JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J. (1) This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 8 March, 2016 passed by the Ld. Single Judge whereby two writ applications filed by the appellant, inviting common questions of facts and law being WP No. 526 (W) of 2016 and WP No. 527 (W) of 2016, were dismissed. Facts of the case:- (2) At all material times, the petitioner carried on and still carries on the business of supplying labour for plant and field operations and other mechanical and electrical maintenance work for various parties like the Indian Oil Corporation Ld. (the respondent no. 1 and in short ‘IOCL’), National Thermal Power Corporation, Jindal Power Ltd. etc. Such labour is supplied pursuant to and in terms of the service contract entered into by and between the appellant and other party. (3) On 29 May, 2013 IOCL issued a Notice Inviting Tenders from interested parties for providing service contracts for plant and field operation at site mixed bulk explosives support plant at Kusmunda, Korba, Chhattisgarh and at Jayant (Singrauli), Madhya Pradesh, for a period of three years. The facts and figures mentioned in this judgment pertain to the Chattishgarh plant of IOCL. (4) The appellant participated in the tender process and emerged as the successful bidder. A work order dated August 29, 2013 was issued by IOCL in favour of the appellant. The work order mentioned that the contract will be valid for a period of three years from the commencement of the service contract i.e. from 01.08.2013 to 31.07.2016 which may be renewed for a period of another three years on satisfactory completion on mutual consent. However, IOCL reserved the right to short close the contract with prior notice of a period of 45 days in case of breach of terms and conditions of the contract by the tenderer. The rights of the parties were to remain firm for the contractual period. The IOCL also reserved the right to shorten the period of contract without assigning any reason therefor, by giving 45 days’ notice and also the right to extend the period of contract on some terms and conditions if mutually agreed to by both the parties. The appellant was requested to affix his seal and sign on a copy of the work order as a token of acceptance and forward the same to IOCL, which the appellant did. The appellant was requested to affix his seal and sign on a copy of the work order as a token of acceptance and forward the same to IOCL, which the appellant did. Subsequently, an agreement dated 11 September, 2013 was entered into by and between the appellant and IOCL. The relevant clauses of the said agreement are set out hereunder:- “1. The scope of work and other details in respect of Plant and Field operations including additional requirement to be fulfilled by the Contractor are all contained in the Tender documents in details, and to avoid prolixity the said Tender document is treated as the part hereof. 10. The corporation reserves its right to short close the contract with prior notice of 45 days in case of breach of terms and conditions of the contract by the Contractor. The Corporation also reserves its right to shorten the period of contract without assigning any reason thereof, by giving 45 days notice. 16. That the Contractor shall submit Bank Guarantee of Rs. 7,15,840.00 towards Security Deposit, or deposit the same amount by way of demand draft or Banker’s cheque within one month from the date of this contract towards due performance of the subject contract. The Security Deposit amount, if deposited by the Bank Draft or Banker’s cheque, it will not carry any interest and the same would be refunded only six months after successful execution of the entire contractual job. The Bank Guarantee, if submitted by the contractor towards security deposit before commencement of the work, the validity thereof would be for a period of three years and six months (proposed period of the contract + six months) subject to change of Bank Guarantee amount during subsequent years with reasoning. Alternatively the said Security Deposit amount may be adjusted again the Contractor’s monthly bills. Total value of the contract based on NIT quantity : 3,69,25,200.00 Value of contract for 1 year : 1,23,08,400.00 Security Deposit – 10% of the contract value of 1 year: 12,30,840.00 Less EMD Deposited with the tender : 5,15,000.00 Balance Amount of Security Deposit : 7,15,840.00 22. DEVIATION CLAUSE: The quantities indicated in the Work Order are indicative and may vary to any extent on either side. 23. DEVIATION CLAUSE: The quantities indicated in the Work Order are indicative and may vary to any extent on either side. 23. TERMINATION: The Corporation shall be entitled to terminate the contract by written notice at any time during its currency, on or after occurrence of any one or more of the following events/contingencies: Default or failure, by the Contractor, of any of the obligations of the Contractor under the contract, • If the Contractor is incapable of carrying out the work. • If the Contractor misconducts himself in any manner. • Death of the Contractor in case of individual. If the Contractor or any person employed by it shall make or offer for any purpose connected with the contract any gift, gratuity, royalty, commission, gratification or other inducement (whether money or in any other form) to any employee or agent of the owner. If the Contractor shall assign or attempt to assign its interest or any part thereof in the contract. The decision of the GM (Explosives) of the Corporation as to whether any of the events/contingencies mentioned hereinabove, entitling the Corporation to terminate the contract, has occurred or not shall be final and binding upon the Contractor. 