JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard Shri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 03.12.2016, passed by the Prescribed Authority / Civil Judge ( Junior Division), West, Ballia in Misc. Case No.88 of 2016 ( Manoj Kumar Vs. Shiva Devi and others), arising out of an objection under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC read with Section 34 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and Rule 22 of the Rules framed thereunder. 3. The facts of the case briefly stated are that Jagarnath Prasad and Raghunath Prasad filed a release application, under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 for release of a shop in the tenancy of one Gopal Ram. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority but the order was reversed in appeal. 4. The consequential writ petition was allowed and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was affirmed. 5. The Special Leave Petition filed before the Apex Court was dismissed on 27.09.2016. 6. In proceedings, under Section 23 of the Rent Control Act initiated for implementation of the order of eviction passed against the tenant, the petitioner filed the objection aforemenioned giving rise to Misc. Case No.8 of 2008. 7. The case of the petitioner is that the eviction order passed against Gopal Ram ( since deceased) and represented by his sons, Bhola Prasad and Kunnu Prasad, was given effect on 29.10.2016, when the tenants vacated the shop in question. Thereafter, one of the co-landlords' namely, Ramji Prasad executed a fresh tenancy in favour of the petitioner on 03.11.2016. 8. It is, therefore, contended that the execution case has been rendered infructuous, in as much as, the tenants, who had been ordered to be evicted had vacated the property in question. 9. Subsequently, a fresh tenancy has been created in favour of the petitioner and therefore, he cannot be evicted in the execution case, which stands rendered infructuous. 10. The factum of a fresh tenancy having been created stood admitted by the affidavit filed by the co-landlord, Ramji Prasad in the misc. case. 11. Elaborating further, it has been submitted that the objection of the petitioner has been rejected holding him to be a trespasser. 10. The factum of a fresh tenancy having been created stood admitted by the affidavit filed by the co-landlord, Ramji Prasad in the misc. case. 11. Elaborating further, it has been submitted that the objection of the petitioner has been rejected holding him to be a trespasser. Since the petitioner has been held to be a trespasser, he cannot be evicted in execution of a decree in a case to which he was not a party. A trespassers can only be dispossessed in accordance with law. 12. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another (1997) 3 SCC 694 , especially paragraph 9 thereof and Uma Shanker and others Vs. Sarabjeet and another (1996) 2 SCC 371 . 13. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the record. 14. At the very outset, it would be relevant to note that the petitioner, Manoj Kumar, is the son of Bhola Prasad, one of the sons of Gopal Ram, the original tenant. 15. The case of the petitioner is that the order of eviction passed on the release application filed by Jagarnath Prasad and Raghunath Prasad was duly implemented and the tenants, Bhola Prasad and Kunnu Prasad, sons of Gopal Ram (since deceased) had relinquished possession over the shop in question on 29.10.2016. 16. The order of eviction had been passed in favour of persons, who had filed the release application, now represented by their heirs. There is nothing on record to show that the possession was handed over to the decree holders. The petitioner alleges that the tenants, judgment debtors, had handed over possession to one Ramji Prasad, who is allegedly a co-landlord and this fact as also the fact of creation of new tenancy in favour of the petitioner has been admitted by him in his affidavit filed in the Misc. Case. This contention in my considered opinion is not liable to be accepted. There was no decree in favour of Ramji Prasad, although, he is alleged to be a co-landlord. He could not have, in my considered opinion, accorded satisfaction of the decree for eviction against the tenants. 17. Case. This contention in my considered opinion is not liable to be accepted. There was no decree in favour of Ramji Prasad, although, he is alleged to be a co-landlord. He could not have, in my considered opinion, accorded satisfaction of the decree for eviction against the tenants. 17. It is also relevant to note that the Prescribed Authority, in the impugned order, has recorded that an application filed by Ramji Prasad and one Draupati Devi for impleadment in the proceedings arising out of a release application, under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, had been dismissed. 18. It is therefore, clear that Ramji Prasad was not a party in the proceedings for release of the shop in question. He was, therefore not the decree holder and therefore, could not have accorded satisfaction of the decree, which was in favour of other persons. 19. The allegation that Ramji Prasad, to whom possession of the disputed shop is alleged to have been handed over, was a co-landlord is an issue which, in my considered opinion, was beyond the scope of the execution proceedings. The executing Court is not required to go behind the decree to ascertain as to who was the beneficiary, there under. A Court, called upon to execute a decree, is merely required to ensure that execution is sought on or on behalf of the decree holders. 20. Besides, the decree holders have not accepted the contention that the decree had been complied with, voluntarily, by the tenants. This coupled with the fact that the petitioner is the son of one of the judgment debtors, the order impugned, in my considered opinion, cannot be faulted with. 21. The second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has been held to be an unauthorized occupant by the impugned order and therefore, separate proceedings are required to be initiated for his eviction. This contention is also not liable to be accepted. The decree would stands satisfied only in case, the decree holders had been put in possession. This, as noticed above, is not the case pleaded. 22. Moreover, the provisions contained in Section 23 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are quite categorical and provide that an order of eviction is to be executed against a tenant as also against any other person found in actual occupation of the premises, in question. This, as noticed above, is not the case pleaded. 22. Moreover, the provisions contained in Section 23 of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are quite categorical and provide that an order of eviction is to be executed against a tenant as also against any other person found in actual occupation of the premises, in question. The petitioner, in my considered opinion will be covered by the words any other person found in actual occupation and therefore, the contention that separate proceedings for his eviction are liable to be drawn, cannot be accepted, especially, since the petitioner is the sons of one of the judgment debtor. 23. The judgment in the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary cited by counsel for the petitioner, especially paragraph 9 thereof, is to the effect that a person resisting an order of eviction and who is a stranger to the decree, can invoke the provisions contained in order 21 Rule 97 CPC. In case, such an objection is filed, the same must be considered and decided. 24. On the strength of this authority, it has been submitted that there has been no adjudication in the instant case and the objection has been turned down without requisite adjudication. 25. I do not find any substance in this submission. The objection filed by the petitioner has been duly considered and in view of the above discussion, the same has been turned down for cogent reasons. 26. In so far as, the judgment in the case of Uma Shanker is concerned, in paragraph 8 thereof, it has been held that if there is a subsequent dispossession, after a decree for possession has been complied with, a suit to obtain possession is not barred simply because an earlier decree obtained by the plaintiff for possession has been complied with. This judgment has been cited in support of the argument that since the petitioner was held to be a trespassers by the order impugned, fresh legal proceedings were liable to be initiated, before he could be dispossessed. This aspect has already been considered by me in the preceding paragraph of this judgment and it has been held by me that the no separate suit is required to be filed for evicting the petitioner. 27. This aspect has already been considered by me in the preceding paragraph of this judgment and it has been held by me that the no separate suit is required to be filed for evicting the petitioner. 27. Besides, in my considered opinion, the part of the impugned order, wherein it has been observed that the status of the petitioner would be that of a trespasser is a mere passing observation. As already noticed above, the petitioner is the son of Bhola Prasad, one of the judgment debtors'. 28. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is found to be devoid of merits and the order impugned calls for no interference. 29. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed.