JUDGMENT Hon’ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Sri Amit Manohar, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri C.S. Agnihotri and Sri A.D. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondent/cross objector in First Appeal No. 628 of 1986. 2. Both the aforesaid First Appeals arise from the impugned common judgment dated 24.2.1986 in L.A.R. Nos. 184 of 1979 and 173 of 1979, passed by the Court of District Judge, Ghaziabad determining compensation @ Rs. 10/- per square yard alongwith additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) and other benefits under the Act including interest. FACTS: 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that by notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) dated 11.1.1977, certain lands of village Raghunathpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad were acquired. Notification under Section 6 of the Act was made on 12.1.1977. Possession was taken over on 20.3.1977. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the award on 6.2.1979 offering compensation @ Rs. 17,456.67 per bigha. At the instance of the claimants, references were made under Section 18 of the Act and two such references have been decided by the impugned common judgment. 4. Against the impugned judgment in L.A.R. No. 184 of 1979, the claimant-Sri Tek Ram also filed a First Appeal No. 779 of 1986 which was decided by the Division Bench by the judgment dated 5.1.2010 as under : “In this land acquisition appeal, the applicant has prayed for enhancement of rate of compensation. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 699 of 1987 Smt. Kamlesh Kumari v. State of U.P. decided on 17.7.2001 by which the Division Bench has allowed the appeal and directed to pay the compensation as per award made in the Land Acquisition Reference No. 238 of 1984 passed by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge had awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard. In this case also after the perusal of the judgment, we find that the appellant has been granted the same rate as was granted in the Land Acquistion Reference No. 238 of 1984. The land is of the same vicinity and the village. Therefore, we allow the appeal with the direction that the appeallant should be given compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. The land is of the same vicinity and the village. Therefore, we allow the appeal with the direction that the appeallant should be given compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard alongwith 30% solatium and other benefits accordingly as per the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order is passed as to costs.” 5. Thus, the Division Bench has awarded compensation to the claimant-Sri Tek Ram @ Rs. 28.12 per square yard alongwith 30% solatium and other benefits as per provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal of Sri Tek Ram was allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the Reference Court stood modified. SUBMISSIONS: 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondents are not entitled for benefit of provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act inasmuch as the acquisition was made much prior to the amendment and, therefore, the amended provisions shall not be applicable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593 , Kashiben Bhikabai and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2002) 2 SCC 605 (para 2, 5, 8, 17) and Major Pakhar Singh Atwal and others v. State of Punjab and others, (1995) Supplement Act (2) SCC 401 (para 2 and 9). He further submits that since the acquisition was made prior to the amendment and as such the cross objector is not entitled for compensation over and above the claimed amount. In support of his submissions, he relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer-cum-DSWO, AP v. B.V. Reddy and Sons, (2002) 3 SCC 463 . 7. Learned counsels for the respondents/cross objector submit that in the First Appeal No. 779 of 1986 filed by the claimant Sri Tek Ram, the Division Bench has already determined compensation @ Rs. 28.12 per square yard alongwith 30% solatium and other benefits accordingly as per provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and therefore, both the appeals of present appellants deserve to be dismissed and the cross objection filed by the claimant-respondent in First Appeal No. 628 of 1986 deserves to be allowed in terms of the Division Bench judgment in the case of Tek Ram (supra). They further submit that the judgment in the case of Tek Ram (supra) has been accepted by the appellants and thus, the impugned common judgment which has been modified, has attained finality with respect to the claimants particularly, the claimant-respondent-Sri Tek Ram, who was appellant in First Appeal No. 779 of 1986. They further submit that appellants have accepted the aforesaid judgment with respect to one of the two claimants whose claims came for consideration in the impugned judgment of the Reference Court and as such the appellants cannot deny the same benefit to the cross objector as has been extended to the claimant-respondent in First Appeal No. 629 of 1986, who was the appellant in the decided First Appeal No. 779 of 1986. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS: 8. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties. 9. It is admitted to the appellants that the present two First Appeals were filed by the appellants while First Appeal No. 779 of 1986 was filed by claimant Sri Tek Ram who is the claimant-respondent in First Appeal No. 629 of 1986. It is also admitted to the appellants that the judgment in First Appeal No. 779 of 1986 has attained finality, which was passed by the Division Bench. Under the circumstances, the cross objection filed by the claimant -respondent in First Appeal No. 628 of 1986 deserves to be allowed in terms of the aforesaid Division Bench judgment in the case of Tek Ram (supra), which has been quoted above. 10. Since, the Division Bench of this Court has enhanced the compensation in the appeal filed by one of the claimants against the impugned common judgment which has attained finality and as such the appeals filed by the present appellant, namely, NOIDA, deserve to be dismissed. 