24. ARBITRATION CLAUSE: Any dispute or difference whatsoever arising between the parties out of, or relating to the construction, interpretation, application, meaning, scope, operation or effect of this contract, the validity or the breach thereof, shall be settled by conciliatory arbitration in accordance with the rules of the Arbitration of the ‘SCOPE’ forum of conciliation and Arbitration and the award made in pursuance thereof shall be binding on the parties.” (5) It is not in dispute that the appellant’s performance in executing the service contract was satisfactory. It is admitted on behalf of the respondent company that there was no scope to complain of the appellant’s performance. (6) By a letter dated 23 November, 2015 addressed to the respondent company, the appellant requested for renewing the contract for a further period of three years after the date of completion of the existing contract. In the said letter the appellant stated inter alia as follows:- “Sir, with mutual dedicated efforts at every level, in both the past years of the contract, we had supplied more than the estimated quantity of 15800 MT of emulsion matrix per year. In the said letter the appellant stated inter alia as follows:- “Sir, with mutual dedicated efforts at every level, in both the past years of the contract, we had supplied more than the estimated quantity of 15800 MT of emulsion matrix per year. We had supplied 19039.530 MT during August, 2013 to July, 2014 and 19238.970 MT during the year August, 2014 to July, 2015. And, in the present working year from August, 2015 to July, 2016, we expect to boost the supply much more than the previous year’s quantities. These figures can reach up to any extent as per the Clause No. 22 (Deviation Clause) of the Agreement.” (7) However, what the appellant received in response to his request was a letter dated 28 December, 2015 which was a notice for short closure of the subsisting contract w.e.f. 1 April, 2016. The said letter is reproduced hereunder:- “Sub: Short closure of work order for service contract of Plant & Field operation – Kusmunda, Distt.- Korba (C.G) vide Ref. IOCL/IBP/SC/13-16/KUS dated 29/08/2013. This has reference to work order issued to vide ref. IOCL/IBP/SC/13-16/KUS dated 29th August, 2013 for Plant & Field Operations – Kusmunda, Distt. Korba, (C.G) for the period 01.08.2013 to 31.07.2016. This is to inform you that the contract period is being shortened as per the rights reserved by Indian Oil Corporation Limited under the provision contained in Clause ‘DURATION OF THE CONTRACT’ of Work Order dated 29.08.2013. Accordingly, this letter may be treated as notice for short closure of the contract w.e.f. 1st April, 2016. As such, you are requested to please acknowledge the receipt of this notice.” It is this letter dated 28 December, 2015 that was challenged by the appellant by filing WP No. 526(W) of 2016. (8) A similar writ petition being WP No. 547(W) of 2016 was filed by the appellant challenging the short closure of a similar service contract for Plant & Field Operation at Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 1 March, 2016. Both the writ petitions were taken up for hearing together by the Ld. Judge and were disposed of by a common judgment and order which is impugned in the present appeal. (9) It is pertinent to note that after short closing the contract with the appellant, the respondent company issued fresh notice inviting tenders for the same purpose. Both the writ petitions were taken up for hearing together by the Ld. Judge and were disposed of by a common judgment and order which is impugned in the present appeal. (9) It is pertinent to note that after short closing the contract with the appellant, the respondent company issued fresh notice inviting tenders for the same purpose. The appellant participated in such tender process but was not successful, having emerged as the second lowest bidder. The Appellant’s Contention:- (10) Ld. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the short closure of the contract is arbitrary and mala fide. It is not the case of the respondent company that there was any breach of the terms and conditions of the contract on the part of the appellant. The notice of short closure does not mention any breach or deficiency on the part of the appellant. No reason has been assigned for such short closure of the contract. (11) Ld. Counsel referred to Clause 1 of the Agreement entered into by and between the parties which provided that the scope of work and other details in respect of Plant & Field Operations including the additional requirements to be fulfilled by the contractor are contained in the Tender document in details and to avoid prolixity the tender document is treated as part of the agreement. He then referred to Clause 27 of the Tender document which provides, inter alia, that ‘the rights will remain firm for the contractual period’. He laid much emphasis on this and submitted that in view of such provision in the agreement, the appellant’s right could not be curtailed or adversely affected by shortening the period of the contract. (12) Ld. Counsel then submitted that the appellant had invested huge sums of money in organizing the labour force that he was required to supply under the service contract and shortening of period of contract would foist huge unforeseen liability on him on account of salary and other emoluments payable to the labourers whom he had engaged for the entire period of contract. This would cause tremendous injustice to the appellant. (13) Mr. Bhattacharya then submitted that IOCL has taken advantage of its dominant position and acted unfairly and arbitrarily to the detriment of the appellant. He submitted that indisputably the appellant’s performance was creditable and no person acting reasonably could have taken the decision to shorten the contract. This would cause tremendous injustice to the appellant. (13) Mr. Bhattacharya then submitted that IOCL has taken advantage of its dominant position and acted unfairly and arbitrarily to the detriment of the appellant. He submitted that indisputably the appellant’s performance was creditable and no person acting reasonably could have taken the decision to shorten the contract. Issuance of the impugned notice shortening the period of the contract followed by fresh tender notices were intended to oust the appellant without justifiable cause. (14) Ld. Counsel relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc.-vs.-Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728 in support of his submission that in an appropriate case, a writ petition to enforce a contractual obligation is maintainable. He submitted that this is a fit and proper case where the writ court should intervene and set aside the notice of short closure of the service contract. Respondent’s Contention:- (15) Ld. Sr. Counsel for the respondent company submitted that there is no arbitrariness or mala fide in the decision of the company to shorten the period of the contract. This was a policy decision and had nothing to do with the performance of the appellant. He referred to an internal correspondence of the respondent company dated 9 December, 2015, the material portion whereof is reproduced hereinunder:- “…….. with passage of time various enhanced sales strategies were formulated to maximise RC quantity as well as its realization by adding few high potential areas neighbouring our Bulk Support Plant. This resulted in increased sales and thus the estimated value of the contract shall not be able to cater till estimated period i.e. 31st July, 2016. Till November, 2015 an expenditure of Rs. 393.34 lacs plus tax has been made leaving balance of Rs. 86.31 lacs plus tax (Annexure – IV). With the present trend of sales captured at Kusmunda, it is expected that the total contract value shall suffice for operations up to 31 March, 2016……… Since value of the contract is likely to get exhausted by 31 March, 2016, the current contract is required to be short closed by giving 45 days notice to M/s. Technocare Engineers, 1st Floor, HIG33, SVBP Nagar, P.O. Jamnipali, Distt Korba (CG) as per the provisions contained under above clause………..” (16) Ld. Counsel submitted that for every project the respondent company has an estimated budget. Counsel submitted that for every project the respondent company has an estimated budget. If such budget is exceeded, the other projects of the company suffer. In the instant case if the contract was kept alive for three years, the actual expenditure incurred would have been far and in excess of the estimated expenditure throwing into disarray the financial planning of the company. Hence the company took a decision to foreclose the contract in exercise of its right under the contract. (17) Mr. Datta then submitted that considering the terms and conditions of the contract, the appellant cannot have any legitimate grievance. He submitted that the contract, though referred to a quantum, elasticity was inbuilt into the contract by suffixing the quantum by +_ 10 per cent and such elasticity read with the deviation clause, conferred a right on IOCL to vary the quantum and such variation cannot give rise to a claim on the part of the appellant. He further submitted that IOCL had received better offers in course of the fresh bid process and since the IOCL is a custodian of the finances of the State, it would be against public interest to restrain it from getting the work done by another party at a lessor cost for the forthcoming years. (18) Ld. Sr. Counsel then referred to the same decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra) in support of his submission that a writ petition may be maintainable in a contractual matter in exceptional circumstances when the parties are at the threshold of a contract. However, once a finally concluded contract comes into existence between the parties, a writ application to enforce the terms of the contract or to claim damages for breach of a contractual term is not available to the aggrieved party. Findings and order of the Ld. Judge:- (19) The Ld. However, once a finally concluded contract comes into existence between the parties, a writ application to enforce the terms of the contract or to claim damages for breach of a contractual term is not available to the aggrieved party. Findings and order of the Ld. Judge:- (19) The Ld. Judge noted the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited on behalf of the writ petitioner, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1031 (Mahabir Auto Stores-vs.-Indian Oil Corporation), AIR 1991 SC 537 (Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi) and AIR 2012 SC 2915 (M/s. Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd.-vs.-State of Karnataka) in support of the contention that Article 14 of the Constitution of India is also applicable to the contractual sphere and it is not the law of the land that whenever a dispute arises out of a commercial transaction, the Writ Court would refrain from interfering. However, the Ld. Judge held that a distinction has to be made between a matter which is at the threshold of a contract and a matter pertaining to breach of a contract. While in the former case, the Writ Court may be willing to intervene, in the latter case, the Writ Court would be reluctant to exercise its discretionary power of judicial review unless Article 14 of the Constitution is found to have been brazenly violated. The Ld. Judge held that a grievance arising out of an alleged breach of contract is made the subject matter of the writ petition and what is prayed for, in effect, was specific performance of the contract, which prayer the Writ Court would not ordinarily entertain. The Ld. Judge further held that if a decision has been taken by the State or its instrumentality to terminate a contract for a reason which is based on a possible and plausible view in the given set of facts and circumstances, the Writ Court would not intervene to unsettle the decision so taken just because a ‘wiser’ or ‘more sound’ decision could have been taken. The IOCL’s decision to shorten the contract period based on its view that the writ petitioner had been provided work much in excess of the projected quantity mentioned in the contract cannot be said to be utterly absurd and is supportable by Clauses in the contract. In such circumstances, the Ld. The IOCL’s decision to shorten the contract period based on its view that the writ petitioner had been provided work much in excess of the projected quantity mentioned in the contract cannot be said to be utterly absurd and is supportable by Clauses in the contract. In such circumstances, the Ld. Judge held that particularly when the contracts are non-statutory, it is not open to the Writ Court to interfere and direct IOCL to permit the petitioner to continue till the expiry of the contract. Having so held, the Ld. Judge dismissed the writ petitions. Our View:- (20) We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and have carefully considered the judgment and order impugned. (21) The Contract between the parties reserved IOCL’s right to short close the contract with prior notice of 45 days in case of breach of terms and conditions of the contract by the Contractor. Under the contract, IOCL also had the right to shorten the period of contract without assigning any reason, by giving 45 days’ notice. In our opinion, it was a policy decision on the part of IOCL to short close the contract. The rationale for such decision is to be found in the internal correspondence of IOCL dated 9 December, 2015 which has been referred to hereinabove. The decision apparently was taken to prevent the financial planning of IOCL from going haywire. Keeping in view the estimated project cost, had the contract been allowed to operate till 31 July, 2016 i.e. for the full duration of three years, the actual expenditure of IOCL on the said project would have far overshot the estimated expenditure which could have thrown its financial planning into total disarray. This would be a good ground for IOCL to short close the contract and the decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any rational basis. It was a policy decision of IOCL which was warranted by commercial exigency and in larger public interest since IOCL being an instrumentality of the State deals with public money. After short closing the contract IOCL invited fresh tenders and the appellant, in fact, participated in the tender process. However, the appellant was unsuccessful as some other party became the lowest bidder. Hence, the decision of IOCL enures to public benefit and it is trite law that private interest must give way to larger public interest. After short closing the contract IOCL invited fresh tenders and the appellant, in fact, participated in the tender process. However, the appellant was unsuccessful as some other party became the lowest bidder. Hence, the decision of IOCL enures to public benefit and it is trite law that private interest must give way to larger public interest. In our view, the decision of IOCL cannot be faulted and in any event the writ court will ordinarily not interfere with a commercial policy decision of an instrumentality of the State unless the same clearly falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution or is so blatantly unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court or causes such grave injustice and prejudice to the aggrieved party which cannot be countenanced in law. (22) Furthermore, the appellant cannot be considered to be a person aggrieved since it was admitted by the appellant’s Ld. Counsel before the Ld. Judge that the appellant was provided work which was 30 per cent in excess of the quantity envisaged under the contract. As per terms of the contract, there was no fixed quantity of work that IOCL was bound to provide to the appellant. The deviation clause in the contract has to be given its natural effect. It is possible that in a given