ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The applicant has challenged the order dated 17.1.2012 passed by learned JMFC, Shivpuri in Criminal Case No.284/2009 whereby the application filed by the applicant under section 91 of CrPC and sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act was dismissed. 3. Brief facts of the case in short are that a complaint is pending against the applicant before the trial Court for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'the NI Act'). It was admitted before the trial Court that some loan transactions took place between the respondent Bank and the applicant and when the impugned cheque was furnished for payment then it was dishonoured. A notice of demand was given and thereafter the complaint was filed. The applicant filed an application that the complainant Bank took 10 blank cheques from the applicant and 9 blank cheques were still with the Bank, therefore, such cheques be called from the Bank. Applicant also simply appended his signature on the cheques and they were not filled up. Those cheques were to be filled up by the Bank authority according to their convenience and therefore, the applicant wanted to get the impugned cheques to be examined by handwriting expert. The trial Court after considering the application dismissed the same. 4. After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it appears that the applicant relies upon the order passed by the Single Bench of this Court in the case of “Sohanlal Singhal and another v. Sunil Jain” [2015(1) MPLJ (Cri.) 294], in which it was laid that handwriting expert can be examined to assess the signature and handwriting mentioned on the cheque. The aforesaid order has been passed mainly on the basis of judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of “T. Nagappa v. Muralidhar” [2008(4) MPLJ (SC) 455]. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has placed his reliance upon the order passed by the Single Bench of this Court in “Sunita Dubey v. Hukum Singh Ahirwar” [ 2015(1) JLJ 65 ], in which it was held that in the light of the provision of section 20 of the NI Act blank cheques can be issued and those shall be considered as valid cheques. 6. 6. After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the applicant has accepted that he appended his signature on the cheques and therefore, his signature on the cheque is not disputed. The art of examination of handwriting is not perfect science and it depends upon comparison of two handwriting. No handwriting expert can claim that he would give age of ink by which the entries were filled up. Since the cheque is not filled up in the handwriting of the applicant then certainly it was filled up after cheque was given to the respondent. This fact is sufficient for the decision of criminal complaint under section 138 of the NI Act. If it is accepted by the parties that except of the signature remaining portion of the cheque was filled up by someone else then it is for the applicant to get advantage of this fact. If aforesaid fact is already established then there is no need to know about age of the ink by which the entry of the cheques were filled up. If the application of the applicant is allowed and cheque is referred to the handwriting expert then no fruitful result would be obtained. It would be simple wastage of time. In the case of T. Nagappa (supra), the matter was referred to the handwriting expert because the accused denied the signature on the cheque hence due to factual variance the law laid in T. Nagappa (supra), cannot be applied here. As discussed above that no necessity is there to assess the age of the ink by which the cheque is filled up and it is sufficient for the applicant to show that the cheque was not filled up by him. Thus, it cannot be said that any illegality or perversity was done by the trial Court while denying the opportunity of examination of expert relating to handwriting of the cheque. 7. So far as calling of 9 blank cheques is concerned, it relates to loan transaction of the applicant and present complaint has been filed only for one cheque, therefore, the entries of other cheque are not at all relevant with the present case and therefore, the applicant cannot call the other cheques given by him to the respondent bank. 7. So far as calling of 9 blank cheques is concerned, it relates to loan transaction of the applicant and present complaint has been filed only for one cheque, therefore, the entries of other cheque are not at all relevant with the present case and therefore, the applicant cannot call the other cheques given by him to the respondent bank. Bank is a public institute and officers of the Bank have no enmity with any customer so that any fraud or violation of rules would have been done by them. The present matter does not relate with the remaining 9 cheques therefore, such 9 cheques are not required to be called in the present complaint. The trial Court has rightly dismissed the application under section 91 of CrPC in toto. 8. Looking to the aforesaid factual and legal position, the aforesaid order passed by the different Single Bench of this Court cannot be applied in the present case. This is not necessary at this stage to discuss about section 20 of the NI Act otherwise prejudice would be caused to the Court below at the time of final hearing. 9. On the basis of aforesaid discussions, the applicant could not prove that the impugned order passed by the Court below is perverse or away from the legal provisions hence it is not a case in which the inherent power vested under section 482 of CrPC can be invoked in favour of the applicant. 10. Consequently, the petition under section 482 of CrPC filed by the applicant -Sharafat Khan is hereby dismissed at motion stage. 11. Interim stay dated 15.5.2012 is hereby vacated. 12. Copy of the order be sent to the trial Court for information and compliance and to proceed with the case.