JUDGMENT : P. KALAIYARASAN, J. This Original Side Appeal is directed against the Order, dated 22.03.2013 passed by the learned single Judge in O.P.No.432 of 2010 dismissing the O.P, thereby confirming the Award, dated 26.11.2009 passed by the majority of the Arbitrators. 2. The brief facts leading to the present Original Side Appeal are as follows : (i) The appellant/claimant is the Port Trust of Chennai constituted under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963. The first respondent/counter claimant/contractor was originally incorporated as M/s. Mukund McNally Wellman Ltd., and subsequently changed the name and is now renamed as M/s. Metso Minerals (India) Pvt., Ltd., In order to develop the infrastructure facilities of the Port, the claimant invited tenders to install 3 Nos of Gantry Cranes at Jawahar Dock. The first respondent was selected among the participants and an order was placed with the respondent on 15.02.1996, for the design, manufacture, supply, erection, commissioning and handing over of 3 Nos. 20T Granty Cranes. (ii) An agreement, dated 29.08.1996 was entered into between the parties. As per the terms of the contract, the completion period of the project was 24 months from the date of approval of the "General Arrangements Drawings" by the claimant. On 06.06.1996, the claimant approved the drawings submitted by the first respondent. Accordingly, the first respondent should have supplied, erected, tested, commissioned and handed over the 3 Nos. Cranes on or before 06.06.1998. But the respondent did not adhere to the schedule. The first crane was commissioned on 25.03.2000 and the second and third crane was commissioned on 14.12.2000, i.e., after a lapse of two and half years with so many defects and shortfall of spares. (iii) By series of letters, the claimant requested the respondent to expedite the commissioning of the cranes. Due to improper planning, the commissioning of the cranes were much delayed and as a result thereof, the claimant was put to great hardship and loss. The first respondent failed and neglected to rectify the defects indicated by the claimant and the cranes could not be put into operation in toto due to safety regulations and other reasons. Since the first respondent did not turn up to rectify the defects pointed out by the claimant, the claimant got the defects rectified by investing Rs.365.89 lakhs. The first respondent failed and neglected to rectify the defects indicated by the claimant and the cranes could not be put into operation in toto due to safety regulations and other reasons. Since the first respondent did not turn up to rectify the defects pointed out by the claimant, the claimant got the defects rectified by investing Rs.365.89 lakhs. Since the first respondent did not rectify the defects as per contractual obligations, the claimant encashed the Bank Guarantee of Rs.135 lakhs under intimation to the first respondent. (iv) Since the payment has been made to the first respondent in instalments, there was excess payment of Rs.37.36 lakhs, which was in excess of the 90% entitled amount under Clause 12. Therefore, the claimant made a total claim of Rs.371.85 lakhs under the heads of amount paid in excess, cost incurred for rectification of defects and liquidated damages. (v) The first respondent made a counter claim denying the claimant's allegations. The claimant had not provided sufficient site and storage space and therefore, the Civil work had not progressed on site. Though the first respondent had adequate man power to commence the erection of first and second crane simultaneously it could not be done due to space constraint. For movement of the heavy materials of crane without interruption, the claimant was requested to stop the traffic in the said road, but it was not immediately stopped and therefore, the delay in transportation of material was caused. Due to shortage of power supply of 3.3 KV, the first respondent could not proceed with the work of internal checks, trial and load testing for cranes 2 and 3. (vi) As per the contract, adequate electricity, storage space with a clear site were necessary for commissioning the three cranes simultaneously. For want of these requirements, the first respondent had to erect the three cranes at different times, which has resulted 30 to 40% over-run in time. The alleged defects in the cranes were vexatious. Therefore, the first respondent prays for rejection of the claim. (vii) The first respondent has made counter claim (a) claiming for payment of retention amount of 10% of contract price; (b) additional claim due to prolongation of the project including the escalation charges on account of the delay attributable to the claimant; (c) Refund of balance amount against two invoices, dated 30.06.1999; and (d) Refund of Bank Guarantee. 3. (vii) The first respondent has made counter claim (a) claiming for payment of retention amount of 10% of contract price; (b) additional claim due to prolongation of the project including the escalation charges on account of the delay attributable to the claimant; (c) Refund of balance amount against two invoices, dated 30.06.1999; and (d) Refund of Bank Guarantee. 3. After analysing the terms of the contract and the materials placed before the Arbitrators, the majority of the Arbitrators passed the Award, directing the claimant to pay to the first respondent the balance amount receivable by the first respondent under the contract, the Bank Guarantee encashed by the claimant and also to pay the interest at the rate of 9% p.a. 4. Aggrieved by the Award, the claimant preferred O.P.No.432 of 2010 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned single Judge, after analysing the divergent contentions of both sides dismissed the O.P. Against the order of the learned single Judge, the claimant has now come forward with this present Original Side Appeal. 5. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant contends that the Arbitrators have not decided in terms of the contract and they deviated from the terms of the contract. It is further contended that the erection and commission of 2nd and 3rd cranes were not done as per the said terms of the contract and the delay is attributable only to the first respondent. It is also further contended that completion certification from the claimant is to be obtained as per the terms of the contract and the same has not been given and defects in the cranes were also not rectified by the first respondent. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously argued that Arbitrators passed the Award without appreciating various Clauses of contract and without considering vital evidence and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 6. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the first respondent per contra contends that when the view of the Arbitrators is plausible, the same cannot be interfered with by the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the learned Arbitrators after analysing the materials placed before them held that the time is not essence of the contract as per the terms and passed the Award in terms of contract between the parties. It is also contended that the learned single Judge has also after analysing the divergent contentions of both the parties and after perusal of all materials, rightly dismissed the O.P, confirming the Award and the same does not require any interference. 7. The Award of an Arbitral Tribunal can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The main arguments of the appellant in this case is that the learned Arbitrators deviated from the terms of the contract and the Award is also not based on the vital evidence. 8. As per Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an Arbitral Award may be set aside by the Court if the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. It is trite law that fundamental policy of Indian Law consists three distinct and fundamental juristic principles namely (1) Judicial approach; (2) Audi Alteram partem and (3) perversity. 9. It is also settled law that where (i) a finding is based on no evidence or (ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at or (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be perverse, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders case [ (2015) 3 SCC 49 ]. 10. Under Section 34 (2) (A), an Arbitral Award may also be set aside by the Court if the Award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the Award. Principle of patent illegality contains 3 sub-heads (i) an Award in contravention of the substantive law of India; (ii) an Award in contravention of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act itself (Section 31(3) of the Act) and (iii) an Award in contravention of the terms of the contract (Section 28 (3) of the Act). 11. Thus according to Section 34 of the Act, if the award is found to be perverse or patently illegal, the same is liable to be set aside by the Court. 12. 11. Thus according to Section 34 of the Act, if the award is found to be perverse or patently illegal, the same is liable to be set aside by the Court. 12. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the first respondent cited the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc v. Burn Standard Co., Ltd., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 and contented that if the view of the Arbitrator in interpreting the terms of the contract is plausible and the finding is not perverse, the Court cannot interfere by reappraising the evidence as if it be an appellate forum. In the Judgment it has been held as follows : "52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it. .... .... .... 111. In State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions [ (2003) 7 SCC 396 ] this Court held: (SCC p. 398, para 4) “4. Any award made by an arbitrator can be set aside only if one or the other term specified in Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is attracted. It is not a case where it can be said that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings. It was within his jurisdiction to interpret clause 47 of the agreement having regard to the fact-situation obtaining therein. It is submitted that an award made by an arbitrator may be wrong either on law or on fact and error of law on the face of it could not nullify an award. The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine (see Sudarsan Trading Co. The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine (see Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala [ (1989) 2 SCC 38 ]). Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference therewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering (see U.P. SEB v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd. [ (2001) 3 SCC 397 ] and Ispat Engg. & Foundry Works v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [ (2001) 6 SCC 347 ]).” 112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [ (2003) 8 SCC 593 ] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [ (2004) 5 SCC 325 ].)” 13. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [ (2003) 8 SCC 593 ] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [ (2004) 5 SCC 325 ].)” 13. Let this Court analyse the contention of the appellant as to the deviation of the terms of the contract and perverse finding of the learned Arbitrators, bearing the above provisions of law and principles in mind. 14. It is relevant to mention the following Clauses in the contract between the parties : Special condition of supply under Schedule - B : Clause 2 - The equipment shall be supplied, assembled and demonstrated within the Trust's premises and handed over not later than 24 months from the date of receipt of order, i.e., by 14.2.98. If the contractor fails to complete the supply in all respects within the period specified or within such extended period as may be allowed by the Chief Mechanical Engineer, the Contractor, shall pay or allow to the Board a sum equivalent to 1/2% of the value of the unfulfilled portion (each crane) of the contract price per week (7 days) or part thereof subject to maximum limit of 5% the value of the unfulfilled portion of the contract as liquidated damages and not by way of penalty for every week or part thereof beyond the said period of extended period as the case may be during which the wharf crane shall remain not supplied erected and commissioned completely, such damages shall be deducted by the Board from any moneys due or to become due to the Contractor. Clause 24(i) The Chief Mechanical Engineer shall issue a certificate after the trials are completed satisfactorily which alone shall be the proof of acceptance of the plant. If the performance of the plant/equipment is not satisfactory, the same are to be re-adjusted, replaced or changed as per the directions of the Chief Mechanical Engineer and his decision alone shall be final and binding on the Contractor. The representative of the contractor should also be present at such test. If the performance of the plant/equipment is not satisfactory, the same are to be re-adjusted, replaced or changed as per the directions of the Chief Mechanical Engineer and his decision alone shall be final and binding on the Contractor. The representative of the contractor should also be present at such test. (ii) As soon as the supply and acceptance of the plant/equipments is completed the Chief Mechanical Engineer shall grant a certificate of delivery and granting of such certificate shall alone be evidence of the delivery of the equipments and the date thereof. Technical Specification : Clause 20.0 - Guarantee : 20.1. The equipment shall be guaranteed for trouble free (excluding brake down hours) working for a period of 12 (twelve) months excluding breakdown hours from the date of acceptance, free of all manufacturing defects and/or bad workmanship including replacement of parts damages (excepting due to wear and tear) and repair. The period of 12 months shall exclude the period during which the equipment would be put out of commission due to manufacturing defects and/or bad workmanship. Tenders site representative shall be informed of any repair/replacement who shall arrange for expeditious repairs/replacements. 21.0 Acceptance : 21.1 The crane shall be tested and accepted by the Madras Port Trust within 7 days after completion of erection in all respect. However test load/loaded container shall be arranged by the Port Authorities. 15. There is no dispute that as per the contract, all the three cranes should have been erected, commissioned and handed over on or before 06.06.1998. There was delay in erection, commission and handing over of three cranes. The first crane was commissioned on 25.03.2000; the second and the third crane on 14.12.2000. 16. The appellant/claimant mainly based their claim of liquidated damages, encashment of Bank Guarantee etc., on the ground that the claimant sustained loss due to the delayed erection and commission of the cranes by the first respondent contrary to the terms of the contract. The first respondent contended that the delay in erection and commission of the cranes was occasioned for want of storage space, movement restriction due to heavy traffic in the port, delay in approval of drawing and non-laying of rail track by the Port Trust Authority. 17. It is also well settled that while interpreting the terms of the contract, subsequent communications between the parties are also to be taken into account. 17. It is also well settled that while interpreting the terms of the contract, subsequent communications between the parties are also to be taken into account. The drawing was approved by the Port Trust on 06.06.1996. As per Clause 2 of the special conditions of the contract, the contract is to be completed not later than 24 months and therefore, the period of contract comes to an end on 06.06.1998. The above said Clause 2 of the contract further provides for liquidated damages, for failure of erection and commission of the cranes within the stipulated period or within the extended period if any. According to the first respondent, delay occurred only for the reasons attributable to the appellant/ claimant and the time was impliedly extended. In other words, they contend that time is not essence of the contract. The first respondent in its letter addressed to the Port Trust in November 1998 (Ex.C.21) pointed out that Civil works had not been started even in April-May 1997 and the civil work would have taken between 9 to 10 months for completion and they are compelled to delay the start up of erection to March 1998. Thus the work site was not made ready for executing the work as per the contract. Rails as per the contract was not laid by the Port Trust as per Clause 4 of the contract. Admittedly, there was heavy traffic in the Port Trust, which also led to post pone the work. 18. No doubt there was several correspondence from the appellant after erection of the cranes in March 2000 and December 2000 requiring the first respondent to rectify the defects and also about the delay. In one letter, the appellant even informed that if the first respondent fails to rectify, the contract itself will be terminated (Exs.C.27, C.28, C.32, C.34 and subsequent letters). The point as to the rectification of defects will be discussed later. 19. The learned Arbitrators after considering the materials as to the delayed furnishing of the drawings, insufficient storage space, the fact that the work site was not ready and rail length was not provided and also the fact that adequate power supply was not provided, held that time is not the essence of the contract. 19. The learned Arbitrators after considering the materials as to the delayed furnishing of the drawings, insufficient storage space, the fact that the work site was not ready and rail length was not provided and also the fact that adequate power supply was not provided, held that time is not the essence of the contract. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant having accepted the work performed by the first respondent issued the performance certificate as per the terms of contract. Therefore, the interpretation as to the time limit fixed in the terms of contract has been rightly done by the learned Arbitrators. 20. As per Clause 21, the crane shall be tested and accepted by the Madras Port Trust within 7 days from completion of erection in all respect. As per Clause 24, the Chief Mechanical Engineer shall issue a certificate after the trials are completed satisfactorily which alone shall be the proof of the acceptance of the plant. As per Clause 24 (ii) as soon as the supply and acceptance of the plant/equipments is completed the Chief Mechanical Engineer shall grant a certificate of delivery and granting of such certificate shall alone be evidence of the delivery of the equipments and the date thereof. The Chief Mechanical Engineer shall issue a final completion certificate after completion of 12 months of guarantee period from the date of the above said acceptance. The Chief Mechanical Engineer issued performance certificate for one crane on 08.08.2000 [Ex.D.14 (b)] and another performance certificate, dated 29.11.2000 for two cranes [Ex.D.14 (a)]. 21. The performance certificate, dated 08.08.2000 reads thus : "Out of the e cranes ordered, 1 No. crane has been fully erected, commissioned, tested and handed over to Trust on 27.03.2000. In view of the non-availability of berth, the crane could not be put into use. The firm has supplied the balance 2 cranes in knocked down condition and the erection of the same has been completed. In view of continuous handling of coal the berth, HT Power Supply to the cranes could not be arranged by the Trust. After provision of Power Supply, the crane is likely to be commissioned in about one month. The firm has supplied the balance 2 cranes in knocked down condition and the erection of the same has been completed. In view of continuous handling of coal the berth, HT Power Supply to the cranes could not be arranged by the Trust. After provision of Power Supply, the crane is likely to be commissioned in about one month. The performance of the cranes can be furnished only after the cranes are become operational for a minimum period of 3 months." The Performance Certificate, dated 29.11.2000 reads thus : "Out of the 3 cranes ordered, two cranes have been fully erected, commissioned and tested. Due to the non-availability of berth, the crane could not be put into use. The balance 1 No. crane has been fully erected and no load trials have been completed. In view of continuous handling of coal at the berth, the load test could not be carried out by the Trust. The load test is likely to be completed by the end of next week. The performance of the crane can be furnished only after the cranes are put into operation for a minimum period of 3 months." 22. As per the above mentioned Clause 21, within 7 days after completion of erection, Port Trust shall test and accept the crane. The above performance certificates have also been issued by the Port Trust for all the three cranes. Ex.D.22 is the letter, dated 27.10.2001 addressed by the Chief Mechanical Engineer, Chennai Port Trust to the Chief Mechanical Engineer, Vishakapatnam Port Trust. This letter relates to the sale of the above said three cranes. In this it has been specifically stated that the cranes are in good working condition. 23. It is also to be noted that even as per Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been delivered to him. If the purchaser retains the goods without rejecting the same and without intimating the seller that he rejects the same will amount to acceptance of the same. Therefore, in this case, the appellant/ claimant after receipt of the cranes had also issued certificate, as per the terms of the contract and also proceeded to sell the same to Vishakapatnam Port Trust. Therefore, in this case, the appellant/ claimant after receipt of the cranes had also issued certificate, as per the terms of the contract and also proceeded to sell the same to Vishakapatnam Port Trust. Having done so, it is to be concluded that the appellant/claimant accepted the erection and commissioning of the three cranes, as per the contract. Though the appellant contended that the Port Trust spent huge amount to rectify the defects, no proof was produced before the Arbitrators. Therefore, the Arbitrators have rightly rejected the claims of the appellant. 24. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the learned Arbitrators failed to consider the vital evidence of Ex.D.26, wherein the appellant had brought to the notice of the first respondent, the defects on the pending issues. 25. Under Ex.D.26 and Ex.D.29, dated 24.05.2005 and 31.05.2005, the appellant - Port Trust sent the list of defects to the first respondent. Even on 26.12.2001, the respondent sent to the Port Trust about the completion of the work noting down the pending points under Ex.C.45. The above letter of the first respondent was sent after issuance of the performance certificates by the Port Trust and also after taking steps for the sale of the cranes. To the above letter addressed by the first respondent in December 2001, there was no response and in May 2005, the above two letters were sent by the appellant. The learned Arbitrators considered the above fact and decided the issue. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that vital evidence has been left out and therefore, the Award is perverse cannot be accepted. 26. As per Section 31 (7) (a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Arbitral Tribunal may fix the interest at such rate as it deems reasonable for the whole or in part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Therefore, the Arbitrators has rightly fixed the interest at 9% p.a. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Arbitrators passed the Award in terms of the contract and there is no perversity in the findings. Therefore, the Arbitrators has rightly fixed the interest at 9% p.a. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Arbitrators passed the Award in terms of the contract and there is no perversity in the findings. The learned single Judge has rightly dismissed the O.P, which does not require any interference and accordingly, this Original Side Appeal is liable to be dismissed. In fine, this Original Side Appeal is dismissed, confirming the Order of the learned single Judge, dated 22.03.2013 made in O.P.No.432 of 2010. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.