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2016 DIGILAW 399 (HP)

Pitamber Sharma v. Union of India

2016-04-01

RAJIV SHARMA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge: Petitioner was appointed as Diesel/Motor Mechanic Grade-B on 4.11.1987. He was promoted to the post of Diesel/Motor Mechanic Grade-A on 4.11.1991. He was also promoted to the post of Assistant Foreman Grade-VI on 21.6.1995. He was transferred to Cement Corporation of India (CCI), Rajban. He joined at CCI, Rajban Unit on 2.9.2003. Since the petitioner had completed 8 years eligibility criteria, he was upgraded to the next higher post of Assistant Foreman (Diesel) Grade-VII under stagnation policy with effect from 1.1.2005. He was further promoted to the post of Junior Engineer (Diesel) Grade-II on 1.1.2008. He was considered to the post of Junior Engineer Grade-I by the Departmental Promotion Committee. Fact of the matter is that he was not found suitable for promotion. 2. Petitioner is seeking promotion to the post of Junior Engineer (Diesel) Grade-I with effect from 12.4.2005. Present petition has been filed by the petitioner on 22.12.2012. Petitioner has not explained the delay and laches. It is settled law by now that the matter pertaining to promotion/seniority should be filed at least within a period of 6 months or one year. The purpose of filing the petitions expeditiously in these matters is that the rights of other parties also come into existence with the passage of time. Settled things should not be unsettled. 3. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy versus State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 2271 have held that where a Government servant slept over the promotions of his juniors over his head for 14 years and then approached the High Court with writ petition challenging the relaxation of relevant rules in favour of the juniors, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. Such an aggrieved person should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of promotion of his juniors. Their Lordships have further held that it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. Their Lordships have held as under: [2] The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2nd respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the 2nd respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the court in the year 1957 after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head, he could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” 4. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.