scenario even if the entire contractual period was allowed to run, the quantum of work actually allotted to the appellant was less than that what the appellant, in fact, was allotted as on the date of short closure of the contract. In such a scenario, the appellant could not have complained in view of the deviation clause. The appellant having been allotted 30 per cent more work than as contemplated under the contract, as on the date of short closure of the contract, we find no legitimate reason for the appellant to be aggrieved by the short closure of the contract. Since, in our view, the appellant cannot be described as a person aggrieved, his locus standi to maintain the writ petition is also doubtful. (23) Even assuming that the appellant has some grievance against the IOCL, the same pertains to breach of the contractual terms. It is true that there is no absolute rule of law that the Writ Court will not interfere in the contractual field, but as observed by the Ld. (23) Even assuming that the appellant has some grievance against the IOCL, the same pertains to breach of the contractual terms. It is true that there is no absolute rule of law that the Writ Court will not interfere in the contractual field, but as observed by the Ld. Judge, there has to be a distinction between a matter which is at the threshold of contract and a matter which involves a breach of a contractual term. In the former case, the Writ Court may be willing to interfere depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, but in the latter, normally the Writ Court will not interfere. Specific performance of a contract is not a remedy that is ordinarily available in the high prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Unless a case of exceptional injustice arising out of a violent infraction of Article 14 or other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution is made out, an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is normally not entertained in the contractual sphere. No such case has been made out in the facts of the present case. Further, the instant case does not involve any public law element, in the absence of which the Writ Court is slow to intervene. In this connection we may refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra) wherein at paragraph 69.1 to 70.9 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarised the law in this regard. “69.1. The court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under A. 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4 Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4 Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances. 70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2 State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of A. 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under A. 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under A. 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/Instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under A. 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under A. 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality of agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.” (24) We also cannot lose sight of the well-established principle of law that judicial review is not concerned with the merits of a decision but is concerned with the decision making process. So long as the decision has been taken by a public authority in compliance with the principles of natural justice and following due procedure of law and so long as the decision is not patently absurd or perverse, the writ court will ordinarily not interfere with the decision. Even if the writ court has a view which is different from the view of the public authority which is under challenge, the writ court will not substitute its view in the place and stead of the authority’s view so long as the latter is a possible and plausible view in the given set of facts and circumstances. In our opinion, in the present case, the decision of IOCL to short close the contract is neither violative of Article 14 of the Constitution nor warrants the interdiction of this court for any other reason. (25) As regards the grievance of the appellant that by reason of short closure of the contract the appellant will be exposed to huge liability on account of salary etc., payable to the labourers mobilized by him, no particulars of such alleged liability have been furnished by the appellant. (25) As regards the grievance of the appellant that by reason of short closure of the contract the appellant will be exposed to huge liability on account of salary etc., payable to the labourers mobilized by him, no particulars of such alleged liability have been furnished by the appellant. From the tenor of the service contract we find, and which is also not disputed by the appellant, that he was not required to make any investment on infrastructure or raw materials as the same were provided by IOCL. In the event the appellant feels that IOCL has inflicted unlawful loss on him by short closure of the contract, he is at liberty to approach the appropriate forum seeking damages or compensation if he is entitled to do so in law. (26) In view of the aforesaid we find no reason to interfere with the judgment and order impugned in this appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. (27) Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities. I Agree.