that in view of Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and Another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the age of the dependent parents for purpose of determining the multiplier is relevant. Based on the said observation of Sarla Verma (supra) Mr. Gon Choudhury, learned counsel has reiterated that the multiplier thus has been applied on the wrong premises. 4. Appearing for the claimant-respondents, Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel has seriously resisted such proposition of law having relied on Sarla Verma (supra). He has submitted that observation as made in Sarla Verma (supra) be necessarily noticed, but the law has been very carefully curved out in Sarla Verma (supra) having observed thus: “Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased.” 5. He has further referred a decision of the apex court in P.S. Somanathan & Ors. versus District Insurance Officer & Another reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1313 where the apex court has revisited the law and as follows : “23. The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. He has further referred a decision of the apex court in P.S. Somanathan & Ors. versus District Insurance Officer & Another reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1313 where the apex court has revisited the law and as follows : “23. The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.” [Emphasis added] 6. Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the claimant respondents has raised a question of maintainability of this appeal as the appellant was not impleaded as the party in the claim proceeding but their status is that of a noticee. In this regard there is no controversy. Whether the noticee without having obtained the permission as granted under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act can take all the general defences or not. This has been well settled by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh versus Nicolletta Rohtagi and Others reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 . Mr. Deb, learned counsel has referred a decision where Nicolletta Rohtagi was restated by the apex Court. In Rekha Jain versus National Insurance Company Limited and Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 389 the apex court has enunciated as under : “45. Ltd., Chandigarh versus Nicolletta Rohtagi and Others reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 . Mr. Deb, learned counsel has referred a decision where Nicolletta Rohtagi was restated by the apex Court. In Rekha Jain versus National Insurance Company Limited and Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 389 the apex court has enunciated as under : “45. The finding of fact is recorded by the Tribunal on the question of the accident caused on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the offending truck driver on 17.8.2001, the date of the accident on account of which the appellant herein has sustained grievous injuries and has undergone trauma and mental agony for over a period four years. She had also gone through a number of surgeries on account of this accident in which her face has been disfigured. With regard to the nature of injuries sustained by her, the District Medical Board of Sambalpur, represented by the Chief Medical Officer has issued disability certificate certifying that the appellant has suffered disability to the extent of 30%. The finding recorded by the Tribunal on this important aspect of the case on the basis of legal evidence is not challenged either by the owner of the truck or by the Insurance Company and it could not have challenged the finding without obtaining the permission as required under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act to avail the defence of the insured to contest the case as has been held by a three Judge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi. The relevant paragraphs read as under : “15. It is relevant to note that Parliament, while enacting subsection (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in subsection (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in subsection (2) of Section 149. If Parliament had intended to include the breach of other conditions of the policy as a defence, it could have easily provided any breach of conditions of insurance policy in subsection (2) of Section 149. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in subsection (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to the insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the statutory defences which are available to the insurer to contest a claim are confined to what are provided in subsection (2) of Section 149 of the 1988 Act and not more and for that reason if an insurer is to file an appeal, the challenge in the appeal would confine to only those grounds.” The said finding of fact has attained the finality and the compensation has been awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. The only aspect which was required to be examined by the High Court in the appeals filed both by the respondent Insurance Company as well as by the appellant was the quantum of compensation required to be awarded in her favour under the different heads of non-pecuniary damages as per the principles laid down by this Court, House of Lords, Queen’s Bench and authors in various judgments and extracts from various texts and books respectively, referred to supra.” [Emphasis added] 7. Having appreciated the submissions made by the learned counsel as well as scrutinized the records as placed before this court, this court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in determining the multiplier on the age of the deceased. Moreover this appeal is not competent for not having permission under Section 170(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act since the appellant was a mere noticee. 8. There is no merit in this appeal and hence it stands dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.