JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The petitioner is a Seasonal Collection Peon in Tehsil Bikapur, District Faizabad. He has instituted this writ proceeding for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the third respondent dated 17th May, 2010, whereby his claim for regularisation has been rejected. 2. This case has peculiar facts. Hence, the facts need to be stated in a little bit detail. 3. The petitioner was initially engaged as a Seasonal Collection Peon in the year 1974. In April, 1994 a seniority list of the Seasonal Collection Peons was issued wherein the petitioner’s name figured at Serial No. 2. 4. The grievance of the petitioner was that vide an order dated 30th November, 1994 his juniors Sri Suresh Chandra, Sri Sujauddin, Sri Keshav Ram, Sri Ram Lal and Sri Virendra Pratap Tiwari were regularised ignoring the claim of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner preferred a claim petition, being Claim Petition No. 2125 of 1998, in the State Public Services Tribunal. The claim petition was disposed of on 19th December, 2000 with a direction upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bikapur to consider the claim of the petitioner. In compliance thereof, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate vide his order dated 18th August, 2001 rejected the claim of the petitioner on the grounds that in the last four fasals his recovery was less than 70%, therefore, the Selection Committee was not satisfied with the work of the petitioner and he was overage as his age was more than 45 years. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred a writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 3770 (SS) of 2003. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 07th April, 2009 and the matter was remitted back to the competent authority to consider it afresh. On the second time, when the matter was reconsidered by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, he almost reiterated the same findings i.e. recovery of the petitioner in last four fasals was less than 70% and he is overage, and on these grounds rejected his claim vide order dated 07th May, 2009. 6. This order dated 07th May, 2009 was again challenged by the petitioner by means of Writ Petition No. 697 (SS) of 2010 (Sri Yamuna Prasad Dubey v. State of U.P. and others). 6. This order dated 07th May, 2009 was again challenged by the petitioner by means of Writ Petition No. 697 (SS) of 2010 (Sri Yamuna Prasad Dubey v. State of U.P. and others). The said writ petition was allowed by this Court vide order dated 23rd February, 2010, whereby the impugned order therein dated 07th May 2009 was quashed and the matter was remitted back again to the authority concerned with a direction to consider afresh in the light of the judgment of this Court in Vinay Kumar Upadhyaya v. State of U.P. and others, 2009(8) ADJ 465 . 7. In compliance with the said order of this Court, the impugned order dated 17th May, 2010 has been passed by the third respondent on the same grounds i.e. the petitioner’s recovery was less than 70%, therefore, his work was not satisfactory and he is overage. 8. A counter-affidavit has been filed wherein the same grounds, as mentioned in the impugned order, have been justified and except that no fresh facts have been mentioned. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the ground on which the petitioner’s claim has been rejected has already been set aside by this Court two times earlier and in the last judgment this Court has issued a direction to the authority to decide the matter in the light of the judgment in Vinay Kumar Upadhyaya (supra). He further submits that the impugned order indicates that the law laid down in Vinay Kumar Upadhyaya (supra) has not been adverted to at all by the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court to the averments made in paragraph-5 of the the writ petition, wherein the petitioner has stated that his work and conduct has always been satisfactory and no memo was issued to him regarding bad work or conduct. 11. Learned Standing Counsel has justified the grounds mentioned in the impugned order. He submits that the petitioner is admittedly overage, so he cannot be regularised. 12. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. The experience reveals that the authority concerned has proceeded with a premeditated mindset. The petitioner, who is a Class-IV employee, was compelled to file a claim petition in the year 1998. 12. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 13. The experience reveals that the authority concerned has proceeded with a premeditated mindset. The petitioner, who is a Class-IV employee, was compelled to file a claim petition in the year 1998. His grievance was that his five juniors, whose names he has mentioned in the writ petition, have been regularised in the year 1994 without considering the case of the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner’s name was at Serial No. 2 in the seniority list of April, 1994 has not been denied in the counter-affidavit. In compliance of the order of the Tribunal, when an order was passed by the authority on 18th August, 2001, this Court vide order dated 07th April, 2009 set aside that order and has noted that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the rejection of the petitioner’s claim only on the ground of overage was not justified and as on the date when his juniors were regularised, the petitioner was admittedly within the age limit. This Court in the order dated 07th April, 2009 held as under: “Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is provided that the case of the petitioner shall be considered afresh, taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner was engaged on the post in question in the year 1974 and persons junior to him were regularised. It is clarified that in case, the petitioner is within age limit on the date when the services of his juniors were regularized, but his claim has been rejected only on the ground of overage, though the petitioner submits that he is within age limit, as prescribed under the Rules, the authority concerned shall re-consider the case of the petitioner for regularization.” 