JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner. This review application has been preferred alleging errors in the judgment dated 2.2.2016. 2. This matter was heard by us on 7.12.2016 and we passed the following order calling upon the learned counsel to assist the Court on the issues so raised : “Heard Sri H.G.S. Parihar learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra for the petitioner. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Bench which disposed of the matter finally on 2.2.2016 also went on to delve into the issue of the writ petition being not maintainable on account of withdrawal of the suit. According to the learned counsel the withdrawal of the suit was an issue which had already been decided as a preliminary issue vide order dated 29.10.2015. In view of this it is urged that there is an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the issue which has been finally decided and the preliminary objection of non-maintainability of the writ petition has been rejected, the same could not have been a subject-matter of decision afresh while delivering the final judgment. It has been pointed out that the application which was moved by the applicant for withdrawing the suit is Annexure 2 to the supplementary-affidavit filed by the petitioner dated 11.8.2015 and the order that was passed thereon is appended as Annexure CA-1 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Life Insurance Corporation. A perusal of the said application indicates that the application was moved seeking permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit as some aspects of the dispute had been left over to be incorporated in the plaint. The said application for withdrawal was partly allowed granting permission to withdraw the suit but the prayer to file a fresh suit was declined categorically on the ground that no such material was available so as to grant that permission. From the record it is evident that the punishment order against the applicant had been passed on 2.5.2006 against which the petitioner had submitted a memorial in 2007 that was finally disposed of rejecting the same on 6.2.2009. From the record it is evident that the punishment order against the applicant had been passed on 2.5.2006 against which the petitioner had submitted a memorial in 2007 that was finally disposed of rejecting the same on 6.2.2009. Thus, the said order was very much in existence when the application for withdrawing the suit was filed on 20.2.2010 and the order was passed on 19.3.2010. It is on these principles that the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 read with the relevant decisions in this regard have to be taken into account to ascertain the final outcome and impact of the aforesaid application and the withdrawal of the suit so as to construe the abandonment of the claim or allowing its continuance through the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the matter be taken up tomorrow to address the Court on this issue. Put up tomorrow.” 3. The issue relates to the punishment of the petitioner, vide order dated 2.5.2006 whereby he was awarded a penalty reducing him to the minimum pay scale payable in the cadre of Development Officers of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Against the punishment order, the petitioner preferred an appeal that was dismissed on 18.1.2007 and a memorium filed against the appellate order was also rejected on 6.2.2009. Prior to the rejection of memorium, the petitioner had filed a Regular Suit No. 828 of 2008 assailing his order of punishment as well as the appellate order. During the pendency of the suit, the memorium filed against the appellate order, came to be rejected on 6.2.2009. 4. In the background of the aforesaid development, the petitioner moved an application for withdrawal of Regular Suit No. 828 of 2008. A copy of the said application has been filed with the supplementary-affidavit dated 11.8.2015 filed by the petitioner as Annexure SA-2 therein. 5. A perusal of the said application indicates that the petitioner had stated that since certain important issues had been left out inadvertently from being raised while drafting the plaint, therefore, an amendment was required to be carried out and which was not possible by way of an amendment in the existing plaint as such the plaintiff petitioner should be permitted to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. This application dated 20/22.2.2010 was taken up by the Court on 19.3.2010 but while allowing the application of the petitioner plaintiff to withdraw the suit, the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Unnao clearly observed that no material was placed before the Court so as to grant liberty or permission to the plaintiff petitioner to file a fresh suit. This part of the request was accordingly rejected by the aforesaid order dated 19.3.2010. It is noteworthy to mention that by that time admittedly, the memorium had been rejected on 6.2.2009 and no plea for amendment of the suit challenging the said order or any other relief was claimed in the suit which could have been claimed or ought to have been claimed in the suit itself. To the contrary, a plain and simple application was filed in February, 2010 as indicated above, to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. Such fact also does not appear to have been placed before the Trial Court informing it about the existence of such a contingency or expressing any desire to challenge the order dated 6.2.2009. 6. It is thereafter, that the present writ petition was filed and the respondent Corporation took a plea that there is a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable as the petitioner who was a plaintiff in the suit, had abandoned his claim inasmuch as, after the Court having refused permission to file a fresh suit, the petitioner did not challenge the order dated 19.3.2010 either by way of a revision or even before this Court in the present writ petition. Thus, in view of the aforesaid position that emerges the present writ petition cannot be entertained for the same cause of action that was available to the petitioner in the suit that was dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh suit. 7. A Division Bench of this took notice of the aforesaid preliminary objection and relying on the decision in the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 7 SCC 166 , and after considering the judgment cited on behalf of the respondent in the case of Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 625 , rejected the preliminary objection by the following order dated 29.10.2015 : “Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Sri P.K.Khare, learned Counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the petitioner as against the cause of action which is the subject-matter of present writ petition had previously filed a civil suit before the Civil Court praying for the same relief under the same set of facts and circumstances which suit was subsequently withdrawn before filing of the present writ petition. The preliminary objection against maintainability of the writ petition is pressed on the strength of Order XXIII Rule 1 read with Order 2 Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure. The facts in brief for disposal of the preliminary objection are that the petitioner on the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings was subjected to punishment vide order dated 2.5.2006 against which the petitioner filed an appeal which was decided against him by order dated 18.8.2007. The petitioner feeling aggrieved filed a civil suit before the Civil Court assailing the said orders and simultaneously a memorial was also filed by him under Regulation-49 of the Staff Regulations 1960 and the said memorial came to be rejected by the competent authority by order dated 6.2.2009. The order passed on the memorial not being subject-matter of the civil suit, therefore, the petitioner filed an application for withdrawal of civil suit wherein liberty to file fresh suit was prayed for. The Civil Court by order dated 19.3.2010 allowed the application and suit was allowed to be withdrawn but the liberty for approaching the Civil Court afresh was not granted. It is in the above circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the impugned order of punishment as upheld by the appellate authority coupled with the order passed on the memorial. The submission advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner before us is that after the liberty being refused by the Civil Court to file a civil suit afresh, the petitioner in a situation of rejection of his memorial by the competent authority is rendered remedediless, therefore, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be barred. On the contrary, Sri P.K. Khare, learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioner against the refusal of liberty to file a fresh suit has a remedy of revision under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure but the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable. On the contrary, Sri P.K. Khare, learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioner against the refusal of liberty to file a fresh suit has a remedy of revision under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure but the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable. At the relevant stage when the present writ petition was filed before this Court no other proceeding was pending before any other Court is an undisputed fact. By virtue of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure though the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit but he chose to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Although the scope of civil suit and writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India stand at variance and the remedy of suit is wider but to say that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not available at all, such a plea after exchange of pleadings in the writ petition at this stage is wholly unjustified for the reason that the remedy of suit is merely an alternative remedy and does not exclude the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The position does not stand diluted even in a situation where suit is permitted to be withdrawn without liberty and remedy being available to the petitioner to file a revision. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, in order to support his contention has placed reliance upon a judgement in the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 4 SCC 166, wherein a similar situation was dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. (supra), the suit filed by the petitioner was also withdrawn during pendency of writ petition filed before the High Court and the suit though not pending at the stage when the writ petition came up for final hearing yet the High Court dismissed the writ petition in that case and the judgement in intra Court appeal was affirmed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in such a situation has held that once at the stage of final hearing of the writ petition, parallel proceeding of suit was not pending, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was very much available to the petitioner and could not be denied simply on the ground of suppression of the fact as regards filling of a civil suit. In the present case, at the time when the writ petition was filed before this Court, no other proceedings were pending, therefore, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very much available to the petitioner which cannot be refused on the strength of preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent subject of course to the scope of writ jurisdiction. Since no other proceedings at this stage are pending in any other forum and the petitioner has chosen the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the case cannot be straight away thrown out, the preliminary objection, in view of the case law cited above deserves to be rejected. Learned Counsel for the respondents lastly referred to the case law in the case of Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited, (2013) 1 SCC 625 and it is urged that Order 2 Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would certainly bar filing of the writ petition. The argument being misconceived is noted to be rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are not inclined to entertain the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent and the same is accordingly rejected. Pleadings have been exchanged, list the writ petition for hearing on merit in the next cause list.” 8. Sri Parihar has vehemently urged that firstly, there is an error apparent on the face of record inasmuch as, Hon’ble Judges who reserved the judgment and delivered it after about a month completely omitted to notice the order dated 29.10.2015 deciding the preliminary issue of the maintainability of the petition and this error has prejudiced the cause of the applicant. This error therefore, being apparent at the face of record, the final judgment dated 2.2.2016 deserves to be reviewed. 9. This error therefore, being apparent at the face of record, the final judgment dated 2.2.2016 deserves to be reviewed. 9. The second contention of Sri Parihar is that in the light of decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant petitioner, the cause of action in the writ petition was on a subsequent development of the rejection of the memorium dated 6.2.2009, which was not the cause in the suit, and therefore it could not be said that the writ petition had been filed on the same cause of action so as to bar the filing of the petition. As a corollary to the said argument, Sri Parihar also submitted that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to writ proceedings which are in the extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore,neither res judicata nor the principles of estoppel or the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 or any other principle would be attracted herein. He has then cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and another v. M/s. National Construction Company, Bombay and another, 1996 [14] LCD 555, to urge that the aforesaid principles have been enunciated and as such, the Division Bench has erred in dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable. The third decision relied upon by him is in the case of Kandapazha Nadar and others v. Chitraganiammal and others, (2007) 7 SCC 65 , to urge that the principles of res judicata will not apply and where the suit had been permitted to be withdrawn without adjudication on merits, the same does not amount to a decree under Section 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, hence the petitioner plaintiff is not debarred from filing a fresh writ petition. 10. Sri P.K. Khare on the other hand, has urged that on the principles of public policy once the suit had been withdrawn, then in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code read with Order 2 Rule 2 and the principles of public policy as enunciated by the Apex Court in several decisions, the present writ petition would be barred and would not be maintainable. He also submits that the disposal of the preliminary objection as urged by the petitioner, was not a final disposal of the writ petition and the writ petition had been entertained only with a view to be heard on merits. He therefore submits that there is no error apparent at the face of record so as to entertain this review application for setting aside the final judgment dated 2.2.2016. 11. We have considered the aforesaid submissions raised and the first issue is as to the impact of Order dated 29.10.2015 whereby the Division Bench had disposed of the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition. It is correct that the said order dated 29.1.2015 has been omitted to be mentioned in the final judgment dated 2.2.2016 and therefore, this error can be construed to be an error apparent on the face of record. It can also be construed to be a mistake of the Court but at the same time the final judgment does indicate that the issue of maintainability was again raised and has then been answered. The review application nowhere disputes about the issue of maintainability not having been again raised at the time of final hearing as well. The only presumption therefore that can be drawn is that the issue of maintainability has been re-agitated and then a decision has been rendered thereon. 12. It is in this background that we proceed further to examine the impact and the error which is being canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner applicant. This error in essence arises out of and relates to the question of maintainability of the writ petition. 13. We have been able to lay our hands on the three decisions of our Court that may be a pointer directly on the issue. The first is the Division Bench judgment in the case of Smt. Raisa Sultana Begam and others v. Abdul Qadir and others, 1966 AIR (Allahabad) 318. The effect of withdrawal of a suit by the plaintiff was discussed therein and it was held that permission to withdraw a suit was not required and the act of the plaintiff was sufficient to draw a curtain over the litigation at the instance of the plaintiff himself. The effect of withdrawal of a suit by the plaintiff was discussed therein and it was held that permission to withdraw a suit was not required and the act of the plaintiff was sufficient to draw a curtain over the litigation at the instance of the plaintiff himself. The permission to file a fresh suit was however not the issue therein and it was held that the withdrawal was complete as soon as the plaintiff expresses his desire to do so before the Court concerned. The issue as to whether a writ petition can be filed after the disposal of the suit came up in the case of Sheo Nath Dubey v. District Inspector of Schools, Mainpuri and others, 1985 UPLBEC 1374, where the suit had been dismissed for want of prosecution and applying the principles of Order 9 Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code the writ petition that had been filed, was dismissed on the ground of public policy. The third decision in issue which covers the present case on the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 read with Order 23 Rule 1, was on the doctrine of election and public policy namely, M/s. Akay Organics Private Limited v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission and others, (1992) 2 AWC 792. In that case, the petitioner had filed a writ petition for quashing a contract executed in favour of the respondent in the said writ petition. For the same relief, the petitioner had therein filed a suit in the Court of learned Civil Judge wherein an application was moved for withdrawal of the suit on the ground that the delay caused in hearing had frustrated the object the of suit. The learned Civil Judge passed the order dismissing the suit as withdrawn whereafter the writ petition was filed before the High Court. The Division Bench held as followed : “When the civil suit is withdrawn without permission to file the fresh suit, filing of the new suit is prohibited in view of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. Petitioner, in our opinion, has given up the remedy of civil suit, which was already availed of by him, without any justification. To entertain his writ petition, in these circumstances, would be against the public policy. The petitioner cannot be permitted to harass the party by changing the forum from one Court to another. Petitioner, in our opinion, has given up the remedy of civil suit, which was already availed of by him, without any justification. To entertain his writ petition, in these circumstances, would be against the public policy. The petitioner cannot be permitted to harass the party by changing the forum from one Court to another. As laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sheo Nath Dubey (supra), the sound exercise of judicial discretion is that the writ petition should not be entertained and should be rejected.” 14. However, while dismissing the writ petition, the Division Bench gave liberty to the petitioner plaintiff to file an application for recall of the order of withdrawal before the Civil Court itself. Applying the principles in the aforesaid decision in the present case that have been delineated hereinabove, leave no room for doubt that firstly, the petitioner who was the plaintiff was pursing his remedy before an appropriate forum. The very same issue of his punishment for the order dated 2.5.2006 and the rejection of appeal was the subject-matter of the suit. It is only the consequential rejection of the memorium which had also occurred during the pendency of the suit is being pleaded as a fresh cause of action. We are unable to agree with this proposition inasmuch as, the rejection of the memorium on 6.2.2009 was very much a cause that was available to the petitioner during the pendency of suit itself and which could have been made the subject-matter of challenge in the suit or the suit itself could have been sought to be withdrawn on this ground for which the permission could have or could not have been granted. The petitioner did not choose to bring this fact to the notice of the Civil Court in the application for withdrawal which was moved much after. The only reason to withdraw mentioned in the application dated 20.2.2010 was of some inadvertent omission in the pleading of the plaint without specifying anything. The absence of any mention of a fresh cause of action is therefore clearly evident and it is for this reason that that the Trial Court vide order dated 19.3.2010 came to the conclusion that no material has been placed before it so as to allow the filing of a fresh suit. The absence of any mention of a fresh cause of action is therefore clearly evident and it is for this reason that that the Trial Court vide order dated 19.3.2010 came to the conclusion that no material has been placed before it so as to allow the filing of a fresh suit. The order of the Trial Court was perfectly justified and in case the petitioner wanted to file a fresh suit, he ought to have challenged the order dated 19.3.2010 by way of a revision which he admittedly did not do nor the said order is under challenge before us in the said writ petition. 