JUDGMENT : These appeals are by the plaintiffs in the suits filed to pass declaratory decrees that the communications of the Bangalore Development Authority (for short ‘BDA’) vide (Exs.P9 to P44) as illegal and for grant of permanent injunction against the defendants – BDA and its Officers, from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule shop premises. For convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘the plaintiffs’ and ‘the defendants’. 2. The plaintiffs filed 41 separate suits in respect of the shop premises situated in Austin Town and Indiranagar Shopping Complexes of the BDA. The plaintiffs having occupied the respective shop premises by virtue of the licences issued by the BDA, are carrying on business therein. The BDA having served notices vide Exs.P9 to P44, the suits were filed contending that they are ‘the lessees’ and being in settled position are not liable to be dispossessed otherwise than in a manner known to law. It was contended that the only course open to the defendants is to follow due process of law i.e. institute suits for ejectment, after determination of the tenancy of the plaintiffs or by filing suits for possession after revocation of the so called licences. 3. The defendants filed written statements and contended that the BDA is a statutory authority and that it functions in accordance with the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (for short ‘BDA Act’) and the BDA Rules, 1975. It was stated that the BDA allotted the shop premises to the plaintiffs by way of licence i.e., to use the shops for the purpose of conducting business. It was further stated that the plaintiffs have executed the ‘deeds of licence’ and are in occupation as licensees. It was submitted that in view of the decision of the BDA to demolish the existing commercial complexes and reconstruct the same, the licences issued to the plaintiffs were determined in terms of clause 24 of ‘deeds of licence’. It was stated that the licence period has expired and the occupation of the plaintiffs is unauthorized. The plaintiffs were notified vide Ex.P9 to P44 to vacate the shop premises which are in their respective occupation. Other defences were also raised including the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to serve notice under S.64 of the BDA Act and dismissal of the suits was sought. 4. Based on the pleadings, issues were raised. The plaintiffs were notified vide Ex.P9 to P44 to vacate the shop premises which are in their respective occupation. Other defences were also raised including the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to serve notice under S.64 of the BDA Act and dismissal of the suits was sought. 4. Based on the pleadings, issues were raised. At the request of both parties, the suits were consolidated and common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.2406 of 2010. The plaintiffs in O.S. Nos.2406/2010 and 3533/2010 and GPA holder of plaintiff in O.S. No.3629/2010 deposed as PWs 1 to 3 and marked 61 documents as EXs.P1 to P61. An official of the BDA was examined as DW-1 and a document produced was marked as Ex.D1. 5. The Trial Court after consideration of record and rival contentions by a common Judgment dated 15.02.2016 held that the relationship between the BDA and the plaintiffs is that of ‘Licensor and Licensee’ and that there is no jural relationship of ‘lessor and lessee’ and that Exs.P9 to P44 were issued by the BDA in pursuance of the Order dated 17.04.2009 passed in W.P.7421/2009 and connected cases and that the plaintiffs are in unauthorized occupation of the suit schedule premises. The material issues raised were answered against the plaintiffs and the suits were dismissed with costs. 6. Sri Sampat Anand Shetty, learned advocate filed synopsis of common arguments and contended that the mere nomenclature of the basic document relied upon by the BDA (Ex.P6) will not govern the relationship of the parties. He submitted that the intention of the parties to the documents will have to be taken note of by the Court to reach the conclusion with respect to the jural relationship and that the approach of the Trial Court to the matters is wholly erroneous. He submitted that the reliance placed by the Trial Court on Exs.P45 and P46 and the so called admissions of PWs 1 to 3, noticed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the common Judgment passed, is erroneous and that the dismissal of the suits is illegal. He further submitted that the plaintiffs having effected works of permanent character by spending huge amount, it is not open to the BDA to dispossess the plaintiffs from their respective shop premises. He further submitted that the plaintiffs having effected works of permanent character by spending huge amount, it is not open to the BDA to dispossess the plaintiffs from their respective shop premises. He submitted that the appreciation of the record of the suit by the Trial Court being erroneous, the impugned common Judgment and the consequential Decrees are liable to be set aside. 