JUDGMENT: Sonia Gokani, J. 1. This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the action of the respondent authority of compulsorily retiring the petitioner from the service. 2. Brief facts are that the petitioner is B.E. (Electrical) having birth date 14.5.1940, who joined as Deputy Engineer (Trainee) in the respondent Board. He was promoted as Executive Engineer on 30.10.1981, and was working since then. 3. A complaint was filed by one Harji Raghavji Patel on 14.3.1988 accusing him of the offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, of receiving illegal gratification in connection with providing electric connection. Initially, he was arrested and released on bail, but later on, he was charge sheeted. 4. The petitioner was placed under suspension on account of criminal case lodged against him by an order dated 25.3.1988. The respondent Board did not contemplate any separate departmental proceedings against the petitioner, and he continued to be under suspension. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that he was served with the impugned order dated 10.5.1995 of compulsorily retiring him with effect from 13.5.1995 on his completion of 55 years of age on the ground that the authority has reasonable cause to believe that the petitioner is lacking in integrity. He was paid three months notice pay. Such order was passed under the provision of General Standing Order (G.S.O.) No. 218 dated 26.4.1972 read with Service Regulation No. 72 of the Board. The petitioner in this petition has challenged this order of compulsory retirement. 6. During the pendency of this petition, the petitioner came to be acquitted by the Sessions Court in Criminal Case No. 3 of 1996 vide judgment and order dated 13.4.1999. Criminal Appeal was also preferred by the State, being Criminal Appeal No. 582 of 1999, which was dismissed in limine on 21.9.1999. 7. It is the grievance of the petitioner that his acquittal though is not on technical ground but on merit, the order of compulsory retirement even otherwise would not survive. Criminal Appeal was also preferred by the State, being Criminal Appeal No. 582 of 1999, which was dismissed in limine on 21.9.1999. 7. It is the grievance of the petitioner that his acquittal though is not on technical ground but on merit, the order of compulsory retirement even otherwise would not survive. He has already attained the age of superannuation on 31.5.1998, therefore, he would naturally not make any prayer for reinstatement, but instead has asked for the financial benefits, as if such order was never in existence, with all promotional benefits, and as would have been made available to him, had such order not been passed. Therefore, this petition with the following prayers: "(A) declaring the impugned order of compulsory retirement dated 10.5.95 as irrational, arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of the principles of natural justice and by way of abuse of power and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and also violative of the service regulations of the Board and, therefore, illegal, null and void and quashing the same; (B) directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his original post with continuity in service and with benefits of backwages and other allowances; (C) restraining the respondents from taking any action on the basis of the impugned order dated 10.5.95 and from enforcing the said order; (CC) may be paid with 18% interest. (D) directing the respondents to stay the operation of the order dated 10.5.95 and to allow the petitioner to be under suspension as before with all benefits from suspension; and (E) making any other appropriate order." 8. In the first affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent Board, it is contended that the order of compulsory retirement is not punitive. It is the prerogative of the respondent Board to review the situation even at the age of 50 years, as the petitioner has already crossed 50 years of age. It is the further say of the respondent authority that it is not the Board which has lodged any complaint against the petitioner, but it is a third party, and on realizing from the news item published in the daily newspaper, the action of suspension was taken against him. It is the further say of the respondent authority that it is not the Board which has lodged any complaint against the petitioner, but it is a third party, and on realizing from the news item published in the daily newspaper, the action of suspension was taken against him. Heavy reliance is placed on G.S.O. No. 218 dated 26.4.1972 stating inter alia that it is the right of the appointing authority to retire any employee by giving a notice of not less than three months or salary of three months in lieu of the notice period. In case of a workmen, this needs to be done on or after the age of 55 years, and in case of a person other than workman, on or after the date he attains the age of 50 years. It is contended that the Board was paying 75% of salary without taking any work from the petitioner, and therefore, the petition is required to be decided in the public interest. 9. An additional affidavit-in-reply is also filed stating therein that the competent authority was of the view that his case could be considered as a premature retirement, and accordingly, he was paid three months' salary in lieu of notice period. If he was acquitted during the pendency of the petition, payment cannot be released merely because he made a request after his acquittal. It is the say of the respondent Board that the petitioner disabled himself to serve from May 1995 to May 1998 as the judgment and order of acquittal came in the year 1999, and therefore, to ask for backwages for the period from May 1995 to May 1998 is not sustainable. It is further disputed that his acquittal was not an honorable acquittal, but it was on technical grounds, and certainly a case not beyond reasonable doubt. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed in respect of their respective pleadings. 10. Both the sides have been heard at length. 11. From the submissions and the pleadings, three aspects are required to be considered. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed in respect of their respective pleadings. 10. Both the sides have been heard at length. 11. From the submissions and the pleadings, three aspects are required to be considered. Firstly, whether the respondent has got the authority to compulsorily retire the petitioner after his having reached the age of 55 years, secondly, without independently initiating any departmental proceedings, such decision could have been taken by retiring him compulsorily, and thirdly, whether non-payment of his dues till the year 2002, i.e. till the judgment and order of acquittal was passed, can have any bearing on any of these aspects. 12. As rightly pointed out by the respondent authority, the Board is authorized to exercise its powers to compulsorily retire a person as the G.S.O. No. 218 dated 26.4.1972 empowers the Board with service regulations. The appointing authority without assigning any reason can retire an employee by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' salary in lieu of such notice. In case of workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the same has to be done on or after the date on which he attains the age of 55 years, and if he falls in other categories other than that of a workman, the same can be done on or after the date he attains the age of 50 years. 13. Clause (v) of the amendment to the GSO 218 of 26.4.1972 dated 11.12.1975 provides as under: "(v) Once it is decided to retain an employee in service beyond the age of 50/55 years, the should be allowed to continue upto the age of 55/58 years without any fresh review unless such a review is justified by special reasons, such as his subsequent work or conduct or the state of his physical health, which may make his earlier retirement clearly desirable. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clauses, an employee of the Board under suspension on a charge of misconduct shall not be required or permitted to retire on reaching the date of compulsory retirement, but shall be retained in service till the inquiry into the charge is concluded and a final order is passed there upon by competent authority. The competent authority should decide whether the period of such compulsory retention in service should count for provident fund and gratuity. The competent authority should decide whether the period of such compulsory retention in service should count for provident fund and gratuity. Normally, when the employee charged is honorably acquitted, such period will count for provident fund and gratuity." 14. The order impugned dated 10.5.1995 provides that the petitioner would be completing 55 years on 13.5.1995, therefore, in the wake of G.S.O. No. 218 read with service regulation No. 72, his case is required to be reviewed for extension of his service beyond 55 years of age. As the petitioner was lacking in integrity, the authority thought it fit to consider the petitioner for premature retirement, therefore, the powers have been exercised to retire the petitioner from the Board's service on 13.5.1995 under the proceedings. The petitioner immediately challenged the action of the respondent authority of compulsorily retiring him by preferring this petition. 15. As is pointed out from the record, by the judgment and order dated 13.4.1999 passed in Special Criminal Case No. 3 of 1996, the petitioner came to be acquitted. The criminal appeal also as mentioned hereinabove resulted into dismissal on 21.9.1999. 16. The question, therefore, would be whether the action on the part of the respondent authority in exercising the powers to compulsorily retire the petitioner before the petitioner attained the age of 55 years was permissible or not. 17. Both the regulations sought to be relied upon by the authority permit the authorities to exercise of such powers in the larger public interest. It would not be possible to endorse the contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner that since the petitioner has already crossed the age of 50 years, such powers cannot be exercised at all. Of course, the amendment to the said G.S.O. No. 218 dated 26.4.1972 provides that if one has already attained the age of 55 years, he should be allowed to complete the service till he attains the age of 58 years. In stricto senso, if the same is looked at, the order was passed on 10.5.1995 when the petitioner had yet not completed the age of 55 years, and as the wordings used in the said G.S.O. No. 218 is "on or after the date on which he attains the age of 50 years", to restrict it only when he completes 50 years may not be feasible. At the same time, clause (v) also may not help the cause of the petitioner, inasmuch as the petitioner had not completed the age of 55 years when the order dated 10.5.1995 was passed by the respondent-Board, and therefore, it can be said that the Board had power to compulsorily retire a person even before he attains the age of 55 years. However, the non-obstante clause, which is given in the amendment, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any of the clauses provided in the said standing order, if there is already any enquiry initiated against a person, he should not be compulsorily retired, but he shall be retained in the service till the inquiry into the charge is concluded, and a final order is passed there upon by the competent authority. The competent authority is also expected to decide whether such period of compulsory retention in service should count for provident fund and gratuity, when the employee charged is honorably acquitted. 18. It appears that this amendment has come in the December 1995, whereas the order impugned has been passed in May 1995. However, it has been provided in the non-obstante clause not to retire any person subsequently if already the departmental proceedings are initiated after the order of suspension is passed in relation to any act of misconduct on the part of the employee. In absence of such amendment before the Board, to say at this stage that the powers had been wrongly exercised of retiring him before he completed the age of 55 years may not be countenanced. 