15. The impact of the order dated 19.3.2010 therefore clearly is that the petitioner had virtually burnt his boats may be on the legal advice given to him. The decision in the case of M/s. Akay Organics Private Limited (supra) as extracted hereinabove therefore does not allow the petitioner to file a fresh writ petition but at the same time the said decision permits the litigant to get his suit reopened. 16. There is another aspect which deserves mention namely that the petitioner in his writ petition in paragraph-28 and 29 has mentioned about the filing of the suit and its withdrawal but the petitioner neither filed the copy of the application nor the copy of the order of the trial Court in this regard. The writ petition was entertained but a prompt counter-affidavit was filed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India taking this preliminary objection way back in the year 2012 itself where the copy of the order of the trial Court was annexed. 17. Three years thereafter, the petitioner came with the supplementary-affidavit dated 11.8.2015 and filing a copy of the application whereby the permission has been sought for withdrawing the suit. Thus, this was not a case of pendency of the writ petition on the strength of a complete disclosure by the petitioner. Rather, such facts had been withheld and the petitioner had clearly tried to elect his own forum at will and took his chance for filing this writ petition on the pretext that his chances of success before the Civil Court would be frustrated. This approach of the petitioner of taking a better chance before the High Court therefore cannot be appreciated as an alternative before remedy after having withdrawn the suit in the circumstances as indicated above. This approach of the petitioner of taking a better chance before the High Court therefore cannot be appreciated as an alternative before remedy after having withdrawn the suit in the circumstances as indicated above. 18. Having said so, we find that the preliminary order dated 29.10.2015, which stands merged with the final order dated 2.2.2016 if is surviving and is being claimed to be a ground for review, then in that event the correctness of the order dated 29.10.2015 also deserves to be considered for review. The error is apparent on the face of record of the said order dated 29.10.2015 as well which has not discussed the relevant law on the subject as indicated above. Thus, there is an error apparent in the conclusions drawn in the order dated 29.10.2015. This Court therefore, would not review the final judgment dated 2.2.2016 so as to restore the incorrect position of law. The final judgment dated 2.2.2016 therefore rightly holds the writ petition to be not maintainable and this conclusion being supported in law as indicated above does not call for review on that ground. We would therefore refrain from reviewing the judgment dated 2.2.2016 on this ground. 19. The Division Bench, however at the same time has also proceeded to record its opinion on the merits of the claim as well. The Division Bench has categorically held that non-supply of the original document as alleged was not established as the Corporation did not possess the original documents. The complainant had not appeared in person and produced the documents rather, he declined to attend the departmental proceedings. The Court came to the conclusion that there was no procedural irregularity in the inquiry if the complainant had not appeared voluntarily. Thus, the decision on merits has been rendered on 2.2.2016 which does not disclose any such error apparent on the face of record in so far as the merits of the case are concerned. 20. We may further add to the aforesaid findings by referring to the orders passed on the memorium of the petitioner dated 6.2.2009. The Chairman while rejecting the memorium has held that the charges are proved not only on the complainant’s letter but have been proved on documentary and corroborative evidence. In such a situation, any withdrawal of the complaint as alleged by the petitioner, becomes immaterial. The Chairman while rejecting the memorium has held that the charges are proved not only on the complainant’s letter but have been proved on documentary and corroborative evidence. In such a situation, any withdrawal of the complaint as alleged by the petitioner, becomes immaterial. If the complainant had withdrawn himself, then he ought to have been produced by the petitioner to support his contention of withdrawal which was not done. The hand writing expert had given a detailed report. The standard of proof in departmental proceedings is not that of a criminal charge. The charge against the petitioner was of misappropriating policy holders’ money which was proved and therefore, the financial transactions were found to be clearly an outcome of the act of the petitioner which charge has been proved. In view of the gravity of such misconduct, the petitioner had been found to be guilty. Thus, there was no procedural irregularity and the procedure has been substantially complied with in respect of the charges which were obviously grave in nature. The judgment therefore, can be subjected to an appeal before a higher Court and cannot be reheard under the scope of review for all the aforesaid reasons. We, therefore, do not find any error apparent on the face of record so as to review the judgment as prayed for. The review application is accordingly rejected.