JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. -- Heard Shri Surendra Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri L.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The preliminary objection of the caveator is that this petition, initially filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was subsequently controverted to one under Article 227 and, therefore, a better affidavit should have been filed in support thereof. 3. I do not find any substance in this objection. The same is over-ruled. 4. The instant writ petition arises out of a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, filed by the respondent, for release of a shop in the tenancy of the petitioner. 5. The release application was filed on the ground that the room/shop in question is part of a Trust, created by a trust deal executed by one Kaushalya Devi in the year 1943. 6. The religious activities in the temple could be performed by Kaushalya Devi herself and by Rajwanti during their life time; and after the death of Kaushalya Devi, by Rajwanti alone and, thereafter, by one Kanhaiya Lal, their relative as per the deed itself. 7. The Seva and Bhog, after the death of Kaushalya Devi, was performed by Rajwanti. Kanhaiya Lal who was to manage the temple after Rajwanti, left Bhadohi and settled elsewhere. Therefore afresh trust deed was executed by Rajwanti, providing that after her death her brother Mata Prasad would perform Seva, Pooja etc and thereafter, by his sons would perform the Seva etc. It was specifically provided that the sons of the other brother of Rajwanti, namely Vishwanath, would have no concern with Pooja, Seva etc. 8. It was also alleged that Rajwanti had let out the room in question to the petitioner. The sons of the sarvarakar required the shop in question for their setting up a business and also that the building in question was dilapidated and required reconstruction. It was therefore, liable to be released also on the ground of bona fide need. 9. The release application was contested by the petitioner, alleging that the property was a public charitable trust. The provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were therefore, not applicable to it, the respondent was never appointed as the Sarvarakar of this public trust and, therefore, could not maintain the release application. 9. The release application was contested by the petitioner, alleging that the property was a public charitable trust. The provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were therefore, not applicable to it, the respondent was never appointed as the Sarvarakar of this public trust and, therefore, could not maintain the release application. The landlord tenant relationship was denied and it was also alleged that no rent was aver paid to the respondent/landlord. 10. The Prescribed Authority by its judgment and order dated 20.07.2016 rejected the release application on the ground that the property in question was a religious institution and, therefore in view of Section 2 (1) (bb) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the same was exempted from the provisions of the Act. It was also held that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. The property belonged to the deity and, therefore, the release application could be filed on behalf of the deity alone. It was also held that the property in question is not in a dilapidated condition. 11. The appellate Court vide order dated 06.10.2016 set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and allowed the appeal as also the release application. It is this order, which is impugned in this writ petition. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no evidence on record to establish that the property in question is a Private Trust. He submits that it is a Public Trust. He has further submitted that there is no evidence on record to establish a tenant-landlord relationship between the parties. 13. Elaborating further, it has been submitted that the respondent was never appointed Sarvarakar. He submits that the impugned order is vitiated because it records that the various deeds have been examined by the appellate Court. In fact only one deed was filed on record and, therefore, the finding returned is perverse. It is also submitted that the deed available on record, did not establish that the property in question belongs to a Private Trust. 14. Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has supported the impugned order. 15. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 16. The first question for consideration is whether the property in question is a Private or a Public Trust. 17. 14. Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has supported the impugned order. 15. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 16. The first question for consideration is whether the property in question is a Private or a Public Trust. 17. The Prescribed Authority found it to be a Public Charitable Institution while the appellate Court has come to the conclusion that it is a Private Trust. 18. The appellate Court has considered this aspect elaborately. It has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Radhakanta Deb Vs. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, AIR 1981 Orissa, 798 which has laid down guidelines for ascertaining as to whether a temple is a private or a public temple, especially, when no document is available to prove the nature of the endowment. 19. Referring to the deed available on record, the appellate Court has come to the conclusion that it contains nothing which would indicate that the general public had any right to offer prayers in the temple in question, as a matter of right. 20. It has been submitted that various deeds in this regard are mentioned in the impugned order, there was only one deed available on record, and, therefore, the finding returned is perverse. 21. In view of the submission, I have perused the deed itself, which has been filed on record and upon such perusal I agree with the finding given by the court below that it contains no recital which would lead to a conclusion that there was any intention to create a Public Charitable Trust. 22. One of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Radhakanta (supra) is that where evidence is available to show that the founder retains control in the management of the temple belonging to the founder, such an endowment was of a private nature. This is clearly established from a bare reading of the deed available on record and, therefore, the finding returned by the appellate Court can no manner to be said to be perverse. 23. Although, it is alleged that several deeds were mentioned in the release application but only one deed was filed on record, it appears that the observation of the court below to several deeds appears to be a typographical error. 23. Although, it is alleged that several deeds were mentioned in the release application but only one deed was filed on record, it appears that the observation of the court below to several deeds appears to be a typographical error. A finding returned upon consideration of the evidence available on record cannot be said to be perverse, especially where the finding returned is not one which no prudent person could have arrived at. 24. As already noticed above, the finding that has been returned by the Court below is a cogent finding recorded upon due consideration of the deed available on record read in conjunction with the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Radhakanta (supra), the submissions to the contrary made by counsel for the petitioner therefore, cannot be accepted. 25. The deed available on record specifically mentions that Mata Prasad, the brother of Rajwanti, one of the original founders of the trust, had clearly laid down that after her death, the temple would be managed by her brother Mata Prasad and, thereafter by his sons and that the sons of her other brother Vishwanath would have no concern with the same. 26. In this connection it would further be relevant to note that although the title of the respondent/landlord has been specifically denied by the petitioner, there is nothing in either the written statement or the evidence filed by the petitioner and his witnesses to indicate as to who is the landlord. 27. On a pointed query from counsel for the petitioner in this regard, he has submitted that the respondent was not the landlord and, therefore, no rent was paid or was payable to him. It is the petitioner who is performed Pooja, Seva etc. in the temple and, therefore, he has acquired title to the shop in question. 28. This submission by itself shows the mala fidies on the part of the petitioner. He does not claim to be the owner of the property in question. On the contrary he admits having been inducted as a tenant by Rajwanti, yet, he has not stated as to who is the owner and landlord thereof. 29. Moreover, the deed available on record shows that after Rajwanti, the temple was to be managed by her brother Mata Prasad. The release application was filed by the son of Mata Prasad. On the contrary he admits having been inducted as a tenant by Rajwanti, yet, he has not stated as to who is the owner and landlord thereof. 29. Moreover, the deed available on record shows that after Rajwanti, the temple was to be managed by her brother Mata Prasad. The release application was filed by the son of Mata Prasad. The deed also provided that after Mata Prasad, his sons would be entrusted with the duty of performing Pooja, Seva etc., in the temple. It is also not disputed that the shop/room in question is part of the building where the temple is situated. 30. Although, it has not been specifically stated, yet from the perusal of the affidavits of the petitioner and his witnesses as also the written statement, it emerges that by implication, it has been admitted that the respondent was the title holder inasmuch as it was stated that the respondent was interested in getting the shop vacated and, thereafter selling the temple and settling in Varanasi, where his brother residing. It was also the case of the petitioner that all the brothers were not parties in the proceedings and, therefore, the same was not maintainable. By stating that the respondent wanted to sell the property including the temple in question indicates that the petitioner accepted the title of the respondent to the property in question at least as a co-owner. There is no question of a person selling some property unless he is the owner, thereof. 31. The court below has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sri Ram Mohan Baijpai Vs. Vth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others reported in 1980, ARC 279, wherein it has been held that the need of a Sarvarakar of a Private Trust should be taken as the need of the deity installed in a temple. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not produced this judgment to show, that the same has been misread or misinterpreted. Neither has anything been submitted in this regard. Reliance upon this judgment therefore, by the court below, cannot be faulted with. 32. The appellate Court has also held that there is no material available on record to show that during the pendency of the release application, any effort was made by the petitioner to look for alternative accommodation. Neither has anything been submitted in this regard. Reliance upon this judgment therefore, by the court below, cannot be faulted with. 32. The appellate Court has also held that there is no material available on record to show that during the pendency of the release application, any effort was made by the petitioner to look for alternative accommodation. It has therefore decided the issue of comparative hardship in favour of respondent/landlord. 33. In view of the above discussion, this court finds the view taken by the Court below that the property in question was a Private Trust and therefore, not beyond the ambit of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, is not vitiated in any manner. 34. Besides except bald allegations, no evidence has been filed by the petitioner either before this Court or before the courts below, to show that the property in question belonged to a Public Trust. 35. On the question of bona fide need, the court below has believed the case of the landlord on the basis of evidence adduced by him. The evidence adduced by the petitioner was only to the effect that the landlord was a propertied person possessing a large number of properties. This stand of the petitioner was devoid of specifics and, therefore, even the finding on the question of bona fide need, calls for no interference. 36. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is devoid of merits. It is accordingly dismissed.