JUDGMENT : S.S. Sundar, J. The defendant in the suit in O.S.No.170 of 1999 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur is the appellant in S.A.(MD)No.442 of 2005 and the defendant in the suit in O.S.No.171 of 1999 on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur is the appellant in S.A.(MD) No.443 of 2005. 2. In both the second appeals the respective appellant is a tenant under the respondent in respect of the building owned by the respondent and the suits came to be filed on the ground that the suit buildings were constructed in the year 1996 after demolishing the entire old structure and hence, the buildings are exempted in view of Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Though the relationship is not in dispute the appellant/tenant has contested the suit on the ground that the suit is not maintainable and that the building is not a new building to attract Section 30 of the Act and on other factual premises touching the maintainability of the suit. The only issue that is now raised before this Court is whether the building is exempted under Section 30 of the Act strictly in terms of the said provision. 3. At the time of admitting the second appeals the only question of law framed is as follows: "Whether it is correct in law to exempt the plaintiffs' building from the provisions of the Rent Control Act under Section 30 (i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 without any pleading or proof as to the compliance of the condition of notifying to the local authority of the construction of the new building to claim such exemption?" 4. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to Section 30 (i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and submitted that there is no pleading or proof in the present case as to the requirement of Section 30(i) of the Act regarding the notification that is required to be sent to the authority. The learned counsel submitted that unless the construction of the suit building is notified under Section 30(i) of the Act to the local authority, the suit is not maintainable by stating that the building is exempted under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The learned counsel submitted that unless the construction of the suit building is notified under Section 30(i) of the Act to the local authority, the suit is not maintainable by stating that the building is exempted under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Section 30 (i) reads as follows : "30. Exemption in the case of certain buildings-Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to- [(i) any building for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed and notified to the local authority concerned;] 5. In the present case, admittedly, there was no pleading as to the notification of the completion of construction to the local authority. The Courts below taking into consideration the fact that the building is assessed to property tax by the local body after the commencement of lease in favour of the appellant in the respective appeal held that the suit which is filed within five years from the date of the new lease and the enhancement of property tax would attract the exemption provided under Section 30(i) of the Act. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant on the interpretation of Section 30(i) made the following submissions: (a) When the law states a particular thing to be done in a particular way, the same cannot be done in any other manner; (b) Since Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation keeping in mind the hardships that may be caused to the tenants by indiscriminate eviction, the provisions of the Act are required to be interpreted in favour of the tenant when the Court expresses any doubt or the interpretation of the provision; (c) The Court cannot re-write the statute and the word ‘notify’ should be given its logical meaning. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that it should not be jettisoned. Since the language employed in Section 30(i) is plain, clear normal literal meaning should be given to the provisions and the word ‘notify’ cannot be substituted by the set of words ‘assessed to tax’. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that it should not be jettisoned. Since the language employed in Section 30(i) is plain, clear normal literal meaning should be given to the provisions and the word ‘notify’ cannot be substituted by the set of words ‘assessed to tax’. When the plaintiffs/respondents claimed exemption under Section 30(i) of the Act, strict adherence to the condition should be observed by Court while dealing with the issue whether a particular building is exempted from the provisions of Rent Control Act; (d) The first appellate Court ought not to have tried to find out supposed intention of the legislation. The intention of the legislation can be collected only from the words used by the legislature. If the words do not match with the alleged intention of the legislature, the legislature has to step in and make suitable amendments. It is not within the province or jurisdiction of the Court to effect any change in the phraseology adopted by the legislature; and (e) Finally, on the basis of his submission on the interpretation of Section 30(i) of the Act, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the landlord does not notify the completion of the building, it means that he has impliedly waived his right to get the benefit of Section 30(i) of the Act. A person can waive the benefits and by not notifying the completion of the building to the local body, it is to be construed that the landlord has waived his right though the Act grants an exemption in respect of the buildings for a period of five years. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant in respect of his submissions relied upon several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court and they are dealt with in the following order: 7.1. He relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harcharan Singh v. Smt. Shivrani and others reported in (1981) 2 SCC 535 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "21. .... It must also be emphasised that where two constructions are possible, the one that must be preferred is one which would accord with reason and justice." 7.2. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Polester & Co. .... It must also be emphasised that where two constructions are possible, the one that must be preferred is one which would accord with reason and justice." 7.2. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Polester & Co. v. Additional Sales Tax Commissioner, New Delhi reported in AIR 1978 SC 897 for the proposition that the plain and natural meaning should be given to the words in a statute. The relevant portion is as follows : "It is a well settled rule of interpretation that where there are two expressions which might have been used to convey a certain intention, but one of those expressions will convey that intention more clearly than the other, it is proper to conclude that, if the legislature used that one of the two expressions which would convey the intention less clearly, it does not intend to convey that intention at all." 7.3. He also relied upon a judgment in State of Maharashtra and others v. Nanded-Parbhani Z.L.B.M.V. Operator Sangh reported in AIR 2000 SC 725 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows : "8. ... It is a cardinal principle of rule of construction of statute that when the language of a statute is fairly and reasonably clear, then inconvenience or hardships are no considerations for refusing to give effect to that meaning. It is not the contention of the learned counsel, appearing for the State nor can it be said that on giving a plain meaning to the words used in Section 207(1) of the Act, there will be any absurdity or would make the statute offending any provisions of the Constitution." 