11. From the records, it appears that the First Appeal No. 628 of 1986 was earlier decided by Division Bench by judgment dated 18.1.2011 as under: “The present appeal has been filed by the New Okhala Iindustrial Development Authority, Noida, against the judgment and order dated 27th February, 1986 passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in Land Acquisition No. 173 of 1979 (Daulat Ram v. State). The learned District Judge had awarded compensation of the land acquired at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq.yard. The learned District Judge had awarded compensation of the land acquired at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq.yard. A cross objection has been filed by the heirs and legal representatives of Daulat Ram seeking enhancement of the compensation on the ground that for the acquisition of the land at the adjoining area by the NOIDA the District Judge has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard which has become final. We have heard Sri Amit Manohar, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Y.D.Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the claimants. We find that this Court in First Appeal No. 631 of 1986 (New Okhala Iindustrial Development Authority Noida district Ghaziabad v. Daulat Ram and another) had allowed the appeal vide judgment and order dated 20th April, 2010 and fixed compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yards. No distinguishing feature has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant or by the learned counsel appearing for the claimants for not applying the aforesaid judgment and order dated 20th April, 2010 to the facts of the present case. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we allow the cross objection filed by the claimants and enhance the compensation from Rs. 10/- per sq. yard to Rs. 28.12. per sq. yard alongwith solatium and interest as per the prescribed rates. In view of the foregoing discussions, the cross objection is allowed. However, the appeal preferred by the New Okhala Iindustrial Development Authority Noida stands dismissed.” 12. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment was not challenged by the present appellants, namely, the NOIDA. However, the claimants preferred Civil Appeal No. 9526 of 2011 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was decided by judgment dated 4.11.2011 as under; “Leave granted. Feeling aggrieved by the denial of the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’), the appellants have filed this appeal against judgment dated 18.1.2011 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The appellants’ land was acquired by the State Government in 1977. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, New Okhala passed award dated 8.2.1979 and held that the appellants are entitled to market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 17,456.67 per bigha. The appellants’ land was acquired by the State Government in 1977. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, New Okhala passed award dated 8.2.1979 and held that the appellants are entitled to market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 17,456.67 per bigha. On a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, District Judge, Ghaziabad (for short, ‘the Reference Court’) determined the amount of compensation in the following terms : (1) Each of the claimants is entitled to the price of this land acquired calculated at Rs. 10/- (ten) per sq. yard. (2) Each of the claimants under sub-section 1(A) of Section 23 of the Act is entitled to interest 12% per annum on the market value of his land acquired respectively determined @ Rs. 10/- (ten) per sq. yard from 11.1.77 to 20.3.77. (3) Each of the claimants under sub-section 2 of Section 23 of the Act is entitled to solatium @30% on the market value of the land acquired calculated @ Rs. 10/- (ten) per sq. yard. (4) Each of the claimants under Section 28 of the Act is entitled to interest @ 9% per annum on the difference between the compensation determined by me and the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer from 21.3.77 to 20.3.78. (5) Each of the claimants is entitled to interest @ 15% per annum on the difference between the compensation determined by me and the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer from 21.3.78 to the date on which the above difference is paid. The claimants further are held entitled to their costs. The amounts, if any, received by the claimants as compensation shall be adjusted.” Respondent No. 1 challenged the judgment of the Reference Court by filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act. On being noticed by the High Court, the appellants filed cross objections and prayed for award of higher compensation. The Division Bench of the High Court referred to the judgment of Appeal No. 631 of 1986 New Okhala Industrial Development Authority, Noida District, Ghaziabad v. Daulat Ram and another, whereby enhanced compensation Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard in respect of the adjoining land was upheld, dismissed the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 and allowed, cross objections of the appellants and directed the respondents to apy compensation to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard. 28.12 per sq. yard in respect of the adjoining land was upheld, dismissed the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 and allowed, cross objections of the appellants and directed the respondents to apy compensation to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per sq. yard. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside because even though he High Court ordained payment of enhanced compensation, the benefit of Section 23(1-A) and other provisions of the Act has not been given to them. He submitted that even though this plea was very much raised before the Division Bench of the High Court, the same has not been considered. Shri Ravindra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 fairly stated that the impugned judgment does not indicate consideration of the issues raised by the parties. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel and are satisfied that the judgment under challenge deserves to be set aside only on the ground that it does not satisfy the requirement of a speaking order. In our view, the High Court should have adverted to the issued raised in the appeal and the cross objections including the appellants’ claim for grant of benefit in terms of Section 23 (1-A) and decided the same by recording appropriate reasons. Its failure to do so as has resulted in grave injustice to the appellants. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 alongwith the cross objections filed by the appellants.” 13. It is relevant to note that the Division Bench, in its judgment dated 18.1.2011 as aforequoted, described name of parties of First Appeal No. 631 of 1986 to be New Okhala Industrial Development Authority, Noida, District Ghaziabad v. Daulat Ram and another, whereas the correct description of parties is New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Noida v. Ratan Lal and another. 14. In the light of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforequoted order, I proceed to examine the following questions- (i) What would be the market value of the acquired land of the cross objector? (ii) Whether cross objector is entitled for benefit in terms of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act? 14. In the light of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforequoted order, I proceed to examine the following questions- (i) What would be the market value of the acquired land of the cross objector? (ii) Whether cross objector is entitled for benefit in terms of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act? Question No. (i) What would be the market value of the acquired land of the cross objector? 15. So for as the question No. 1 is concerned, it is concluded by the Division Bench judgment in the case of Tek Ram (supra) which arose from the impugned common judgment. The Division Bench judgment, on the similar set of facts in the case of Tek Ram (supra), is binding on this Bench. Consequently, the market value of the acquired land of the cross-objector is held to be Rs. 28.12 per square yard. Question No(ii) Whether cross objector is entitled for benefit in terms of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act? 16. It is admitted to the parties that the acquisition was made by notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 11.1.1977. Notification under Section 6 was made on 12.1.1977. The possession was obtained over the land on 20.3.1977. The award was made by the S.L.A.O. on 6.2.1979 offering compensation @ Rs. 74,456.67 per bigha. Two references, namely, the Reference Nos. 184 of 1979 (Tek Ram v. State) and 173 of 1979 (Daulat Ram v. State), were made at the instance of the tenure holders under Section 18 of the Act which were decided by the impugned common judgment dated 24.2.1986. 17. Sub-Section 1(A) in Section 23 was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 which provides as under: “(1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.—In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded.” 18. Section 30(1) of the Act 68 of 1984 regarding its application to proceedings pending on or after 30.4.1982 provides as under : “Section 30—Transitional provisions. 30(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to: (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People] in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the commencement of this Act.” 19. The question as to applicability of the newly inserted provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act came for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 SCC 277 (para 21 and 22) and Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under : “21. Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on April 30, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30 sub-section (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before September 24, 1984. If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30 sub-section (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before September 24, 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in Section 30 sub-section (2). 22. In the case before us, on October 26, 1967, the notification under Section 4 was issued. On March 5, 1969 the Collector made the award. The result is that on April 30, 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector. Therefore, Section 30 sub-section (1)(a) is not attracted to the case. Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before April 30, 1982, Section 30 sub-section (1)(b) is also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis. The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A).” (Emphasis supplied by me) 20. The aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court was considered by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others (supra) (paras 75 and 80) and it it was held as under : “75.............In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago (1990) 1 SCC 277 to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view. 80. For the reasons aforementioned it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. 80. For the reasons aforementioned it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. Zora Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 673 insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 21. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by Hon’ble Supreme Court as aforenoted, I have no difficulty to hold that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act shall not be applicable to the cross-objector/claimant inasmuch as the acquisition was made by notification under Section 4 of the Act on 11.1.1977, followed by notification under Section 6 issued on 12.1.1977 and the award was made by the S.L.A.O. On 6.2.1979, which all are prior to coming into force the Amending Act 68 of 1984. In the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra), the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has overruled the judgment in the case of Zora Singh (supra) in which it was held that the amount under Section 23(1-A) is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. Under the circumstances, the cross objector shall not be entitled to the benefit as provided under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. 22. In view of the above discussion, both the appeals filed by NOIDA and the cross objection filed by the claimant in First Appeal No. 628 of 1986 are disposed of. The claimant/cross objector shall be entitled for compensation @ Rs. 28.12 per square yard alongwith all benefits and interest under the Act excluding the benefit of the amended Section 23(1-A). The impugned judgment and decrees is accordingly modified.