ORDER 1. These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the decree holder is directed against the order dated 1.10.2015 passed in respective Execution Case No.13-A/2015 and 5-A/2015; whereby, the Executing Court has entertained the objection raised by respondent Debtor vide application under Order 21 rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. As evident from the record that, a suit for eviction by present petitioner was compromised and a compromise decree was passed on 30.1.2016 in Writ Petition No.18844/2015 in the following terms : **1- izfroknh] oknh dks oknxzLr ifjlj ds mi;ksx ,oa miHkksx ds fy, {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa ,d gtkj #i;s izfrekg tuojh 2006 ls oknh dks vnk dj ikorh jlhn izkIRk djsxkA 2- izfroknh] fdjk;snkjh Lkky dk fjDr vkf/kiR; oknh dh fyf[kr lwpuk ij oknh dks Hkou fuekZ.k djus ds rhl fnu iwoZ fjDr dj lkSaisxkA 3- ;fn le;kof/k esa izfroknh fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr ds lqiqnZ ugha djrk rks oknh U;k;ky; dh dafMdk vuqlkj oknxzLr ifjlj dk fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr djsxkA vkSj iqu% uohu vuqca/k ds vUrxZr nqdku izkIr djus dk vf/kdkj ugh jgsxkA 4- oknh fookfnr ifjlj dk uofuekZ.k izkjaHk djus dh fnukad ls vkB&nl ekg 'kkWfix dkWEiysDl dk uofuekZ.k iwjk djsxkA 5- oknh uofuekZ.k ds i'pkr uofufeZr 'kkWfix dkWEiysDl esa ls ,d nqdku izfroknh dks uohu fdjk;snkj vuqca/k varxZr rRle; izpfyr nj ij cM+k cktkj esu jksM ls yxh gqbZ izfroknh dks fdjk;s ij nsxkA** And in Writ Petition No.18849/2015 in the following terms : 1- izfroknh oknh }kjk 'kkWfix dkEiysDl fuekZ.k dh vko';drk dks Lohdkj djrk gS og oknh dks fyf[kr lwpuk ij Hkou fuekZ.k djus ds 30 fnu iwoZ fjDr vf/kiR; oknh dks lkSai nsxkA 2- izfroknh le;kof/k esa fjDr vkf/kiR; oknh dks ugha lkSairk gS rks oknh U;k;ky; esa fu”dklu dk;Zokgh }kjk fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr dj ldsxkA vkSj izfroknh iqu% oknxzLr nqdku fdjk;s ij izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugh gksxkA 3- oknh oknxzLr ifjlj dk uofuekZ.k izkajEHk djus ds fnukad ls 9 ls 10 eghus esa 'kkWfix dkEiysDl dk fuekZ.k djsxkA 4- uofuekZ.k i'pkr 'kkWfix dkWEiysDl esa oknh izfroknh dks uohu HkkM+snkjh vuqca/k ds vUrxZr rRle; izpfyr nj ij cM+k cktkj esu jksM ls yxh gqbZ ,d nqdku fdjk;s ij nsxkA 5- izfroknh ,d gtkj #i;s izfrekg {kfr iwfrZ jkf'k tuojh 2006 ls oknh dks vnk djrk jgsxkA** 3. That, there being non-adherance to the terms of the decree in not vacating the premises within 30 days from the date of construction of complex, decree holder brought an execution proceedings in the terms of the decree. The grievance of the petitioner is that instead of executing the decree in its own terms, the Executing Court has entertained objection raised by the judgment debtor which tantamount to going behind the decree. 4. Though elaborate submissions were made by both parties against and in support of the course adhered to by the Executing Court. The decision, however, would turn on the construction of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 18 of M.P. Accommodation Act, 1961. To cut it short the same has been elaborately discussed in Ghanshyam Hazarimal v. Nathamal Laxminarayan [ 1975 MPLJ 509 ], wherein, while relying on the decisions by the Supreme Court and by our High Court it is held : “9. It is plain from the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 18 that the right of re-entry is given to the tenant as a concession on the fulfilment of the conditions precedent, namely, that the tenant must deliver possession of the accommodation of the landlord on or before the dates specified in the decree. Hargovind v. Smt. Sunder Bai (supra). If the tenant fails to do so, he forfeits the right of re-entry. Babulal and another v. Mahabir Pershad (supra). The provision of section 18(3) has to be construed strictly and the tenant planding that privilege, must fulfil it exactly. After all, the right of re-entry is given to him as a concession on the fulfilment of the condition precedent. 10. In Ram Nath v. Ram Nath Chittar Mal (supra), their Lordships, while interpreting the analogous provision contained in section 15(3) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, observed as follows:- “Under that section they had the right to elect and did elect to get possession after re-building; this possession was to be given by the landlords to the tenants within a reasonable time and six months period was fixed by consent between the parties and the rent, if the respondents were not put into possession on the same terms as before, was to be settled by Court and that is what was done under the terms and the consent decree. The applications for being put into possession which were filed by the respondents were really under section 15(3) of the Act. As the respondents did not deliver possession to the appellants on or before the dates specified in the decree the provisions of section 15 contained in sub-section (3) of that Act were not available to them and they were not entitled to be put into possession as prayed by them.” 11. No doubt, the word “Court” appearing in section 18(1) means not only the Court trying the suit, but also the appellant Court. It may well be that the land lord's suit under section 12(1) (h) may fail in the Court of first instance, but succeed in appeal. All that the section provides is that the “Court” while making an order for eviction under section 12 (1)(g)(h) shall ascertain whether the tenant elects to be placed in possession. When the suit is decreed by the trial Court, that Court has the duty to ascertain the fact, and if the tenant so elects, to specity a date by which he should deliver possession. But, if the suit is decreed on appeal the appellant Court has to perform that duty. 12. The Act, however, nowhere provides that when the tenant does not abide by his election and files, instead, an appeal against the decree, the appellant Court should specify another date. The tenant has to make a choice. If the Appeal No.151 of 1967 Vijay Kumar and others v. Sharimati Mahadevi and others decided on 21.8.1971, in similar circumstances, I had occasion to observed : “I refrain from making any direction under section 18(1) of the Act. The Act nowhere contemplates that an appellate Court in hearing an appeal against a decree under section 12(1)(h) should make a fresh direction in terms of section 18(1). Such a direction was made by the learned Additional District Judge and the matter must rest at that.” I find no reason to take a different view now.” 5. In view whereof and the law laid down in Ghanshyam Hazarimal (supra), the course adhered to by the Executing Court in entertaining the objections by the tenant cannot be given the stamp of approval and is set aside. The tenant having not stood by the terms of compromise, he forfeits his right of re-entry. 6. In the result both the petitions are allowed in above terms. The tenant having not stood by the terms of compromise, he forfeits his right of re-entry. 6. In the result both the petitions are allowed in above terms. No costs.