JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The petitioner was a Constable in Civil Police. He has instituted this writ proceeding for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 17.4.2008 passed by the fifth respondent. 2. The essential facts of the case are; the petitioner was initially appointed as Constable in Civil Police on 1.2.1982. It is stated that he has put in 26 years of unblemished service record. On 11.4.2008 the petitioner alongwith another constable, namely, Omprakash Kanaujiya were sent from Police Lines, Bareilly to produce a prisoner from Central Jail, Bareilly before the Additional District Judge-IV, Moradabad. While they were returning from Moradabad, due to their negligence the accused ran away from their custody. A first information report was lodged on 11.4.2008 by the petitioner which was registered as Case Crime No. 429 of 2008 under Sections 223, 224 IPC regarding the said incident. A copy of the first information report is on the record as annexure-2 to the writ petition. 3. The petitioner was arrested and later, he was released on bail by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The fifth respondent, the disciplinary authority, exercising his power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 dispensed with the enquiry and dismissed the services of the petitioner in terms of the said Rules. The petitioner challenged the said order amongst other on the ground that in facts and circumstances of the case the exercise of power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 was not warranted and on those facts the disciplinary authority could have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in terms of Rule-14(1) and Rule-20 of the Rules, 1991. 4. It is stated that the said exercise of power by the disciplinary authority is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Singh v. U.P. State Sugar Corporation and another, 2002(1) ESC 165 (All) and Avatar Singh Chhabra v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(4) ADJ 463 (DB). 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed. The allegations made in the impugned order have been reiterated in the counter-affidavit. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the only allegation against the petitioner is that a prisoner has escaped from his custody due to his negligence. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed. The allegations made in the impugned order have been reiterated in the counter-affidavit. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the only allegation against the petitioner is that a prisoner has escaped from his custody due to his negligence. He further submits that on similar facts, in the past, the respondent authorities have exercised their power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991, which was found to be illegal by this Court in several other cases, mentioned above, however, without paying regard to the law laid down by this Court the fifth respondent has passed the impugned order, therefore, the order impugned is vitiated on this ground alone. He has lastly submitted that the allegations, on which the petitioner’s services have been dismissed, could have been enquired in the disciplinary proceedings where the petitioner could have proved his innocence. However, resorting to power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 the petitioner has been denied the said opportunity and in any event of the matter the allegations are not of such a nature which warrant to invoke the power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 by the disciplinary authority. 8. Lastly, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that alongwith the petitioner another constable, namely, Omprakash Kanaujiya, who was on duty, was also dismissed by the disciplinary authority exercising the same power. The said constable preferred a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24638 of 2008 (Omprakash Kanaujiya, Constable 61 A.P. v. State of U.P. and others, which has been allowed by this Court vide order and judgment dated 21.8.2015 and no special appeal has been filed against the said order as yet. 9. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 has rightly been invoked in the matter as it was not possible to hold the enquiry. He has justified the grounds on which the disciplinary authority has exercised his power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. 10. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 11. The petitioner has more than 26 years services. He has justified the grounds on which the disciplinary authority has exercised his power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. 10. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 11. The petitioner has more than 26 years services. The allegation on which he has been dismissed is common in Police Department, where in the past also on similar facts and circumstances the disciplinary authorities have been using their power conferred on them under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. 12. This Court in a long line of decisions has considered the exercise of power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 in a case where a prisoner escaped from the custody of the police constable. In those cases the Court has taken a consistent view that in such matters the Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991, which is pari materia to Article 311 of the Constitution, the exercise of said power cannot be said to be justified. The Court has expressed its consistent view that in such circumstances it is always open to the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and the allegations can be examined in the regular enquiry. 13. The operation of the Rule 8(2)(b) has a very limited circumstances. Those circumstances have been considered by the Supreme Court at length in Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , Union of India v. Balbir Singh, AIR 1998 SC 2043 and in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1991 SC 385 . The Supreme Court has dealt elaborately the contingency when the Article 311(2) of the Constitution can be invoked. 