19. However, the challenge made by the petitioner on the second and third count may require a deeper consideration. As could be noticed from the order impugned, three months' salary was paid while retiring him compulsorily. All his service benefits were not paid to him till he was acquitted by the trial court and the appellate forum. There is nothing in both the affidavits as to why the respondent Board had delayed the making of the payment all these years. By way of oral submission, learned counsel for the respondent Board submitted that the Board was waiting for the outcome of the judgment and order of the pending criminal matter. There is nothing in both the affidavits as to why the respondent Board had delayed the making of the payment all these years. By way of oral submission, learned counsel for the respondent Board submitted that the Board was waiting for the outcome of the judgment and order of the pending criminal matter. It is quite a contradictory stand taken by the respondent Board which on one hand claims the prerogative of exercising its right of compulsorily retiring an employee in the public interest, and on the other hand hold back his payment for a period till the competent court decides the charges of corruption levelled against him. This approach can not permit this Court to sustain the subsequent action on the part of the authority. Had there been an order of compulsorily retiring the person in the larger public interest and making of the total payment of dues to the petitioner, the question would have been different. 20. The Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Babu Lal Jangir reported in AIR 2014 SC 142 has said that in the event of a judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement, interference is permitted only on the ground of non-application of mind, mala fide, perverse, or arbitrary or if there is non-compliance of statutory duty by the statutory authority. Power to retire compulsorily a government servant in terms of service rule is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms a bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement is in public interest. The Apex Court while so doing has relied upon the decision in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 . It is thus emphasized that the order of compulsorily retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. It is based on subjective satisfaction of the employer, and a very limited scope of judicial review is available. It would be apt to also quote the principle of law crystallized by the Apex Court: "24. It is thus emphasized that the order of compulsorily retirement is neither punitive nor stigmatic. It is based on subjective satisfaction of the employer, and a very limited scope of judicial review is available. It would be apt to also quote the principle of law crystallized by the Apex Court: "24. The principle of law which is clarified and stands crystallized after the judgment in Pyare Mohan Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and others, 2010 (10) SCC 693 is that after the promotion of an employee the adverse entries prior thereto would have no relevance and can be treated as wiped off when the case of the government employee is to be considered for further promotion. However, this 'washed off theory' will have no application when case of an employee is being assessed to determine whether he is fit to be retained in service or requires to be given compulsory retirement. The rationale given is that since such an assessment is based on "entire service record", there is no question of not taking into consideration an earlier old adverse entries or record of the old period. We may hasten to add that while such a record can be taken into consideration, at the same time, the service record of the immediate past period will have to be given due credence and weightage. For example, as against some very old adverse entries where the immediate past record shows exemplary performance, ignoring such a record of recent past and acting only on the basis of old adverse entries, to retire a person will be a clear example of arbitrary exercise of power. However, if old record pertains to integrity of a person then that may be sufficient to justify the order of premature retirement of the government servant. 25. Having taken note of the correct principles which need to be applied, we can safely conclude that the order of the High Court based solely on the judgment in the case of Brij Mohan Singh Chopra was not correct. The High Court could not have set aside the order merely on the ground that service record pertaining to the period 1978-90 being old and stale could not be taken into consideration at all. The High Court could not have set aside the order merely on the ground that service record pertaining to the period 1978-90 being old and stale could not be taken into consideration at all. As per the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that entire service record is relevant for deciding as to whether the government servant needs to be eased out prematurely. Of course, at the same time, subsequent record is also relevant, and immediate past record, preceding the date on which decision is to be taken would be of more value, qualitatively. What is to be examined is the "overall performance" on the basis of "entire service record" to come to the conclusion as to whether the concerned employee has become a deadwood and it is public interest to retire him compulsorily. The Authority must consider and examine the overall effect of the entries of the officer concerned and not an isolated entry, as it may well be in some cases that in spite of satisfactory performance, the Authority may desire to compulsorily retire an employee in public interest, as in the opinion of the said authority, the post has to be manned by a more efficient and dynamic person and if there is sufficient material on record to show that the employee "rendered himself a liability to the institution", there is no occasion for the Court to interfere in the exercise of its limited power of judicial review." 