7. Sri M.V. Vedamurthy, learned advocate, on the other hand submitted that the plaintiffs / appellants being licensees, in the commercial establishments / offices situated in the shopping complexes belonging to the BDA and the period of their licences having expired, the respective shopping complexes also being in dilapidated condition, the BDA resolved to demolish the two shopping complexes and to have multiplexes, so as to cater to the growing needs of the public. He submitted that after W.P. No.7421/2009 and connected cases filed by the plaintiffs was allowed on 17.04.2009, the plaintiffs were served with notices vide Exs.P9 to P44. He further submitted that the suit schedule premises being ‘public premises’ as defined under S.2(e) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 (for short, 'the Act'), and the BDA having been constituted and incorporated as an Authority as per S.3 of the Karnataka Act No.12 of 1976, the plaintiffs being in unauthorised occupation, as defined under S.2(g) of the Act and the plaintiffs having not handed over the possession of the licensed premises, proceedings under the Act would be initiated and the possession of the suit schedule premises would be resumed, i.e., in the manner known to or recognised by law and not otherwise. Learned counsel submitted that the suits filed by the plaintiffs being not maintainable, Trial Court is justified in dismissing the same. Learned counsel further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the cases, the impugned Judgment and Decrees are not liable for interference. 8. Having regard to the rival contentions and the record of the case, the only question for determination is, whether the plaintiffs are licensees or tenants in the suit schedule premises? If it is the latter, the plaintiffs will succeed and if it is the former, the plaintiffs will be out of Court. 9. 8. Having regard to the rival contentions and the record of the case, the only question for determination is, whether the plaintiffs are licensees or tenants in the suit schedule premises? If it is the latter, the plaintiffs will succeed and if it is the former, the plaintiffs will be out of Court. 9. Undisputedly, the plaintiffs had filed W.P. Nos.7421/2009 and connected cases, assailing certain communications of the BDA, whereby, they were directed to vacate and deliver the shop premises in their respective occupation. The writ petitions were allowed by a common Order dated 17.04.2009. The relevant portion of the said order reads thus: “2. The records reveal that the petitioners are the licensees having commercial establishments / offices / Tribunals in the shopping complexes belonging to the Bangalore Development Authority. 3. xxx xxx xxx 4. It is not in dispute that the petitioners have occupied certain portions of the shopping complexes belonging to Bangalore Development Authority as licensees. The period of licence is also expired. However, the petitioners are in possession of the properties even thereafter by paying licence fees…” 10. Finding that the impugned communications are bereft of reasons and also in cyclostyled form, the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned communications were quashed, reserving liberty to the BDA to proceed in accordance with law by taking such steps as are open to it in law for getting the writ petitioners evicted. The said Order has attained finality. 11. The BDA having served on the plaintiffs, Exs.P9 to P44 – Vyapara Maligeya Hanchike Raddati Aadesha, O.S. Nos.2406/2010 and connected cases were filed in the Trial Court. The Trial Court having appreciated the evidence produced by the parties and after referring to the Order passed by this Court, noticed supra, has dismissed the suits. 12. In the order passed on 17.04.2009, in W.P. No.7421/2009 and connected cases, the fact of the petitioners being in occupation of the shop premises belonging to the BDA, as the licensees and the period of licence having expired and they being in continued occupation by paying the licence fees has been noticed. In view of the said undisputed fact, it is not open to the plaintiffs to contend that the jural relationship between them and the defendants is that of ‘lessees and lessor respectively’. The plaintiffs cannot approbate and reprobate, since the said order has attained finality. 13. In view of the said undisputed fact, it is not open to the plaintiffs to contend that the jural relationship between them and the defendants is that of ‘lessees and lessor respectively’. The plaintiffs cannot approbate and reprobate, since the said order has attained finality. 13. S.38 of the BDA Act, 1976 empowers the BDA to lease any movable or immovable property belonging to it for the formation of open spaces or for building purposes or for any development scheme. Thus, it is clear that no lease of the property belonging to the BDA can be made by the BDA for any other purpose. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule premises was leased by the BDA for any of the purposes shown in S.38 of the BDA Act. As no lease can be made contrary to the said statutory provision, the claim of the plaintiffs that the jural relationship between them and the BDA i.e., in respect of the suit schedule premises is, that of ‘lessee and lessor’ is unacceptable. No lease of the property belonging to the BDA can be made without following the procedure prescribed under the BDA Act and the Rules. 14. The provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 are not applicable to the property belonging to the BDA. The immovable property of BDA falls within the definition of ‘premises’ under S.2(e)(iii) of the Act. Hence, it is not open to the plaintiffs to contend that the BDA should recover the possession of the suit schedule premises by having recourse to the provisions made under the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1881 i.e., after determination of the tenancy. 15. In the case of NEW BUSSTAND SHOP OWNERS ASSOCIATION Vs. CORPORATION OF KOZHIKODE, (2009) 10 SCC 455 , the facts were that the members of the appellant – Association had put in possession of various shops and offices in the Municipality bus stand building, owned by the Corporation of Kozhikode, under an Agreement made with the appellant – Association, under S.215 of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. The respondent – Municipal Corporation issued licences to that effect i.e., to the shop holders, under the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. The shop holders were paying the licence fee. The respondent – Municipal Corporation issued licences to that effect i.e., to the shop holders, under the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1994. The shop holders were paying the licence fee. However, at the time of renewal of licence, State Government insisted that the said licence should be treated as lease and accordingly, stamp duty, thereon, should be paid. The question determined by the Supreme Court was “whether the Agreement under which the appellant – Association granted shop was the agreement for lease or licence, so that the stamp duty could be levied accordingly under the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959?” Upon consideration of the rival contentions and while allowing the appeal, Apex Court has held that “lease” or “licence”, “lessor” or “licensor”, “Rent” or “licence fee” by themselves are not decisive and true test is nature and quality of occupation. The relationship created between the respondent – Corporation and the appellant – shop holders was held to be that of “licensor and licensee” and not that of “lessor and lessee”. 16. In the present cases, there is no dispute with regard to the plaintiffs having obtained the suit schedule shop premises as licensees and having paid the licence fee. In W.P.No.7421/2009 and connected cases, this Court found that the petitioners/plaintiffs therein to be the licensees of the shop premises in question and they having paid the licence fee. It is not the case of the plaintiffs, that subsequently the defendants leased the suit schedule premises and that they entered into lease transactions. Merely because on certain occasion the amount paid was acknowledged as rent, instead as licence fee, does not create the jural relationship of lessor or lessee. 17. That by serving on the plaintiffs Exs.P9 to P44, they were treated as unauthorised occupants i.e., in terms of the definition under S.2(g) of the Act. In view of the continuance of the plaintiffs in the public premises, even after the expiry of the licence period i.e., after the notices vide Exs.P9 to P44 were served, the BDA should initiate proceedings under the provisions of ‘the Act’, which right was reserved in its favour, in the order passed on 17.04.2009 in W.P. No.7421/2009 and connected cases. 18. 18. The fact that the plaintiffs are licensees and that the suit schedule premises are public premises being well established and the licence period having expired, the BDA can recover possession by having recourse to the provisions of ‘the Act’ and not otherwise. Neither the State nor its instrumentalities, falling within the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution can dispossess a person by executive orders. The authorities cannot become the law unto themselves. It is settled position of law that the Government and its instrumentalities can resume possession of the property only in a manner known to law or recognised by law and not otherwise. In view of the above, the appeals are dismissed. However, the respondents shall not dispossess the appellants or resume possession of the suit schedule premises otherwise than in due course of law. Ordered accordingly. Costs made easy.