JUDGMENT : A.B. Chaudhari, J. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 23.06.1994 passed by Extra Joint District Judge, Amravati in Regular Civil Appeal No. 197/1991 by which the judgment and decree dated 14.08.1991 passed by 2nd Jt. Civil Judge Junior Division, Amravati in Regular Civil Suit No. 585/1989 was set aside and the suit of the appellant-plaintiff was dismissed, the present was filed in this Court by the unsuccessful plaintiff. 2. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court, contended that the lower appellate court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court on the ground that the identity of the property was not properly proved by the appellant-plaintiff under the sale deed Exh.45 in favour of the appellant. According to Mr. Mishra, this finding is per se perverse since there was no such defence set up by the respondent-defendant in answer to the suit and on the contrary, the defence was that the suit property was bequeathed by Mahadeo, father-in-law of the defendant by Will Exh.57 dated 30.11.1983 in favour of her daughter. According to Mr. Mishra, the will Exh.57 was of no avail to the respondent for the simple reason that the suit property purchased by the appellant under the sale deed Exh.45 was the share of Motiram, which he received in the register partition deed Exh.49 and, therefore, the question of Mahadeo bequeathing the property to his granddaughter does not arise. He then submit that the transaction of sale deed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff did not have presumptive value under Section 60 of the Registration Act and, therefore, it was incumbent on the respondent-defendant to affirmatively prove by appropriate and specific pleadings that the suit property purchased by the appellant-plaintiff was not the same. But there was no pleading in that behalf in the written statement. Mr. Mishra, therefore, contend that the lower appellate Court unnecessarily recorded a finding about identity of the property which as a matter of fact and was never in dispute and, therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court deserves to be restored. 3. Per contra, Mr. P.Y. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, submit that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court about identity of the property was not shown to be perverse. According to Mr. 3. Per contra, Mr. P.Y. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, submit that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court about identity of the property was not shown to be perverse. According to Mr. Deshpande, there is a pleading about mis-description or wrong description of the suit property in the sale deed Exh.45. It was for the appellant-plaintiff to make verification about the exact details of the property sought to be purchased by the plaintiff from Motiram including the portion sought to be purchased along with correct boundaries. There is a pleading to show that the property claimed by the appellant-plaintiff, in fact, belong to Mahadeo and did not belong to Motiram, which would be sufficient to show that suit property did not belong to Motiram, the vendor of the appellant-plaintiff. All other things, according to Mr. Deshpande, are matters of evidence and reasonable inference could be drawn from the documents also. He contend that the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court is perverse and illegal. Consequently, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 4. At the time of admission of the appeal on 17.11.2003, this Court had framed following substantial question of law. "Whether the sale deed dated 15.04.1997 of survey No. 7/1 to the extent of 81 R have conferred title of Lilabai and whether Motiram was competent to enter into the transaction of sale on 15.04.1997 of the share received by him in the partition in the year 1979?" In modification of the said substantial question of law I re-frame the question as under: "(i) Whether the appellant-plaintiff prove that under the sale deed Exh.45 dated 15.04.1987, he purchased the suit property by further proving that the same, in fact, belongs to his vendor Motiram and did not belong to anybody else and, therefore, had a clear title on the suit property since Motiram had sold the share allotted to him in partition Exh.49? ......In the Negative. (ii) What order? .....As per final order." 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties for quite some time. Perused the entire documentary and oral evidence so also pleadings of the parties and reasons recorded by the Courts below and in particular those recorded by the lower appellate Court. 6. ......In the Negative. (ii) What order? .....As per final order." 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties for quite some time. Perused the entire documentary and oral evidence so also pleadings of the parties and reasons recorded by the Courts below and in particular those recorded by the lower appellate Court. 6. It is seen from the partition deed Exh.49, which is a register document that the Vendor of the appellant-plaintiff Motiram was allotted a piece of land towards North-South on the Eastern side of the consolidated property of Mahadeo, while Haridas was allotted the middle portion of the property in his share. The lower appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding in his judgment in paragraph 9 in this context. I quote paragraph 9 of the judgment which reads as under: "9. As per partition deed Exh.49, Motiram got extreme right portion i.e. astern portion of land survey no. 7/1 to the extent of 5 acres. According to plaintiff he purchased part of his share through register sale-deed dated 15.4.87. The plaintiff has not produced the original sale-deed on record but he has produced the certified true copy of the sale-deed at Exh.45. Though this sale-deed should not have been admitted in evidence the Trial Court exhibited the document as secondary evidence. In fact, it should have not been done by the trial court. Still as no objection has been raised by the defendant. I venture to look into this document for ascertaining the boundaries for the part of the land sold to Motiram. The boundaries shown in the sale-deed are as under: To the East: Remaining land of Motiram and Leelabai Ingole i.e. plaintiff, to the West: Land of Pandurang Babhunlkar, to the North: land of Ambadas Patil. Now, when the plaintiff has admitted the partition deed Exh49, partition deed shown to Motiram got eastern portion whereas P.W.1 Bhimrao had admitted that Mahadeo had got extreme portion i.e. western portion of the land survey no.7/1 whereas the middle portion has fallen to the share of Haridas which is purchased by plaintiff as per her own admission vide deposition Exh.43. Therefore, if at all Motiram would have sold his share to the extent of 81 R of land to the plaintiff to the West he should have shown either name of Haridas of the purchaser/vendee from Haridas namely P.W.1 Bhimrao or at the most Leelabai, the plaintiff, by no stretch of imagination the name of Pandurang Bhabhaulkar could have appeared to the west in the boundaries shown in the sale-deed Exh.45. Therefore, if the partition deed Exh49 if conjointly read with sale-deed Exh.45, it clearly shows Motiram did not sell his share to the plaintiff but sold some on else's share. At this juncture, the contention of defendant has to be taken into consideration whether Motiram had sold share which had fallen to the share of Mahadeo during the partition in the year 1979 and which he subsequently bequeathed as per Will Exh.57 on 28.6.1983. the defendant has specifically contend that the suit land have been bequeathed to her three daughters by deceased Mahadeo by executing will-deed in the year 1983 which is at Exh.57." 7. I have carefully compared the said finding of fact with the sale deed Exh.45 and partition deed Exh.49 to find out whether the lower appellate Court made any error and I find that the lower appellate Court has made no error in comparing the boundaries and finding out as to which portion was actually sold on Exh.45 to the plaintiff. I, therefore, concur with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court in paragraph 9. 8. The next objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no pleading for disputing identity of the property which is under Exh.45 to the appellant-plaintiff. I have, therefore, with the assistance of learned counsel for the rival parties perused the specific pleadings taken by Kamlabai in her written statement. True it is that in the pleading, there are no specific words about the dispute as to the identity of the property but then careful reading of the pleadings shows that the pleading is that the property sold by Motiram did not even belong to him but it belonged to Mahadeo after partition was effected and that Mahadeo bequeathed the property to his granddaughter. I think, no party is expected to plead evidence in the written statement and above pleading should be sufficient in the present case. I think, no party is expected to plead evidence in the written statement and above pleading should be sufficient in the present case. I, therefore, do not agree with Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant that there was total absence of pleadings. The appellant-plaintiff, at any rate made a very serious mistake in conducting the suit and the mistake is not curable. The appellant-plaintiff did not produce before the Court primary evidence namely; Exh.45 the sale deed but she produced certified copy of the register sale deed before the Court. There is noting on record to show as to the whereabouts of the original documents of sale deed or rather primary evidence. There was no application for leading secondary evidence for production of the certified copy of the register sale deed and/or for proving the same. I do not think that the certified copy of the register sale deed could be taken as admissible evidence in the absence of any explanation for loss of primary evidence or after obtaining permission to lead secondary evidence. Nothing was done. I think, this is the defect left by the plaintiff by not proving the sale deed. When the sale deed itself was not proved, the title could not be held to be proved by the appellant-plaintiff and, therefore, the above question will have to be answered in the negative. 9. To sum up, the following order will have to be passed. ORDER (i) Second Appeal No. 47 of 2000 is dismissed. (ii) No order as to costs.