JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. M. Devananda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S. Rupachandra, learned ASG appearing for the respondents. 2. The deceased husband of the petitioner was serving as constable in the 27th Bn. CRPF. While in service, on allegation of misconduct in discharge of duty and for overstaying after completion of leave without permission, a departmental proceeding was started and on conclusion of the proceeding, he was dismissed from service by order of the disciplinary authority dated 20.5.1996. It is the case of the petitioner that her deceased husband, because of his ailment, neither preferred an appeal against the said order of dismissal nor challenged it in any court of law. After prolong ailment, her deceased husband died in the year 2000. Fifteen years thereafter, she submitted an application on 14.8.2015 to the competent authority to convert the order of “dismissal from service” to one of “compulsory retirement” so that the she could get pensionary and other benefits. The said application of the petitioner was not entertained on the ground of maintainability for which this writ petition has been filed in the year, 2016. 3. Shri S. Rupachandra, learned ASG appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on ground of long delay in filing the writ petition. Admittedly, the deceased husband of the petitioner was dismissed from service in May, 1996 and he neither preferred any appeal against the said order of dismissal nor challenged the same in any court of law. It is stated by the petitioner that her deceased husband had suffered from serious ailment in support of which documents have been filed along with the writ petition. It is also admitted that the deceased husband of the petitioner died in the year, 2000. The first representation by the petitioner after death of her husband was filed in 2015 to convert the order of “dismissal from service” to one of “compulsory retirement.” The said application having not been entertained as maintainable, this writ petition has been filed in 2016. On the basis of these admitted facts, we are called upon to decide as to whether the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches or notice should be issued. 4. On the basis of these admitted facts, we are called upon to decide as to whether the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches or notice should be issued. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Gauhati High Court in Writ Appeal No.116 of 2005 disposed of on 12.8.2010 and submitted that under similar circumstances another constable who had also been dismissed from service was granted relief by the High Court even though the writ application was filed by the wife of the said constable. A copy of the said judgment is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-A/7. On reading of the judgment, we find that husband of the petitioner therein, while serving as constable, faced a departmental proceeding on certain charges and was dismissed from service by order dated 20.1.1997. He preferred an appeal against the said order of dismissal on several grounds. During pendency of the appeal, he died and consequently his wife filed the writ petition in the year 1997 in the High Court challenging the order of dismissal from service. The first writ petition filed by his wife was disposed of with a direction to dispose of the appeal preferred by her deceased husband and after rejection of the appeal, she again preferred writ petition in 1999. Therefore, there was practically no delay in filing of the writ petition by the wife of the deceased constable in the said case. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a decision of the apex Court in the case of K.C. Sharma & Ors vs. Union of India and Ors reported in (1997) 6 SCC 721 . In the said reported case, the appellants before the Supreme Court were Railway employees who had retired in between 1980 – 1988. They were aggrieved by a notification dated 5.12.1988 which adversely affected their pension retrospectively. The said notification was not challenged by the appellants in time. However, after the Central Administrative Tribunal in another case declared the said notification to be invalid, the appellant before the Supreme Court, on the basis of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, claimed the benefit of the judgment and filed an application before the Tribunal in April, 1994. The said application filed before the Tribunal was rejected on the ground of delay and latches. The said application filed before the Tribunal was rejected on the ground of delay and latches. Considering the fact that the Tribunal had held the notification to be invalid, the Supreme Court was of the view that even if there has been some delay in filing the application for the relief on the basis of the judgment of the Tribunal holding the notification dt. 5.12.1988 to be invalid, such delay and latches should have been condoned by the Tribunal. The facts of the above reported case are completely different from that of the case. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a decision of the apex Court in the case of N. Balkrishnan vs. M. krishnamurthy reported in (1998)7 SCC 123 . The said reported case relates to a suit which had been decreed ex parte and considering the facts of that case, the Supreme Court confirmed the order of the trial court in condoning the delay. The fact of the case has no similarity with the facts of the present case. The learned counsel also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 . In the said reported case also, the subject matter of dispute was as to whether delay in filing application for setting aside abatement of the suit and condoning the delay in bringing the LRs on record should be allowed or not. On reading of the judgment also, we do not find any similarity of facts with the present case. 7. In the matter of condonation of delay, each individual case has to be examined on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, as stated earlier, the long delay of 15 years i.e. from 2000 to 2015 has not at all been explained by the petitioner except saying that she was not aware of the law. We, therefore, are of the view that the question of condoning such long delay in filing the writ petition should not be considered in favour of the petitioner and consequently we dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches.