JUDGMENT : P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, J. 1. The verdict passed by the Employees Insurance Court in I.C. No. 57/2009 preferred by the respondent employer, setting aside the proceedings of the appellant Corporation demanding contribution and interest for the period from 01.04.1992 to 31.10.1992 (nearly six years after declaration of the legal position by the Apex Court) holding that it is beyond reasonable time, is under challenge in this appeal. 2. The respondent is a unit of the National Textile Corporation Limited, Bangalore who in fact is a 'sick company' declared by way of appropriate proceedings, pursuant to the recommendation made by the BIFR, and was in the course of revival steps. The Government of India, as per notification dated 27.03.1992, had amended Rules 50, 51 & 54 of the ESI (Gen.) Rules, 1950 w.e.f. 01.04.1992, whereby the wage ceiling/coverage under the Act came to be raised from Rs.1600/- to Rs.3000/- per month. By virtue of the very same amendment, the rate of employers' contribution came to be reduced from 5% to 4% of the wages payable to the employees and the employees' contribution was re-fixed as 1½ %, instead of 2¼ %. The amendment was to the chagrin of both the Management and Trade unions, who sought to challenge the same by filing different petitions before this Court. O.P. No. 5743 of 1992 was a petition filed by the Alagappa Textiles Employees Union representing the employees of the establishment and by one employee by name K.R. Gopinathan, wherein an interim order of stay was passed by this Court with regard to the implementation of the notification. The O.P. was finally heard and disposed of by this Court as per common judgment dated 20.10.1992 reported in 1992 (2) KLT 910 [Tata Employees Union Vs. Union of India] repelling the challenge against the amended Rules, however, directing that the same will stand implemented only w.e.f 01.11.1992, instead of 01.04.1992. Pursuant to the said verdict, the amended provisions were implemented and contributions were being made to the extent as specified, raising the wage ceiling upto Rs.3000/- p.m., w.e.f. 01.11.1992. 3. The postponement of the date of implementation ordered by the learned Single Judge was subjected to challenge by the appellant Corporation by filing an appeal. But, interference was declined and the appeal came to be dismissed, which made the Corporation to approach the Apex Court by filing S.L.P. Nos. 18897 – 920/1994. 3. The postponement of the date of implementation ordered by the learned Single Judge was subjected to challenge by the appellant Corporation by filing an appeal. But, interference was declined and the appeal came to be dismissed, which made the Corporation to approach the Apex Court by filing S.L.P. Nos. 18897 – 920/1994. After hearing, the Apex Court, as per order dated 21.04.1995, held that the above notification should be implemented w.e.f 01.04.1992 itself. 4. Pursuant to the above verdict passed by the Supreme Court, the appellant Corporation issued notice dated 18.09.2000, demanding contribution and interest in respect of the category of employees for the period from 01.04.1992 to 31.10.1992. Clarification was sought for by the respondent, as to the course and proceedings, particularly since they were not aware of the proceedings before the Apex Court. On receipt of the said letter, the Corporation issued reply dated 16.02.2001, enclosing a copy of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court and requiring the respondent establishment to comply with the requirement/demand. Thereupon, a specific letter dated 26.02.2001 was issued by the respondent, seeking to inform whether the judgment dated 20.10.1992 in O.P. No. 5743 of 1992 passed by this Court was the subject matter of challenge before the Supreme Court, in response to which, the appellant Corporation, as per letter dated 30.05.2001, informed that they would confirm the position, after ascertaining the same from the Head Quarters at New Delhi. More than 2 years after this communication, the appellant sent letter dated 14.10.2003, informing the respondent that all the judgments passed by this Court, including the one in the Writ Appeal were subjected to challenge before the Apex Court and they came to be reversed by the Apex Court in the verdict passed in Employees State Insurance Corporation Vs. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation, (1994) 1 SCC 268 : 1994 SCC (L & S) 516 and hence that the respondent/employer was liable to meet the demand. Some other correspondences were also there in between, followed by the notices dated 08.12.2003 and 11.12.2003, demanding a total sum of Rs.14,33,886/- towards contribution and interest. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation, (1994) 1 SCC 268 : 1994 SCC (L & S) 516 and hence that the respondent/employer was liable to meet the demand. Some other correspondences were also there in between, followed by the notices dated 08.12.2003 and 11.12.2003, demanding a total sum of Rs.14,33,886/- towards contribution and interest. This was sought to be challenged by the respondent establishment before the Insurance Court; mainly contending that the demand was barred by the proviso to Section 77 (1A) (b) of the ESI Act, also pointing out that the company was under the revival Scheme sanctioned by BIFR and there was no justification for demanding the contribution and interest, after long lapse of years. 5. The claim was resisted by the appellant Corporation contending that ESI Act did not provide for limitation for recovery of contribution due from the Employer and that the limitation prescribed under Section 77 was applicable only to an application filed before the Court seeking for Court's interference, which in fact was not applicable to a proceeding/recovery by way of permissible coercive steps by the Corporation itself. The Insurance Court placing reliance on the decision rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation Vs. Excel Glasses Limited reported in 2003 (3) KLT 42 held that the proceedings were barred by limitation. This was sought to be challenged by filing an appeal before this Court and the matter was pending consideration. 6. While so, on being aggrieved by the verdict passed by the Full Bench of this Court in Excel Glasses's case (cited supra) and the verdicts passed under similar circumstances, the Corporation had sought to challenge the same by filing necessary proceedings before the Supreme Court. After a threadbare analysis of the relevant provisions of law, the Apex Court as per the judgment reported in 2007 (1) KLT 133 (Employees State Insruance Corporation Vs. Santhakumar) held that the proviso to clause (b) to Section 77 (1A) fixing the period of 5 years for raising a claim by the Corporation will apply only in respect of the claim made by the Corporation before the ESI Court and that it will not have any bearing or significance to the adjudication proceedings of the Corporation under Section 45A and recovery steps under Section 45B of the Act. On bringing the position to the notice of this Court (where the challenge against the order passed by the Employees Insurance Court is in favour of the respondent was pending), the matter was remanded for fresh consideration, particularly since there was an observation by Apex Court in 2007 (1) KLT 133 (cited supra) that even though Limitation Act was not applicable, the steps had to be pursued within the reasonable period and the reasonable period would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 7. Pursuant to the remand, the matter was reconsidered by the Employees' Insurance Court and after making a reference to the pleadings and evidence on record, it was held that the legal position was made clear by the Apex Court years back and no demand was raised by the Corporation till 18.09.2000. Referring to the sequence of events, the Employees Insurance Court held that the proceedings initiated and sought to be pursued by the Corporation were much beyond reasonable time, and as such, the impugned proceedings were set aside as per order dated 09.11.2009, which in turn is under challenge in this appeal. 8. Heard Mr. T.V. Ajayakumar, the learned standing counsel for the appellant Corporation and Mr. E.K. Madhavan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in detail. We have gone through the relevant judgments as well. 9. Admittedly, the dispute is in respect of the contribution for the period from 01.04.1992 to 31.10.1992 and interest payable thereon. It is also not in dispute that the interim stay was granted by this Court in O.P. No. 5742 of 1992 preferred by one of the Trade Unions of the establishment as to the implementation of the notification from 01.04.1992 till the O.P. was disposed of as per judgment dated 20.10.1992, whereby the challenge against raising the wage ceiling was repelled, however directing that implementation shall only be from 01.11.1992, instead of 01.04.1992. The said judgment was affirmed by a Division Bench, which however came to be set aside only as per the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in SLP Nos. 18897-920 of 1994 on 21.04.1995. The said judgment was affirmed by a Division Bench, which however came to be set aside only as per the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in SLP Nos. 18897-920 of 1994 on 21.04.1995. By virtue of the interim order passed by this Court in the original petition and stipulation in the final verdict (which came to be set aside by the Supreme Court only on 21.04.1995), the respondent employer was not in a position to have the notification implemented w.e.f 01.04.1992 and could not have collected any contribution for the disputed period. It is also relevant to note that, pursuant to the judgment passed by this Court, the notification was implemented from 01.04.1992 as ordered and the contribution was being effected accordingly. There is also no case for the appellant Corporation that, any order was passed or any demand was raised by them in respect of the disputed contribution and interest at any time before and even much after the verdict passed by the Supreme Court on 21.04.1995, till demand was raised for first time as per the notice dated 18.09.2000. 10. Another important aspect to be noted is that, in the verdict passed by the Supreme Court in Santhakumar's case (cited supra), the declaration made by the Supreme Court is only to the effect that prescription of limitation of 5 years under proviso to Clause (b) to Section 77 (1A) cannot be read into Section 45A conferring right upon the Corporation to determine the claim and in turn right of recovery under Section 45B. There is a strong contention for the respondent that it was never a case involving Section 45A, in so far as no need, necessity, or occasion was there for the Corporation to have passed any order under Section 45A; nor is there any order under Section 45A. That apart, when the Supreme Court declared the law that limitation under Section 77 (1A) (b) will apply only to a proceeding before the ESI Court and same will not be applicable to a proceeding under Sections 45A and 45B, it was also alerted as per the very same decision, that even under the said circumstances, the proceedings have to be initiated within a reasonable time. It was accordingly, that the law declared by the Full Bench of this Court in Excel Glasses's case (cited supra) was held as not correct, while endorsing the view taken by the Madras High Court as the correct one (as held in paragraph 32) and proceeded to consider the question whether the concept of 'reasonable time' can be read into the provision, even though not specifically provided for (paragraph 33). After making a reference to the verdicts of the Apex Court in Hindustan Times Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 242 , Collector & Ors. Vs. V.P. Managamma & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 488 , Veerayee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 and Joseph Severance Vs. Benny Mathew, (2005) 7 SCC 667 , besides making a reference to the commentary/Advanced Law Lexicon (by P. Ramanath Iyer 3rd Edition 2005), the Court observed that the expression 'reasonable time' would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case concerned and there cannot be any empirical formula to determine the same. But one thing was made clear, that some sort of certainty/finality had to be there and as such, it had to satisfy the test of reasonable time. It was accordingly, that the matters were disposed of, without examining the factual aspects involved in the concerned cases, giving appropriate direction as contained in paragraph 41 which reads as follows:- “41. In the circumstances we dispose of all these appeals with the following directions: (1) The employers shall move the E.S.I. Court within a period of two months, if not already done; (2) They shall deposit 25% of the amount claimed with the E.S.I Court along with the application in terms of Sections 75 & 76 of the Act before the E.S.I. Court. (3) The E.S.I. Court shall determine the quantum of contribution, if any, payable and consider the question as to whether demands were raised within a reasonable period of time or not after considering the question of prejudice, if any, for the delayed action taken by the Corporation. (4) The approach of the E.S.I. Court and the Authorities should be that of a watch dog and not of a blood hound, even though the legislation is a beneficial one. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. (4) The approach of the E.S.I. Court and the Authorities should be that of a watch dog and not of a blood hound, even though the legislation is a beneficial one. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Appeals are accordingly disposed of but without any order as to costs. 11. Testing the factual position in the instant case, in the light of the law declared by the Apex Court as above, it has to be ascertained whether the proceedings initiated by the appellant Corporation as per notice dated 18.09.2000 for recovering the contribution and interest for the disputed period between 01.04.1992 to 31.10.1992 is within the reasonable time or not. As mentioned already, though the liability to pay contribution and interest is statutory, the respondent/employer was not in a position to do the same by virtue of the interim order of stay passed by a Single Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 5743 of 1992 and the declaration given as per the final verdict to the effect that notification could be implemented only from 01.11.1992. The position continued till the same was varied by the Apex Court as per the judgment dated 21.04.1995 in the concerned SLPs. As such, it cannot be said that there was any failure on the part of the respondent in this regard. By virtue of declaration of law made by the Apex Court that the notification had to be implemented w.e.f. 01.04.1992, further proceedings ought to have been initiated and finalized by the Corporation within a 'reasonable time'. The fact remains that the first move from the part of the Corporation in this regard, especially when there was no order under Section 45A, was only as per the notice dated 18.09.2000 i.e. nearly six years after passing the judgment by the Supreme Court in the SLPs. Absolutely no reason has been stated anywhere, either before the Insurance Court or in this appeal, as to the compelling circumstance, if any, or to the administrative exigency in keeping the proceeding in cold storage for nearly six years. The proceedings initiated by the Corporation after about six years, despite passing the final verdict by the Apex Court as early as on 21.04.1995, comes as a matter revelation, which cannot be said as done within reasonable time. The proceedings initiated by the Corporation after about six years, despite passing the final verdict by the Apex Court as early as on 21.04.1995, comes as a matter revelation, which cannot be said as done within reasonable time. The finding and reasoning given by the Employees Insurance court is well based on the actual facts and figures and adequately supported by reasons. Absolutely no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, has been raised by the appellant to sustain an appeal under Section 82 of the Act. Appeal fails and the same is dismissed accordingly.