14. In spite of clear finding that the issue relating to age was not a valid ground, on remand the authority concerned has reiterated the same finding that the petitioner is overage with reference to some Government orders. The authority concerned has also reiterated its ground of recovery that it was less than 70%. The said order passed by the authority concerned has again been set aside by this Court and now in the impugned order again the authority concerned has reiterated the same grounds. The authority concerned has also reiterated its ground of recovery that it was less than 70%. The said order passed by the authority concerned has again been set aside by this Court and now in the impugned order again the authority concerned has reiterated the same grounds. In case the earlier orders of this Court were contrary to the rules, it was always open to the respondents to file a special appeal against the orders of the learned Single Judge. In both the previous writ petitions, which were allowed by this Court, the authority has complied with the order without any demeanour. If the authorities were of the view that the order of this Court was contrary to the statutory rules or the Government order, they could have filed appeal against the said order, but in the garb that the Court has directed him to decide the matter in accordance with law, the directions and findings of the Court cannot be ignored. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, (2007) 1 SCC 689, has considered the somewhat similar facts and observed that even if the order of the Court is wrong and illegal, that is binding on the parties unless that order is challenged in the superior Court. The Supreme Court has further held that if this principle is not adhered to by the respondents and the State, there will be end of the rule of the law. Paragraphs-32 and 33 of the judgment, being relevant for the purpose, are extracted herein-below: “32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent Court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an order passed by a Court of law is not complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of the rule of law. If a party against whom such order is made has grievance, the only remedy available to him is to challenge the order by taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the directions on a specious plea that no such directions could have been issued by the Court. In our judgment, upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would seriously affect and impair administration of justice. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying with the directions on a specious plea that no such directions could have been issued by the Court. In our judgment, upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would seriously affect and impair administration of justice. The argument of the Board, therefore, has no force and must be rejected. 33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged.” 16. All the three impugned orders, referred to above, clearly demonstrate that the authorities have not taken pain to look into the judgments of this Court and the same grounds have been reiterated in all the impugned orders mentioned herein-above. Such adamant attitude of the authority concerned is highly deprecated. 17. The Supreme Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board (supra) has taken the judicial notice of the adamant attitude of some officials who take same view in spite of the judgment of the Court. 18. Such adamant attitude of the authority concerned is highly deprecated. 17. The Supreme Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board (supra) has taken the judicial notice of the adamant attitude of some officials who take same view in spite of the judgment of the Court. 18. The issue with regard to 70% recovery has been set at rest long back in the year 2002 in the case of Dinesh Kumar Asthana v. Collector, Azamgarh and others, (2001) 1 UPLBEC 867 . In the said case, the Court has considered the provision of Rule-5 of the Uttar Pradesh Collection Amins’ Service Rules, 1974. Relevant part of the judgment is extracted herein-below: “Necessary pleadings on this aspect are wanting. Even the Counter-affidavit does not disclose that no person in the list prepared in the year 1993 has been regularised whose recovery was below the prescribed limit or that all persons above such regularized persons were inefficient and or had poor efficiency on comparison. This Court has no means to find out whether the recovery in a particular year with respect to the petitioner was low for reason other than this own efficiency. It is very relevant circumstance while considering the efficiency of Seasonal Collection Amin. For example, recovery is not possible beyond a certain limit for various factors and reasons like-orders from Court, the total extent of recovery to be made in one’s area and/or whether Government itself kept recovery in abeyance due to famine, flood, drought etc. These will be relevant consideration to be taken into account and a Seasonal Collection Amin, being put to sufferance for reasons beyond his control, cannot be non-suited for low recovery as it does not reflect at all upon his efficiency.” 19. The judgment in Dinesh Kumar Asthana (supra) has been consistently followed by this Court in the cases of Brijesh Kumar v. Collector/District Magistrate, Mainpuri and others, 2001(3) ESC 1325; Suresh Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(1) ADJ 655 ; Molhey Ram v. State of U.P. and others, 2013 (31) LCD 2364; Ramveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ-A No. 27358 of 2004. 20. Learned Standing Counsel has failed to point out any other law to the notice of the Court on this subject which has taken a contrary view. 20. Learned Standing Counsel has failed to point out any other law to the notice of the Court on this subject which has taken a contrary view. Thus, it is established that issue with regard to 70% recovery is well-settled in the year 2001 itself and it is a matter of regret that the revenue authorities of the State are totally oblivious of the law laid down by this Court. 21. It is well-settled law that the judgment of the highest Court of the State is binding on all the authorities, tribunals and the subordinate Courts in the State irrespective of the fact whether they are party in the case or not. In case the High Court lays down a law, it is binding on all the authorities irrespective of the fact, as mentioned above, whether they were party in the writ petition or not. The said law has been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1962 SC 1893 . 22. Pertinently, while remitting the matter, this Court had issued a direction to the authority concerned to take a decision in the light of the judgment in the case of Vinay Kumar Upadhayay (supra). In the said case, the Court has considered the issue with regard to 70% recovery. The impugned order clearly indicates that the authority concerned has not considered the judgment of Vinay Kumar Upadhayay (supra), wherein “satisfactory service” in the “last four fasals” has been considered in great detail. The said fact clearly indicates that the authority has passed the impugned order either with a closed premeditated mind or with an adamant attitude. In either of the way it is clear that the conduct of the authority concerned borders the contempt of this Court and his approach was completely casual. Such type of functioning of the State functionaries is one of the reasons of pendency of the cases in this Court where a Class-IV employee is compelled to file three writ petitions in this Court. 23. Recently, the Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has laid down the law that when the Court should impose the cost to check the frivolous writ petitions and the orders which are cause of explosion of dockets of the Courts. 23. Recently, the Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , has laid down the law that when the Court should impose the cost to check the frivolous writ petitions and the orders which are cause of explosion of dockets of the Courts. The relevant paragraph, being paragraph-191 of the judgment, is quoted below: “191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted with frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill-considered claims. One needs to keep in mind that in the process of litigation, there is an innocent sufferer on the other side of every irresponsible and senseless claim. He suffers long-drawn anxious periods of nervousness and restlessness, whilst the litigation is pending without any fault on his part. He pays for the litigation from out of his savings (or out of his borrowings) worrying that the other side may trick him into defeat for no fault of his. He spends invaluable time briefing counsel and preparing them for his claim. Time which he should have spent at work, or with his family, is lost, for no fault of his. Should a litigant not be compensated for what he has lost for no fault? The suggestion to the legislature is that a litigant who has succeeded must be compensated by the one who has lost. The suggestion to the legislature is to formulate a mechanism that anyone who initiates and continues a litigation senselessly pays for the same. It is suggested that the legislature should consider the introduction of a “Code of Compulsory Costs”.” 24. In view of the above, I find that the impugned order dated 17th May, 2010 passed by the third respondent is unsustainable and it is accordingly quashed. A direction is issued to the respondents that the petitioner shall be treated to be regularised from the date when his juniors have been regularised. The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits treating him as a regular employee. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the second respondent to pass the orders in terms of the directions of this Court within three weeks from the date of communication of this order. 25. The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits treating him as a regular employee. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the second respondent to pass the orders in terms of the directions of this Court within three weeks from the date of communication of this order. 25. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that ordinarily the Court should not pass the order itself and the matter should be remanded back to the authority concerned to pass the order in the light of the observations made in the judgment or in accordance with law. Having found favour with the peculiar facts of this case, as noted by this Court in some petitions earlier, the Court can itself pass the order in some event. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another v. K.S. Jagannathan and another, (1986) 2 SCC 679 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that in some peculiar cases instead of remanding the case to the authority concerned the High Court itself can pass the order. 26. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 27. Insofar as the cost is concerned, since a poor Class-IV employee has been dragged in litigation to this Court and the Public Services Tribunal four times without any fault only on account of the fact that respondents/State functionaries have disobeyed the directions of this Court and have repeatedly passed same order three times, I find that the ends of justice would be met by imposing a cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the State. The cost shall be paid by the State. It is open to the State to recover the said amount from the officials, who have passed the same order repeatedly.