JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel and perused the record. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 19.01.2012 and 17.05.2007 passed by opposite party no.2/Additional Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda as contained in Annexure Nos.1 and 2 to the writ petition. 3. Facts in brief of the present case are that initially, father of opposite party nos.4 to 7 filed a suit for partition under Section 176 of U. P. Z. A. Act, ex-parte allowed by order dated 11.11.1987 passed by opposite party no.3. When the petitioners came to know about the said order, he filed an application for restoration of order dated 11.11.1987 before the opposite party no.3, rejected by order dated 18.10.1998. 4. Aggrieved by the order dated 18.10.1998, petitioners filed an appeal bearing Appeal No.297/2001 under Section 331 of U. P. L. R. Act before the opposite party no.2, which was dismissed in default on 17.04.1989. 5. Thereafter, they moved an application for restoration of the order dated 17.04.1989, which was dismissed in default on 11.09.1995. Again, they moved an application for restoration of the order dated 11.09.1995, which was again dismissed in default on 13.09.1999. 6. Lastly, they moved an application for restoration of the order dated 13.09.1999, allowed by order dated 29.12.2000 passed by opposite party no.1 and orders dated 13.09.1999, 11.09.1995 and 17.04.1989 were setting aside and appeal was restored to its original number. 7. Thereafter, when the matter came up for consideration before the opposite party no.2, on 17.05.2007, he dismissed the matter for want of prosecution. Consequently, against the said order, petitioners on 23.06.2011moved an application for restoration, rejected by order dated 19.01.2012. 8. In view of the above said facts, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for redressal of their grievances before this Court. 9. On 30.03.2012, this court passed an order thereby issuing notice to the opposite party nos.4 to 7. 10. In response to the same, office has submitted a report dated 28.02.2013 that service on opposite party no.6 is sufficient and as per Chapter VIII Rule 12 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, service of opposite party nos.4 and 5 are also sufficient. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 12. 10. In response to the same, office has submitted a report dated 28.02.2013 that service on opposite party no.6 is sufficient and as per Chapter VIII Rule 12 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, service of opposite party nos.4 and 5 are also sufficient. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 12. Admittedly, in the present case, once by order dated 29.12.2000 passed by opposite party no.1, orders dated 13.09.1999, 11.09.1995 and 17.04.1989 were setting aside and appeal was restored to its original number, then there is no justification on the part of opposite party no.2 to dismiss the case by means of order dated 17.05.2007 with the finding that application for recall of the order dated 13.09.1999 is pending and nobody is taking interest in the matter, rather the said finding is contrary to the material on record. Thereafter, against the said order, petitioners moved an application for restoration, which was also dismissed by order dated 19.01.2012. 13. Taking into consideration the said facts as well as the settled proposition of law that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the way should be given to substantial justice. In the case of Manoharan vs. Sivarajan and others 2014 (122) RD 285, Hon'ble the Apex Court held as under : - "When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab (1995)6 SCC 614 this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. In N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed in 2008(228) ELT 162(SC) : It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay.In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court." 14. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 19.01.2012 and 17.05.2007 passed by opposite party no.2/Additional Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda is liable to be set aside. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 19.01.2012 and 17.05.2007 passed by opposite party no.2/Additional Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda is set aside. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 19.01.2012 and 17.05.2007 passed by opposite party no.2/Additional Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda is liable to be set aside. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 19.01.2012 and 17.05.2007 passed by opposite party no.2/Additional Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the said authority to decide the appeal after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. The said exercise will be done within a period of six months from the date of receiving a certified copy of this order.