14. The exercise of power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991 came to be considered by this Court in a long line of decisions. This Court in the case of Om Prakash Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 3625 of 2010, decided on 23rd April, 2012, has considered three Division Bench decisions of this Court and held as under: “The three Division Benches of this Court in the Cases of State of U.P. and others v. Chandrika Prasad, 2006(1) ESC 374, Pushpendra Singh and other v. State of U.P. and Yadunath Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(9) ADJ 86 , have followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases. In the case of Pushpendra Singh (supra), this Court held as follows : “Thus, in order to dispense with the regular departmental proceeding for inflicting punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, recording reasons is condition precedent. The idea or object of recording reasons is obviously to prevent arbitrary, capricious and mala fide exercise of power. Therefore, recording of reason is mandatory and in its absence the order becomes laconic and cannot sustain. Onus is on the State or its authorities to show that the order of dismissal has been passed strictly as per prescription of the statutes. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Tutsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , while considering Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India held that two conditions must be satisfied to uphold action taken under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, viz., (i) there must exist a situation which renders holding of any enquiry not reasonably practicable, (ii) the disciplinary authority must record in writing its reasons in support of its satisfaction. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that though Clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final, yet such finality can certainly be tested in the Court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a rule to dispense with the enquiry. The satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry has to be spelled out either in the order itself or at least it has to be available on record. Learned Standing Counsel also during his submission could not show us any such reason recorded by the competent authority in the. record to show any ground or reason for invoking the provisions contained in Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules. It is well-settled legal position that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on some reasons or grounds, its validity is to be tested on the ground or reasons mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by giving reasons through affidavit filed in the case (See Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851 , para 8).” 15. The similar view has been taken by the another Division Bench in Yadunath Singh v. State of U.P. and others. In the said case also the disciplinary proceeding was dispensed with without any plausible reason. The only reason mentioned in the order was that the departmental inquiry shall consume sufficient time and on the said ground the Rule 8(2)(b) was invoked. This Court set aside the order of the disciplinary authority and has held as under : “Here in the present case, the disciplinary authority had recorded its satisfaction but it is well-settled that that satisfaction has to be based on germane grounds and not ipse dixit of the disciplinary authority. Here the only ground to dispense with the inquiry is that if the writ petitioner-appellant is allowed to continue in service, a departmental inquiry shall consume sufficient time and, therefore, such continuance will have bearing on the moral of the other police personnel. We are of the opinion that the ground recorded by the disciplinary authority while dispensing with the inquiry is not germane nor is it on any material that may be relevant, as such, the ground set forth cannot justify dispensing the inquiry at all. 5. The provisions contained under Rule 8 (2)(b) have been incorporated keeping in view the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The power conferred on the authority to dispense with an inquiry in a given situation where it is reasonably not practicable to hold an inquiry, has been envisaged therein. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 , had the occasion to consider the scope of the aforesaid provision and the Apex Court laid down the test of reasonableness in the said case to be reflected by the authority while proposing to dispense with an inquiry. Paragraph 130 of the said decision is reproduced below: Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances byway of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the Government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the Government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the Court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, is an instance in point.” 16. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, is an instance in point.” 16. In addition to above, another constable, whose name figures in the impugned order, was also on duty alongwith the petitioner on 11.4.2008. The disciplinary authority has also dismissed Omprakash Kanaujiya exercising its power under Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules, 1991. From the impugned order also it is evident that Constable 61 A.P. Omprakash Kanaujiya was on duty alongwith the petitioner to produce the said prisoner. The writ petition filed by Om Prakash Kanaujiya has been allowed by this Court vide order dated 21.8.2015. The operative portion of the said judgment is extracted herein below: “The facts in the present case are that the petitioner alongwith another person has allowed to escape an accused person and the Hon’ble Division Bench in Yadunath Singh (supra) has not granted any such relief to the petitioner, as such, it is provided that payment of backwages and other consequential benefits shall be subject to outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.” 17. In view of the settled law, mentioned above, I am of the view that the the impugned order dated 17.4.2008 is liable to be set aside. It is, accordingly, set aside. It is open to the respondents to take appropriate decision in the matter. 18. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. 19. No order as to costs.