7.4. The learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court in Vallivalam Desikar Polytechnic Educational Society, rep. by its Chairman, Nagapattinam v. District Registrar (Society Registration), Nagapattinam and another reported in (2007) 4 MLJ 584 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that when a statue prescribes to do a particular thing in a particular manner, the same shall not be done in any other manner than prescribed in law, following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 . In that case, the learned Single Judge held that the contention that the petitioner society got dissolved on 10.12.2003 was found unsustainable in view of the fact that the gazette notification in respect of the society in question was not issued as contemplated under the provisions of Section 44(4) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. 7.5. Again the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon another judgment of this Court in Sha Poosaji Mangilal v. The South Indian Humanitarial League reported in 2009 (2) CTC 25 wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court made a distinction between the two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, prescribing two types of exemption namely Section 29 and 30. While the exemption under Section 29 is characterized as a "floating exemption", the exemption under Section 30 has been described as "fixed exemption" which can be withdrawn only by way of an amendment to the Act and not depend upon any notification by the Government. 8. As against the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of A.K.S. Thiyagarajan and others v. M. Gopal reported in (2001) 3 M.L.J. 785 wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court has dealt with a similar case where the existing building was demolished and a new building was constructed after evicting the tenant from the building. Upon new lease being created in favour of the tenant, this Court found that the new building is exempted under the Rent Control Act and that the landlord is at liberty to evict the tenant by determining the tenancy without any fetters imposed by the Rent Control Act. The eviction of the tenant by the Court was confirmed by this Court by decreeing the suit for eviction. Similar issue also raised before the another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of S. Syed Sadick v. A.M. Adhil Badusha and other and S. Syed Rasool v. A.M. Adhil Badusha and others reported in 2011 (2) T.N.C.J. 534 (Mad). Similar issue also raised before the another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of S. Syed Sadick v. A.M. Adhil Badusha and other and S. Syed Rasool v. A.M. Adhil Badusha and others reported in 2011 (2) T.N.C.J. 534 (Mad). In that case, the argument of the tenant was that the plaintiff failed to prove the construction of building within five years anterior to the date of filing of the suit for eviction so as to bring the building within the exemption contemplated under Section 30(i) of the Act. It was also argued in that case by the tenant that mere production of a communication issued by the municipality about the construction of building is not sufficient to claim exemption under the Act. Since the suit properties were assessed to tax from the Financial Year 2006-2007 and the suits were filed in the year 2008, this Court accepted the contention of the landlord and treated the building as one exempted under Section 30(i) of the Act by relying upon the assessment of property tax as on the relevant date. 9. Section 30 of the Act though gives exemption for new buildings for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed and notified to the local authority concerned, the Act does not provide or contemplate a procedure for communication of completion of the construction to the local authority. The word "notify" is not defined in the Rent Control Act so as to attribute any importance to the word "notify". Section 30 of the Act commence with the phrase "nothing contained in this Act shall apply to". From the language of Section 30, the opening part of Section 30 speaks about application of the Act to any new building for a period of five years from the date of completion of construction. The tenant in the present case was inducted on a fresh lease after completion of the building is not in dispute. The fact that the new building came into existence only in the year 1996 is also not in dispute. It is also admitted in evidence that the new building was assessed to property tax from the year 1996. The Act does not contemplate a legal obligation of the building owners to inform the local body about the completion of construction. The fact that the new building came into existence only in the year 1996 is also not in dispute. It is also admitted in evidence that the new building was assessed to property tax from the year 1996. The Act does not contemplate a legal obligation of the building owners to inform the local body about the completion of construction. The words "notify" is only to indicate the starting point for the five years given in this Section. When the assessment of property tax is an indication for completion of construction of any new building, it is one way by which one can infer that the completion of construction is notified to the local body. The date of completion of the building and the date on which the completion is notified, must be same. There cannot be two dates for the purpose of arriving at the starting point for the five years period mentioned in Section 30 of the Act. Court often experience difficulties in interpreting the provisions of a statute because of variety of reasons. It is also the duty of Court to act upon the true intention of the legislature. To give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the content it is permissible to read 'and' as 'or' and vice versa. Hence, in my view, if the word 'or' is read instead of 'and' in Section 30(i), the same will reduce the anomalies. Further, if a building is occupied by tenant, the date of completion of construction of building cannot be after the date of such occupation. Similarly any communication of completion of construction of building to the local body or the assessment of building for the purpose of property tax can also be taken in the absence of actual date of occupation. The period of five years shall commence from the earliest date on which the building is either occupied or its completion is informed to the local body. However, every new building is exempted from the purview of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed or notified to the local authority concerned whichever is earlier. 10. Be that as it may. However, every new building is exempted from the purview of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed or notified to the local authority concerned whichever is earlier. 10. Be that as it may. In the present case, having regard to the admitted facts that the construction was completed in the year 1996 that the fresh tenancy was created in favour of the appellant only in the year 1996 and that the assessment of property tax was made from 1996, I hold that the suit filed within five years is maintainable in view of the statutory exemption as provided under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. In that view of the matter, the substantial questions of law framed in these Second Appeals are answered by stating that notifying the completion of building is not a mandatory or legal requirement before claiming exemption under Section 30(i) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and the actual date of completion of construction of the building is the criteria that may be adopted for every building to claim exemption under Section 30 of the Act. 11. In view of the question of law being answered in the manner indicated above, there is no merit in these second appeals and the Second Appeals are, therefore, dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.