JUDGMENT : Janak Raj Kotwal, J. This is a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (for short the Code) for quashing of a complaint and proceedings under Section 500 Ranbir Penal code lodged against the petitioner and others by Respondent No. 1 and setting aside of the order dated 08.06.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Udhampur whereby the application filed by the petitioner seeking his discharge in terms of Section 253(2) of the Code has been dismissed. 2. I have learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. A few facts need to be stated. The Public Prosecutor, Udhampur with previous sanction (consent) of the State Government, Home Department, filed a complaint against the petitioner and proforma Respondents 1 and 2 for having published a news item in Newspaper, namely, Himalayan Mail, alleging that the same is defamatory against a public servant, namely, Vijay Singh Sambyal, a Senior Superintendent (SSP) of the Jammu and Kashmir Police. Petitioner has been arraigned as accused in his capacity as resident editor of the paper, proforma Respondent No. 1 as owner, printer, publisher and editor and proforma Respondent No. 2 as executive editor. 4. Learned Sessions Judge, Udhampur after taking cognizance of the offence and recording initial statements of witnesses issued process against all the accused for proceeding against them for commission of offence under Section 500 Ranbir Penal code. During pendency of the trial petitioner filed application under Section 253(2) of the Code seeking dropping of the proceedings and his discharge on the grounds that no sanction to prosecute him has been accorded by the Government and that no role in publication of the alleged defamatory news item has been attributed to him in the compliant. It was contended in the application that law mandates previous sanction of the Government for launching prosecution against all the accused but the learned Sessions Judge has ignored this mandatory provision of law. 5. Learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the application taking the view that before exercising jurisdiction under Section 253(2) of the Code opportunity has to be given to the complainant to produce at least the important witnesses he wants to examine and thereby rejecting the plea that proceedings can be dropped at any stage of the trial. 5. Learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the application taking the view that before exercising jurisdiction under Section 253(2) of the Code opportunity has to be given to the complainant to produce at least the important witnesses he wants to examine and thereby rejecting the plea that proceedings can be dropped at any stage of the trial. Learned Judge held that the complainant has a right to make out a case for charge, which he can do if he gets the chance to examine his witnesses or at least the important witnesses. 6. The petitioner seeks setting aside of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and quashing of the complaint and proceedings on the grounds that complaint against him without prior sanction under Section 198-B(3) of the Code is illegal, that the news item per se is not defamatory and is covered under exception 3 of Section 500 Ranbir Penal code and that the resident editor of a paper has no role in selection of the news to be published in the paper. 7. Mr. Ajay Vaid, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the Government order dated 20.08.2008 a copy whereof is lying on the trial court file has accorded sanction for prosecution against owner, editor, publisher and executive editor of the newspaper, whereas the petitioner at the relevant time was a resident editor only and is not covered under the sanction. His argument was that prosecution of the petitioner being without sanction as required under Section 198-B (3) is illegal so learned Sessions Judge has fallen in error by not dropping the illegal proceedings against the petitioner or not discharging him in terms of Section 253(2) of the Code. Mr. Vaid urged that illegal prosecution can be dropped by the trial court and accused can be discharge at any stage if the illegality is pointed out and the court is satisfied that the prosecution is illegal for any reason, whatsoever, like lack of sanction as required under law. 8. Per contra, Mr. L.K. Moza, Learned AAG, supported the impugned order. He argued that the learned trial court having taken the cognizance and issued process against the petitioner and the co-accused, no case for quashing the proceedings or discharge of the petitioner is made out. 9. 8. Per contra, Mr. L.K. Moza, Learned AAG, supported the impugned order. He argued that the learned trial court having taken the cognizance and issued process against the petitioner and the co-accused, no case for quashing the proceedings or discharge of the petitioner is made out. 9. As said above, learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the application mainly taking the view that before exercising jurisdiction under Section 253(2) of the Code opportunity has to be given to the complainant to produce at least the important witnesses he wants to examine. The two important pleas of the petitioner that complaint against him has been filed without prior sanction under Section 198-B of the Code and that the complaint per se does not disclose any offence against the petitioner seem not have attracted the mind of the learned Judge. 10. Section 198 of the Code lays down the procedure for initiation of prosecution inter alia for commission of offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 RPC, which falls in Chapter XXI of the Ranbir Penal code. It provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence of defamation, among others, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence. Section 198-B relates exclusively to and provides an additional provision for prosecution for defamation of high dignitaries, like President, Vice President, Governor of a State, Ministers or public servants in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions. Section 198, short of its provisos, and Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 198-B are relevant in this case and are reproduced: "Prosecution for breach of contract, defamation and offences against marriage No Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Ranbir Panel Code, or under Section 493 to 496" (both inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence. "[198-B. Prosecution for defamation against public servants in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 is alleged to have been committed against the President or the Vice-President [or the Governor of the State, or of any other State in India] or a Minister, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his pubic functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor. (2) Every such complaint shall set forth the facts which constitute the offence alleged, the nature of such offence and such other particulars as are reasonably sufficient to give notice to the accused of the offence alleged to have been committed by him. (3) No complaint under sub-section (1) shall be made by the public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction,- (a) In the case of the President or the Vice-President [or the Governor of the State or of any other State in India], of any Secretary to the Government authorised by him in this behalf; (b) In the case of Minister of the [Government of India] or of a State Government, of the Secretary to the Council of Ministers, if any, or of any Secretary to the Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned; (c) In the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, of the Government concerned. (4) No Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence under sub-section (1), unless the complaint is made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. ............" (underlining by me) 11. Government order dated 20.08.2004, where Government in terms of Section 198-B (3) of the Code has accorded consent (sanction) for prosecution in its operative part reads: "Now, therefore, in terms of Section 198-B (3) Cr. ............" (underlining by me) 11. Government order dated 20.08.2004, where Government in terms of Section 198-B (3) of the Code has accorded consent (sanction) for prosecution in its operative part reads: "Now, therefore, in terms of Section 198-B (3) Cr. P.C., the Government of Jammu and Kashmir hereby accord its consent to the prosecution against the owner, editor, publisher and executive editor of the Himalayan Mail newspaper." This order undoubtedly does not include prosecution of resident editor, the capacity in which petitioner has been arraigned in the complaint. The question, thus, raised is whether prosecution of the petitioner without sanction to prosecute him is illegal? 12. Reading Sections 198 and 198-B of the Code in juxtaposition would show that Section 198 lays down the general rule for lodging prosecution for offence of defamation, among others. Only a person aggrieved by the offence can lodge prosecution against the accused by filing complaint in the court of a Magistrate. Court will not take cognizance of offence of defamation on a complaint filed by a person other than an aggrieved person. Section 198 in a way gives the aggrieved person a right to lodge prosecution for the defamation committed to him by filing complaint in the court of Magistrate. Section 198-B, however, authorizes the Public Prosecutor to lodge prosecution when defamation is committed to high dignitaries, ministers and public servants in the discharge of their public functions. But this authorization has a rider. The complaint by a public prosecutor, can be filed only with previous sanction of the Competent Authority. Besides, such a complaint will have to be filed in the Court of Session within six months of the date of commission of offence. 13. The object of lodging prosecution by the Public Prosecutor and the purpose of obtaining prior sanction has been eloquently stated by the Supreme Court in P.C. Joshi and Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 387 , which I quote: "9. Section 198-B is enacted to provide machinery for vindicating the conduct of high dignitaries, Ministers and public servants when they are exposed to defamatory attacks. The section contemplates the institution of proceedings for defamation of two different classes of persons, (1) high dignitaries like the President, the Vice-President, the Governors and Rajpramukhs and (2) Ministers and Public Servants. Section 198-B is enacted to provide machinery for vindicating the conduct of high dignitaries, Ministers and public servants when they are exposed to defamatory attacks. The section contemplates the institution of proceedings for defamation of two different classes of persons, (1) high dignitaries like the President, the Vice-President, the Governors and Rajpramukhs and (2) Ministers and Public Servants. It is not disputed that a provision which enables a prosecution to be launched by the State, and at State expense for defamation of members of the first class, having regard to their status in public life, is pre-eminently designed in the public interest, and it would be entirely appropriate that any question of awarding compensation should be raised, even if the complaint for defamation be found to be false and frivolous or vexatious. There can be no doubt that in a democratic set up, in order to maintain purity of public behaviour and administration, charges of improper conduct against persons in the second class, in so far as such charges relate to the discharge of their public functions should be investigated. It is also in the public interest that in vindicating his character or conduct, the person defamed should not ordinarily be called upon to bear the burden of what may turn out an expensive and long drawn out proceeding, nor for obvious reasons should he have control over the proceeding. In the vindication of the character or conduct of a private individual who is defamed, the State is primarily not concerned: the party aggrieved may, if he is so minded, take proceedings for obtaining relief. But in the investigation of defamatory charges against Ministers and Public Servants in the discharge of their public functions, the State is as vitally concerned as the individual defamed. The Legislature has therefore authorised the State to take upon itself the power in appropriate cases to prosecute the offenders. But lest this procedure be abused, provision has been made for the examination of the person defamed and for awarding against him compensation if it be found that the complaint was false and frivolous or vexatious. Normally, a Minister or a Public Servant defamed in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions would himself move the Government under which he functions for taking proceedings for-vindicating his character or conduct. Normally, a Minister or a Public Servant defamed in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions would himself move the Government under which he functions for taking proceedings for-vindicating his character or conduct. The complaint eonomine in cases under Section 198-B is undoubtedly the Public Prosecutor, but the complaint may, when the person defamed is a Minister or a Public Servant, properly be regarded as filed at the instance of such Minister or Public Servant. He has in any case to support the accusation by evidence, and his conduct is exposed to judicial scrutiny. In this context, it would be difficult to hold that a person who has either been instrumental in the initiation of a complaint, or in any event has to support it by his evidence, has no concern with the lodging of the complaint. The court would obviously award compensation only if it is satisfied that the claim made by the person posing to be aggrieved is false and either frivolous or vexatious." 14. It seems plain, and that is manifest, that sanction to lodge the prosecution under Section 198-B of the Code is not a protection provided to the accused. It rather is restrict ion imposed on the function of the Public Prosecutor in lodging the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor can lodge the prosecution only if sanction in this regard is accorded by the Competent Authority as provided under the same section. No such sanction is required when an aggrieved person himself lodges prosecution under Section 198. Section 198-B rather deals with lodging of prosecution on behalf of an aggrieved dignitary, minister or a public servant and not with lodging of prosecution against a person or persons. It contemplates prior sanction to lodge prosecution on behalf of a dignitary, minister or a public servant as the case may be and not a sanction similar to that required under Section 197 to lodge prosecution against a public servant. 15. That the previous section contemplated under Section 198-B Ranbir Penal code is not a protection provided to the accused would be clear if the matter is looked from another angle. Section 198-B engrafts an exception to the general rule provided in Section 198. It does not take away the right of the aggrieved person under Section 198 to lodge prosecution himself irrespective of his status. Section 198-B engrafts an exception to the general rule provided in Section 198. It does not take away the right of the aggrieved person under Section 198 to lodge prosecution himself irrespective of his status. This has been made clear in sub-section (12) of Section 198, which says that provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, those of Section 198. Had the sanction under Section 198-B been provided as a protection to the accused such a sanction would have been made mandatory for lodging a complaint under Section 198 also, which, however, is not. This being the clear legal position, no benefit is available to the petitioner even if the 'resident editor' of the paper is not mentioned in the sanction order and his prosecution cannot be held illegal on that score. 16. Another ground on which quashing of the complaint and proceedings is sought is that the news item in question per se is not defamatory. It is noticed in this regard that learned Sessions Judge after recording initial statements of the witnesses has arrived at a conclusion that offence under Section 500 Ranbir Penal code is prima facie made out. I after examining and according my consideration to the material on the trial court file am not persuaded to show any indulgence in exercise of power under Section 561-A of the Code on merits of the case at this stage also for the reason that matter is likely to come up for consideration on merits at the stage of framing charge against the accused persons. 17. Yet another ground on which quashing of the complaint and the proceedings is sought is that the petitioner in his capacity as 'resident editor' has no role in selection of a news item published in the newspaper. Further it has been argued that there is no specific allegation, much less allegation of maligning the SSP, against the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on a Karnataka High Court judgment in Prabhu Chawla v. A. U. Sheriff, 1995 Cr. L.J. 1922. 18. The Karnataka High Court judgment in Prabhu Chawla (supra) is based on a Supreme Court judgment in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr., 1992 Cr. LJ 3779. In K.M. Mathew's case, appellant K.M. Mathew was the 'chief editor' of Malayala Manorama, a daily newspaper. L.J. 1922. 18. The Karnataka High Court judgment in Prabhu Chawla (supra) is based on a Supreme Court judgment in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr., 1992 Cr. LJ 3779. In K.M. Mathew's case, appellant K.M. Mathew was the 'chief editor' of Malayala Manorama, a daily newspaper. Separate editions of this newspaper were published from different centres in Southern India and each of those editions had a separate editor responsible for selection and publication of news items. The chief editor was based at, Kottayam and was responsible for general policy of the daily and various other publications of the Manorama, group of publications. A complaint for publication of a defamatory material was filed in a court of Magistrate against the chief editor, the printer and publisher of the newspaper. The question relating to quashing of the proceedings against the chief editor landed up before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noticed that there was no averment against the chief editor except the motive-attributed to him and held that even Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (for short the Central Act) has no applicability for a person who is simply named as 'chief editor' for the reason that presumption under that section is only against the person whose name is printed as 'editor' as required under Section 5(1) of the said Act. Paragraphs 9 and 10 judgment in K.M. Mathew are reproduced: "9. In the instant case there is no averment against the Chief Editor except the motive attributed to him. Even the motive alleged is general and vague. The complainant seems to rely upon the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books, 1867 ('the Act'). But Section 7 of the Act has no applicability for a person who is simply named as 'Chief Editor'. The presumption under Section 7 is only against the person whose name is printed as 'editor' as required under Section 5(1). There is a mandatory (though rebuttable) presumption that the person whose name is printed as 'Editor' is the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced. Section 1(1) of the Act defines 'Editor' to mean 'the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper'. There is a mandatory (though rebuttable) presumption that the person whose name is printed as 'Editor' is the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced. Section 1(1) of the Act defines 'Editor' to mean 'the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper'. Section 7 raises the presumption in respect of a person who is named as the editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper. The Act does not recognize any other legal entity for rising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief Editor is printed in the newspaper, there is no presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act. See State of Maharashtra v. Dr. R.B. Chowdhary, [1967] 3 SCR 708: ( AIR 1968 SC 110 ); D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma, [1971] 3 SCR 257, ( AIR 1971 SC 856 ); Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty, [1974] 2 SCR 39; ( AIR 1974 SC 47 ); and Haji C.H. Mohamad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya, [1979] 1 SCR 664: ( AIR 1979 SC 154 ). 10. It is important to state that for a Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence as against the Chief Editor, there must be positive averments in the complaint of knowledge of the objectionable character of the matter. The complaint in the instant case does not contain any such allegation. In the absence of such allegation, the Magistrate was justified in directing that the complaint so far as it relates to the Chief Editor could not be proceeded with. To ask the Chief Editor to undergo the trial of the case merely on the ground of the issue of process would be oppressive. No person should be tried without a prima facie case. The view taken by the High Court is untenable. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside." 19. Corresponding law in the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the Jammu and Kashmir State, Press and Publications Act, 1989 (for short the State Act). The State Act relates to press and publication in the State of the Jammu and Kashmir. 'Editor" is defined in Section 2 (g), which is pari materia to the interpretation of the term 'editor' as given in Section 1 of the Central Act. The State Act relates to press and publication in the State of the Jammu and Kashmir. 'Editor" is defined in Section 2 (g), which is pari materia to the interpretation of the term 'editor' as given in Section 1 of the Central Act. It reads: "(g) 'editor' means the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in the newspaper." 20. Section 5(1) of the State Act corresponding to Section 5(1) of the Central Act makes it mandatory that every copy of a newspaper shall contain the name of the person who is the editor thereof printed clearly on such copy as the name of the editor of that newspaper. Likewise Section 3 of the State Act mandates inter alia that every newspaper printed within the State shall have printed legibly on it the name of the printer and place of printing as also the name of publisher and the place of publication. Under Section 7 of the State Act, like Section 7 of the Central Act, in a legal proceedings a copy of the newspaper is sufficient evidence against the person whose name is printed therein as editor to be the editor of every portion of that newspaper, that is, of all the news items published therein. A copy of the newspaper said to be containing the defamatory news item is available on the file of the Sessions Judge. On it is printed the names of Sneh Gupta (Respondent No. 1) as Owner, Printer and Publisher as also the Editor of the Paper, Vicky Mahajan (Respondent No. 2) as Executive Editor and Arun Sharma (Petitioner) as Resident Editor. 21. The complaint filed before the learned Sessions Judge was read out in the Court by learned counsel for the petitioner to point out, and rightly so, that it does not contain any specific allegation of intention to malign or defame the complainant against the petitioner. What is alleged in paragraph (iv) is that 'the accused persons made a false and frivolous publication in the News caption in relation to public functions of Sh. What is alleged in paragraph (iv) is that 'the accused persons made a false and frivolous publication in the News caption in relation to public functions of Sh. Vijay Singh Sambyal as such public servant and intentionally singled him out among the total seventeen public servants of the rank of SSP and SP who has been transferred in the interest of administration to harm his reputation and contextually it is averred in para (vi) that the news item has been prima facie published with malicious intention and design to harm his reputation as a public servant. 22. As per Section 2(g), editor of a newspaper is the person who controls the selection of a matter to be published in the newspaper and under Section 7, the copy of the newspaper is sufficient evidence to show as to who is the editor of the newspaper, responsible for publication of a particular news item in it. Presumption under Section 7, however, does not apply to a resident editor. There is not even a whisper in the complaint or in the initial statements of the witnesses as to whether and in what manner the petitioner was responsible for selection and publication of the news item in question. In absence of any specific allegation against the petitioner about his role or responsibility in selection of a particular news item for its publication in the newspaper, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against him for commission of offence of defamation in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in K.M. Mathew's case. The complaint against and prosecution of the petitioner, therefore, is groundless and illegal and is liable to be quashed to prevent abuse of process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. 23. In view of all said that and discussed above, this petition is allowed and the complaint and the proceedings as against the petitioner only are quashed. 24. Disposed of.