21. However, what could be noticed here is that such order is passed in the wake of a Government Resolution dated 2.5.1995, which had asked all the concerned departments and authorities to take a review of the matter, and not to continue to pay 75% of salary as subsistence allowance to the suspended employees. This was done for taking work from them, and if the departmental enquiry is not to be completed, to reinstate them in service. Instead of so doing, the Board has chosen to retire him compulsorily. If that was done, there could not have been a delay in making payment, and there would be no question of waiting for the outcome of the criminal case. It is also to be noted that no separate or independent departmental enquiry has been initiated or contemplated by the respondent Board. If that was done, there could not have been a delay in making payment, and there would be no question of waiting for the outcome of the criminal case. It is also to be noted that no separate or independent departmental enquiry has been initiated or contemplated by the respondent Board. Instead, it has chosen to suspend the petitioner on the ground of his pending criminal case, and the arrest that has been made subsequently. If that be the case, the amended G.S.O. No. 218 clearly provides that if there is an honorable acquittal, and if there is no separate enquiry which has been conducted by the respondent authority, for the purpose of payment of gratuity and provident fund and other retiral benefits, such period will be counted normally. 22. In the case of Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and others Vs. Hari Kishan Verma reported in, AIR 2015 SC 2426 while retiring a person prematurely, the entire record of the employee was scrutinized. Adverse entries were made against the employee. The plea that after promotion earlier adverse entries of employee have lost their significance was not accepted. The Court held that the entire record of the employee can be scrutinized by the employer to adjudge the justification of continuance of the employee after reaching a particular age as contemplated in the regulations. The question that was raised before the Court was whether the order passed by the employer is stigmatic so as to lose the favour of compulsory retirement, which does not have the attributes of punishment. The Court has referred to the decision rendered in the case of Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation reported in (2007) 10 SCC 71 to say that if the satisfaction of the employer rested on the unsatisfactory performance on the part of the appellant, the matter might have been different, but in that case, from the impugned order it is evident that it was not the unsatisfactory nature and character of his performance only which was taken into consideration, but a series of his acts as well as the misconduct on his part had also been taken into consideration. It is one thing to say that he was found unsuitable for a job, but it is another thing to say that he was said to have committed some misconduct. The words used were "inefficiency" and "not fit". It is one thing to say that he was found unsuitable for a job, but it is another thing to say that he was said to have committed some misconduct. The words used were "inefficiency" and "not fit". The Court has, therefore, said that the use of such words may not convey the meaning of being stigmatic even remotely. 23. In the case of Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja (supra), the question was whether the termination of service was punitive or simpliciter. The appellant was discharged from service after prescribed probation period was over. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tests governing termination of probation is no longer res integra. Paragraphs No. 26 and 27 are reproduced hereunder: "26. V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab is a case where the order impugned in the writ petition was as under: (SCC p. 240, para 2) "Shri V.P. Ahuja, s/o. late Shri H.N. Ahuja was appointed on probation for 2 years as Chief Executive of the Coop. Spg. Mills Ltd., vide orders Endst. No. Spinfed/CCA/7844-45 dated 29.9.1998 and posted at Bacospin. However, he failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. Therefore, as per clause I of the said appointment order, the services of Shri V.P. Ahuja are hereby terminated with immediate effect." It was held to be stigmatic in nature stating: (SCC p. 241, paras 7-8) "7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. 8. The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular inquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant." 27. Yet again, in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. a case on which counsel for both the parties relied upon, this Court held: (SCC p. 31, para 23) "23. The theory of 'object of the inquiry' was further emphasised by the Constitution Bench in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, that was a case of a temporary employee. The theory of 'object of the inquiry' was further emphasised by the Constitution Bench in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, that was a case of a temporary employee. The discharge from service was by way of an order 'simpliciter'. But there, an inquiry was held and the termination order was based on it as it stated on its face that it was 'found undesirable' to retain the employee and hence his services were being terminated. The order was held to be punitive on its face and was quashed. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) discussed the earlier cases and held that in every case the purpose of the inquiry was crucial. If the inquiry was held 'only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not', it could not be treated as punitive and that the motive operating in the mind of the authority was not relevant. But "the form in which the order terminating the service is expressed will not be decisive." It was held: (AIR p. 453, para 13) "13. what the Court will have to examine in each case would be, having regard to the material facts existing upto the time of discharge, is the order of discharge in substance one of dismissal?" Therefore, the 'form' was not of importance but the 'substance' was. It was further held : (SCC pp. 34-35, para 30) "30. We shall now refer to a different type of cases where a departmental inquiry was started, then dropped and a simple order of termination was passed. In State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, the charge memo was served, reply given and at that stage itself, the proceedings were dropped and a termination order was passed. The High Court felt that the object of departmental inquiry, being to punish the employee, the order of termination must he treated as punitive. This was not accepted by a three Judge Bench consisting of Justice Shah (as he then was) who had laid down in Madan Gopal's case the principle of 'object of the inquiry'. This Court reversed the High Court judgment and held that neither Madan Gopal's case nor Jagdish Mitter's case applied. This was because in the case before them the inquiry did not go beyond the stage of the explanation. No findings were given and no inquiry report was submitted as in the above two cases. This Court reversed the High Court judgment and held that neither Madan Gopal's case nor Jagdish Mitter's case applied. This was because in the case before them the inquiry did not go beyond the stage of the explanation. No findings were given and no inquiry report was submitted as in the above two cases. In that case (i.e. Sukh Raj Bahadur) this Court felt that the decision in A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1966 dated 13-12-1966) was more direct. In Benjamin's case, a charge memo was issued, explanation was received and an Enquiry Officer was also appointed but before the inquiry could he completed, the proceedings were dropped stating that : departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the formalities, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves. There also the order was held not to be punitive. Following the above case, this Court in Sukh Raj Bahadur's case stated that the position before them was similar to what happened in Benjamin's case and concluded as follows : (AIR p. 1095, para 17) "17. the departmental inquiry did not proceed beyond the stage of submission of a charge-sheet followed by the respondent's explanation thereto. The inquiry was not preceded with, there were no sittings of any inquiry officer, no evidence recorded and no conclusion arrived at in the inquiry." (emphasis in original) 24. It is for the concerned authorities to decide whether the person in public interest needs to be compulsorily retired. The Courts are expected to scrutinize except when powers are exercised mala fide, arbitrarily or in perverse manner or in breach of statutory powers. If bona fide in public interest it is exercised, no interference ordinarily is desirable. However, if the order is punitive or stigmatic losing flavour of compulsory retirement, the Courts need to interfere. In the instant case, if one looks at the order impugned, the respondent authority has clearly mentioned in the order that such decision of retiring him compulsorily is being taken only on account of the fact that he is lacking in integrity. It is on the strength of the record available and the documents produced before the Board that such decision has been taken. It is on the strength of the record available and the documents produced before the Board that such decision has been taken. It is one thing to have the powers of compulsorily retiring the employee after he attained the age of 50 or before he completes 55 years, and it is different to consider the actual exercise of such powers as can be noticed from the order itself. Words incorporated of his having no integrity are only on the strength of the criminal case, which had been registered against him. To do so, without initiating any departmental enquiry, and also to maintain the words like 'lacking in integrity', such expression shall have to be termed as stigmatic in nature. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, ordinarily, the Court is not required to enter into the aspect of compulsory retirement, and the authorities are also permitted to scrutinize the entire record of the employee to adjudge the justification of not continuing him after reaching a particular age. As noted, in the instant case, to term him having no integrity without any separate proceedings of departmental enquiry coupled with the fact that the amount of retiral benefits had been paid to him only in the year 2002 after his acquittal by the Sessions Court and the appellate forum both, this Court is of the opinion that while upholding the powers of the authority to retire the employee compulsorily before he attained the age of 55 years, the order impugned requires to be quashed. 25. As pointed out in the petition itself, the petitioner had retired on 31.5.1998, and therefore, there is no question of reinstatement. However, the judgment and order of acquittal of petitioner of criminal charges having come from the competent courts, and there being no separate challenge by way of departmental proceedings, he deserves to be paid all his retiremental benefits, as if he had continued to serve. Again, had the authorities deemed it fit to retire him in public interest, it ought to have paid him all his dues when the order impugned was passed. Instead, it waited for the criminal proceedings to reach its logical conclusion before paying him his dues in the year 2002. Again, had the authorities deemed it fit to retire him in public interest, it ought to have paid him all his dues when the order impugned was passed. Instead, it waited for the criminal proceedings to reach its logical conclusion before paying him his dues in the year 2002. Both the steps (i) of non payment and (ii) of retiring him for lack of integrity without departmental proceedings also in the wake of judgment and order of acquittal would warrant interference. 26. This Court is further supported by the subsequent amendment made on 11.12.1995 to the G.S.O. No. 218, where it says that once acquittal is given to the employee from the charges of corruption, for the purpose of payment of gratuity and provident fund, his period of suspension shall be treated as regular. There is no other ground either put forth as could be noticed before this Court as disentitling him to receive the statutory dues, bearing in mind the entire chronology of facts and circumstances. 27. Resultantly, this petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 10.5.1995 stands quashed and set aside. Upon due calculation of all the benefits, including gratuity, provident fund, treating his period of suspension as regular, shall be paid by the respondent Board to the petitioner within twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.