JUDGMENT : This Court has heard the pros and cons expatiated by learned Counsels of either side. 2. Although, at the time of presentation of this second appeal, no substantial question of law was formulated by the appellant but it transpires that this Court allowed the amendment application on 10.9.2015 whereby such questions were permitted to be added by way of filing the amended memo of appeal. Therefore, the contention of learned Counsel for respondent no.4 that this second appeal is not maintainable, as contemplated under Section 100(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, looses its relevance. As such, deeming this appeal maintainable, I now proceed to adjudicate upon its admissibility discussing the merits of the case. 3. Vide order dated 21.7.2016, this Court, while rendering the opportunity of hearing to either party, at some length, formulated the following two substantial questions of law: - A. “Whether the land, on which the respondents are raising construction (which has been stopped by the injunction issued by this Court), is the part and parcel of the old residential building wherein the plaintiff was allocated 1/5th of his share in the preliminary decree dated 5.10.1999 passed in O.S. No.41 of 1992. B. Whether the disputed land is none other but the Khasra No.358, which is the part of Khata No.83 having total area 3 Nali & 4 Muthhis, which was purchased way back on 28.4.1977 by way of two sale deeds for the total consideration of Rs.13,000/- and such consideration was paid by Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Thapliyal (father of litigating parties) out of the received compensation of land acquired by the Government for establishing the Srinagar-Garhwal University.” 4. Today, after hearing the arguments, I think it would be in the fitness of things to formulate yet another substantial question of law which is as under:- C. “Whether the land, in question, which is the part of Khata No.83 Khasra No. 358 admeasuring 1 Nali & 4 Mutthi or even in total 3 Nali and 4 Mutthi, was the subject matter inter alia of the Original Suit No. 41 of 1992?” 5. It seems that Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Thapliyal was the father or father-in-law of the litigating parties and the plaintiff Mr. Ramesh Chandra Thapliyal is the real brother of defendant nos.1 to 3 viz. Anusuya Prasad, Shanti Prasad and Dinesh Prasad. Mr. It seems that Mr. Bhagwati Prasad Thapliyal was the father or father-in-law of the litigating parties and the plaintiff Mr. Ramesh Chandra Thapliyal is the real brother of defendant nos.1 to 3 viz. Anusuya Prasad, Shanti Prasad and Dinesh Prasad. Mr. Anusuya Prasad passed away during pendency of litigation, so now his widow Smt. Poornima Devi (defendant no.4) is in the fray. 6. Now, the controversy to the effect ‘whether the land in question is the part and parcel of the old residential building wherein the plaintiff was allocated 1/5th of his share in the preliminary decree dated 5.10.1999 passed in O.S. No.41 of 1992’ is concerned, the Court will have to look into the issues, as framed by the Civil Judge and the relief granted thereon. 7. The same plaintiff Mr. Ramesh Chandra Thapliyal, by way of filing the Suit No.41/1992, sought division of the building situated in Nanda Devi Mohalla, Gurudwara Road, Srinagar, claiming his 1/5th share in such property. In addition thereto, he also claimed the same share in the land situated in Village Kothar bearing Khata No.44, area 3 Nali & 10 Mutthi as also the land situated in Village Srikot Gangnali, Patti Katulsyun bearing Khata No.27 having the area 2 Nali and 8 Mutthi. 8. In that suit, plaintiff also sought the relief of injunction that the defendants Bhagwati Prasad (own father of plaintiff) and three brothers, namely, Anusuya Prasad, Shanti Prasad and Dinesh Prasad, be restrained from interfering in his peaceful possession. 9. Issues were, accordingly, framed by the Trial Judge pertaining to the disputed building and the lands situated in Khata Nos.44 and 27. Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Pauri Garhwal, vide judgment dated 5.10.1999, decreed that suit. In the operative portion of the judgment, there is a mention about the building which is situated in Nanda Devi Mohalla, Gurudwara Road, Srinagar¸ recorded in the Nagar Palika of the town, whereon 1/10th share of the plaintiff was declared. That apart, 1/6th share of the plaintiff was also declared in the lands bearing Khata Nos.44 and 27 having the area, as indicated above. A preliminary decree was also directed to be prepared accordingly. However, the Civil Judge did not make any order regarding issuance of any injunction. That apart, 1/6th share of the plaintiff was also declared in the lands bearing Khata Nos.44 and 27 having the area, as indicated above. A preliminary decree was also directed to be prepared accordingly. However, the Civil Judge did not make any order regarding issuance of any injunction. So, it becomes abundantly clear that the land, in question, which is the part of Khet No.83, Khasra No.358, area 3 Nali & 4 Mutthi, situated in Gram Bhalgaon, Patti Kutulsyun, Distt. Pauri Garhwal, was never the subject matter of the original Partition Suit No.41 of 1992. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn the attention of this Court towards the mentioning of the property, along with the particulars of the other property, even before the commencement of the pleadings under the heading ‘subject of suit’. But at the same time, it cannot be ignored that while framing the Issues, no question was raised by the plaintiff asking the Court to frame any other additional issue or to form the issue in such a manner so that to include this property along with the lands of Khata Nos.44 and 27. 11. It has nowhere been argued or found on the record of the case that whether this preliminary decree was ever persuaded in order to make it a final decree by the Court. Therefore, after lapse of several years, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to agitate upon the piece of land of Khet No.83, Khasra No.358 on the ground that this property was the subject matter of Original Suit No.41 of 1992. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that this property was purchased by his father on 28.4.1977 and 30.4.1977 vide two registered sale deeds and the total consideration of Rs.5,000/- + Rs.8,000/-, was paid by him from the money received out of the sale of one ancestral property which he sold to Smt. Bhaga Devi on 21.4.1977 for Rs.5,000/- and another sale deed was in favour of H.N.B. Garhwal University. 13. 13. So far as receiving the consideration from the aforesaid University is concerned, plaintiff, in his cross-examination, has himself accepted about the compensation in lieu of the acquisition of land in favour of University by his father in the year 1991-92, then where remains the question that while purchasing the sale deed almost 15 years ago in 1977, his father could utilize that money received as compensation in order to purchase the sale deed dated 30.4.1977. 14. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court towards the questionnaire which has been answered by the University under the Right to Information Act, showing that the University paid the compensation of Rs.11,350/- to Mr. Bhagwati Prasad in lieu of acquisition of 14 Nali and 3 Mutthi land; but this answer, issued under the signature of a competent officer, nowhere reveals as to on what date, Mr. Thapliyal received such money. 15. It was further argued for the appellant that since his father received Rs.5,000/- on 21.4.1977 by selling some portion of his agricultural land to Smt. Bhaga Devi and that money was spent by him to purchase one sale deed for the selfsame amount in favour of Mr. Anusuya Prasad on 28.4.1977 i.e. just after seven days, and the latter, at such time, was pursuing his Post Graduation in Science, so he was not capable to earn this money those days in order to get this sale deed executed. It has also been highlighted during the course of arguments that Mr. Ramesh Chand Thapliyal is the eldest among 8 brothers and sisters; presently, the plaintiff is running in his late seventies, so this can be approximately calculated that his father, at the time of sale deeds which he got executed in 1977, had touched 40 years and by that time, almost all brothers and sisters had been the part of his family. It is difficult to understand that the plaintiff, at the age of 40 years, was earning nothing and was totally dependent on the money which he received in lieu of selling his land. 16. It is difficult to understand that the plaintiff, at the age of 40 years, was earning nothing and was totally dependent on the money which he received in lieu of selling his land. 16. For a father, when he manages such an extended family, there remains myriad factors under his contemplation to settle all his progeny in a decent manner and it can never be accepted that the father of plaintiff used the same currency notes of Rs.5,000/- which he got from Smt. Bhaga Devi in order to purchase the sale deed in favour of Anusuya Prasad. 17. Even if the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel is accepted for a moment, then also, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Mr. Bhagwati Prasad might have spent something from his own earnings in order to settle the plaintiff Ramesh Chandra Thapliyal decently in his career. 18. It is an established position of law that no brother and sister can claim any ancestral right in the self-acquired property of their father out of his wishes. 19. At the time when such properties were purchased in the year 1977, plaintiff had been quite grown up and no objection was raised by him either at the time of purchase or even at the time of mutation in the concerned municipal/revenue records. Therefore, now the plaintiff is estopped to agitate the matter on such grounds. 20. Original Suit No.7 of 2001 was instituted by the plaintiff seeking injunction on the land in question, but no relief of any declaration of his ownership in the same property, was sought by him, and as has been adjudicated above that this property, in question, was never an issue in the O.S. No. 41 of 1992, that is why his suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge on 1.7.2005, and the Appeal No.16 of 2005, filed against the said dismissal order, has also been dismissed by the First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 29.11.2010. 21. Even further, the review application presented by the plaintiff against such adjudication has also met the fate of dismissal. 22. So, in view of what has been set forth above, I do not find that this appeal is even worth admission. So, the appeal is hereby dismissed at the threshold. All the substantial questions of law, as quoted above, stand answered accordingly. 23. Interim order dated 30.4.2015 is vacated. 24. 22. So, in view of what has been set forth above, I do not find that this appeal is even worth admission. So, the appeal is hereby dismissed at the threshold. All the substantial questions of law, as quoted above, stand answered accordingly. 23. Interim order dated 30.4.2015 is vacated. 24. Let a copy of this judgment along with the LCR be sent back to the court below.